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Dawes and the 1924 Republican Vice Presidential Nomination

"You will easily understand that I did not expect this nomination," declared Charles G. Dawes as he greeted approximately 5,000 people who had gathered in front of his old home in Marietta, Ohio, to give him a rousing ovation.[1] On the preceding evening, June 12, 1924, the Republicans, in the final session of their short, three day convention at Cleveland, had nominated him as their candidate for the vice presidency. The story behind Dawes's nomination was a tangled one; it sharply contrasted with the account of how President Calvin Coolidge's nomination was smoothly engineered. Frank W. Stearns, the Boston dry goods merchant who was the President's close friend and sponsor, understated the situation as he confided to his brother-in-law after the Convention, "There was a mix-up over the Vice Presidency."[2]

The principal nomination, Coolidge's, was so taken for granted that it aroused little interest.[3] It had been apparent for some time that he had gained undisputed control of his party since President Harding's death the previous year.[4] William Butler, a Massachusetts textile industrialist whose avocation was politics, C. Bascom Slemp, the President's secretary who was the most influential Southern Republican, and Stearns comprised the Coolidge triumvirate at Cleveland. Through these managers, he dominated the arrangements, appointments, and platform of the Convention.[5] Butler became widely known as Coolidge's first lieutenant; re-

1 *Marietta Register*, June 13, 1924.
2 Stearns to Atherton Clark, June 14, 1924, quoted in Claude M. Fuess, *Calvin Coolidge: The Man from Vermont*, Boston, 1940, 346, footnote.
3 William Allen White, *A Puritan in Babylon*, New York, 1938, 301.
4 *Ibid.*, 295–296.
5 *Ibid.*, 299.

porters depended upon him for news and delegates looked to him for orders.[6]

In the matter of the vice presidential nomination, however, the Administration forces could not maintain their influence. Prior to the Convention, Coolidge had "authorized the positive statement" that he would take no hand in the selection of the candidate.[7] Although this suggested personal detachment, the state of affairs in 1924 placed special significance on the vice presidency. Coolidge's unexpected accession to the presidency, still fresh in the mind of everyone, emphasized the importance of selecting a competent man for the second ranking post. In addition, there was the threat of the Senate having to choose the Vice President, and, in effect, the President, because of a deadlock created by the Progressive Party in both the Electoral College and the House of Representatives.[8] The question of the vice presidential nomination was therefore a grave one; various Republican leaders said it was of more importance "than at any time in recent history."[9]

Coolidge himself was not as uninterested in the matter as he indicated. In early May, his personal envoy had asked Frank O. Lowden, former Governor of Illinois, to join the President as his running mate. Lowden emphatically refused at that time and many times before the Convention opened.[10] Coolidge later expressed interest in having Senator William Borah of Idaho fill the post; this overture also drew a definitely negative reply.[11] During the Convention itself, Butler, Slemp, and Stearns kept the President informed of developments through private telephone and telegraph wires connected with the White House; they sought his advice on crucial matters, including the vice presidential question.[12]

The contest for second place, none the less, was the only business of the Convention allowing free play.[13] On the eve of the

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6 *Ibid.*, 300. White, who reported the Convention, noted that even before the opening session, orders came from Butler's room "with a certain tone of authority as from the general superintendent's office or the head of the sales department." W. A. White, *Politics: The Citizen's Business*, New York, 1924, 28.

7 *New York Times*, June 7, 1924.

8 This possibility was widely discussed as early as the first part of April. *Ibid.*, April 7, 1924.

9 *Ibid.*, April 14, 1924.

10 William T. Hutchinson, *Lowden of Illinois*, Chicago, 1957, II, 536.

11 Claudius O. Johnson, *Borah of Idaho*, New York, 1936, 300.

12 *New York Times*, June 9, 1924.

13 White, *A Puritan in Babylon*, 301.

Convention's opening day, practically all discussion among the delegates centered on this subject.[14]

In the early spring of 1924 attention had focused on Dawes as a likely candidate for the second highest office in the land. He was by no means unknown to the public—he had gained national prominence as the outspoken defender of those who had directed the war effort in France, as the Chicago banker who served as the first Director of the Federal Budget, and as Chairman of the Experts' Committee appointed by the War Reparations Commission. Various Republican sources claimed that Dawes's candidacy would provide geographical, as well as personality, balance for the ticket.[15] In April, a conference of party leaders in Washington concluded that of the several men considered, Dawes might well be the strongest candidate.[16]

Dawes knew of this public sentiment in his favor. His intimate friend, James G. Harbord, who had served with him on General John J. Pershing's staff and who was now President of the Radio Corporation of America, wrote him about it while Dawes was on the reparations assignment in Paris.[17] Nevertheless, as he returned to the United States in late April, Dawes stated that he was not a candidate and that he planned to resume his life as a private citizen.[18] In early June, as the Republican delegates convened at Cleveland, Dawes went to Marietta for the fortieth anniversary of the graduation of the Marietta College class of 1884, continuing to profess lack of interest in holding political office.

As the Convention docilely adopted the proposed platform and went through the formalities of nominating Coolidge, ignoring the futile objections registered by the admirers of Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, the outward calm camouflaged the uneasiness caused by the problem of obtaining a satisfactory, willing candidate to run with Coolidge.

In Marietta, Dawes kept in touch with the convention proceedings by means of a radio which had been installed at the College.[19] He had known several days before the Convention

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14 *New York Times,* June 10, 1924.
15 *New York Sun,* March 18, 1924.
16 *New York Times,* April 25, 1924.
17 Harbord to Dawes, March 20, 1924, James G. Harbord Collection of Personal Letters and Manuscripts, New York State Historical Society, New York City, New York. (This Collection is hereinafter referred to as Harbord MSS.)
18 *New York Times,* April 29, 1924.
19 *Marietta Register,* June 10, 1924. This was the first national political convention to be broadcast.

opened about the possibility of an intense contest developing for the vice presidential spot. At that time, he was requested to support the movement to secure the nomination for no other than his close friend, Harbord, whose interests were being advanced by Henry J. Reilly, Editor of *The Army and Navy Journal.* Reilly wired Dawes on May 31 that Senator William B. McKinley of Illinois had suggested that he contact Dawes "respecting next steps as boom already well under way."[20] This request put Dawes in a quandary. He had initially supported another personal friend, Lowden, for President in 1920, and now it was Lowden who was being referred to as the "Administration's choice" for the vice presidency. Perhaps this was why Dawes bluntly wired Reilly, "I am not in politics. Think you should consult Harbord as to what he wishes."[21]

On June 2, Dawes wrote Harbord, tactfully trying to explain why he had answered Reilly the way he had:

> In the light of this telegram [Reilly's], you can see how it feels, yourself, to be mentioned in connection with political things. Things like this read well and are pleasing, but when one figures on getting off a rock and walking on shaking sands for the balance of his life, if he is wise he does not become particularly enthusiastic. If you really are interested in this thing, let me know.[22]

Harbord wired a reply immediately—he was interested: "I am interested in the matter you mention and will appreciate anything you see fit to do."[23] On the same day, he also wrote Dawes, frankly explaining why he didn't think Dawes's advice applicable to him and why he wanted the nomination:

> I think if I were in your position, with the Central Trust Company of Illinois and many other financial interests behind me, I should feel very much as you do about it.
>
> I never had any particular ambition to be Vice President for itself, but it seems to me that if the nomination could be secured, it would be a recognition and a rounding up of my career in the Army which I should be glad to have. The years that are left me are not very numerous, and while if I secured this thing it would mean real financial loss, assuming that matters are to go on as well with me in the future with the Radio Corporation as they have in the past, the salary of the place would be enough for Mrs. Harbord and myself for the four years we would occupy if we were successful,—and, I am encouraged to believe that there would

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20 Reilly to Dawes, May 31, 1924, Harbord MSS.
21 Dawes to Harbord, June 2, 1924, Harbord MSS.
22 *Ibid.*
23 Harbord to Dawes, June 4, 1924 (telegram), Harbord MSS.

be a connection of some sort for me here after it was over, if it ever came to that.

There does seem to be an attitude of uncertainty with regard to the Vice Presidency, and I think there is a good argument for a man with a military record on the ticket.[24]

In response to this simple, open statement of personal ambition and direct appeal for assistance, Dawes wired: "Nothing in it."[25] He then wrote Harbord, just before leaving Chicago for Marietta, elaborating on his telegraphed message and repeating his previous remarks of caution:

> The papers have already given you the information. Let me tell you that in my judgment, you are very fortunate that no such alleged opportunity has opened up for you. Your feet are on a rock now, and if you had gone into politics they would have been upon sinking sand.[26]

The information in the newspapers caused Harbord to find little solace in his confidant's discouraging prognosis and implicit refusal to assist him. He read a report, for instance, that "the politicians," ever mindful of organized labor's potential voting strength, had grown cold to Dawes when they learned that he had headed a group in Illinois which upheld the "open shop" principle.[27] And as the Convention opened, he read the front page heading, "Delegates Still Are at Sea over Vice-President."[28] Knowing that the move in his behalf had the approval of men such as Secretary of War John W. Weeks as well as several war veterans in Congress,[29] Harbord, indeed, could have easily thought that a war hero like himself might be the very person behind whom the disagreeing factions could consolidate.

He was further encouraged by the reports from Reilly in Cleveland, who took Dawes's statement that he was "not in politics" at its face value. It was generally known that both Lowden and Borah were working to avert their own nominations. Simultaneously, while there was strong support for Judge William S. Kenyon of Iowa, a former senatorial leader in the farm bloc, there was extensive sentiment against him due to his "disposition to

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[24] Harbord to Dawes, June 4, 1924 (letter), Harbord MSS.
[25] Dawes to Harbord, June 6, 1924, Harbord MSS.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *New York Sun,* June 5, 1924. The group referred to was the Minute Men of the Constitution, an organization which Dawes had founded. (The *Sun* was evidently one of Harbord's favorite newspapers as he referred to it in his correspondence with Dawes.)
[28] *Ibid.,* June 10, 1924.
[29] Harbord to Dawes, June 4, 1924, Harbord MSS.

break away from party alignment."[30] Furthermore, Butler had "eliminated" Dawes from consideration on the grounds that "they could not control him, that he had been in the Army, and that the cry would be raised that he was tied up with the international bankers."[31] Believing all these developments meant that Harbord's star would rise, Reilly wired him an urgent, staccato message as the Convention opened:

> Lowdens supporters most numerous you decidedly next strength far possible determine stop . . . Only things mentioned against you is [sic] being soldier and claimed you signed petition or issued statement against Ku Klux stop Please telegraph me for confidential use how far latter is true stop.[32]

To this request the eager Harbord promptly replied:

> Have no recollection ever signing petition or issuing any statement whatever on subject mentioned your telegram this date.[33]

He was doing everything he could, certainly, not to discourage his champion in the field; consequently, Reilly took heart as he conducted his lively campaign. When he launched the movement on May 29, he emphasized Harbord's impressive war service record;[34] later, as he began his work at Cleveland, he stressed the man's demonstrated business ability.[35] He distributed 2,000 statements of Harbord's background among the delegates as they arrived; when this supply was exhausted, 2,000 more were mimeographed.[36]

Significant headway had been made in Harbord's behalf by the time soldier delegates from 39 states and 2 territories caucused in the afternoon of the Convention's first day. After this group resolved that a military man should be chosen as the Republican candidate for Vice President, a committee comprised of a single delegate from each state and territory represented at the caucus was appointed to select the soldier candidate. This committee met

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30 *New York Times,* June 11, 1924.
31 Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.
32 Reilly to Harbord, June 10, 1924, Harbord MSS.
33 Harbord to Reilly, June 10, 1924, Harbord MSS. The Klan was more of an issue in the Republican Convention than is commonly believed. A 60 member delegation, headed by M. W. Evans, Imperial Wizard, and Walter Bossert, Grand Dragon of Indiana, maintained headquarters in Cleveland during the Convention in order to fight any proposal to include an anti-Klan plank in the platform. *New York Times,* June 10, 1924. Such a proposal was hotly debated in the platform drafting committee before it was defeated. *Ibid.,* June 11, 1924.
34 *Ibid.,* May 30, 1924.
35 *Ibid.,* June 10, 1924.
36 Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

immediately; 5 states voted for Dawes, 1 for Frank T. Hines, Director of the Veterans Bureau, and the remainder for Harbord.[37] Harbord was now announced as the candidate of the soldiers and ex-service men began canvassing state delegations in his interest.[38]

Hopefully, Reilly again wired Dawes:

> Careful reconnaissance throughout day indicates clearly with you definitely out shoul [sic] Lowden continue refusal General Harbord leading candidate stop saw General Harbord at New York his letter to you stop believe should you see fit issue public statement indicating your support his candidacy effect would be considerable.[39]

Jubilantly, he wired Harbord: "Strong advice [sic] your telegraphing secretary weeks you [sic] willingness accept stop."[40]

The fact that Dawes chose not to answer the telegram he received[41] did nothing, to be sure, to impede his own chances for nomination. These chances were being actively furthered, primarily, by Edward Clifford of Chicago, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who had arrived in Cleveland as the convention week began to promote Dawes's interests; when questioned, he admitted he was acting without Dawes's approval. There was little visible evidence of his efforts except the small cards which were being distributed. Although these carried only one line of print, "Helen Maria," the identification was perfect; this was the famous expletive Dawes had shouted while being questioned by the congressional committee investigating the war effort.[42]

The boom for Harbord continued to grow during the second day of the Convention. By this time, it had become all the more obvious that Lowden, the favorite, remained adamant in his unwillingness to be placed on the Republican ticket. He stated on the day preceding the Convention's opening that he could not accept the nomination if it were to come to him.[43] As soon as the Convention opened, he sent messages to various ones there,

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37 *Ibid.*

38 *New York Times*, June 11, 1924.

39 B. F. Blye to Dawes, June 10, 1924, Charles G. Dawes Collection of Personal Letters and Manuscripts, Deering Library, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. (This Collection is hereinafter referred to as Dawes MSS.) Mr. Blye relayed this message to Dawes in Marietta on the same day it was received in Chicago.

40 Reilly to Harbord, June 11, 1924, Harbord MSS.

41 Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

42 *New York Times*, June 8, 1924. Clifford told Reilly that should he not succeed in getting Dawes nominated, he would be "only too willing to see General Harbord obtain the vice-presidency." Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

43 *New York Times*, June 9, 1924.

saying that his decision was irrevocable.[44] In addition, two telephone appeals which were made directly to him at Oxford, Ohio, where he was speaking at Miami University, failed in getting him to reconsider his position.[45] Many delegates knew that Congressman Frank W. Mondell of Wyoming, Permanent Chairman, had a sealed letter of declination from Lowden which would be read to the Convention if he were nominated.[46]

But even though many were convinced that Lowden was not available, they were undecided as to what other man they should support. The strained relations between Butler and Slemp were one factor making for the confusing situation. Many of the state party chieftains looked to Slemp for orders rather than to the newcomer, Butler, the self-assertive leader whom Slemp regarded as "a bungling amateur in the game of national politics."[47] At no time were these two leaders in accord at Cleveland.[48] Sensing this, many bewildered delegates waited for Coolidge explicitly to express his choice for a running mate, since his influence was felt in all other matters before the Convention.[49]

Further complicating the situation, a clique of party stalwarts demanded a voice in the vice presidential selection; they had little opportunity to figure in other matters.[50] Their demand was supported by Slemp, although he wanted to do nothing to make things more difficult for Coolidge.[51] This determined, self-constituted band spent much time in Secretary Weeks's rooms in the Cleveland Hotel, discussing the pending nomination. After a process of elimination, they settled on Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, and so informed Butler. Butler replied in his characteristic manner: "I have just been talking by telephone to the White House. We must nominate Borah for Vice-President."[52] But beyond the fact that Borah would never be acceptable to the regulars, he himself

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44 Hutchinson, *Lowden of Illinois*, II, 538.

45 *New York Times*, June 10, 1924.

46 Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS. These developments prompted William R. Bach, a strong Lowden supporter in the Illinois delegation, to wire this request to the former governor: "Will you wire our delegation your support for General Harbord, Vice President. Soldier representatives of thirty-nine states endorsed his candidacy last night." No answer was received to this telegram. *Ibid.*

47 Guy B. Hathorn, "C. Bascom Slemp—Virginia Republican Boss, 1907–1932," *Journal of Politics*, XVII (1955), 260–261.

48 *New York Times*, June 17, 1924.

49 *Ibid.*, June 11, 1924.

50 *Ibid.*, June 8, 1924.

51 Hathorn, "C. Bascom Slemp," *loc. cit.*, 261.

52 Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years*, New York, 1939, 280–281.

had no intention of being drafted for the post. Even though he was summoned to the White House in the midst of the Convention and urged by the President to accept, he telegraphed former Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge at Cleveland, instructing him to make his decision known should his name be presented.[53]

In an attempt to strengthen their own bid for leadership, the party stalwarts firmly withheld support from Harbord.[54] They expressed favor, instead, with the results of the caucus of 12 western states, a caucus which Butler had encouraged. While this group could not rally behind any one candidate, Kenyon and Curtis claimed the most support; Dawes made a good showing, Harbord had only a small following, and others received scattered support.[55]

Between two and three o'clock on the morning of the third day, the results of this important caucus were announced; here was the sentiment of the normally Republican states which were most likely to defect to the Progressive Party, thereby spelling defeat for the Republicans. It was difficult, however, for true party regulars, that is, the "Coolidge crowd," to choose between Kenyon and Curtis. Kenyon's independent spirit made many think his selection unwise, and Curtis, as party whip in the Senate, had botched the task of safeguarding the Administration's program.[56] Confounded by this dilemma, factional leaders thrashed about as they searched for the most propitious solution to the whole vexatious problem.

As late as three o'clock on this morning, Butler, trying to make the White House choice stick, insisted that Borah should be nominated and that he would not refuse.[57] Routed out of bed at his Washington residence at half past three and asked to confirm this, Borah replied, "I am not going to accept the nomination for Vice President."[58]

In the meantime, in order to obviate any groundswell developing for Harbord, Weeks suggested that his name be dropped. Weeks

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53 Claude G. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, Cambridge, 1932, 539.

54 Reilly believed that the party leaders had favored the soldier caucus because they were confident that since no one military man could claim the united support of the soldier contingent, potential nominees with military records, all of whom were opposed by the pacifist element, would eliminate each other. These leaders were subsequently surprised by the ready support which the soldiers gave Harbord. Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

55 *New York Times*, June 12, 1924.

56 White, *A Puritan in Babylon*, 301–302.

57 White, *Politics: The Citizen's Business*, 46–47.

58 *New York Times*, June 12, 1924.

maintained that since Harbord had not been discussed in the press to any great extent, he was "not known to many delegates" and in order that he be a successful candidate, he would have to be "described, sold . . . to the public." There was no time to do this, argued Weeks, before the party presented its ticket to the voters. The Secretary further felt that Harbord, "because of pressure in one direction or another," might not receive as many delegate votes as were claimed for him if his name were placed in nomination; this, he concluded, "would have a rather bad effect on the soldier element."[59]

Agreeing with this, Senator David A. Reed, of Pennsylvania, and Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., of New York, called Harbord early in the morning of the third day. They contended that Curtis, whose nomination they feared, might be chosen if Harbord permitted his name to go before the Convention. Harbord, who later referred to his political naiveté, was thus persuaded to authorize Reed to inform the delegates that he was no longer a candidate.[60]

Harbord's convention manager was neither consulted nor informed about this early morning communication; later in the morning, elated by the facts that sentiment was not crystallizing on any other candidate and that both Lowden and Borah obviously continued to be uninterested, Reilly wired Harbord: "Your strength amongst delegates now considerable and steadily increasing."[61] To this reassuring note, the depressed Harbord briefly replied, "Suggest you see Senator Reed regarding his telephone conversation with me."[62] As Harbord joined the ranks of the eliminated and as enthusiasm for him rapidly dwindled, Butler, desperately trying to stabilize his tenuous position of leadership, announced in mid-morning that the vice presidential candidate would be Kenyon.[63] Without doubt, the picture faced by the delegates as the time for the vice presidential balloting approached could hardly have been more baffling.

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59 Weeks to Harbord, June 13, 1924, Harbord MSS.

60 Harbord to Reilly, August 7, 1924, Harbord MSS. Reilly reported, however, that it was understood at the Convention that Harbord decided to take this action because he was told if he did not, "some radical" would be nominated. Reilly denied that any such threat existed and saw this move as the final effort to prevent Harbord's nomination. Be that as it may, the word was spread quickly that Harbord had authorized the withdrawal of his name and Reed, particularly, gave the impression that Harbord himself had initiated this action. Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

61 Reilly to Harbord, June 12, 1924, Harbord MSS.

62 Harbord to Reilly, June 12, 1924, Harbord MSS.

63 White, *Politics: The Citizen's Business*, 48.

After the afternoon session opened, Kenyon, Lowden, Senator James E. Watson of Indiana, Dawes, Curtis, Maryland National Committeeman William P. Jackson, Governor Arthur M. Hyde of Missouri, and Hines were duly nominated. Lowden led on the first ballot, followed first by Kenyon and then by Dawes. On the second ballot, the former Illinois Governor attracted enough support from all factions to win the nomination, which was then made unanimous. Kenyon and Dawes both lost strength on this ballot, Dawes losing more than Kenyon. The Convention then adjourned until later in the day so that a telegram could be sent to Lowden, asking for an official acceptance or declination. Lowden replied that he had said "a thousand times" he would decline if nominated and that he must now keep his word. After this message was read to the late evening session of the Convention, a third ballot was taken. Dawes won by a comfortable majority, while Kenyon received only a few more votes than he had on the second ballot.

An unusual turn of events happened on the last ballot as Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who had not even been nominated after he requested the California delegation not to submit his name,[64] polled over three times as many votes as Kenyon and a third as many as Dawes. The fact of the matter was that Butler, determinedly trying to swing votes away from Dawes, made an eleventh hour effort to secure Hoover's nomination.[65] Before the third ballot he declared, "It must be Hoover."[66] But most of the delegations with whom he talked held firm in their choice of Dawes, whose nomination was subsequently made "all but unanimous." The Convention had the candidate it wanted and, for the first time, Butler was decisively rebuffed. After this triumph, the convention delegates quickly adjourned, relieved that they had agreed on a candidate who was suitable to them and who was also willing to run.[67]

One of the most outstanding features of the Convention was the autocratic attitude of Butler; appearing as Coolidge's spokesman he sought to make his will prevail in every respect. Dawes's nomination, in one sense a political fortuity, was a revolt against this pressure. Party stalwarts, angered by Butler's ignoring of their

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64 *New York Times*, June 12, 1924.
65 *Ibid.*, June 13, 1924.
66 *Independent*, CXII (1924), 330.
67 Information regarding the balloting was taken from the *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Eighteenth Republican National Convention*, New York, 1924, 167–194, *passim*.

demands, found satisfaction in Dawes's selection "mainly because he was not the candidate of Mr. Butler." The "more moderate" supporters of the Administration, at the same time, were pleased because they thought Dawes would appeal to the business element and to people in general because of the favorable reception of the Dawes Reparations Plan.[68] Soldier delegates, piqued by the snubs of all factions, gladly threw their support to Dawes, after Harbord had withdrawn, since he too was a soldier "under the ban of Mr. Butler."[69] All this suggests that had Butler wanted Dawes, Dawes would not have been nominated.[70] Many of the delegates, it is fairly certain, were voting "not so much for Dawes as against Butler."[71]

Everything considered, it was not too odd, actually, that the delegates settled on Dawes as the best answer to their dilemma. As one observer of the Convention said:

> They knew him as a man of certain elementary American qualities. They have watched him achieve great things in war and in peace. They knew him as an outspoken man who says what he thinks. And they believed him to be human and acquainted with the West and its needs.[72]

Dawes did not have to be "sold" to the voting public. And while his splendid service record would attract the soldier vote, he was not enough of a "militarist" to alienate the strong pacifist elements; he was not a professional soldier, but a banker.[73] All in all, Dawes was as felicitous a second choice as could be made. Weeks later wrote Harbord that while he had not seen any particular prospect of Dawes's nomination on the first day of the Convention, by the last night, "for various reasons, it was the only thing to do."[74]

The defeated Harbord bore no resentment toward Dawes. No vanquished could have hailed the victor more graciously as Harbord congratulated the new vice presidential candidate in a sincerely

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[68] *New York Times*, June 13, 1924.
[69] Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.
[70] *Independent*, CXII (1924), 330.
[71] *New York Times*, June 13, 1924.
[72] Ernest Hamlin Abbott, "The Cleveland Town Meeting," *The Outlook*, CXXXVII (1924), 305.
[73] Harbord later wrote that even though Dawes "wore a uniform in France and did as every other soldier the things that were assigned him to do," he did not believe that the service men would feel that "he particularly represents them." Harbord to Weeks, June 16, 1924, Harbord MSS.
[74] Weeks to Harbord, June 13, 1924, Harbord MSS.

amiable manner.[75] In his reply, Dawes explained his apparent lack of enthusiasm regarding Reilly's entreaties for assistance. He admitted that he had received the wire from Cleveland and that he had gone so far as to compose a message "along the line suggested by Reilly"; he said, however, that "after thinking it over carefully and realizing somewhat the situation there in regard to Lowden," he "fortunately" had not sent it. He went on to say that he had not been in communication with the Convention at any time and that he "supposed that the administration would pick out somebody and nominate him after Lowden's declination."[76]

This is hardly an adequate explanation for his inaction. After Lowden had removed himself from consideration even before his nomination, a fact which Dawes surely knew since he heard and read the news reports from Cleveland, he was completely free to back Harbord, if he had no other reason than his admiration for Lowden for not giving the support earlier. And why did Dawes regard it "fortunate" that he had not sent the message of support? This allows for various interpretations. Could Dawes have been thinking of his own interests? And, again, would it have been improper or damaging to Harbord's chances, as Dawes thought, for him to have expressed his support for his war comrade, if he truly wished to disassociate himself from the race? A statement of preference from Dawes would have meant much, as Reilly realized. Dawes was not a part of the Administration and was under no obligation to abide by its choice, unless, of course, he did not want to defy the Administration as long as there was any indication that he might become an Administration member.

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[75] Harbord to Dawes, June 18, 1924, Harbord MSS. To Reilly he wrote that since the yearly salary of $12,000 as Vice President would not have paid the income tax on his salary at the Radio Corporation, he had no regrets. Harbord to Reilly, August 7, 1924, Harbord MSS. He also wrote Weeks that "the matter went exactly to the right point for the Radio Corporation" and for himself as well, since there had been "much agreeable publicity, the testimony of many old friends, and perhaps the making of a few new ones." In this manner, he convinced himself that he had "no complaints." Harbord to Weeks, June 16, 1924, Harbord, MSS.

[76] Dawes to Harbord, June 30, 1924, Harbord MSS. It was obvious that Dawes was bothered over the fact that while he had admonished Harbord to follow him and to stay out of politics, he himself had accepted the nomination for which he had previously said he was not a candidate and which Harbord had admittedly wanted. When Reilly called on Dawes in Chicago in late June, Dawes was "most painstaking" in explaining that he had started to do what Reilly had requested and "had partially written a telegram," but that he concluded "it might do more harm than good," and hence did not complete it. Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

Strong bonds of friendship, however, can withstand severe tests and trials. Harbord accepted Dawes's explanation in good faith; their friendship, which lasted through the many years, was not diminished in the least by the incident of the contest at Cleveland.

In the light of all these details, there appears little basis to believe that Dawes was really surprised when the Convention accorded him the nomination; it was easy to perceive that, for the most part, the sentiment for him persisted, while the sentiment for other men, for one reason or another, gradually decreased and finally disappeared. It was also apparent that the party leaders at the Convention were unable to enlist sentiment for any other man, as they wished to, and that the honor could eventually come to one whose name always remained before the Convention but for whom there was no driving movement.

Neither is there basis to believe that Dawes was as much against accepting the nomination as he had stated. Since he evidently did not question Harbord's qualifications and since Lowden repeatedly bowed out of the running, it can rather easily be concluded that Dawes was interested in protecting his own chances for being nominated as he refused both before and during the Convention to give his valuable support to Harbord's candidacy. Dawes denied the urgent requests for support even though he knew, probably better than anyone else in public life, that Harbord was sincerely interested in securing the nomination. If Dawes had really wanted to make sure that the nomination would not be tendered him, he could have issued an unequivocal statement declaring his intention to decline the honor, if offered, as did Borah and Lowden, instead of merely repeating that he was "not a candidate" and was "not in politics." There was cause for him to make such a statement, if he did not wish to be considered, since he knew of the sentiment which had long been developing for him. The one plausible conclusion is that Dawes was available and interested; he made no genuine effort to avert his nomination. The call had to come to him, however, as it did, without any outward effort on his own part.

As he accepted the call, the ticket of Coolidge and Dawes suggested little incongruity; in fact there were several indications that this combination augured well for the Republican party. First, the men respected each other; Dawes had expressed admiration for Coolidge and Coolidge was especially impressed with Dawes's accomplishments in initiating the federal budget system. The follow-

ing two messages, in which the President said that the White House door was always open to the Daweses, suggest the esteem in which he held Dawes:

> Doubtless in your travels about the country you learn of matters of which you think I should know, and you must feel equally free to write to me at any time.[77]
>
> I do not have any particular matter that I have to take up, but know you are so interested in the Government that it is helpful to me to talk with you.[78]

As a second promising indication, Dawes met the requirements for the position of vice presidential nominee as stipulated by Coolidge himself at a news conference just before the Cleveland Convention:

> 1. He must be big enough to succeed to the presidency, should Mr. Coolidge die in office.
>
> 2. He must be from the West.
>
> 3. He must be a regular Republican, and by that the President meant a man not classed as a radical.[79]

Dawes, with his administrative, business, and governmental experience, was "big enough" to become President if Coolidge died. Being from Illinois, he was far enough west not to be considered from the East, and, in addition, with his birthplace being in Ohio and his former home in Nebraska, he was all the more qualified to be classified as a westerner. Finally, no one could call Dawes a Republican "radical"—his early "radical" days had long since passed, and since that time this successful banker, while he had expressed disagreement with certain Republican policies at various times, had never been identified as a member of the radical group within the party.

Another factor which boded well for the party was that Dawes would fill the need for a top party candidate who could effectively deliver the Republican message in the campaign; Dawes could do this, Coolidge could not. With Coolidge's appeal as a steady leader guiding the nation's destiny augmented by Dawes's more colorful appeal as a hard hitting speaker who could hold his own in the rough-and-tumble of campaign debating, the party presented a well rounded ticket personality-wise. Thus, while Dawes's nomi-

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77 Coolidge to Dawes, October 16, 1923, Dawes MSS.
78 Coolidge to Dawes, October 8, 1923, Dawes MSS.
79 Reilly to Harbord, July 26, 1924, Harbord MSS.

nation climaxed a revolt against Butler, it complemented well—in terms of political strategy—the nomination of Coolidge; Butler, as a potential campaign manager, could have made no better choice in this respect had he been free to do so.

Several important considerations indicated, therefore, that Coolidge and Dawes could work well together as a team, during both the campaign and their periods of office if they were elected. The Republican party, distraught by the sensational news of scandal and malfeasance within its high ranks and weakened by the contempt which the public held toward the dilatory Republican Congress, took new hope in its prospects for being retained in power as it presented its standard bearers for public approval.

The anticipated harmony between the two members of the party's main team, however, was short-lived; much to Coolidge's consternation, his relations with Dawes were nettling. As the campaign got under way, Dawes soon began to chafe under the meddlesome hand of Butler, who had become Chairman of the Republican National Conmittee and who had feared earlier that Dawes could not be controlled; the President himself finally had to pull his running mate back into line. As the pair were later inaugurated into office, Dawes antagonized the Senate by defiantly attacking its procedural rules while Coolidge cautiously tried to effect a rapprochement by courting its good will. During their terms of office, while Coolidge worked to realize certain goals, Dawes regularly and unabashedly criticized Administration policy. Thus, though not realized at the time by the Republicans, Dawes's nomination, evolving out of difficult circumstances, portended problems of delicate nature for the party in its effort to achieve forceful White House leadership under Coolidge.

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Strategy Makers in the Union Navy Department, 1861-1865

For information on the inner-workings of the Navy Department, the relationships between Secretary Gideon Welles and his assistant, Gustavus Vasa Fox, and strategy and policy decisions, writers of recent Civil War literature rely heavily upon Charles Oscar Paullin's "President Lincoln and the Navy" (1909),[1] David D. Porter's *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War* (1885), sections of *Battles and Leaders* (1885–87), and James R. Soley's *The Blockade and Cruisers* (1887). The multivolume set, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, contains little with regard to top echelon decision making. But an understanding of strategy planning in the Navy Department will certainly not come by repeating generalizations that have become embedded in the historical literature of the Civil War.

Our own analysis of certain strategy decisions begins by stating that at the outset of the war the nation had certain fundamental and negative attitudes toward the Navy which were deeply entrenched. Moored in the backwash of America's march westward for almost fifty years preceding Fort Sumter, the Navy had no chance to attract attention. Most Americans had applauded the heroics of the Army in the Mexican War and on the American frontier. They were oblivious to the fact that the navies of the world were in a stage of transition. Iron was superseding wood; steam was displacing sail.

At the outset of the Civil War the Union had no clear strategy for fighting a campaign at sea. Every naval problem had to be solved after the shooting had started. The Navy Department lacked an established doctrine and the machinery for strengthening its depleted fleet. The new technology outdated classic theories and confronted the civilian chiefs and naval officers with new ships, new cannon, and a new type of warfare. "A condition of war was itself a novelty to the government," reported Gideon Welles in his diary, and "These novel and untried changes and revolutions were . . . wrought into practical use by a people un-

[1] Charles Oscar Paullin, "President Lincoln and the Navy," *American Historical Review*, XIV (1909), 284-303.

accustomed to war. Army and navy officers were as inexperienced in many respects as civilians."[2]

Few men, if any, in Lincoln's Cabinet were cognizant of the importance of naval power in an all-out war. Secretary of State William Seward confided that no one on the Cabinet level had any notion of how to operate a Navy.[3] Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, ignorantly boasted that thirty-odd sailing ships, each armed with a single cannon, could easily gain control of the sea, blockade enemy ports, and "fret" the South into submission.[4] Lincoln confessed that he knew nothing about ships.[5] Philosophically, Gideon Welles, who would have preferred the Postmaster Generalship to the position of Secretary of the Navy, asserted that time would determine the best strategy.[6]

Throughout the war, the President called upon Welles to run the routine business of the Navy Department almost independent of the Cabinet. With the exception of joint Army and Navy movements, when members of the Cabinet were often consulted, Welles steered the Department with a free hand, pleased with Lincoln's confidence in him.[7] Clear-headed and sagacious, yet thriving on paper work and detail, Welles took advantage of inventions or suggestions and readily experimented with ship design, gunnery, and projectiles that promised to increase the squadrons' efficiency.

Appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox was imaginative, aggressive, conceited. Despite this self-satisfaction, reported David D. Porter, naval officers respected him as the best executive in the Department, for "What little brains there were . . . he found them."[8]

The relationship between Welles and Fox is blurred. By a careful reading of pertinent manuscript materials, however, several points come to light. Criticized by many, including the chairman of the Senate Naval Committee to whom he was a "very, very

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2 Gideon Welles' MS Diary, introduction and 16 September 1861, Gideon Welles Papers, Library of Congress.

3 William H. Russell, *My Diary North and South*, London, 1863, II, 283.

4 James R. Gilmore, *Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War*, New York, 1898, 25, 27.

5 Lincoln to Welles, Washington, 14 May 1861, Lincoln Papers, Illinois State Historical Library.

6 Welles to his wife, Washington, 21 April 1861, Welles Papers.

7 Welles Diary, 16 September 1862.

8 David D. Porter, "Journal of Occurrences during the War of the Rebellion," 163–168, 401, David Dixon Porter Papers, Library of Congress.

small man,"[9] the hardworking and diligent Welles wanted to escape the spotlight of publicity. He entertained infrequently. Observing the hushed and orderly atmosphere of the Navy Department, reporters described "Old Gid" as sleeping over the perils of the country.[10]

Flamboyant Fox relished headlines. Once Welles accused him of trying "to get his name in the histories."[11] The Assistant Secretary lavishly entertained politicians and foreign dignitaries and his home was open, day and night, for consultations with the President and top military and naval officers. Lincoln was impressed with this little man, the erstwhile naval officer who had come to Washington before the war with a plan to relieve Fort Sumter. Frequently, the President called Fox to the White House for advice and counsel.[12] Unlike Welles, Fox was obsessed by inter-service rivalry. If the Navy, and the Navy alone, could win the war, then, he reasoned, it would assume in the public mind greater importance than the Army. His desire to whip the South with the naval squadrons was paramount. In December 1861 he wrote ". . . the country looks to us to collapse this infernal rebellion, and I think we shall not disappoint them."[13] Later, he pointed out, "The crowning act of this war ought to be [carried out by] the navy. I feel that my duties are twofold: first, to beat our southern friends; second, to beat the Army."[14]

Early in the war, soon after Lincoln had issued the Blockade Proclamation, the Navy focused its attention on the seizure of important ports and inlets of the Confederate seaboard. There was talk in Washington of creating a naval Strategy Board to consider methods of tightening the blockade.[15] Cognizant of the need for such a group, Welles and Fox approached Alexander Bache, director of the United States Coast Survey, to head a five-man committee, whose membership came to be naval Captains Samuel Francis DuPont and Charles H. Davis, Major J. G. Barnard of the Army engineers, and Fox. The Board convened se-

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9 Hale to Fogg, Dover, N.H., 27 April 1863, New Hampshire Historical Society.

10 *Army and Navy Journal*, 9 December 1864.

11 Welles Diary, 30 January 1865.

12 Virginia Woodbury Fox Diary, April-June 1861, Blair Family Papers, Library of Congress.

13 Fox to Goldsborough, Washington, 13 December 1861, Louis M. Goldsborough Papers, Library of Congress.

14 Fox to DuPont, Washington, 3 June 1862, Gustavus Vasa Fox Papers, New-York Historical Society.

15 DuPont to Bache, Philadelphia Navy Yard, 30 May 1861, Rhees Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library.

cretly at the Smithsonian Institution and studied charts, and culled intelligence reports,[16] and reached the astonishing conclusion that commerce flourished between the North Carolina sounds and inlets and the Confederate port cities, which transshipped the materials to armies in the field.

In mid-July 1861, the Strategy Board completed its North Carolina report and concluded that the ports of Norfolk and Richmond could not be successfully blockaded until the Atlantic entrances to Pamlico and Albemarle sounds were shut. Underscored was its recommendation that an important Union objective was to paralyze this flow of commerce. From these reports and suggestions Fox worked out plans for an offensive thrust against Hatteras Inlet.

The Board began discussing another major flaw in the Federal blockade. Off Savannah and Charleston vessels were being forced to steam eastward out to sea in bad weather and to go northward several hundred miles to Hampton Roads, the nearest Federal naval base, for supplies. This caused delay and vulnerability. Another primary objective, the Board reasoned, was to seize by amphibious assaults well-protected harbors along the southern seaboard to be used as supply bases and points of refuge for the blockaders.

Sifting charts and poring over intelligence reports, the Strategy Board singled out three South Carolina targets: Bull's Bay, St. Helena, Port Royal. Once blueprints for operations against these ports were drawn, they were dispatched to the Navy Department.[17] Copies were forwarded to the Cabinet, which, generally pleased, approved them without criticism. Welles emphasized that the harbors, once secured, would be made the points of offensive military operations into the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida.[18] Impressed, General Scott indorsed them.[19] Attorney General Edward Bates emphasized further potentialities. Coastal assaults would harass and alarm the enemy, strengthen Federal public credit, and revive Northern spirits.[20] It was decided to leave the responsibility for

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16 Davis to his wife, Washington, 26 June 1861, in Charles H. Davis, *Life of Charles Henry Davis, Rear Admiral, 1807–1877*, Boston, 1899, 125.

17 Strategy Board to Welles, Washington, 13, 16, 26 July 1861, File ON, Record Group 45, National Archives.

18 "Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December 2, 1861," *Senate Exec. Doc., No. 1*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1861, 6.

19 Davis to his wife, Washington, 19, 27 July 1861, in *Davis*, 126, 127.

20 Howard K. Beale, ed., "The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859–1866," American Historical Association, *Annual Report, 1930*, Washington, 1933, IV, 195.

final selection of the target to the commanders of the expedition, who, after some hesitation, picked Port Royal, South Carolina.

The joint Army-Navy attacks against Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal were successfully launched in August and November 1861, respectively. Washington confidently expected that the expeditions would exploit the initial victories. Yet the commanders of the expeditions misjudged the strength of their naval power and were unaware of the weaknesses of the Southern coastal defenses,[21] including the ports of Charleston, Savannah, and Wilmington, to such extent that their following offenses sputtered and were stalled. The southern forts had fallen too easily and neither the Navy Department nor the commanders had planned beyond their original objectives. "I never thought I could carry it out so fast," confided Admiral Samuel Francis DuPont,[22] in charge of the Port Royal venture. It is clear that the expeditions could have accomplished much more against the inadequately armed south Atlantic area. Had the orders been more explicit about follow-up operations or had the commanders been more aggressive, the South would have experienced a more serious loss, perhaps that of Savannah or Charleston or at least considerable damage to these two ports. A Confederate naval officer recalled, "There was nothing to prevent it. . . ."[23]

In Washington, the Administration looked westward to the Mississippi River. In the Cabinet, Bates suggested that the Army and Navy take and hold New Orleans and other southern ports and that a giant force be created to control the Mississippi. This, he explained, would strangle the South by severing its supply line from Europe and from the trans-Mississippi West and would starve it back into the Union.[24] Two days after Bates submitted his ideas, he wired his friend, James B. Eads, a St. Louis businessman, to hurry East and aid the government with his knowledge of western rivers.[25] Eads, Bates, and other Cabinet members considered west-

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21 See, for example, Clark to Walker, Raleigh, 1, 7, 8 September 1861, Executive Letterbook, 1861–1862, State Historical Commission of North Carolina; and Lee to Benjamin, Coosawhatchie, S. C., 9 November 1861, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, Washington, 1897, series 1, XII, 299–300. (Hereafter cited as *ONR*. All volumes referred to are in series 1).

22 DuPont to Fox, Port Royal, 6 December 1861, Fox Papers.

23 William H. Parker, *Recollections of a Naval Officer, 1841–1865*, New York, 1883, 215.

24 Bates' memo, 15 April 1861, in Beale, "Diary of Edward Bates," 182.

25 Bates to Eads, Washington, 17 April 1861, James B. Eads Papers, Missouri Historical Society.

ern operations. Cameron vetoed all projects.[26] Sensing the importance of the Mississippi River to ultimate victory, Welles asked Eads to prepare a written statement. Eads urged the purchase of one boat, armed with guns and cotton bales for protection, to be sent down river to devastate the economy of the South by blockading the main artery through which the Confederates received the goods from the Northwest.[27]

At Army headquarters in Washington, Winfield Scott, pondering his over-all Anaconda Plan to crush the Confederacy, relied heavily upon the Navy to close the Southern ports as a means of cutting off European aid. Together with these operations, he hoped to dispatch a powerful force down the Mississippi from St. Louis to New Orleans, cleaning out the Rebels and keeping open this line of communication. Such a force would muster twenty gunboats, forty transports, 80,000 men.[28]

The basic strategy on the Mississippi was to destroy the South's economy rather than to open the river and the port of New Orleans to the commerce of the Northwest. The wants of that section were not considered by General Scott. At first Northwesterners believed that it would be a short war and that by railroad, canal, and the Great Lakes, their produce would find a market to the East. The West clamored for the Army to crush Richmond and paid scant heed to Scott's Anaconda Policy.[29]

The Navy Department, on the strength of the Eads Report, dispatched Commander John Rodgers west to purchase and fit out gunboats. Yet Simon Cameron and the War Department claimed jurisdiction over this newly established flotilla.[30] The idea of a river navy was so novel, so strange, that official Washington boggled not knowing whether this auxiliary belonged to the Army or to the Navy. The Navy, whose officers and men were to operate the flotilla, believed that the problem was difficult, anomalous, and embarrassing. The Army, whose generals were to make the strategic and tactical decisions for the flotilla, complained that its officers understood little about gunboats. Officers of both branches ridiculed the idea, professing unwillingness to shoulder

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[26] Charles B. Boynton, *The History of the Navy during the Rebellion*, New York, 1867, I, 498–500.

[27] Eads to Welles, Washington, 8 May 1861, Welles Papers.

[28] Scott to McClellan, Washington, 3, 21 May 1861, George B. McClellan Papers, Library of Congress.

[29] See, for example, *Daily Missouri Democrat*, 10 May 1861.

[30] Boynton, *Navy*, I, 500.

the responsibility of directing this bastard force.[31] Time and experience would be needed to resolve the conflicts of interest.

In Washington through the late summer, fall, and winter of 1861 the Strategy Board continued to evaluate the North Carolina Sounds. Despite the initial success at Hatteras Inlet, Beaufort and Wilmington harbors, Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and the inland water communications with Norfolk and Richmond still remained in Confederate hands.

The Board recommended that the sounds of North Carolina be occupied permanently by gunboats to break up foreign and interior trade.[32] Captain Louis Goldsborough, commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, met with Lincoln and his Cabinet in October to discuss naval tactics in the sounds.[33] Early in November 1861 Scott resigned and General George B. McClellan was appointed General-in-Chief of the Union Armies. General Ambrose Burnside, who was then at Annapolis equipping a force for Chesapeake waters, was summoned to Washington where, in the presence of Lincoln, Seward, McClellan, and Goldsborough, he was told that his division's objective had been switched to North Carolina.[34]

Once the thrust into North Carolina was decided upon, Goldsborough insisted upon the capture of Roanoke Island, then, in rapid succession, Newbern, Beaufort, and Fort Macon.[35] Studying the captain's suggestions, Fox concluded that if the plan were successful, it would "fasten the Navy for this generation . . . firmly in the hearts of the people."[36]

In February and March, 1862, the Army-Navy assault forces captured Roanoke Island, Newbern, Beaufort, Fort Macon; obstructed the entrances to canals; scattered the Rebel squadron in the sounds; temporarily occupied Elizabeth City, Edenton, Washington, Winton, and Plymouth. Almost simultaneously 1000 miles away, New Orleans fell to the Union Navy. Although the Strategy

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31 Lenthall's memo, 1 June 1861, & Meigs to Welles, Washington, 28 September 1862, Water Transportation File, RG 92, National Archives.

32 Strategy Board to Welles, Washington, 2, 12 September 1861, File ON, RG 45.

33 Goldsborough to his wife, Washington, 9 October 1861, Goldsborough Papers.

34 Burnside's testimony, "Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," *Senate Report, No. 108*, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., Washington, 1863, III, 333–334.

35 Goldsborough to Fox, Hampton Roads, 4 December 1861, Fox Papers.

36 Fox to Goldsborough, Washington, 13 December 1861, Goldsborough Papers.

Board had reported unfavorably upon an assault from the Gulf against New Orleans as too costly and had advised a strong blockade of the mouth of the Mississippi,[37] Welles regarded the Queen City of the South as the "most important place in the insurrectionary region and the most difficult to blockade." As early as November, 1861, Fox had begun to develop plans for the capture of New Orleans.

During his maritime days, Fox had ascended the river in an ocean steamer at night without a pilot and felt certain that the forts guarding New Orleans from the Gulf, built in the days of sailing vessels, would be ineffective against steamers operating under the cloak of darkness. Checking the charts, he saw that once the gunboats passed New Orleans they could steam up-river and cooperate with the Western Flotilla moving southward. Fox wanted New Orleans for the Navy, while both he and Welles knew that military plans of the Army called for a descent of the Mississippi to culminate in the capture of New Orleans.

On 14 November Fox consulted Lincoln about New Orleans,[38] stressing the point that steam had revolutionized naval warfare. When the President showed interest in the project but doubted its feasibility, Fox countered with the argument that the Confederates would expect an attack from above. An assault up to New Orleans from the Gulf, he emphasized, would be less difficult, less exhausting, less costly, and far more fatal to Confederate commerce and morale than a mere blockade. Consequently, the next evening at McClellan's headquarters in Washington, Fox, Lincoln, Seward, Welles, and Commander David D. Porter, who had just arrived from Gulf blockading duties, consulted with McClellan. While Fox detailed his New Orleans scheme, McClellan thought the plan might divert Confederates from the Virginia front to Louisiana, but predicted that this operation would take 50,000 men. Fox argued that this was to be a naval operation and that the gunboats would need only 10,000 soldiers to hold the city once it was captured. McClellan had little faith in the venture, but agreed to send the troops. Informally, Lincoln told the General that the New Orleans expedition should be supported by enough troops to proceed up to Vicksburg.[39]

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[37] Strategy Board to Welles, 9 August 1861, File ON, RG 45.
[38] Virginia Woodbury Fox's Diary, 14 November 1861.
[39] Gideon Welles, "Admiral Farragut and New Orleans," *The Galaxy*, XII (1871), 673, 820; Montgomery Blair, "Opening the Mississippi," *The United Service*, IV (1881), 34; statement in Miscellaneous File, Welles Papers.

In February 1862 the Western Flotilla, operating under military orders from Cairo, Illinois, subdued Fort Henry on the Tennessee River. The Army, supported by the same gunboats, captured Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. In April Farragut stormed past the river batteries guarding the approaches of the Gulf, moored at New Orleans, and took that city's surrender. Upon receiving urgent and confidential orders from Fox to push up-river, Farragut, who felt his deep-drafted vessels more suited for an attack against Mobile, reassembled his squadron in New Orleans for the ascent of the Mississsippi.[40] After he had maneuvered his forces up-stream and analyzed the defenses of Vicksburg, Farragut decided to head back down-river to New Orleans.

Dispatches from Washington awaited him. Lincoln was distressed over rumors of Farragut's retreat. Fox pressed for the squadron to steam back.[41] The commander answered Fox and wrote a lengthy letter to Welles. Navigation in the Mississippi was beyond anything he had ever encountered, beyond his abilities. The whole Gulf Squadron, Farragut said, might be wiped out within twelve months. It was with bitterness that the commander reascended the river.[42] "I am now up the Mississippi again," he grieved, "and when I will go down, God only knows."[43] Throughout the squadron, men knew that the "Old Man" had no heart for river fighting.[44] After lingering for a month before Vicksburg, in which time he joined forces with the Western Flotilla, he received welcome orders from Washington to proceed down-river, strengthen the blockade, and conduct operations in the Gulf, leaving Mississippi operations to the Cairo gunboats.[45]

The river operations of Farragut clearly demonstrated the lack of coordination and faulty communications between the Navy Department and a commander in New Orleans. Fox was trying to run the Gulf Squadron from Washington. The Navy lacked ships of suitable draft to steam up-river, while the Army lacked sufficient troops to move beyond New Orleans.

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[40] Farragut to Welles, New Orleans, 1 May 1861, Captains Letters, RG 45.

[41] Fox to Farragut, Washington, 17 May 1862, *ONR*, XVIII, 498.

[42] Farragut to Welles, New Orleans, 30 May 1862, *ibid.*, 519.

[43] Farragut to Bailey, Baton Rouge, 11 June 1862, *ibid.*, 551.

[44] See, for example, Russell to McPherson, on board *Kennebec*, 4 July 1862, Edward McPherson Papers, Library of Congress; Jackson to his wife, n.s., 27 August 1862, Samuel Jackson Papers, Pennsylvania Historical Society; Phelps to Foote, on board *Benton*, 6 July 1862, Mississippi River File, RG 45.

[45] Farragut to Davis, on board *Hartford*, 23 July 1862, *ONR*, XXIII, 239.

By now, considered "smart as Hell" in naval matters,[46] Fox was busy with plans for the reduction of Charleston, his "specialty."[47] The Navy had caught the "iron fever" after the historic battle between the *Monitor* and the *Virginia.* The Department pushed forward the construction of monitors and Fox told a Congressional committee that naval commanders would have "no hesitation in taking *Monitor* right into Charleston."[48] To John Ericsson, the *Monitor's* inventor, Fox confided, "From the beginning I have advocated the product of your brain and staked the reputation of the Navy on the results."[49] "The invincible iron Navy," explained Fox, was "to battle down the stronghold of treason."

Encouraging Welles when he was doubtful,[50] Fox sounded out Admiral DuPont of the South Atlantic Squadron on the idea of taking Charleston with the monitors. "Our summer's work must be Charleston by the navy," he told the Admiral, "We can give you the *Monitor* . . . [which] can go up to Charleston and return in perfect safety." With several monitors, Fox added, "don't you think we can . . . make it *purely navy?*"[51] DuPont was dubious and replied that the Rebels around Charleston had been ceaseless in their efforts to reinforce Fort Sumter.[52] Fox retorted: ". . . the 'Monitor' can go all over. . . . She is absolutely impregnable. . . . I pray you give us Charleston. . . . The Fall of Charleston is the fall of Satan's Kingdom."[53]

The possibility of an expedition to Charleston was frequently discussed in Cabinet meetings. Recalled to Washington for discussions, DuPont had already concluded that the attack on the harbor should be a combined Army-Navy effort with at least 25,000 soldiers.[54] But Fox insisted that the monitors were invulnerable, argued that success depended upon the Navy alone, and discarded

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46 Virginia Woodbury Fox Diary, 10 September 1861.

47 Ericsson to Adlersparre, n.s., 6 March 1868, in William C. Church, *The Life of John Ericsson,* New York, 1906, II, 124.

48 Fox's testimony, "Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," III, 421.

49 Fox to Ericsson, [Washington], 21 February 1863, in Church, *Life of Ericsson,* II, 24.

50 John T. Morse, Jr., ed., *Diary of Gideon Welles,* Boston 1909, I, 265.

51 Fox to DuPont, Washington, 3 April, 12 May 1862, Fox Papers.

52 DuPont to Fox, Port Royal, 25, 31 May 1862, Fox Papers.

53 Fox to DuPont, Washington, 3 June 1862, Fox Papers.

54 C. R. P. Rodgers to Fox, Port Royal, 3 September 1862; DuPont to Fox, Port Royal, 29 September 1862, Fox Papers; & Welles to DuPont, Washington, 10 September 1862, *ONR,* XIII, 322.

the idea of using troops.[55] DuPont was not alone in his misgivings. John Ericsson firmly held that his ship could not crush Charleston. "Your confidence in the great naval attack," he told Fox, "astounds me —You have not turrets enough . . . you have not guns enough."[56] However, Fox remained optimistic and kept prodding DuPont to attack. He confessed that "Though everybody is despondent about Charleston, and even the President thinks we shall be defeated, I must say that I have never had a shadow of a doubt as to our success. . . ."[57]

On 7 April 1863 the monitors entered Charleston Harbor and failed. The major share of the responsibility must rest with the Assistant Secretary. Against the advice of DuPont and Ericsson, he had insisted that the monitors were the keys to Charleston and had pushed aside the suggestion of Army cooperation.

July 1863, witnessed Lee's Army retreating from the Union guns at Gettysburg and the Rebel forces inside Vicksburg succumbing to the forces of Grant. The Navy was still committed to leveling Charleston. Welles and Fox, alert to the rumors that the Confederates were readying the iron ram *Tennessee* to steam out of Mobile and crush the blockaders, mulled over the possible consequences.[58] If the reports were true, the campaign at sea and the blockade itself were endangered. Welles realized that iron rams could destroy wooden ships. To counteract the threat, monitors were urgently needed in the Gulf. As soon as the newly built monitors were launched they were dispached to Farragut, who was readying for an attack against Mobile. General Sherman and his legions, 80,000 strong, had pushed off from Chattanooga into the Lower South and were trudging toward Atlanta. To relieve the pressure from Johnston's Army, Sherman wired General Canby in New Orleans to "kick up a ruckus" with Farragut at Mobile.[59] The new monitors *Manhattan* and *Tecumseh* left northern navy yards for Pensacola and the ironclads *Winnebago and Chickasaw*

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55 DuPont to Welles, Port Royal, 3 June 1863, *ONR*, XIV, 70; & *id.* to *id.*, near Wilmington, Del., 22 October 1863, in "Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, In answer to resolutions of the House and Senate in relation to the operations of armored vessels in service of the United States," *House Exec. Doc., No. 69*, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., Washington, 1864, 261–262.

56 Ericsson to Fox, New York, 20 February 1863, Fox Papers.

57 Fox to Ericsson, Navy Department, 9 April 1863, Fox Papers.

58 Fox to Porter, Navy Department, 6 April 1863, Fox Papers; Welles to Farragut, Washington, 3 January 1864, *ONR*, XXI, 4.

59 Sherman to Canby, Allatoona Greek, 4 June 1864, *ONR*, XXI, 317. See also Drayton to Hoyt, Pensacola, 14 July 1864, Percival Drayton Papers, New York Public Library.

were on their way down the Mississippi River to the Admiral. Once these arrived in the Gulf, they and the wooden ships under Farragut entered Mobile Bay in August 1864, capturing the forts and the *Tennessee*.

From the beginning of the Atlantic coastal war, Welles had wished to close the port of Wilmington, which, despite the Federal blockade, continued to trade with Confederate runners. After the development of the monitors in the fall of 1862, Fox had sketched out a scheme for these vessels to reduce Wilmington. The plans, however, were discarded when the *Monitor* sank off the coast of North Carolina and mechanical difficulties delayed the progress on the vessels.[60]

Northern concern increased over blockade running into Wilmington.[61] Both Welles and Fox knew the importance of capturing Fort Fisher, guarding the approaches to the Cape Fear River, but, after DuPont's failure at Charleston, the Navy Department again set aside any immediate plans it had for North Carolina. In early 1864 the the Department recognized that a stalemate existed at Charleston and, with public pressure mounting for the Navy to attack Wilmington, Welles and Fox again began to concentrate on reducing Fort Fisher. Realizing that the monitors alone could not neutralize the Confederate installation, Welles wrote a lengthy letter to Stanton asking Army support.[62] The Secretary of War showed the letter to General Halleck, who reported that such an attack would involve the suspension of "other and more important operations."[63]

Months passed. As the presidential election of 1864 neared, the Administration feared that unless it tightened the blockade, it would lose at the polls in November. Welles noted that the capture of Wilmington would be the "most important and effective demonstration" that could be made.[64] He again urged Stanton to reconsider and to enter into plans for an amphibious operation. The War Department finally expressed a willingness to cooperate if Grant would assent.[65] On September 2, 1864, Fox visited the

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60 Lee to Welles, off Newport News, 10 May 1863, Blair-Lee Family Papers, Princeton University.

61 See, for example, *The Congressional Globe*, 38 Cong., 1 sess., Washington, 1864, 869.

62 Welles to Stanton, Navy Department, 2 January 1864, Fox Papers.

63 Halleck to Stanton, Washington, 6 January 1864, *ONR*, IX, 386–387.

64 Morse, *Diary of Gideon Welles*, II, 127, 133. Also see Forbes to Fox, Boston, 18 June 1864, Fox Papers.

65 Stanton to Grant, Washington, 1 September 1864, *OAR*, Washington, 1889, XLII, 624.

General at his headquarters at City Point, Virginia. After a short conference, Grant promised 12,000 men.[66] After one failure before Fort Fisher in December, 1864, a second assault proved successful and, in the following February, Wilmington fell to Union arms.

It is a far easier task to describe the strategy making than to determine the relative importance and influence of those who made it. The scanty evidence we possess indicates that President Lincoln, like most Americans of his day, misjudging the advantages of a potent sea arm, paid little attention to naval matters in comparison to the military campaigns. This is understandable, as the nation for generations, intent upon building its Western empire, had lightly regarded its Navy. When the Civil War came, armies were locked in deadly combat. By pencil, photograph, letters from the front, and the countless pens of reporters, every movement, every campaign of the Army was impressed upon the nation. Off on the blockade and solitary patrol, the Navy, with the exception of certain episodes, made poor copy.

Yet we cannot dismiss Lincoln's preoccupation with military affairs as a sign of indifference. Although, at times, he doubted the Navy's capacity to strike effective blows, he was consulted on strategy. Fox called on him frequently and, especially with respect to the New Orleans campaign, Lincoln was party to the plans. It would be just as much a mistake to ignore the achievements of Gideon Welles as to exaggerate them. Never overestimating the potentialities of naval warfare, this Connecticut Yankee labored patiently and ran the Navy Department efficiently under a hail of criticism.

But within the councils of the Administration, Fox, the man whom Lincoln had appointed to advise the ex-newspaper editor, was more influential than the Secretary in determining naval strategy. "When Mr. Well[e]s took the helm," a friend wrote Fox, "the old ship was on shore. He pointed her head seaward. You found her in the breakers—She is now afloat. . . ."[67] With a lively imagination and a disdain for the Army, Fox jumped to conclusions without weighing evidence. Frequently ignoring the advice of naval officers, he relied on his own judgment. Throughout the Navy, many officers were dissatisfied with Fox, who

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66 Grant to Fox, City Point, 10 September 1864, *ONR*, X, 450.
67 Engle to Fox, Philadelphia, 16 September 1863, Fox Papers.

treated most of them in a brusque, sailorlike manner and assumed a dictatorial attitude.

On the evidence it is clear that Welles permitted Fox to plan most of the naval assaults along the southern coasts. The Assistant Secretary was a member of the Strategy Board which, during the early stages of the war, blocked out offensive operations. Fox planned and urged the attack on New Orleans and, despite the negative attitude of the President, the Cabinet, naval officers, and Ericsson in demanding the monitors move into Charleston Harbor, his boldness fastened to the American Navy, once and for all, the idea of using iron ships.

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Cleveland's Constructive Use of the Pension Vetoes

Several recent studies of Woodrow Wilson's presidential leadership[1] have suggested that Wilson's first cognizance of the realities of presidential office and his consciousness of the potentialities of executive power developed during the Cleveland era, particularly in his observation of Cleveland's second administration, which provided precedent for his own career as President. Unlike Woodrow Wilson, Cleveland had no preconceived or academic theories about executive power when he entered the White House. His verbalization of executive power, always in some practical situation, was factual and personal. Experience with legislative bodies in Buffalo and Albany, and his personal traits including self-assertiveness and willingness to assume responsibility, provided him a basis for asserting executive leadership, assuming as he did, that sufficient powers already existed in the Constitution for presidential initiative. In his use of the veto, Cleveland provided one kind of precedent for succeeding Presidents by fully assuming responsibility for its constructive purposes, and through it for asserting the President's role in the policy making process.

Although President Cleveland's use of the veto, especially of individual pension bills, has been construed as negative in purpose for a number of reasons by various critics ranging from G.A.R. posts and partisan editors of his day to contemporary historians,[2] careful study of the messages accompanying the vetoes as well as the facts of federal aid to veterans during his two administrations lead to an opposite conclusion: that Cleveland's pension vetoes were constructive in purpose. They were intended: 1) to protect all veterans by vetoing benefits for only a relatively small number whose doubtful claims were advanced by congressmen in special acts. The absurdity of these claims Cleveland exposed in detailed veto messages; at the same time he encouraged passage of uniform pension laws to be administered uniformly by the Pension

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1 Arthur W. Macmahon, "Woodrow Wilson as Legislative Leader and Administrator," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 50 (September 1956), 641–675.

2 H. S. Merrill, *Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleveland and the Democratic Party*, Boston, 1957.

Bureau, headed by Colonel John C. Black, which had set up regular and orderly procedures for investigating and certifying legitimate veteran claims under the general laws; 2) to point out the influence of special interests relating to veterans affairs on Congress, pressures that threatened the passage and purpose of general laws; 3) to protect the work of an administrative agency delegated by Congress to enforce the pension laws; 4) to encourage better legislation both as to language and content by veto criticism, not only of the contents and purposes of pension measures presented for his signature but by pointing out incorrectness and ambiguity of wording that rendered comprehension of a bill's purpose vague and enforcement difficult.

I

Concerned that many of the bills to benefit individuals brought in by congressmen tended to ignore the existing general relief measures for groups of veterans or their dependents and to weaken fair enforcement of those already in effect, President Cleveland took the position of protecting all veterans by his veto. " I have conceived the prevention of the complete discredit which must ensue from the unfair and reckless granting of pensions by special acts to be the best service I can render our veterans."[3] And in vetoing a doubtful claim: "I withhold my assent from this bill because if the facts before me, derived from the army records and statements of the claimant are true, the allowance of this claim would, in my opinion, be a travesty upon our whole scheme of pensions and an insult to every decent veteran soldier."[4] In several cases he pointed out that the veteran claimant would be better off under benefits of the general laws: "As the Bureau has quite lately determined that there was no disability, it is evident that this old soldier can better rely upon the general law referred to,"[5] or, "Inasmuch as the bill herewith returned limits any increase to the rate fixed by law for cases of total disability, it appears to accomplish nothing of benefit to the beneficiary therein named."

Cleveland's sharp dissection of the claims made for individuals through special bills, some after their claims had been rejected by

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[3] James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 1899, Vol. VIII, 684.

[4] *Ibid.*, 546, Veto of House Bill No. 927, February 4, 1887.

[5] Cleveland's veto of pension for Alexander Falconer, Mexican War veteran whose claim was based on military service, old age and poverty. A general bill to aid veterans of the Mexican War had been passed in January, 1887. Richardson, VIII, 543.

the Pension Bureau or while they were still pending, provided unanswerable criticism as to the character of most special legislation, dubious in origin and unfair in purpose, as he saw it, to the greatest number of veterans. His messages often included the complete medical record of the petitioner and the complete history of the case as provided by the Pension Bureau—a method that showed up discrepancies in indisputable fashion. After reading pension requests for people who suffered epilepsy "caused by a jar to the head from heavy firing," who fell into cellars while on furlough, who were drowned twenty years after the Civil War because they could not swim because of rheumatism contracted during the war, who fell from ladders and fractured their skulls, committed suicide because of domestic troubles, or were killed by snow slides in Colorado, Cleveland often caustically pointed out the weak points of the petitions. Citing the record of one soldier he said:

> Thus it quite plainly appears that the claimant spent the most of his term of enlistment in desertion or in imprisonment as a punishment of that offense. And thus is exhibited the long and faithful service and the high character of the claimant as entitling him to consideration by the committee who reported favorably on this bill.[6]

In rejecting a widow's claims he concluded, "This rejection was clearly right unless the government is to be held as an insurer against every fatal casualty incurred by those who have served in the army without regard to the manner of its occurrence."[7] Of another widow's claim he could not resist sarcasm:

> This widow admits that prior to her marriage with the deceased soldier she had married another man whom she could only say she believed to be dead. I believe her case to be a pitiable one and wish that I could join in her relief. But unfortunately official duty cannot always be well done when directed solely by sympathy or charity.[8]

In the case of the man who fell from the ladder—"It is not a pleasant thing to interfere in such a case. But we are dealing with pensions, not gratuities."[9] And on the details of the claim

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[6] Veto of pension of Cudbert Stone, February 5, 1887, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., 1405.

[7] Veto pension for Catherine Sattler, February 5, 1887, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 2nd sess., 1406.

[8] Veto pension for Harriet Welch, June 24, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 6401.

[9] Veto pension for Rebecca Eldridge, May 29, 1886, *Congressionl Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 6401.

of a widow whose husband was drowned crossing the Roanoke River, he commented:

> It was claimed as late as 1885 in behalf of the widow that her husband's wounds caused deafness to such an extent that at the time he was drowned he was unable to hear the ferryman with whom he was crossing the river call out that the boat was sinking. How he could have saved his life if he had heard the warning is not stated.[10]

He pointed out the absurdity of the medical reasons given for pensions. One soldier whose only record in the war had been a series of hospitalizations, starting with the measles, brought Cleveland's comment:

> Fifteen years after this brilliant service and this terrific encounter with the measles, and on the 28th of June, 1880, the claimant discovered that his attack of the measles had something to do with his army enrollment and that this disease had "settled in his eyes also affecting his spinal column."[11]

And in another veto: "The ingenuity developed in constant and persistent attacks on the public treasury by those claiming pensions or an increase of those already granted is exhibited in bold relief by this attempt to include sore eyes among the results of diarrhea."[12]

If in his veto of special acts President Cleveland purposed constructively to encourage passage and enforcement of uniform general laws to aid veterans, the number of veterans placed on the federal rolls under general laws during his two administrations and the appropriations asked of Congress for the Pension Bureau in his annual messages should provide some proof of his intentions. The total number of veterans receiving pensions in March, 1885, namely 345,125,[13] was increased by June, 1886, to 365,783 or by 40,857, nearly the largest single increase for one year since 1861; Civil War veterans numbered 305,605.[14] By the fiscal year ending June, 1888, 60,522 claimants had been added to bring the total number at the end of the first Cleveland administration to 452,557. In 1892–3 an additional 89,944 veterans received pensions chiefly under the general laws, making a total of 966,012.

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[10] Veto pension for Mary Norman, June 23, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 6401.

[11] Veto pension for William Bishop, June 23, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 6461.

[12] Veto pension for John W. Farris, June 23, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 6461.

[13] Richardson, VIII, 360, First Annual Message, December 8, 1885.

[14] *Ibid.*, VIII, 523, Second Annual Message, December 6, 1886. The names of 20,658 had been dropped from the list.

In his message of December, 1894, Cleveland gave the total figure of 969,544, and at the end of his second administration in December, 1896, it was 970,678 veterans, the largest number reached in that era.[15] Most of these additions to the pension rolls took place under general bills as in 1892–3 when 89,944 new veterans' claims were allowed under a general law passed June 27, 1890 and enforced when President Cleveland assumed his second term.[16]

Critics of President Cleveland's individual pension vetoes usually ignore President Harrison's expressed concern with the number of private relief bills presented in his administration, his encouragement of general legislation and his objection to the character of some private claims. Referring to the Disability Pension Act of June 27, 1890, President Harrison said: "This liberal enlargement of the general law should suggest a more careful scrutiny of bills for special relief both as to the cases where relief is granted and as to the amounts allowed."[17] Slight wonder that President Harrison as well as Cleveland showed concern with pension requests when it is noted that of total estimated appropriations of $457,261,335.33 for the federal government presented to Congress for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1894, the amount of $165,000,000 was earmarked for pensions under administration of the Pension Bureau.[18]

II

Long before Woodrow Wilson's denunciation of special interests operating on Congress, Cleveland recognized the pressures productive of many pension claims as an important aspect of the legislative process in his time, and the evidence suggests that he was the first President to point out repeatedly the problems arising from such special and particular influences on Congress. His veto messages as mayor and governor, especially his vetoes of appropriation bills for public buildings and public works pointed out the danger of special legislation to the public interest and the necessity of protecting it by use of the veto power.[19] Pointing out in

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[15] *Ibid.*, IX, 736, President Cleveland's Annual Message, December 7, 1896.

[16] *Ibid.*, IX, 452, Message of December 4, 1893.

[17] *Ibid.*, IX, 118, President Harrison's Second Annual Message, December 1, 1890.

[18] *Ibid.*, IX, 319, President Harrison's Fourth Annual Message, December 8, 1892.

[19] Charles Armitage, *Grover Cleveland As Buffalo Knew Him*, Buffalo, 1926.

his first inaugural "the existence of a large variety of diverse and competing interests," he believed they "need give us no fear that the greatest good of the greatest number will fail to be accomplished if in the halls of the National legislature that spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail in which the Constitution had its birth."[20] Later he referred to "the challenge of wild and reckless pension expenditure which overleaps the bounds of grateful recognition of patriotic service and prostitutes to vicious uses the people's prompt and generous impulse to aid those disabled in their country's defense."[21]

Cleveland strategically eliminated the pension bills that he believed contradicted the greatest good of the greatest number by stressing the public interest as a main reason for veto. The course of special legislation operated very unfairly:

> Those with certain influence or friends to push their claims procure pensions, and those who have neither friends or influence must be content with their fate under general laws. It operates unfairly by increasing in numerous instances the pensions of those already on the rolls, while many other deserving cases, from the lack of fortunate advocacy, are obliged to be content with the sum provided by general laws . . . the freedom with which these private pension bills are passed furnishes an inducement to fraud and imposition. . . . I have conceived the prevention of the complete discredit which must ensue from the unreasonable, unfair and reckless granting of pensions by special acts to be the best service I can render our veterans.[22]

He absolved veterans in general as unaware of the extent of "absurd" claims: "I believe that if the veterans of the war knew all that was going on in the way of granting pensions by private bills they would be more disgusted than any class of citizens."[23] True patriotic claims suffered in prestige by the special acts, he claimed, and "yet I neither believe it to be a duty or a kindness to the worthy citizens for whose benefit our scheme of pensions was provided to permit the diversion of the Nation's bounty to objects not within its scope or purpose."[24]

Not only were veterans' interests in general to be protected by veto of special bills, but Cleveland often referred to the individuals whose sufferings these measures ignored. "While the claims of

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[20] Richardson, VIII, 300, First Inaugural Message, March 4, 1885.
[21] *Ibid.*, IX, 390, Second Inaugural Message, March 4, 1893.
[22] *Ibid.*, VIII, 684, Veto of Senate Bill No. 1547 for Mary Ann Dougherty, July 5, 1888.
[23] *Ibid.*, VIII, 681, Veto of House Bill No. 2215, June 22, 1888.
[24] *Ibid.*, VIII, 423, May 25, 1886.

thousands of wounded and disabled soldiers wait for justice at the hands of the government" he pointed out in one instance, "I am constrained to impose an objection to a measure which proposes to suspend general and wholesome laws for the purpose of granting what appears to me to be an undeserved gratuity,"[25] or again, "I cannot forget the thousands of poor widows with claims superior to this beneficiary but with no interested friends to push their claims for increase of pensions, who would be discriminated against if this proposed bill becomes a law."[26]

Not only were special pension bills unfair to veterans as a group and to deserving individuals, but Cleveland contended such bills demoralized the individual whose claims were pursued, and Congress as well. Sometimes he referred sarcastically to the evident fraud, "I do not suppose that the Congress is prepared to go so far in special pension legislation as to grant pensions to those against whom charges of desertion appear on record,"[27] or "This is not the conduct of a man claiming in good faith a pension from the government. . . . I believe this claim for pension to be a fraud from beginning to end, and the effrontery with which it has been pushed shows the necessity of a careful examination of these cases,"[28] or he referred to demoralization of the individual involved,

> I credit this claimant with being a good soldier, and I am willing to believe that his insistence upon a greater pension than that already allowed by the Pension Bureau under liberal general laws, enacted for the benefit of himself and all his comrades, is the result of the demoralization produced by ill-advised special legislation on the subject.[29]

Such special claims promoted by Congress not only demoralized individuals, Cleveland contended in his veto messages, but helped to undermine public morality and honesty:

> Already in the matter of procuring pensions there exists a widespread disregard of truth and good faith, stimulated by those who as agents undertake to establish claims for pensions heedlessly entered upon by the expectant beneficiary, and encouraged, or at least not condemned, by those unwilling to obstruct a neighbor's plans.[30] Every relaxation of principle in granting of pension invites applications without merit and encourages those who for gain urge honest men to become dishonest. This is the

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25 *Ibid.*, VIII, 411, Veto of a pension for John Hollins McBlair, March 10, 1886.

26 *Ibid.*, VIII, 679, Veto of increase of pension for a war widow, Mary Minor Hoxey, June 22, 1888.

27 *Ibid.*, VIII, 736, Veto of House Bill No. 10563, October 16, 1888.

28 *Ibid.*, VIII, 667, Veto of House Bill No. 8164, May 19, 1888.

29 *Ibid.*, VIII, 480.

30 *Ibid.*, VIII, 555.

demoralizing lesson taught the people that against the public treasury the most questionable expedients are allowable.[31]

Bad precedents in legislation and legislative procedure, Cleveland feared, were being "established by the hundreds of special pension bills." He was convinced, he said, that "the interposition by special enactment in the granting of pensions should be rare and exceptional,"[32] that "the allowance of pensions by special acts based upon service only give rise to unjust and unfair discriminations among those equally entitled and makes precedents which will eventually result in an entire departure from the principle upon which pensions are now awarded."[33] In a long message he referred to the numerous general bills passed for veteran aid, and the special acts

which have been passed granting pensions where for my part I am willing to confess that sympathy rather than judgment has often led to the discovery of a relation between injury or death and military service. I am constrained by a sense of public duty to interpose against establishing a principle and setting a precedent which must result in unregulated, partial and unjust gifts of public money.[34]

III

One motivation for veto of individual pension claims was President Cleveland's conviction that the work and importance of the Pension Bureau should be strengthened and upheld. His sense of executive prerogative in such matters as department recommendations and his desire to promote the efficiency of the Bureau as an executive agency were reflected in the messages, as his veto of a Senate bill illustrates:

After the Pension Bureau has been in operation for a score of years since the late Civil War, equipped with thousands of employees charged with no other duty except ascertainment and adjustment of the claims of our discharged soldiers and their surviving relatives, it seems to me a strange case that this [bill] should be presented to justify the passage of a Special act . . . granting a pension which has been refused by the Bureau especially organized for the purpose of allowing the same under just and liberal laws.[35]

Very often Cleveland concluded a pension veto message with this kind of statement: "I find nothing in the facts presented to me

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[31] *Ibid.*, VIII, 437, Veto message of June 2, 1886.
[32] *Ibid.*, 416, Message May 8, 1886.
[33] *Ibid.*, IX, 833, February 23, 1889.
[34] Message of July 10, 1886 to the 49th Congress, 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, 7073.
[35] Richardson, VIII, 423, Veto of Senate bill No. 1290, May 25, 1885.

which, in my opinion, justifies the reversal of the judgment of the Bureau and the Secretary of the Interior,"[36] or "His claim has not been fully passed upon by the Pension Bureau which, in my opinion, is sufficient reason why this bill should not become a law,"[37] or again, "this is a question which the Bureau is so well fitted to investigate and justly determine that it is, in my opinion, best to permit the same to be there fully examined."[38] Practically every-one of President Cleveland's pension veto messages in Richardson's volumes VIII and IX refers to the advice and work of the Pension Bureau as the agency whose decisions the President is upholding; often, too, he refers to War Department files on the war records of claimants. He was particularly critical of reversal of Pension Bureau decisions by special acts of Congress, complaining that the practice of frequent reversal by special enactment of "the decisions of the bureau invested by law with examination of pension claims fully equipped for such examination and which ought not to be suspected of any lack of liberality to our veteran soldiers is exceed-ingly questionable." He concluded,

> It may well be doubted if a committee of Congress has a better opportunity than such an agency to judge of the merits of the claims. If, however, there is any lack of power in the Pension Bureau for a full investigation, it should be supplied; if the system adopted is inadequate to do full justice to claims it should be corrected, and if there is want of sympathy and consideration for the defenders or our government, the Bureau should be re-organized.[39]

In this same message the President expounded further on the burden Congress placed on the executive by the number of pension bills that reversed Pension Bureau decisions carefully arrived at:

> There has lately been presented to me, on the same day, for approval nearly 240 special bills granting and increasing pensions and restoring to the pension list the names of parties which for cause had been dropped. To aid Executive duty they were referred to the Pension Bureau for examination and report.[40]

Of these 240 bills, Cleveland indicated, he had signed 81. In another message he cited over 600 bills passed by Congress in one session, three times the number passed at any single session

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[36] *Ibid.*, VIII, 435–436.
[37] *Ibid.*, VIII, 435, Veto of House bill No. 3624 granting pension to Fred J. Leese, June 21, 1886.
[38] *Ibid.*, VIII, 444.
[39] Message of May 9, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 2 sess., 4472.
[40] *Ibid.*

since 1861. Protesting the burden of special acts, he reminded Congress that the Pension Bureau "fully equipped and regulated by the most liberal rules in active operation, supplemented in its work by constant special legislation," stood by to judge veterans' claims and it was "certainly not unreasonable to suppose that in all the years that have elapsed since the close of the war a majority of the meritorious claims for pensions have been presented and determined."[41] He constantly reminded Congress of the Pension Bureau's adequacy in handling all claims, with an appropriation of

> $76,000,000 of the public money for distribution as pensions under laws liberally constructed, with a view of meeting every meritorious case. More than $1,000,000 was added to maintain the Pension Bureau which is charged with the duty of a fair, just and liberal apportionment of this fund.[42]

Toward the end of his term Cleveland pointed out that as a result of Pension Bureau efficiency and honesty in carrying out the legislative mandate, reforms had been effected in the pension system.

> The barefaced and extensive pension frauds exposed under the direction of the courageous and generous veteran soldier [Colonel John C. Black] now at the head of the Bureau leave no room for the claim that no purgation of our pension rolls was needed or that continued vigilance and prompt action are not necessary to the same end.[43]

IV

Cleveland's veto messages beginning with his vetoes of sewage bills and pork barrel legislation as mayor and governor, with their constant references to the character and language of the bills presented for his signature as examples of poor legislation, reflect his cognizance of certain aspects of the legislative process and his intention to improve it. Study of his pension veto messages as President brings out at least three constructive suggestions he frequently offered for improvement of legislation and the legislative process: (1) special bills setting a bad precedent in type of legislation and resulting from special pressures should be reduced in number; (2) a more careful process should be followed by Congress and its committees in handling pension bills; (3) the language of bills should be improved so the real legislative intent would be clear and the executive agency of enforcement receive a clear directive.

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41 Richardson, VIII, 438, Veto message of June 21, 1886.
42 *Ibid.*, VIII, 465. Veto of House Bill No. 2971.
43 *Ibid.*, IX, 546, Second Annual message of President Cleveland, December 3, 1894.

To encourage general and uniform laws on veterans pensions, President Cleveland, as pointed out before in this article, gave as reason for some pension vetoes the bad precedents set by special legislation as working to the disadvantage of individuals and of Congress. Vetoing a bill based in a widow's need claim which he felt indefensible as legislative precedent, he wrote: "Passage of this law would, in my opinion, establish a precedent so far-reaching and open the door to such a vast multitude of claims not on principle within our present laws that I am constrained to disapprove the bill under consideration;"[44] in another case, "the allowance of this claim would set a precedent which could hardly be ignored and which, if followed, would furnish another means of attack upon the public treasury, quite as effective as many which are now in operation."[45] In the veto of a pension for one Rachel Barnes, widow of a suicide, he concluded: "It would be an unfair discrimination against many who though in sad plight, have been refused relief in similar circumstances, and would establish an exceedingly troublesome and dangerous precedent."[46]

Not only the purpose of special pension bills invoked President Cleveland's veto but his knowledge of the legislative procedure involved in particular acts provided his suggestion that more careful procedure be observed by the Congressional Committee involved, especially in the handling of evidence regarding claims. He returned one bill, advising

> the Committee to whom the bill was referred by the Senate admit that there is a quantity of contradictory testimony, biased in about equal proportion for and against the claimant. . . . I am not prepared either to gratuitously set at naught two determinations by the Pension Bureau . . . and especially when the evidence before the committee to reverse the Bureau's action is admitted to be "contradictory" and "biased in about equal portions for and against the claimant."[47]

In vetoing a pension for a Mrs. Margaret Dunlop: "It is quite evident that the affidavit presented to the Senate Committee was contrived to deceive, and it is to be feared that this is but a sample of many in support of claims for pensions."[48] Careless disregard by the legislators for facts led to other vetoes: "I deem myself obliged to disapprove this bill on the ground that there is an

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44 *Ibid.*, VIII, 470, Veto of pension for Sally Ann Bradley, July 6, 1888.
45 *Ibid.*, VIII, 458.
46 *Ibid.*, VIII, 702, August 10, 1888, message.
47 *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 428–429, Veto message of June 2, 1886.
48 *Ibid.*, VIII, 542–543.

almost complete failure to state any facts that should entitle the claimant to a pension,"[49] or, "the entire lack of any factor shown to exist which entitles the beneficiary named to a pension."[50]

An aspect of Congressional carelessness in drawing up "the promiscuous and ill-advised grants of pensions which have lately been presented to me for approval," he pointed out, was minority passage,

> the fact that a very large proportion of these bills have never been submitted to a majority of either branch of Congress but are a result of nominal sessions held for the express purpose of their consideration and attended by a small minority of the members of the respective houses of the legislative branch of the government.[51]

Other bills duplicated bills previously passed and approved by the President[52] or were so carelessly worded that they were "not framed in such a way as to accomplish that object [to increase pension] or to benefit the claimant in any way whatever."[53]

Throughout his career in the executive role, Cleveland showed concern for clear wording of legislation presented for his approval and enforcement. Although some of his more terse comment was reserved for acts of the New York legislature or appropriations for public buildings by Congress, the pension vetoes contain many references to the language and form of legislative acts. In his message returning a pension bill to the House he suggested the wording as a main reason for disapproval: "Upon a careful consideration of the language of this section of the bill given, it seems to me to be so uncertain and liable to such conflicting construction and to be subject to such unjust and mischievous application as to alone furnish sufficient ground for disapproving the proposed legislation."[54] In returning the measure he constructively pointed out inexact phrases in the bill and the difficulty of their interpretation by government agencies. Did the advocates of the bill in Congress, he asks, not have differences of opinion as to the meaning of this section he was analyzing?

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[49] *Ibid.*, VIII, 435, Veto message of June 21, 1886.

[50] *Ibid.*, VIII, 438.

[51] Veto of pension bill for Elizabeth De Krafft, June 22, 1886, *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 2 sess., p. 6261.

[52] Pension bills for Mary Sullivan returned April 30, 1888, Richardson, VIII, 651; for William Dickens, January 19, 1887, *Ibid.*, VIII, 539; Charles J. Estey, February 18, 1889, *Ibid.*, VIII, 827.

[53] *Ibid.*, VIII, 463, Veto of House bill No. 3623, pension for William H. Nevil.

[54] *Ibid.*, VIII, 551, Veto of House bill No. 10457 called the "Disabled Veterans Bill," VIII, 551.

V

Analysis of President Cleveland's pension veto messages as to content suggests constructive rather than negative purpose, aiming to promote uniform and general pension laws, to point out that their passage and implementation was endangered by special bills and pressures on Congress, to protect the functions of the Pension Bureau and to encourage passage of better designed legislation. In the immediate context Congress reacted to the pension vetoes and to what some members of the House and Senate felt to be undue executive interference in legislative matters with acrimonious debate conducted chiefly on party lines.[55]

In a wider reference, President Cleveland's use of the veto power constituted an important phase of his executive performance and of his relations with Congress. Further study including President Cleveland's communications and messages to Congress, his contacts with groups and committees in the House and Senate, with key members of his party and with Cabinet members and individuals who had influence on Congress should provide understanding of its growth in office and the transition, as Woodrow Wilson observed, from congressional to presidential government in the United States.

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[55] *Congressional Record*, 49th Congress, 2 sess., 1886, 7007 ff., Speeches by Rep. Lyman of Iowa, Rep. Burrows of Michigan, Rep. Cannon of Illinois, Rep. Browne of Indiana, and others.

A Historical Note on the Uses of Census Returns

The foreign born exerted a surprising influence on the political life of the frontier community of Burlington, Iowa. The Germans, in particular, repeatedly received credit or condemnation for victory or defeat in local elections. Yet the tendency in recent years has been to minimize the significance of the foreign born vote in the *ante bellum* Northwest. Superficial evaluation of census data may have misled us in this critical area of research. A close examination of census figures reveals that a fresh approach is needed when one is gathering statistics on nativity.

Historians compile total population figures indiscriminately when investigating population origins. They find that a certain percentage of the people of a community, state, or region migrated from the older states of the East, South or West, or immigrated from England, Ireland, Germany, and so on. Their conclusions are based on such total figures. If this traditional technique is used, the population of Burlington, Iowa, in 1850, came from the following areas:*

South	473	11.68%
New England	148	3.65%
Mid-Atlantic	602	14.87%
Northwest (including Iowa)	1750	43.24%
Foreign	1074	26.53%
Total	4047	

If, however, these figures are broken down so as to differentiate among adult males, adult females, and children they become much more revealing:

	Men	Women	Children	Total
South	139–12.39%	155–19.01%	179– 8.47%	473–11.68%
New England	82– 7.31%	45– 5.52%	21– .99%	148– 3.65%
Mid-Atlantic	238–21.23%	155–19.01%	209– 9.90%	602–14.87%
Northwest	215–19.17%	180–22.08%	1355–64.18%	1750–43.24%
Foreign	447–39.87%	280–34.35%	347–16.43%	1074–26.53%
Total	1121–27.69%	815–20.13%	2111–52.16%	4047

* All of the population figures cited are compiled from the microfilmed census manuscripts *1850 Census Population, Schedules, Iowa* and *1860 Census Population, Schedules, Iowa.*

The political potential of the foreign born is dramatized by this method. If one considers the adult white males separately, and they are the only group affecting political life, the foreign born percentage rises from slightly more than 26.5% to 39.87½; an enormous increase in terms of voting statistics!

One reason for the difference between the total population and the adult white males is that most of the children of the foreign families were born in America and were listed as native born in the census. The American born children of foreign parents simply pad the total native born figures. These children, of course, were of no importance politically and should not be counted in a political study. Furthermore, if only one of the parents was foreign born it was usually the father. The foreign born element contained a high proportion of adult males. Among all the foreign born, 41.62% were men; 26.07% were women; and 32.30% were children. This explains why nearly forty percent of the Burlington men were foreign born, although only 26.5% of the total population was foreign.

The same principle applies to the figures commonly used for the native born population. It is clear that the impressive total figures for the Northwest resulted from the large number of children born in that region as settlement moved toward Iowa. States such as Indiana, Illinois and Iowa added mostly children to the Burlington population. Illinois, for example, contributed 120 persons, 111 of whom were children. Indiana sent 186 persons, 110 of whom were children. Over one-half of the 615 who came from Ohio were children, and all 813 of those born in Iowa were still children in 1850. There are many cases where children were born in geographical areas other than that of the parents. If the parents were from Virginia and their children were born in Indiana it is certainly a mistake, politically, to enter the children under the total migrating from the northern state. Obviously Ohio, Indiana and Illinois receive an inflated percentage figure as a result of this practice. Yet this is precisely what happens when census figures are simply totaled as they now are.

The census for 1860 confirms the necessity of differentiating between total population and adult males. In the decade from 1850 to 1860 the foreign element in the Burlington population

became even more important, increasing from 26.5% to 36.14%:

South	395	6.49%
New England	307	5.04%
Mid-Atlantic	796	13.08%
Northwest	2385	39.22%
Foreign	2198	36.14%
Total	6081	

Among adult males, however, the foreign born reached the astounding total of 54.5%!

	Men	Women	Children	Total
South	128– 7.61%	147– 9.70%	120– 4.15%	395– 6.49%
New England	145– 8.62%	84– 5.54%	78– 2.70%	307– 5.04%
Mid-Atlantic	282–16.77%	257–16.96%	257– 8.90%	796–13.08%
Northwest	209–12.43%	246–16.23%	1930–66.89%	2385–39.22%
Foreign	917–54.55%	781–51.55%	500–17.33%	2198–36.14%
Total	1681–27.64%	1515–24.91%	2885–47.44%	6081

These figures reveal an actual decline for the South and a decline in percentage for all but New England and the foreign born. The influx of foreign born adults resulted in a percentage decline even for the children. The large number of foreign adult males who immigrated kept the percentage of total adult males at a remarkably stable figure.

The position of the Germans became especially impressive. One of every three adult males in 1860 was German born! The Irish also registered strong gains. The following tables show the comparative positions of the three largest foreign groups in 1850 and 1860:

1850	German	Irish	English	Total
Total population	14.08%	4.07%	5.88%	24.03%
Total adult males	20.78%	7.04%	7.76%	35.58%
Total foreign born	53.07%	15.36%	22.16%	90.59%
Total foreign born adult males	52.12%	17.67%	19.46%	89.25%
1860				
Total population	21.18%	8.25%	2.12%	31.55%
Total adult males	33.55%	11.42%	2.61%	47.58%
Total foreign born	58.59%	22.83%	5.86%	87.28%
Total foreign born adult males	61.50%	20.93%	4.79%	87.22%

Regarding the foreign born, there could be cultural as well as political implications in using this different approach to the census. Remember that while the foreign born constituted thirty-six percent of the total population in 1860, seventy-seven percent of the foreign born were adults, and they comprised fifty-three percent of the total adult population. Therefore the impact of the foreign in terms of the family must have been very great indeed.

In the Christian Race family, to cite a concrete example, the parents were German and their eight children were born in Virginia, Pennsylvania and Iowa. Conventional census totals would simply list two German and eight American born persons. This is as misleading culturally as it is politically. All ten of these people were part of what must have been a "German" family. In the David McKee family the father was Irish and the wife and four children were born in Ohio and Iowa. In that happy time when the male parent was still the dominant factor in the family, would not this be an "Irish" family? If so, then we must accord the foreign element in the population a greater social significance than total census figures would normally indicate.

There is another problem concerning the foreign born. How many of them were naturalized citizens and permitted to vote in the general elections? This could reduce the number of foreign born voters considerably, although if the newspapers can be believed many voted anyway. Even if many were prohibited from voting, the foreign born could have had a decisive influence on any election in Burlington. Certainly the crediting by contemporary observers of the Republican victory in 1860 to the foreign born voters is at least plausible when one considers that Lincoln received fifty-one percent of the vote of Burlington and Des Moines county. In purely local elections all the foreign born adult males could vote. Temperance, Sabbath laws and nativism may assume a new importance if our revised census figures are valid for other areas.

What conclusions may we draw from this evidence? It is possible that the foreign born element in the population has not been properly recognized as a political force after all. It is also likely that statistics regarding migration within the United States are misleading. What can be done to rectify this? Detailed examinations of the census rolls must be undertaken to distinguish the potential *voting* population from the total population in terms of

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ethnic and geographical origins. It is important to know the nativity for the father, mother and each child of each family. Until comparative studies are made we cannot know whether the composition of the Burlington population was representative even of the Middle West. But until the new approach suggested in this paper is tested we cannot proceed with confidence to interpret census returns using the old conventional techniques.

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Anti-Catholicism in Wisconsin Politics, 1914-1920

Sandwiched between the spectacular anti-Catholic movements of the American Protective Association and the Ku Klux Klan, and overshadowed by the "Progressive Movement" and World War One, a significant phase of anti-Catholicism covering the years 1914 through 1920 has gone largely unnoticed. John Higham, in his perceptive analysis of anti-immigration sentiment has noted the crucial importance of the religious issue in New York's gubernatorial election of 1914. In that election, the campaign against Martin Glynn, the Democratic candidate, was marked by the organization of a third party, based exclusively on the Catholic issue.[1] But the emergence of the religious question on the political surface, where all could see it, was confined to New York. Thus, the prevalence and significance of that issue as an underlying factor in the politics and thought of the period may have been underestimated by historians.

Private correspondence of political leaders in Wisconsin reveals that anti-Catholic sentiment was a significant, and at times, decisive factor in the elections of that state between 1914 and 1920. However, since the issue was more suitable for private whispering than for public oratory, it was rarely reported on in the newspapers. Extensive study of the politics of other states in this period might well reveal the existence of the same undercurrent. If this should prove the case, interpretation of the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s would be subject to revision. Equally important, the divisive effects of the religious issue would have to be added to the list of causes of the decline of the progressive movement.

Wisconsin, under its dynamic "Fighting Bob" La Follette, had led the progressive onslaught against privilege, beginning with La Follette's election as Governor in 1900. Legislative and political triumphs for the progressives marked the years that followed, as new issues conveniently emerged to renew the cause. But in 1914 La Follette's powerful organization was in trouble. Senator La Follette and the progressive governor of the state, Francis E. McGovern, openly clashed at the national Republican convention

[1] John Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, New Brunswick, 1955, 184.

of 1912, where La Follette and his partisans accused McGovern of betraying La Follette's presidential ambitions in favor of Theodore Roosevelt. The rival progressive factions headed by the senator and the governor patched up their differences for the 1918 campaign in the state, but in 1913 warfare resumed. The test on which the fate of La Follette's political machine seemed to rest occurred in 1914, when McGovern sought the Republican senatorial nomination against a hand-picked pro-La Follette candidate, Lieutenant Governor Tom Morris of La Crosse. But the conflict was not to be determined wholly on its merits. Morris was a Catholic and that fact contributed heavily to his defeat.[2]

The Scandinavian element, of whom the Norwegians were most numerous, had been a backbone of La Follette's political strength through the years. Some disaffection within this group on the basis of the religious issue was therefore a serious blow to La Follette's cause in 1914.

The Norwegian language paper *Skandinaven* had generally been useful to La Follette. Widely circulated in Wisconsin, it at once mirrored and moulded Norwegian political opinion. It was therefore with some alarm that Herman Ekern, one of La Follette's closest and most astute political lieutenants in the state, read the following letter in the paper, signed only "O.H.":

> . . . Shall we, as Scandinavians and Protestant citizens of Wisconsin, bestow our confidence upon a Roman Catholic as our representative in Washington? . . . The history and record of the Catholic power is black, blood stained and rotten, and cannot bear the light of day, and remember that it never changes, of which fact several of its own prelates have boasted. Its sole aim and struggle is to obtain complete power.
>
> Best to keep politics and religion separate, in general, but as we all know, the Roman Catholic Church is in politics, and on all fours, too; and whether or not it shall become supreme in this country when it has been repudiated and broken in Europe remains with us to say when we cast our ballots.[3]

Others besides Ekern feared the religious issue. A La Follette man in Waushara County wrote Ekern late in April, "Can you tell

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[2] For further details on the factional division among the Wisconsin progressives, see Herbert F. Margulies, "The Background of the La Follette-McGovern Schism," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Autumn, 1956, 21–29, and Herbert F. Margulies, "The Decline of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1911–1914," *Mid-America*, July 1957, 131–155.

[3] *Skandinaven*, April 22, 1914; translation in Herman Ekern to Tom Morris, n.d., Herman L. Ekern Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society Library, Madison, Wisconsin. All manuscript collections cited in this article are at the same repository.

me of what religious belief our Governor is? And State Superintendent C. P. Cary? If they are Catholics do you know wether [sic] they belong to the Knights of Columbus?"[4]

Some McGovern men, on the other hand, regarded the question with satisfaction. In late May one of these reported to McGovern's secretary and political right hand, Harry Wilbur, that in his section, the heavily Scandinavian western part of the state, there was "Marked opposition to Morris on ac. Catholic connections." "To help Morris," he went on, "Ekern is calling the Gov. 'an apostate' —saying that he, the Gov. is at heart a Catholic."[5] Wilbur was not displeased. He quickly replied "I note what you say regarding the opposition to Morris and the ground on which it is based. Reports that come to me from different parts of the state indicate that that particular feature is going to play a large part in the campaign, though, of course, all the work along that line will be done quietly."[6]

As the campaign advanced the issue did not abate, judging by confidential reports to political leaders.[7] Ekern, long close to the editor of *Skandinaven*, made every effort to keep that influential journal from opposing Morris. But he judged that the paper was subject to pressure from its readers.[8] He was apparently right, for early in August, *Skandinaven* came out for McGovern, later raising the religious issue in specific terms.[9]

At once taking advantage of and stimulating anti-Catholic feeling in the state were several national journals and organizations. The leading anti-Catholic paper in the nation, *The Menace*, was read widely in the state, a pro-La Follette politician ruefully noted.[10] Both the Knights of Luther and the Guardians of Liberty were active.[11] Ekern found the leaders of the Guardians of Liberty in the state to be friendly to La Follette but determined to pursue

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4 E. G. Keup to Ekern, April 22, 1914, Ekern Papers.

5 F. A. George to Harry Curran Wilbur, May 22, 1914, Francis E. McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.

6 Wilbur to George, May 26, 1914, McGovern Papers, Wilbur Correspondence.

7 H. J. Mortensen to Herman Ekern, June 11, 1914; E. G. Keup to Ekern, June 23, 1914; Ole Eggum to Ekern, August 1, 1914, Ekern Papers; John S. Donald to James Makenzie, July 31, 1914, John S. Donald Papers.

8 Herman Ekern to Tom Morris, June 10, 1914, Ekern Papers.

9 *Milwaukee Free Press*, August 4, 1914; Herman Ekern to Ole Eggum, August 28, 1914, Ekern Papers.

10 Ole Eggum to Herman Ekern, August 1, 1914, Ekern Papers.

11 John S. Donald to Robert M. La Follette, September 22, 1914, Donald Papers.

the political ends of the organization. This meant gathering information from candidates about their religious affiliations and passing it on to their local branches.[12]

Victory for McGovern was one of the fruits of the anti-Catholic sentiment. He polled 37,125 votes to 26,012 for Morris, 26,156 for the leading anti-Progressive candidate and about 25,000 scattered amongst three others.[13] John S. Donald, progressive secretary of state, conjectured that the closeness of his own renomination contest was due to the fact that many voters falsely believed him to be Irish Catholic.[14]

While 1916 saw no state-wide Catholic versus Protestant tests comparable in importance to the McGovern-Morris battle of 1914, yet the religious issue remained as prominent in politics as it had been, especially in the western part of the state. In the absence of other outstanding issues, the religious question, spearheaded by the Guardians of Liberty, was judged to be the dominant one in local contests throughout the state and of importance even in the national election.[15]

Though no longer dominant in 1918, the religious issue again influenced the outcome of a statewide contest in that year. The war wrought great changes on the Wisconsin political scene. The old economic issues that had divided progressives and "stalwarts" faded into the past as a more emotion-packed question arose. Loyalty was the issue. The existence in Wisconsin of a large German population, together with Senator La Follette's opposition to American entry into the war and to certain of the administration's war measures, aroused the fury of many Wisconsin citi-

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12 Herman Ekern to Tom Morris, July 26, 1914, Ekern Papers.

13 *Wisconsin Blue Book*, 1915, 233–235. McGovern was later defeated in the general election by a liberal Democrat, Paul Husting.

14 John S. Donald to Robert M. La Follette, September 22, 1914, Donald Papers.

15 J. J. Irvine to Merlin Hull, March 17, 1916, Merlin Hull Papers; Anna Adams Dickie to Charles R. McCarthy, August 28, 1916, Charles R. McCarthy Papers; John J. Esch to A. E. Dudley, September 17, 1916; C. Rabenstein to Esch, September 9, 1916; O. G. Munson to Esch, September 12, 1916; Edward E. Browne to Esch, September 16, 1916; F. A. Cooper to Esch, October 2, 1916; Esch to Frank B. Woods, October 2, 1916; Esch to F. A. Cooper, October 3, 1916; Esch to W. F. Esch, October 12, 1916; Esch to Frank B. Oster, October 22, 1916; Esch to A. D. Dudley, October 30, 1916; N. B. Hood to Esch, No. 1, 1916, John J. Esch Papers. For a fuller discussion of the 1916 campaign, see Robert M. Maxwell, *Emanuel Philipp, Wisconsin Stalwart*, Madison, 1959, 122–128; Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette*, 2 vols., New York, 1953, vol. 1, 578–585, and Herbert F. Margulies, "Issues and Politics of Wisconsin Progressivism, 1906–1920," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1955, 279–314.

zens. Led by State Senator Roy Wilcox of Eau Claire, the state legislature in March, 1918, adopted a resolution condemning the state's senior Senator, Robert M. La Follette, for his views and utterances on the war. The Wilcox resolution was part of a general campaign designed to aid the war effort and demonstrate loyalty.

Governor Emanuel Philipp, while never a "La Follette man,"[16] yet failed to satisfy many. In one instance, for example, he laughed at appeals to declare martial law in Milwaukee should the anti-war Social Democratic party win an election there. Elements among the "loyalty" forces determined to oust Philipp from the governorship and replace him with Roy Wilcox. The personal contempt that the two held for each other added color to a contest that was already of vital importance and concern.

The Catholic issue was certainly not the leading question in the 1918 primary campaign. In fact, there is scant testimony to its prominence. There is only the letter of a State Guardian in the Guardians of Liberty, Dr. A. H. Hartwig, in July, 1918, reporting that his organization was opposing Wilcox because he was Catholic. While not certain, Dr. Hartwig believed accurate the organization's claim to 150,000 members in the state.[17] But even assuming the minor character of the issue in 1918, yet it was probably decisive in the Wilcox-Philipp contest, for the incumbent won renomination by a very scant margin—71,614 to 71,164.[18] The Guardians of Liberty were doubtless strong enough to account for fewer than 500 anti-Wilcox votes.

The loyalty question remained prominent in 1920, as did Roy Wilcox. But so too did the religious issue. To several veteran politicians, Wilcox's Catholicism seemed the only major stumbling block to his success.[19] Wilcox was supported by the Anti-Saloon League in his fight for the Republican nomination for Governor. Significantly, though, the state leaders of that powerful organization felt compelled to write League workers late in the campaign explaining away the fact that the candidate did not send his children to the public schools.[20] Again, Wilcox was narrowly de-

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16 Philipp was the leader of the "stalwarts" beginning in 1910 and had been in the anti-La Follette camp since 1902.

17 A. H. Hartwig to James Thompson, July 12, 1918, James Thompson Papers.

18 *Wisconsin Blue Book*, 1919, 93.

19 A. B. Wesner to A. P. Nelson, May 22, 1920; Nelson to Wesner, May 28, 1920, Adolphus P. Nelson Papers.

20 *Capital Times* (Madison), August 27, 1920.

feated, this time by an outright La Follette man, John J. Blaine. The vote was 113,001 for Blaine, 102,199 for Wilcox.[21]

The years 1914 through 1920 in Wisconsin were marked by the last battles of progressivism, the issues arising from the war, and the question involved in post-war reconstruction. Under the surface, however, influencing voting throughout the period, was the pernicious religious issue. It cannot be discounted in consideration of the more prominent political battles, nor should the persistence of the question be overlooked in discussion of the "revival" of anti-Catholicism during the twenties.

In the Ku Klux Klan period of the twenties, Wisconsin was far from the leading anti-Catholic state, but instead had a weaker Klan than Indiana, Ohio, Colorado, Texas, and other states.[22] The anti-Catholicism exhibited in Badger politics during the 1914 to 1920 period therefore cannot be explained in terms of Wisconsin's uniquely virulent anti-Catholic movement. Rather, it seems reasonable to assume that a similar situation existed in many other states.

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[21] *Wisconsin Blue Book*, 1921, 70. For a fuller discussion of the politics of the period 1918 to 1920, see Maxwell, *Emanuel L. Philipp*, 132–211, and Herbert F. Margulies, "The Election of 1920 in Wisconsin: the Return to "Normalcy" Reappraised," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Autumn, 1957, 15–22.

[22] Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 286–299.

Book Reviews

The Idea of Continental Union. By Donald F. Warner. University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1960. Pp. ix, 276. $5.

During much of the 19th century, various groups in the United States and Canada agitated for union of the two nations, a union to dominate not only North America but the whole western hemisphere. Americans link this agitation most prominently with the War of 1812.

Professor Warner presents in this monograph the first full length detailed narrative account of that movement's persistence after 1812; he takes as his dates 1849-1893, rightly feeling that the 20th century finds the movement dead. He has chosen to pin his story on the three dates at which annexation sentiment was strongest; 1849–1850, when economics, centered chiefly around the coastal fisheries problems and the underdevelopment of western Canada sparked the issue; 1865-1873, when prosperity in America caused some Canadians to think of union, compounded also by dissatisfaction with British imperial policies; and 1888–1893, when economics again sparked the movement, together with a rare show of sympathy for union from a few American statesmen.

The chief virtue of this book is its details of the tortuous and complex trail which the issue left in Canadian politics. Warner limits himself to the Canadian story, a little too much be it said for this reviewer's taste. On the surface many factors worked for union: common ethnic ties and a common cultural heritage; geography which made transit of goods from north to south more feasible to much of Canada than from east to west; a Canadian lift that developed more in an American than English mold; and the economic advantages to be gained through free trade between the two countries. It was logical that businessmen led the van of sentiment in favor of union on both sides of the border, and equally logical that racial, ethnic, and emotional conflicts kept most American politicians out of the movement.

The disadvantages to union are also clear. Chief of these was the opposition of imperial authorities in England, which usually led to compromise, as in the act of 1867 which granted Canada autonomy. The annexation movement often defeated itself by provoking political compromise that stole its thunder, as it did also in helping prompt the government to build a transcontinental railroad linking western Canada, where annexation sentiment was always strong, to the rest of the Dominion. Divisions between Canadians, French-Canadians, and Americans generally left the movement shaky. American sentiment on the whole amounted to indifference; only late in the game did American politicians become interested, and then only a few answered the call, such as Fish, Blaine, and Harrison. The long prosperity after 1898 effectively ended the union movement.

This is a well written book, dealing with a complex and hitherto obscure topic. That said, it should be noted that the book needs more background information on the American side of the story. And this reviewer would have appreciated a little more literary flesh—quotations, character studies, analysis—to fill out what remains a skeletal monograph. Nonetheless, it tells a good story and the book well deserves the Mississippi Valley Historical Association's prize.

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The United Colonies of New England, 1643–1690. By Harry M. Ward. Vantage Press, New York, 1961. Pp. 434. $4.50.

This book will almost certainly amaze you, as it did me. Frankly, I had no idea that such a detailed study of the New England Confederation was possible. Even in the standard works on American colonial history this first attempt at union by the English colonies often receives treatment in one page or less. This book is easily the best treatment to date of the subject and is not apt to be displaced. Although footnotes do not appear at the bottom of the pages, they do appear at the end of each chapter, usually to the number of one hundred or more, many of them explanatory in nature and all testifying to the extremely careful study of the primary sources of the period.

But why was this effort at union important? It was important because it was to draw together the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut and New Haven into a union which was to last for about fifty years. This action was "destined to implant in the minds of the colonists the idea of federal union and to serve as a precedent for the later American union." Discussed and formulated in May and August 1643, we find the new union going into operation when the commissioners met at Boston on September 7, 1643. Two commissioners represented each of the four colonies. This confederation, the United Colonies of New England, was basically military, intended to unify the colonial military forces against Indian aggression. This union of the colonies did not create a nation. The confederation was intended to be merely a league. No strong national government was to be created. The final authority still rested with what we call the state legislatures, then usually referred to as the General Courts.

How well did the new organization work? One answer might be that it worked well enough to last about fifty years, whereas the Articles of Federation formulated in 1781 to keep the colonies or states together, lasted only about eight years. However, it must be admitted that the new organization was weak in many respects and was kept purposely so by its constituent members, each determined to keep its own freedom. The confederation could ask for funds for fighting the Indians, but could not forcibly collect any money. The commissioners lacked the power to enforce their decisions on the colonies.

Despite these seeming weaknesses in the organization, it accomplished much, due largely to the respect accorded the commissioners by each colony. At times, rather than oppose all the warlike Indian tribes in New England, the confederation allied itself with the Mohegans and Pequots, for example, against the very powerful Narragansetts. On another occasion, the confederation settled the friction existing between the Dutch in New Netherland and the New England colonies by signing the treaty of Hartford in 1650. Not content with such commendable accomplishments, the confederation during the period 1660–1670 induced the colonies to extend aid in the form of farm produce to the needy students and faculty at Harvard College.

Another commendable accomplishment of the confederation was the essential aid that it gave in 1663 to the printing of the entire Bible in English and in the "Indian language." This was the first Bible printed in America, according to the author. About 1,500 copies were printed, at a cost of one thousand pounds sterling. This accomplishment emphasized the interest of the confederation in Christianizing the Indian, as well as in opposing him militarily. Growing weaker in the 1670's, the confederation became helpless during the Andros regime, 1686–1689, and failed to regain its importance even after Andros was overthrown. By 1690 it had made its contribution, and it was an important one, to American history.

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Robert John Walker, A Politician from Jackson to Lincoln. By James P. Shenton. Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1961. Pp. xi, 268. $6.00.

Robert J. Walker, a native of Pennsylvania who married Benjamin Franklin's great-granddaughter, was an important figure in American history. Twice elected to the United States Senate from Mississippi, he proved himself an official of ability and even distinction as Polk's secretary of the treasury. Later he ran into trouble when he ventured out to Kansas as territorial governor under Buchanan. Still later, during the Civil War, this "wayward Southerner" served the Union cause in the East and abroad in what may be described as a probably effective and certainly eccentric manner. Now a statesman of remarkable astuteness and vision, now a money-making lawyer and versatile pamphleteer, now a mere demagogue and shameless speculator, Walker presents unusual challenges to the biographer and historian.

Professor Shenton has depicted his man neither as a hero nor as the arch-villain some contemporaries took him to be. Instead of trying to camouflage flaws in Walker's character and record, Shenton does not hesitate to point them out. At the same time, he makes the reader fully aware of the diminutive Democrat's talents and virtues. Thus this is no

mere historical photograph or daguerreotype, but a painting in depth with the lights and shadows which one values in excellent portraiture.

Shenton shows us that he knows his way around and through the labyrinthine mazes—as well as along the broad highways—of the so-called "Middle Period." To change the figure of speech, let it be said (decidedly to his credit) that the Columbia professor is an extraordinarily patient and skillful prober who is disinclined to be satisfied with surface manifestations and is well endowed with the asset of curiosity. The author has been especially imaginative and successful in his use of sources. Lacking a large body of Walker letters, Shenton made the most of collateral materials and is particularly impressive in revealing information derived from the William Wilson Corcoran Papers in the Library of Congress. Corcoran, the Washington banker and philanthropist, was far more influential politically as well as financially than has generally been realized. And Shenton is one of the few scholars who have appreciated the fact.

Two other points should be mentioned. When Shenton lacks adequate data to explain all aspects of a biographical problem, he candidly says so. This is refreshing and inspires confidence. Then, too, the Walker book gives evidence of careful pruning and polishing before being submitted to the publisher. Graduate students and others may wish to take note that conciseness and compactness are among the results, and that the volume as a whole has literary charm as well as historical merit.

HOLMAN HAMILTON

University of Kentucky

Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925–1929. By L. Ethan Ellis. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1961. Pp. ix, 303. $7.50.

L. Ethan Ellis provides a factual account of foreign relations that proceeds topically from reorganization of the foreign service through the troubled relations with Latin America, China, and Europe. The author patiently measures the actions of Frank Kellogg against the standards of a period that sought no other goals than preservation of the status quo, peace, and immunity from all association with the League of Nations.

Both Kellogg and Coolidge revered equanimity. They avoided crossing the will of William E. Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and, intent on avoiding trouble and anxious not to offend public opinion, enlightened or unenlightened, refrained from bold strokes in defense of American interests abroad.

The administration did little more than adjust lethargically to developments that it did not understand. Both Kellogg and his chief never doubted their own goodwill toward less favored nations, felt a kind of restrained sympathy for the people in the less developed countries, but viewed askance almost any move those same people made to achieve their aims.

Professor Ellis thinks that the minor achievements he records came less as a result of leadership than of pressures from both the public and the foreign service officers. The appointment of Dwight Morrow led to a temporary reconciliation with Mexico and a general pulling back from all forms of intervention in that unhappy country. Henry Stimson was called in to settle affairs in Nicaragua at a point where Kellogg was ill and completely frustrated by the failure of the discordant elements in that country, who rather inconsiderately persisted in fighting over issues that made little sense to the administration. The author gives Stimson's bold tactics credit for bringing a measure of peace, although he grants that the United States retained a close hold over the country.

The vast drama transpiring in China created a highly inconvenient dilemma for the industrious and worrisome Secretary of State. Public opinion at home sympathized with the Chinese and saw no reason for holding on to the unequal treaties. J. V. A. MacMurray, the American minister, an old China hand who enjoyed great prestige, scolded the Secretary of State for failure to take a firm course and for retreating in the face of Chinese demands. Kellogg shared the vague goodwill that the American public entertained for China and could not bring himself to steer a course that might lead to intervention. Kellogg set aside the advice of his minister in Peking and took a cautious lead in granting the Chinese Nationalists tariff autonomy.

The author sees in the Geneva conference on naval limitations and the participation of the United States in the Preparatory Commission for a conference to reduce land armaments evidence of a lessening allergy to involvement with the major powers. He attributes the failure of the naval conference to both the United States and Great Britain, both of whom failed to rise above the technical question of small cruisers versus large ones.

In his discussion of the war debts and reparations the author emphasizes the firmness of the Secretary of State and the determination not to permit the European nations to link the debts to the reparation question. The story of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is well told and gives a clear picture of the Secretary of State finally getting an issue where he felt he was on the verge of a great achievement that would probably bring him the Nobel peace prize.

Professor Ellis' accurate account steers clear of harsh judgments and is a welcome respite from the free swinging and often obvious censures that can be made of the Coolidge era. The author seeks to understand the actors in their own terms and thereby makes a valuable contribution, even though the reader may sometimes fret about a tendency for the path to lead through the tangled underbrush of detail where the larger sweep of historical forces seem not to penetrate.

PAUL A. VARG

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Notes and Comments

The publications of the School of Hispanic-American Studies of the University of Seville have been consistently of great interest to Latin Americanists. The research papers come in the shorter form of *Estudios Americanos* and in the bulky volumes of the *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*. The most recent *Anuario* is volume XVI dated 1959, which though tardy is very welcome. The tome numbers 743 pages but has many unnumbered pages. The four longer articles are practically of book length. The first of these, "La Busqueda de Eldorado por Guayana," by Helena Ruiz, gives the historiography and cartography of the legend of the Gilded Man from the origin of the myth through three centuries of the search for him, amply illustrated by photocopies of pictures, documents and maps in 166 pages. The author shows that Eldorado was at times a gilded man, a city called Manoa, or a lake called Parime, sought in interior Guiana. The second article, "Las Ferias de Jalapa," by José Joaquín Real Díaz, gives a documentary account of the merchants, merchandise, and fleets involved in the famous fairs at Jalapa in New Spain during colonial times. This runs to 148 pages including documents and bibliography. The long article, 218 pages, by Guillermo Lohmann Villena on "Las *Relaciones* de los Virreyes del Perú" considers first the object, purpose and historical use of these administrative and political memorials, and second presents a collation and analysis of the texts and editions of the *Relationes* of each of the viceroys. A shorter article by L. A. Vigneras offers some new findings on the Spanish fortifications in Florida, 1565–1586, with photographic reproductions of early San Agustín and Santa Elena. In the section on American Historiography and bibliography we find a new edition of Spain's New Laws of 1542–1543, which is most welcome since the earlier edition in this series is long out of print. The editor, Antonio Muro Orejón, gives a photographic reproduction of the original text faced by a transcription and this is followed by a similar reproduction of the first printed edition of 1543 by Juan de Brocar. The last 180 pages of the *Anuario* are valuable for their bibliographical materials.

* * * *

Catholic Archives of Texas: History and Preliminary Inventory, by Sister M. Claude Lane, O.P., published in December, 1961, will be of great interest to archivists, students of Texas history, and historians of the Catholic Church. The history of the development of the Archives in Texas is clearly traced from 1923 when the Texas Knights of Columbus Historical Commission was formed with the purpose of promoting research and writing on the contributions of the Catholic Church to the progress of the state. Besides gathering documents the Commission embarked upon a publishing program that resulted in a number of printed brochures and in the seven volumes of *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas* by the late Dr. Carlos Castañeda. The war interrupted progress and led to the formation of The Texas Catholic Historical Society in 1948 which has since then continued the collection of archival materials from many European, Mexican, and American depositories. Sister Claude then presents a preliminary inventory of the contents of the archive as gathered over forty years, dividing the items according to the colonial, the republican, and the statehood periods of Texas history. She lists also the publications of the Commission and Society. Her work is thorough and detailed in 114 large planograph pages, remarkably free from typing errors. The paperbound volume is distributed by the Sacred Heart Dominican College bookstore, Houston 21, Texas, for the list price of four dollars.

* * * *

The Hoosier Community at War, by Max Parvin Cavnes, might possibly have been the first book published in 1962 if Indiana University Press, its publisher, had delayed the publication date from December 29, 1961, to January 1, 1962. The weighty monograph is the author's doctoral dissertation and it becomes No. 20 in the *Indiana University Social Science Series* and Volume IX of the Indiana War History Series. In nine chapters Dr. Cavnes analyzes the problems posed by World War II in Indiana and shows what progress was made toward the solution of each. The social troubles revolved around population shifts, the war boom towns, race relations, public health, child welfare, juvenile delinquency, recreational facilities, public welfare especially of the aged and prisoners, public education, college adjustments and servicemen's organizations in the larger cities. In all this we find no attempt to gloss over the evils that arose nor any proud boasts about how the Hoosiers won the war. All of the state officials

and the whole Indiana community had on their hands a battle arising out of social conditions that appear in many instances little short of appalling. Progress was made but the years left a heritage of unsolved problems. Although statistics are used constantly the author's style is lively, marred somewhat by dangling participles. For sources the author turns to a fully sufficient number of federal and state records, to War History Commission and Civil Defense Files, to newspapers and periodicals, and to other materials. With the bibliography and index the paper cover volume runs to 527 pages well worth the six dollars asked.

* * * *

The 1961 Britannica Book of the Year published an important article, "The Voice of Latin America," by William Benton, well-known as Senator from Connecticut and former assistant Secretary of State, and now publisher of *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* Now this long article has been brought out in book form, illustrations and all, by Harper & Brothers, New York, with a foreward by Adlai E. Stevenson. The affable Senator presents a report of his observations during an extensive trip through the nations south in 1960 in the hope of sharpening the interest of North Americans in the problems and dangers of the hemisphere. It was a listening tour for which he was briefed here by Latin American scholars and during which he was accompanied by learned observers, though his many years of experience in foreign affairs were qualification enough. He listened to the voices of rulers and people in the important centers, the "Vociferous Ones," "The Resisters," and "The Silent Ones." He tells their story in a thoroughly digestable manner. Large problems loom and associated problems are set in the general picture of Latin America and in the particular scene of a country. United States interests and world interests are correlated, and Chapter 3, "The Threatening Cloud—Communism Plus Castroism," is especially alarming. The Senator's book has received high commendation from scholars and students of world affairs. It is listed at $3.95.

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The Gay Nineties—Reconsidered

Of all the labels pinned on past decades none became more indelibly stereotyped than the "Gay Nineties."* The expression embedded itself in the American mind, it captured a people's faith. Today it conjures up all the nostalgia of the so-called good old days, the confident years, the golden age.

Needless to say, this image grew out of varied circumstances. A dynamic technology created the bicycle built for two, the phonograph, the kinescope in the penny arcade, the sputtering "Red Devils" constructed by Duryea, Haynes, Winton and Ford and the electric dynamo which Henry Adams regarded "the most expressive among a thousand symbols of ultimate energy."[1] Meanwhile, a rabid nationalism enveloped a public fanned by such spectaculars as the Chicago World's Fair, the Spanish American War, Roosevelt's charge up San Juan Hill, the scramble for an overseas empire, and the dash of 6,000 miners to the Klondike.

But the notion that the 90's reeked with levity springs largely from the entertainment of the time. Vaudeville reigned with its loquacious master of ceremonies, the burnt cork darky musicales, the strumming banjo, rag time, the can can chorus, melodramas and perhaps the rendition of "Casey at the Bat." Popular songs flourished. Sigmund Spaeth insists more songs were written in the 1890's than in any previous decade.[2] These ranged from "The Bowery," and "Daisey Bell" to "They'll Be a Hot Time in the

* This paper was read at a joint session of the American Studies Association and the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast at San Francisco State College, November 25, 1960.

1 Lynn White, Jr., "Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered." *The American Scholar*, Spring, 1958, 184.

2 Sigmund Spaeth, *A History of Popular Music in America*, New York, 1948, 253.

Old Town Tonight," "Tra ra ra Boom De Aye," and the barbershop quartet favorite, "Only a Bird in a Gilded Cage."

Yet, the musical gaiety of the era may not have reflected the mood of the average American. Perhaps "After the Ball," or Gussie L. Davis's "In the Baggage Coach Ahead," more accurately depicted the times. Mr. Dooley, decrying hasty observations commented, "I know history isn't true, Hennessey, because it ain't like what I see every day on Halsted Street." How did America look to those on city streets? Did the common man laugh himself to sleep every night? Were the 90's good? Good for whom?

Ample evidence suggests that the 90's were not particularly gay for large segments of the population. On the contrary, millions experienced frustration and despair. For these any suggestion to the effect that the nation wallowed in mirth would have been deemed pure nonsense.

In 1900, the sixty percent of the population living on farms had faced one of the worst economic decades in agriculture. In the Northeast crops were abandoned because of cheaper land in the West. Southern planters struggled against almost universal poverty. In the West, those who had taken Greeley's advice, met recurring drouths, low prices and mounting indebtedness. Farmers complained of 14 cent corn, 5 cent cotton and 12 percent interest. From 1889 to 1893, 11,000 Kansas farmers were forclosed and by the end of the decade the loan companies owned 90 percent of the land in the state. Tom Watson of the Southern Alliance observed that people who once had plenty now lost their homes. "You took down the family pictures from the walls," he lamented, "You picked some favorite flowers and took your weary march into the strange cold world. You walked the roads looking for work. I have done it too."[3]

William Allen White writing for the *Emporia Gazette* in 1896 noted thousands were leaving the state. "Kansas isn't in the civilized world," he fumed, "she has taken the place of Arkansas and Timbucktoo."[4] Hamlin Garland, after bitter experience in Dakota, insisted he was tired of high sounding cliches about the virtues of the American farmer. Writers and orators were blind to the fact that agrarian folk were the hardest working and poorest paid people

[3] C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel*, New York, 1938, 131.

[4] William Allen White, "What's the Matter with Kansas," *The Emporia Gazette*, August 16, 1896, quoted in *Problems in American History*, New York, 1952, 584.

in America. They lived in hovels, their wives filled insane asylums, they were dreary peasants with a well nigh hopeless future. When Mary Lease urged the raising of less corn and more hell, farmers responded by singing:

My country t'is of thee
Once land of liberty
Of thee I sing
Land of the millionaire
Farmers with pockets bare
Caused by the cursed snare
The Money Ring.

Meanwhile, those working for wages suffered a similar fate. According to the United States Bureau of Census, the average annual wage of all workers in the nation in 1890 was $438.00. Ten years later the figure stood at $428.00, actually a loss in wage income during the decade.[5] Hired hands on farms and factory workers in the South received less than $250.00 a year. Negroes got fifty cents a day. Half the women in industry received less than five dollars a week.[6] A Columbia University professor in 1924 described the 1890's as a time when 32 percent of all wage earners were underfed, 57 percent ill-clothed and 52 percent ill-housed.[7]

Moreover, working conditions remained intolerable with factory employees forced to work a 60 hour week under hazardous conditions. Since only half the states had safety inspection laws in 1900, industrial accidents claimed 20,000 lives annually. During the 90's, approximately 7,500 railroad workers were killed each year.[8] In the mines 45 men lost their lives for each 10,000 employed, a death rate three times greater than in Europe. All this in a land where people bragged about the democratic tradition emphasizing the value of the individual. One cynic remarked that in America everything was cheap, especially human life.

When labor attempted to organize to improve working condi-

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[5] United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Washington D.C., 1960, 434.

[6] Carroll D. Wright, "Why Women are Paid Less than Men," *The Forum*, XIII, (July, 1892), 633.

[7] Charles A. Gulick, Jr., "Labor Policy of the United States Steel Corporation," *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*, CXVI, New York, 1924, 73.

[8] Henry C. Adams, "The Slaughter of Railway Employees," *The Forum*, XIII, (June, 1892), 503.

tions, to escape the incubus of the company town and to share in the wealth they had helped create, management offered stiff resistance. The Homestead strike erupted in the Carnegie steel mills in 1892 when the company cut wages and refused to recognize the union. Two years later the Pullman strike broke out in Chicago when wages were cut one-third in spite of four million dollar surplus in the company treasury. Injunctions were issued, Debs went to prison, federal troops broke the strike and the public excoriated Governor Altgeld and Clarence Darrow. In the 1890's there were 14,191 strikes involving four million workers making the decade one of the most violent in labor-management relations.[9]

Nor did white collar workers find Utopia in the gay 90's. Even though apartments rented for $8.00 a month and suits sold for ten dollars, the salaries paid were, in purchasing power, less than half of what they are today.[10] Besides office rules were often dictatorial. One firm warned that a person's integrity would be questioned if he smoked cigars, used liquor in any form, got shaved in a barber shop, or frequented pool halls. Young men would get one evening off a week for courting purposes, however, leisure time should be spent in reading good books and contemplating the glories of the Kingdom of God.[11]

In addition, the panic of 1893, the most serious depression of the century, added to the collective misery. With over two million unemployed in 1894, soup kitchens were set up in New York, wood chopping projects in Denver and street sweeping jobs in San Francisco. Hoping to get Congress to enact a national public works program, Jacob Coxey led his motley army of unemployed on the long hike from Massillon, Ohio, to Washington, D.C. Delegates from Los Angeles and Oakland, including Jack London, joined the demonstration. After reaching the capitol, the leaders were arrested for, as the legal jargon put it, "stepping on cretain plants, shrubs and turf."[12]

Frequently the pleas of working people were met with arrogance. One entrepreneur claimed the masses did not suffer because they could not even speak English. Another suggested that strikers

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9 *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, 99.

10 Morton M. Hunt, "I'll Take 1951," *This Week Magazine*, December 10, 1951, 5. See also Clyde Brion Davis, *The Age of Indiscretion*.

11 "The Good Old Days," *Trustee Magazine*, The Journal of Hospital Governing Boards, published by the American Hospital Association, vol. II, October, 1958, 31.

12 *Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess.*, 4513, 4514.

be fed bullets.[13] A Chicago newspaper hinted that the unemployment problem be solved by giving handouts in which there had been placed a little strychnine.

Although the 90's were difficult for farmers, factory workers and office employees, the notion persisted that the decade was good for the business man. Free enterprise prevailed, governmental restrictions were limited and the graduated income tax non-existent. In the language of the Chamber of Commerce, these were the grand days of laissez faire capitalism which had made America great.

Still, even here generalizations must be viewed with caution because he who generalizes, generally lies. A distinction must be made between small and big business. Whereas giant corporations usually made good profits, the small partnerships and individually owned companies suffered the same financial stringencies felt by those in other occupations. Small business firms lacked capital. The treasurer of the Huber Manufacturing Company of Marion, Ohio, writing to the board of directors in 1896, explained, "We are practically at the end of our string. I have done everything in my power to meet the payroll, but now I must recommend that the plant be closed down. This is not a question of sympathy for workers but of life and death for the company. . . ."[14] During the 1890's, 160,320 companies failed. This is the highest figure for any decade in the 19th century. In fact the ratio of business failures to the total number of firms existing in the 90's was higher than the 1930's following the crash of 1929.[15] In this sense, the gay 90's were not good for the small business man. Those talking so glibly about the halycon days when businessmen had freedom apparently never think about the freedom to go bankrupt.

However, big business through consolidation, by freezing out competition and by exploiting the vast resources of the country, piled up fantastic profits. James Bryce thought it paradoxical that the most individualistic peoples should excel in the art of combination.[16] Conspicuous consumption graced the social life of the Four Hundred, and manifested itself in Gould's $500,000 yacht, Morgan's $100,000 private car, Vanderbilt's two million dollar home with its $50,000 paintings and $20,000 bronze doors. The *Metho-*

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[13] Samuel P. Hays, *The Response to Industrialism*, 1885-1914, Chicago, 1957, 40.

[14] S. E. Barlow, Report of the Treasurer to the Board of Directors of the Huber Manufacturing Company, Marion, Ohio, August 10, 1896, 6.

[15] *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, 571.

dist Quarterly Review estimated that if the original Adam had saved $500 every day since his introduction to Eve 6,000 years ago, he would still be $200,000 behind John D. Rockefeller.[17]

While industrial tycoons produced miracles, they caused anxiety by seizing political power and creating an inequitable distribution of wealth. Twenty-two millionaires sat in the Senate in 1900 and men of wealth dominated many state legislatures. Theodore Roosevelt thought amalgated wealth threatened to make government itself captive. "It matters not one iota what political party is in power," boasted one plutocrat, "We are rich. We own America."[18] "Gas" Adricks claimed the senatorship in Delaware saying, "I've bought it. I paid for it. I'm going to have it."[19] The *Arena* in 1901 claimed one half of the people owned practically nothing because one percent of the population owned 54 percent of the nation's wealth.[20] The *Fortnightly Review* said America had been over run by robber barons. Henry D. Lloyd in his *Wealth Against Commonwealth* saw civilization being destroyed by the great money makers at the top, not by the barbarians from below. John M. Harlan of the Supreme Court in 1911 said those recalling the 1890's would remember the unrest which prevailed by the aggregation of capital in the hands of a few.[21] Vernon Parrington in retrospect termed the spectacle the great barbecue. These days were wonderful except that they almost ruined the country. Ralph Gorman, a journalist writing in 1957, held that "nobody would want to go back to 1900 not even the smooth orators before managerial groups."[22]

In spite of the revisionist school of business historians such as Edward Kirkland, Allan Nevins, Henrietta Larson, Richard Overton, Ralph Hidy and Harold Williamson, the fact remains that after all that is favorable has been said to justify the actions of the industrial magnates of this era, the new looks are never completely convincing. None of these experts believe the distribution of wealth in the 90's was beneficial to society. None insist the nation return to laissez faire capitalism with an absence of governmental

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16 Allan Nevins, "The Audacious Americans," *Life*, January 2, 1950, 79.

17 David Y. Thomas, "The Church and the Poor," *The Methodist Quarterly Review*, July, 1912, 571.

18 Nevins, "The Audacious Americans," 79.

19 *Ibid.*

20 C. C. Regier, *Era of the Muckrakers*, Chapel Hill, 1932, 5.

21 Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of Modern America*, New York, 1951, 155.

22 Edward Keating, "What the Good Old Days were Really Like," *Labor*, July 20, 1954, 3.

controls. Nor do the revisionists think the muckrakers' efforts were detrimental to the general welfare. The concensus remains that this was a dangerous epoch in the nation's life which should never be repeated. Even Allan Nevins, a most prolific historian, writing for *Life* in January, 1950, confessed that "It was not a just or good society and there are statistics and men to prove it was not."[23]

Similarly, much remained deplorable in cultural matters. Senator Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire filled large sections of the *Congressional Record* in 1890 with his concern for education. He cited census returns proving one-third of the children in the United States were growing up without schooling. In 1890, six million Huckleberry Finns were not enrolled in school, in 1890 the figure reached nine million. In Oakland, 26 percent of the children were out of school, in San Francisco, 29 percent; Jacksonville, 42 percent; Chicago, 43 percent and Milwaukee 55 percent.[24] Among adults, six million could neither read nor write. In fact, the colonists in 1776 were twice as literate as the population in 1890.[25] Blair urged the appropriation of ten million dollars of federal funds to help build 120,000 rural schools costing $300 each. Since teacher's salaries were a national disgrace, he called for governmental aid for this purpose. All proposals died because most Congressmen believed such assistance would kill initiative and destroy character.

Medical standards likewise needed improvement. At the turn of the century the life expectancy was only 48 years. Quack medicine flourished with Sears Roebuck selling the following nostrums; Dr. Rowland's lung restorer, Dr. Betz's worm syrup, Dr. Rose's Arsenic Complex Wafers for radiant complexions and Dr. Pasteur's "Death to Microbes," guaranteed to cure tuberculosis, rheumatism, shingles, hives, malaria, blood poisoning, catarrh and opium addiction.[26]

Many suffered ill health because of dietary problems resulting from urbanization. Farmers usually ate a heavy diet rich in bacon, molasses, fried potatoes, pork and pancakes. In moving to town, folks took their eating habits with them. The greasy food, without rigorous exercise led to indigestion, dyspepsia and various kinds of stomach trouble. Many plagued by this gastronomical difficulty went to consult the Mayo brothers at Rochester, Minnesota, who

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[23] Nevins, "The Audacious Americans," 79.
[24] *Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1067.*
[25] *Ibid.*, 1093.
[26] Francis Still Wickware, "The Life and Times of Sears, Roebuck," *Collier's*, December 3, 1949, 73.

had gained fame as daring surgeons with a particular skill in performing abdominal operations. They did 54 of these in 1885, 612 in 1900 and 2,157 in 1905.[27] Their reputation merited the compliment, "Dr. Will is a wonderful surgeon; Dr. Charles is a surgical wonder."

Another solution to the "national bellyache" called for a visit to the health sanatoriums at Battle Creek, Michigan. Following the Civil War, the Adventists led a crusade to end piggery by encouraging vegetarianism. Sanatoriums were built in Battle Creek specializing in baths, massages and health diets. Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, while working in one of these sanatoriums, produced the first pre-cooked flaked cereal health food in 1894.[28] In the same year, C. W. Post concocted a cereal coffee called Postum designed to produce red blood. By accident both men discovered they could sell their health foods to the general public, thus opening the way for a breakfast food business which was to reach 400 million in 1956—a revolution in the eating habits of the American people.

In some respects the 1890's became the most vicious in our history. In 1892, 231 people were lynched. During the decade, 1540 victims met the same fate, the highest totals for any decade during the last century.[29] Frenzied mobs participated in these nauseating crimes where the scaffold, the noose and the burning pyre silenced the shrieks of the condemned. At times the charges were as minor as slander, wife beating, swindling, fraud, refusing to give evidence or writing insulting letters. Lynch leaders prided themselves in their work, often posing for pictures at the scene of death. While Americans mouthed religion, these miscarriages of justice continued with disgusting regularity. To those trapped in the extra-legal proceedings, the 90's were not very gay.

Furthermore, social conditions gave little cause for ecstasy. Booker T. Washington in 1900 stated that not more than one Negro in twenty owned the land he cultivated. Jacob Riis investigating conditions in lower New York city mordantly announced, "The slum is the measure of civilization." Robert Hunter, the sociologist, in 1904 reported ten million of the nation's 83 million people living in poverty. Joseph Kirkland looking at Chicago in 1892 said "It is hard to imagine just how filthy, how squalid, how noise-

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27 Helen Clapesattle, *The Doctors Mayo*, Minneapolis, 1941, 323.

28 Gerald Carson, *Cornflake Crusade*, New York, Rinehart and Company, 1957, 124.

29 Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, "Lynching by States and Race, 1882-1946," *Negro Yearbook, 1941-46*, Tuskegee Institute Yearbook Publishing Company, 1947, 24.

some, how abhorrent it all is."[30] Jane Addams counted 55 saloons in her ward in the same city, one for every 28 voters. Rudyard Kipling after viewing the Windy City in 1899 called the place a splendid chaos. He explained, "Having seen it, I urgently desire never to see it again."

Over all hung a cloud of jingoistic chauvinism fed by men like Senator Albert J. Beveridge who claimed God had marked the Americans as a chosen people—a master race to lead in the regeneration of the world. Cabot Lodge urged the annexation of Canada because it was the tendency to consolidate and small nations were a thing of the past. One imperialist suggested that statemanship was the art of seeing where God was going and then getting things out of His way.

Then too, intolerance, bigotry, anti-intellectualism and reactionary thought abound. Peter Viereck described the 90's as seething in xenophobia, Jew baiting, intellectual baiting, thought control, lynch spirit, negrophobia and anti-Catholicism.[31] Reformers succumbed to militant reactionaries who dominated the social and economic welfare of millions. Senator Joseph H. Choate called the income tax the beginnings of socialism, communism and the destruction of the Constitution itself.[32] Apparently the Supreme Court concurred for it declared such a law unconstitutional in 1894. In the *Plessy v. Ferguson* case in 1896, the Court enunciated the "separate but equal" decision to sanctify segregation in the Southern states. Theodore Roosevelt, as Police Commissioner of New York, called the Populists subversives and recommended their top twelve leaders be "shot dead against a wall."[33] Senator George F. Hoar lectured the members of the American Historical Association in 1895 asking them to refrain from criticizing public officials. Since all politicians were honest and upright, historians should spend their time defending the heroes of representative government.[34] When women demanded the vote to help eliminate the graft in politics, critics hollered socialism. A minister sourly intoned that since all women looked alike, universal suffrage would lead to multiple vot-

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30 Joseph Kirkland, "Among the Poor of Chicago," *Scribner's Magazine*, XII, (July, 1892), 6.

31 C. Vann Woodward, "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," *The American Scholar*, Winter, 1959-60, 59.

32 *Ibid.*, 68.

33 *Ibid.*

34 Herbert B. Adams, "Report of Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association," *American Historical Association Report*, 1895, 3.

ing. Ex-president Grover Cleveland insisted that sensible women did not want to vote and Father Vaughan of Boston thought those who did were "jackasses."[35]

If the 1890's were less gay than commonly believed, there may also be less validity in the long accepted belief that all Americans at the end of the 19th century were imbued with glowing optimism and a confirmed faith in progress. Obviously there is evidence to support the inevitable progress theme. Darwinian principles were applied to the social order by Herbert Spencer and reaffirmed by William Sumner, Andrew Carnegie, John Fiske and others. Reverend Newell D. Hollis in 1900 preached that laws were more just, rulers more humane, music sweeter and books wiser. He asserted, "Art, industry, invention, literature, learning and government all are marching in Christ's triumphial procession up the hill of fame."[36] H. G. Wells in 1906 said our national temper reflected a sort of optimistic fatalism.[37]

However, some Americans doubted the faith in progress thesis. Frederick Jackson Turner reading his paper, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago in 1893, suggested the end of free land had closed the frontier thus terminating a 400 year span of unlimited opportunity.[38] All this implied a less hopeful future.

In like vein, H. D. Sedgwick, writing for *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1902, protested the superficiality, the conformity, the vulgar tastes and the low standards of morality in American life. An industrialized society squeezed every one into the same mold. Since materialism denoted the chief duty of man, dogmas grew, developed and petrified. Men of great vigor appeared but good manners and gracious behavior declined. The United States had retrogressed.

> Look at our religion, read our poetry, witness our national joy in paper mache arches and Dewey celebrations. Our morals are cribbed and confined . . . our poets express trepidity and lassitude. Look at our Christianity. We honor riches, oppress our neighbors and keep a pecuniary account with righteousness.[39]

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[35] Walter Lord, *The Good Years: From 1900 to the First World War*, New York, 1960, 275.

[36] *Ibid.*, 3.

[37] H. G. Wells, *The Future in America*, New York, 1906, 17.

[38] Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," *American Historical Review*, VI (October, 1898), 227.

[39] H. D. Sedgwick, Jr., "Certain Aspects of America," *The Atlantic Monthly*, XC (July, 1902), 8.

The editor, Albert Bushnell Hart in 1898 thought Americans were ignorant of their own past while Brooks Adams believed the whole world was rotting.[40] Henry Adams beheld a doleful society, not much hurt, but like a cow before a railroad locomotive, somewhat discouraged. He concluded in 1895 that politics, religion and statistics had led to nothing. Congressmen were disorganized, stupid and childlike. In Cuba we were beaten and hopeless. Education had proved futile and one had just as well try to educate a gravel pit. Above all nothing could be more tiresome than a superannuated pedagogue. Indeed, our so-called civilization was likely to disintegrate.[41] E. L. Godkin said he came to America with high ideals but they were all shattered forcing him to look elsewhere for even moderate hopes about keeping the human race alive. Thorstein Veblen in *Theory of the Leisure Class* published in 1899, claimed the capitalistic system retarded progress because the wealthy resisted change while the poor worked so hard to make a living that they had no energy left to strive for progress. The middle class remained too small to initiate progressive policies. Veblen, in criticizing the vulgarity of the 90's, insisted that the back of buildings were more attractive than the fronts. He joined Greenough and Sullivan in the hope that form would follow function. Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* pictured capitalism widening the gap between the rich and poor. Although tax revision might prove beneficial, the author rejected the Spencer-Sumner formula of automatic, evolutionary progress. In *Looking Backward*, Edward Bellamy envisioned Utopia, but prophesied its arrival by way of improved technology and the government ownership of the means of production. In fact, Bellamy, writing for the *North American Review* in 1890, quoted the French economist Emil de Loveley as saying Bellamy had proved that the optimism of the old fashioned economists had lost its authority. People no longer believed in the laissez faire principle in which everything would arrange itself for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The good things were not divided according to the laws of justice and discontent grew more profound.[42]

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[40] Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Historical Opportunity in America," *American Historical Review*, Vol. IV (October, 1898), 1. See also, Arthur F. Beringause, *Brooks Adams*, New York, 1955, 122.

[41] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams, An Autobiography*, New York, 1918, 353. See also, Worthington C. Ford, *Letters of Henry Adams*, (New York, 1938), 82.

[42] Edward Bellamy, "Looking Backward Again," *North American Review*, Vol. 150 (June 1890), 353.

In addition, those who accepted orthodox religious views were skeptical about society being on an escalator in an ever improving universe. Leather-lunged evangelical preachers stressed the sinful nature of men who had been conceived in iniquity and born in sin. All like sheep had gone astray and would continue to do so. Dwight L. Moody, Gypsy Smith and Sam Jones traversed the land propounding the old time religion and exhorting the repentant to hit the sawdust trail. Hope resided in salvation and good works, but straight was the way and narrow the gate leading to glory and broad the way leading to destruction. Thus only a remnant would be saved leaving the majority floundering down the slippery road to perdition. Then too, *Revelations* as a prophetic book depicted a future afflicted with wars and rumors of war, earthquakes, pestilence and the nefarious antics of the Anti-Christ. Evil would multiply until the universe plunged into the fiery battle of Armegeddon —a view diametrically opposed to the faith in progress theory. The conservative religionists in the rural regions and small towns tended to reject evolution either because they had never heard of Darwin or else because they could not accept the notion that man emerged from lower forms of life. Numerically, this bloc remained strong, forming the backbone of the Fundamentalist movement in the 1920's.[43]

Likewise, opposition to progress characterized the thinking of most agrarians who believed the migration of rural youth to the wicked city led to moral degradation. Farm journals begged young people to stay on the old homestead. *The Nebraska Farmer* in 1900 warned that city slickers loafing on city streets would lure country boys into saloons and gambling dens where they would hurtle down the slippery road of ruin as fast as the wheels of destruction could carry them.[44] Even James Bryce, speaking at the University of California in Berkeley where he received the third honorary degree granted by the university, spoke of the ideal rural life where there was plenty of fresh air and healthy exercise. Farmers gave stability to political life because they were less excitable than city people cooped up on the crowded streets. He repeated the tired cliche, "God made the country and man made the town."[45] Since the rise of the city seemed inevitable, progress in terms of morality seemed to be on the skids.

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[43] Henry F. May, *The End of American Innocence*, New York, 1959, 125.

[44] *Nebraska Farmer*, August 23, 1900, 604.

[45] *Pacific Rural Press*, April 3, 1909, 274.

In retrospect, the 1890's were years of rapid change brought on by accelerated industrialization, urbanization and technological innovation. How could the ethics of an individualistic, agrarian America be applied to an increasingly highly integrated social order? Could new techniques in social engineering cope with the rise of cities? Could wealth be distributed more equitably? How could dirty politics be reformed? From this maelstrom many were flexible enough to land on their feet; others became confused, discouraged and filled with pessimism. Mark Twain had plenty of evidence to reinforce his growing qualms about society in his later years.

Perhaps it is impossible to prove that the 90's were less gay than other decades in our history because national sentiment is virtually impossible to measure accurately. Scholars lack the techniques with which to make quantative judgments about the thoughts of millions of people living seventy years ago. Too often the views of a few are taken as representative of all society. Nor need the voices of the erudite reflect the ideas of the multitudes. The tendency to over-simplify the past becomes a formidable temptation. It can be argued that the most significant contribution that experts can make over the long pull is to demonstrate that the patterns of human behavior fluctuate less violently than commonly supposed. We may ultimately reach the position of the famous Arnold Toynbee, who after a life time of study of the world's civilizations, concluded that "History proves that life is just one damn thing after another."

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Roosevelt's Third-Term Nomination

Politically, the year 1939 was one that tried the souls of New Dealers. Roosevelt's second term had run over half its course, and the President had adamantly refused to disclose his intentions concerning a third term. None of the prominent New Dealers had been able to escape the Rooseveltian shadow sufficiently to put down roots and reach out toward the warmth of national political power in his own right.[1] New Dealers faced the possibility that the onrushing election year would confront them with the disagreeable alternatives of supporting a conservative Democrat for president or allowing control to fall into the hands of the Republicans. Their one hope seemed to be to rally the New Deal forces in the state conventions and primaries which would select delegates to the Democratic national convention in Chicago. Once in command at the national convention, the New Dealers could insure either the renomination of Franklin D. Roosevelt, if he would accept, or the selection of a liberal candidate who would serve as the executor of the Roosevelt estate.

In the summer of 1939, several of the New Deal group close to the President began to press for the organization of a nationwide movement to protect their political interests in the approaching contest for the 1940 presidential nomination. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, disturbed over the unpreparedness of the New Deal wing of the party, lashed out at the "policy of drifting in the political field." In an emotional letter to Ann Roosevelt Boettiger, the President's daughter, Ickes lamented: "Once in a while a group of us will get together—Frank Murphy, Harry Hopkins, Bob Jackson, Tom Corcoran, Lowell Mellett, Ben Cohen and one or two others, and we will talk without having anything to talk about." The combative Ickes argued that the New Dealers "can't wait much longer without losing so much ground that there will be little, if any, hope of controlling the convention in 1940."[2] Similarly, Robert

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[1] Roosevelt's brief flirtation with a scheme to promote the presidential aspirations of Harry Hopkins is described in Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, 1948, 77–122. Sherwood's account is the only documented instance in which Roosevelt agreed to support one of his close political associates for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1940. The precarious state of Hopkins' health effectively removed him from the presidential picture after 1938.

[2] Ickes to Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, June 1, 1939, Political File, File 26, Ickes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

Jackson, then Solicitor General, warned Harry Hopkins: "If we are not to abandon its works, it is desperately necessary that the *friends* of the administration be promptly mobilized."[3]

Ickes, Jackson and the other leading New Dealers in Roosevelt's entourage were not imagining things. Vice President John Nance Garner and James A. Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had plighted their troth in a marriage of political convenience. At a luncheon meeting in July, 1939, Garner told Farley that he was prepared to place himself at the head of those Democrats who opposed a third term for Roosevelt. Farley promptly pledged his support, whereupon Garner replied confidently: "The two of us can pull together to stop Roosevelt."[4]

The state conventions and primaries thus became a battle-ground on which the delegates to the 1940 Democratic national convention were selected. Conservative Democrats, philosopically opposed to the New Deal, struggled for party supremacy with New Deal Democrats, who favored continuation of the New Deal program beyond January, 1941, either under Roosevelt or a successor pledged to his policies.[5]

A coterie of New Dealers with easy access to the White House, allied with pro-New Deal elements in Democratic party organizations in the states, provided impetus and direction for the preconvention campaign. The President did not discourage the efforts of those who were working enthusiastically in his behalf. Yet this band of dedicated third-termers had to labor in the face of handicaps normally unknown to the adherents of a presidential candidate. Only rarely, and never publicly, did Roosevelt extend aid or comfort to his loyal troops in the field. Furthermore, his nomination had to come in the form of an overwhelming mandate, far in excess of a simple majority. This meant that few, if any, votes could be allotted by the Roosevelt managers to legitimate favorite sons, even for a single ballot. Finally, the hard-core minority of the party fundamentally in opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal had to be denied the representation at the convention to which its numbers fairly entitled it.

Opponents of the New Deal and the third term had no single candidate who could begin to match the popularity of Roosevelt.

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[3] Jackson to Hopkins, March 24, 1939, Confidential Political File, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.

[4] James A. Farley, *Jim Farley's Story*, New York, 1948, 151.

[5] Opposition to the third term served as a convenient rallying point and staging ground for an attack launched by old-line Democrats on the New Deal concept of government.

Their strategy was to put a host of favorite-son candidates into the field so as to deny as many votes as possible to Roosevelt on the first ballot. A principal objective of the conservative Democrats in the spring of 1940 was to expose the deep cleavage existing within the party over the renomination of Roosevelt.

The first two state contests for national convention delegates were won handily by the Roosevelt forces against only token opposition. In New Hampshire, which held the first primary of the year in March, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John L. Sullivan organized the Roosevelt slate. Two Farley supporters and one Garnerite competing with eleven pro-Roosevelt candidates for eight delegate-at-large seats managed to finish ahead only of the two independents in a sixteen-man field.[6] In neighboring Maine, the Democratic state convention instructed its delegation to vote for Roosevelt "in the event he is a candidate."[7] When informed of the results by Maine's Democratic National Committeeman, Roosevelt, who was cautious in his replies to letters on the delicate subject of the third term, answered: "While I cannot comment on the subject matter of your letter, I can truthfully say that the action of your Convention was most complimentary and the sentiments expressed very pleasing to me."[8]

After the skirmishes in New Hampshire and Maine, the first pitched battle between the Roosevelt and anti-third-term forces took place in the Wisconsin primary. A number of considerations influenced Garner's selection of Wisconsin as a site for a major test of his strength. Throughout the 1930's the Democratic party in the state had lagged well behind both the Republicans and LaFollette Progressives. Over the years many liberals, who had once been Democrats, transferred their allegiance to the Progressives. In 1940 the state Democratic party was further wracked by internal dissension, as two cliques quarreled noisily for control of the party machinery and distribution of federal patronage. Both of these factions claimed to be loyal to Roosevelt and entered rival slates pledged to the President, thus threatening to divide the pro-New Deal vote.[9]

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[6] *Concord Daily Monitor*, March 13, 1940, 1.

[7] *Bangor Daily News* (Maine), March 27, 1940, 1. Farley, who had announced his candidacy in February, was present at the convention and addressed the delegates. He did not publicly attack either Roosevelt or the third term. Farley was rewarded with the promise of Maine's vote if Roosevelt were not a candidate at the national convention. *Lewiston Evening Journal* (Maine), March 28, 1940, 1.

[8] Roosevelt to F. Harold Dubord, April 12, 1940, President's Personal File 4031, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.

[9] *Milwaukee Journal*, February 8, 1940, 1; February 12, 1940, 2.

Intending to capitalize on the schism in the Roosevelt camp, supporters of Vice President Garner entered a full ticket of their own in Wisconsin. The core of the 1940 Garner organization was a group of conservative, old-line Democrats who had followed Al Smith in 1928. Well financed from out-of-state sources, the Garnerites reserved time on thirteen radio stations, distributed thousands of pieces of attractively printed campaign literature, dispatched speakers into each of the state's congressional districts, purchased advertising space in most of the larger newspapers, and plastered the state with billboard advertisements.[10]

The emissary of the national administration detailed to look after the President's interests in the primary was Leo Crowley, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Crowley sided with the pro-Roosevelt faction headed by National Committeeman Charles E. Broughton, urging friends of the President to boycott the slate drawn up by the rival pro-Roosevelt organization formed by former Governor Francis E. McGovern.[11] Despite the blessings bestowed by Crowley on Broughton, the McGovern group continued to campaign energetically in the name of Roosevelt. The primary results reflected the split in the Roosevelt coalition. In the presidential preference primary, Roosevelt ran ahead of Garner by the convincing margin of three to one. But three Garner district delegates took advantage of the civil war within the Roosevelt encampment to slip through to narrow victories. The two competing pro-Roosevelt factions shared the remaining twenty-one convention seats.[12]

On the day following the Wisconsin primary, Leo Crowley submitted his report to the White House. He attributed the minor Garner success to a "division between the President's forces involving the question of personalities which could not be corrected." The

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[10] Dewey L. Fleming in *The Sun* (Baltimore), April 1, 1940, 1. Relying heavily on the support of the Irish-Catholic vote, the Garner ticket suggested an Irish ward in New York City, featuring such names as Callahan, Finnegan, Fitzsimmons, O'Haire, Flannagan, Dugan, O'Rielly, and Cavanaugh. The Garner group was headed by twenty-two year old John Callahan, a Marquette University law student. His grandfather, who had helped organize the Smith campaign in 1928, had been the Democratic candidate for the senate in 1934, when Roosevelt publicly endorsed the candidacy of Robert LaFollette on the Progressive ticket in a speech at Green Bay. Many Wisconsin Democrats had neither forgotten or forgiven this alleged "stab-in-the-back." *Ibid.*

[11] *Madison Capital Times*, March 24, 1940, 3.

[12] *Official Results of the Wisconsin Primary*, Official File 300, Democratic National Committee (Wisconsin), Roosevelt Papers; *Milwaukee Journal*, April 5, 1940, 2.

meat of Crowley's report was contained in this direct warning: "No Democrat other than a Liberal can possibly carry Wisconsin next fall."[13]

In the New Hampshire and Wisconsin primaries, high-ranking officials of the Roosevelt administration were dispatched to serve as liaison officers with the state Democratic parties. Roosevelt himself had remained discreetly aloof. The President was under steady pressure from the group rounding up convention delegates in his name to authorize the use of an iron bearing the White House brand. For this reason the intra-party squabble in California in 1940 was of special significance in the national context because Roosevelt sent Harold Ickes, of cabinet rank and a White House intimate, to act as his agent.[14]

In 1938 a coalition of oddly-assorted pressure groups had elected Culbert Olson as California's first Democratic governor in the twentieth century. But within a year Olson had lost control of his own administration. Jealous segments of the California Democratic party were expending their energy flailing at one another. The temblors resulting from the deep fault which lay beneath the surface of the state Democratic party threatened also to send shock waves to the Democratic national convention.[15]

Early in 1940 the warring factions among the California Democrats began to jockey for position in preparation for the May primary.[16] At this juncture the New Deal group headed by Secretary Ickes, which included Robert Jackson and Thomas Corcoran, entered the picture. Following a conference on February 26, Corcoran, whose talents were especially valuable in political cloak-and-dagger work, sent a radiogram to Roosevelt, calling his attention to the national political implications of the tangle in California

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[13] Crowley to Edwin M. Watson, April 3, 1940, President's Secretary's File, Democratic National Conventions, Box 29, Roosevelt Papers.

[14] Ickes undertook his mission to California with the full knowledge and consent of Roosevelt, and he carried with him a chit in the handwriting of the President containing instructions. Harold L. Ickes, "My Twelve Years with F.D.R.," Part VI, *The Saturday Evening Post*, July 10, 1948, 108.

[15] In the summer of 1939, the White House had received a copy of a detailed memorandum on the muddled state of California politics written by Howard Costigan, then Secretary of the Washington Commonwealth Federation. Mrs. Roosevelt forwarded her copy to the President with the penciled notation: "F.D.R. please read.... E.R." Howard Costigan Memorandum, May, 1940, President's Personal File 2, Roosevelt Papers.

[16] Governor Olson had received assurances from the White House that Roosevelt would not authorize any of his rivals to use the President's name in the primary. James Rowe, Jr., to Roosevelt, February 8, 1940, President's Secretary's File, Administrative Assistants, Box 28, Roosevelt Papers.

politics. Corcoran suggested that Secretary Ickes be commissioned to unite all of the pro-Roosevelt forces behind a single primary ticket.[17] The upshot was that Roosevelt gave his blessings to the Ickes mission. He also wrote and signed a chit directing Ickes to work for a "*coalition* ticket to include *some* from all administrative groups. . . ."[18] Ickes later recalled with satisfaction that the conversations he had with F.D.R. concerning the necessity for a united Democratic front in California "were the first open avowal to me by the President of his possible candidacy."[19]

When Ickes arrived in California in mid-March, the battle lines for the May presidential primary had begun to form. The controversial Governor Olson, who was confronted with the threat of a recall action, had drawn up a pro-Roosevelt delegate list which he was ready to announce. But two other influential groups of Democrats, who were thought to be favorable to Roosevelt, refused to support a delegation dominated by Olson. To the right of the Governor were the followers of former Senator William Gibbs McAdoo, aging and sore over his defeat by Sheridan Downey in the 1938 primary. To the left of the Olson administration was the segment of the California Democracy headed by the contentious Lieutenant Governor Patterson.[20] After some touch-and-go preliminary negotiations, Ickes guided Olson, McAdoo, and Patterson, together with a few of their lieutenants, into a single room and won apparent agreement on a unity ticket. Ickes wired Roosevelt: "Everyone seems to be satisfied and outlook here is excellent."[21] The energetic Secretary returned to Washington on St. Patrick's Day, warmed by Roosevelt's remark that he had not thought the job could be done.[22]

Soon after Ickes left the San Francisco Bay area, the fault underlying the California Democratic party began to slip. Patterson withdrew his support of the harmony slate to form his own delegation with C.I.O support, angrily claiming that the Olson-McAdoo

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17 Roosevelt was then enjoying a semi-secret fishing and inspection trip in the Caribbean. Ickes, "My Twelve Years with F.D.R.," 108.

18 *Ibid.* Despite their clashes over policy at the state level, most of the Democrats who had voted for Olson in 1938 were united in their loyalty to the ideals of the New Deal. Costigan Memorandum, President's Personal File 2, Roosevelt Papers.

19 Ickes, "My Twelve Years with F.D.R.," 108.

20 Robert E. Burke, *Olson's New Deal for California*, Berkeley: University of California, 1953, 140.

21 Ickes to Roosevelt, March 14, 1940, President's Secretary's File, Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt Papers.

22 Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, New York, 1955, III, 144.

alliance had given short shrift to women, labor and minority groups.[23] A few days later McAdoo somewhat petulantly issued a withdrawal statement of his own, pleading that he had retired from active politics and was unwilling to return.[24] The abrupt departure of McAdoo and the defection of Patterson from the harmony slate destroyed all rational semblance of unity in the pro-New Deal wing of the California Democracy.

Two openly anti-New Deal cabals also entered convention delegate lists in the Democratic primary. The first of these was the "Ham and Eggs" pension organization of the anti-third-term Senator Sheridan Downey.[25] The second consisted of the most conservative wing of the party, which confidently expected to profit from the jagged fissures within the New Deal wing by electing a delegation committed to Vice President Garner.[26]

The results of the California primary were a notable victory for Roosevelt. The President's margin over Garner approached seven to one, and his total was three times that of the combined vote scraped together by the Garner, "Ham and Eggs" (Willis Allen), and Patterson dissidents.[27] Ickes commented happily: "The President was delighted with the results."[28] Several years later, Ickes wrote that Roosevelt, elated over the primary results, crowed: "That breaks their backs."[29]

The national Garner-for-President campaign had accumulated only three convention votes in Wisconsin and California, despite widespread bickering among Roosevelt's adherents in these two states. Initially the Garner leadership was confident, however, that the Roosevelt managers would not seek to alienate the Texas delegation from its loyalty to the Vice President. The President himself was reluctant to give a go-ahead signal to his lieutenants for

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[23] *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 22, 1940, 1. The outlet of the Hearst press in San Francisco, exulting over the prospects of a rebuff to the third term, chortled that the harmony arrangement had been a "compromise that satisfied nobody." "Some of the delegates hate each other, some hate Olson, others hate ... McAdoo ... and many even hate Ickes." *San Francisco Examiner*, March 15, 1940, 1

[24] McAdoo, however, announced his continued support of the Roosevelt harmony ticket. *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 26, 1940, 1.

[25] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1940, 1.

[26] In 1932 Garner, with the support of the Hearst press and McAdoo, had defeated Roosevelt in the California primary. The principal Garner organizer in 1940 was Zach Lamar Cobb. See speech by Zach Lamar Cobb, April 27, 1940, Official File 300, Democratic National Committee (California), Roosevelt Papers.

[27] Burke, *Olson's New Deal for California*, 143.

[28] Ickes to Melvyn Douglas, May 10, 1940, Political File, File 31, Ickes Papers.

a delegate drive in the state. He feared that the pride of the Texans might be painfully injured. According to Ickes, F.D.R. "intended to send Jesse Jones into Texas with an authoritative note advising his friends not to make any fight on Garner."[30]

While Roosevelt was willing to concede control of the Texas delegation to his rival, a number of New Dealers, both in Texas and Washington, were not. The Ickes circle in Washington was spoiling for a head-on collision with the Garner junto in Texas. The Interior Secretary saw himself cast in the same role he had earlier played on the California stage. Ickes' ambition was to journey to Texas, acting as "a catalyst to bring the numerous Roosevelt people in Texas together in support of Roosevelt delegates."[31]

The Garner managers in Texas were jolted out of their complacency by signs of a rising tide of Roosevelt activity in the state.[32] Amon Carter, Fort Worth newspaper publisher, took umbrage at what he termed the sudden influx of "traveling Master Minds out of Washington." The sharp-tongued publisher compared the alleged invasion by New Dealers to a "similar golden period in Texas' earlier political life, when shoals of visitors from the national capitol ushered in what became known as the Carpetbagger Era." Warming to his work, Carter concluded: "The boys from Washington are down here for the purpose of inducing Texas to put a knife into the back of the Garner Campaign."[33]

With tensions near the breaking point in Texas, leaders of both factions in Washington acted to prevent a direct clash between third termers and Garnerites at the precinct and county conventions scheduled for May. Representative Sam Rayburn, who was torn between loyalties to both Roosevelt and Garner, was particularly anx-

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[29] Ickes, "My Twelve Years with F.D.R.," 111.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.* Ickes could rely upon help from such resourceful political infighters as Representative Lyndon Johnson, then making his first splash in the pool of national politics, Texas-born Alvin G. Wirtz, the Undersecretary of the Interior, and Maury Maverick, the aptly named Mayor of San Antonio.

[32] The Roosevelt forces were partially hobbled in their activities by Roosevelt's continued hands-off attitude. Mayor Tom Miller of Austin complained to Undersecretary of the Interior Wirtz: "The Garner forces are attempting to make the draft-Roosevelt committee appear to be something that has been outlawed and frowned upon by the President as well as his real friends in Washington." Miller added fretfully that the Roosevelt people in the state "can and will win the fight, but we are entitled to have the cooperation of the friends of the President in Washington." Miller to Wirtz, April 11, 1940, Confidential Political File, Hopkins Papers.

[33] Editorial by Amon Carter, *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, March 27, 1940.

ious for a compromise. After preliminary negotiations, including a White House conference attended by Harry Hopkins, Lyndon Johnson and Alvin G. Wirtz, Representatives Rayburn and Johnson called on the President on April 29, and later, from the White House steps, made the compromise public. Under its terms, the Texas delegation was to go to the Democratic national convention pledged to vote for Garner for a single ballot. But the Texans were honor bound not to participate in a stop-Roosevelt alliance at the national convention.[34]

In the national perspective, Garner's hopes for his party's presidential nomination had reached the vanishing point by the end of April. Had the votes of Texas been necessary to his nomination, Roosevelt assuredly could have garnered a number of them by unleashing his backers at the precinct and county conventions.[35] But Roosevelt preferred compromise to conflict in Texas. His acutely accurate sense of political timing told him that peaceful compromise within the party was more politically rewarding in the spring of 1940 than victory won at the cost of smouldering resentments. For this reason, Roosevelt kept a tight rein on Harold Ickes in Washington and Maury Maverick in Texas, both of whom were eager to rustle a majority of the Texas delegation. From the President's standpoint, the compromise served the purpose of a politely written obituary notice for the serious Garner-for-President effort. Confined to the dimensions of a favorite son candidacy, the Garner rivulet of convention votes was easily contained.

Garner's dreams of returning the Democratic party to conservative control in 1940 were thus snuffed out when he was out-voted in Wisconsin and California and out-maneuvered in Texas. But the American political scene offers infinite variety in the interaction between state and national politics. In any one of a dozen or more states, a parochial problem could have snarled the third-term machinery, which depended for success on smooth, silent operation. In a number of states, foes of the New Deal relied upon tactics rather than votes to detour the third term. The New Deal mana-

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34 The text of the agreement was embodied in a telegram to the principal Roosevelt and Garner leaders in Texas and signed by Representatives Rayburn and Johnson. *San Antonio Express*, April 30, 1940, 1.

35 Despite the compromise agreement, some dedicated Roosevelt workers continued to agitate for delegates pledged to a third term. Maury Hughes, a Garner leader, commented: "The amazing thing about the precinct conventions was that any precincts would endorse outright for Roosevelt, as many did, after orders for a compromise came from Austin and Washington." *Houston Post*, May 6, 1940, 1.

gers, themselves playing for high stakes, also resorted to tactics of questionable political morality.

Architects of the national stop-Roosevelt drive planned to capitalize on the hard feelings engendered by the 1938 Democratic primaries, when Roosevelt had unsuccessfully sought to purge several powerful anti-New Deal senators. For example in Georgia (F.D.R.'s "second" home state), the third term encountered resistance from Senator Walter George, whom Roosevelt had singled out for a personal attack in 1938, as well as his colleague Richard Russell, three members of the Georgia congressional delegation, and former Governor Eugene Talmadge.[36] This cabal of conservatives openly strove to mobilize public opinion in favor of a presidential preference primary, in which they conceivably could have mustered a majority hostile to Roosevelt.[37]

The third-term manager in Georgia was Governor E. D. Rivers. He cooly ignored a mass petition requesting a primary which was presented to the Democratic State Executive Committee when it convened to name the Georgia delegation to the national convention. The Rivers-dominated Executive Committee calmly named a delegation instructed to support a third term for Roosevelt.[38] While no official comment on the action was forthcoming from the Little White House at Warm Springs, where the President was then in residence, a political writer for the *Atlanta Constitution* reported: "Several members of the President's party . . . showed keen interest in the proceedings, telephoning to . . . keep in touch with developments."[39]

New York was another state where embers from old political fires threatened to flare up. Foes of the third term in New York City schemed to combine followers of Al Smith, an unhappy warrior, with disgruntled backers of former Representative John O'Conner, the only major figure marked for defeat in 1938 who had lost to a New Dealer. With more temerity than political wisdom, Garner advocates threw the Democratic organization temporarily off bal-

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36 *Atlanta Constitution*, February 3, 1940, 1.

37 Presidential preference primaries were not mandatory under the law in Georgia. The decision-making authority was the Democratic Executive Committee.

38 *Ibid.*, April 26, 1940, 1. A spokesman for the Garner petitioner complained, to no avail, that the action of the Executive Committee constituted a "usurpation of the rights of the people of Georgia" and that a dictatorship was "being set up and operated right here in Georgia." *Ibid.*

39 *Ibid.*

ance by unexpectedly entering a number of candidates for contests in selected districts.[40]

Both Tammany Hall in Manhattan and the Edward J. Flynn organization in the Bronx quickly regained their poise and brought disqualification actions against several of the Garner candidates on various pretexts.[41] Stricken from the ballot in a partisan decision by the Board of Elections, the Garner delegates were restored to the ballot by the Court of Appeals in Albany only a week before the primary election.[42] Nevertheless, the Democratic conservatives showed disquieting strength in an area presumed to be thoroughly controlled by Roosevelt loyalists. Delegates pledged to Roosevelt defeated those entered by Garner in the April primary by the comparatively modest margin of little more than two to one.[43]

Roosevelt himself had shown a keen interest in political developments in New York. Shortly before the primary, he attempted to prevent Jim Farley from establishing a strong beachhead in the New York delegation. F.D.R. suggested to Farley that New York cast its first ballot votes for Governor Herbert Lehman as a favorite son. Farley declined to nibble at the bait.[44] Twenty-four of the thirty-eight convention delegates subsequently elected from upstate New York in the primary were county chairmen with strong ties of personal loyalty to National Chairman Farley.[45] Paradoxically, the single strongest pocket of resistance to the third term was thus formed in the delegation from Roosevelt's own home state.

Ghosts from the 1938 primaries also rose in both Iowa and Maryland to haunt the renomination of the President in 1940. In Iowa, enemies of the third term rallied around Senator Guy M. Gillette, who had been placed beyond the pale of presidential ap-

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[40] *New York Times*, February 28, 1940, 1. The principal anti-Roosevelt candidates were Al Smith, Jr., and State Senator John McNaboe, who had recently introduced a no-third-term resolution in the state legislature. Earlier the Garner managers had unsuccessfully sought to persuate Al Smith, Sr., to compete in a New York City district. *Ibid.*, March 6, 1940, 18; March 7, 1940, 14.

[41] McNaboe was disbarred for failure to register as a Democrat. Smith lost his place on the grounds that he was not a resident of the district in which his name had been entered as a candidate. *Ibid.*, March 12, 1940, 17; March 13, 1940, 13; March 21, 1940, 18.

[42] *Ibid.*, March 29, 1940, 15.

[43] *Ibid.*, April 4, 1940, 15.

[44] Roosevelt informed Lehman that he had suggested to Farley that it would be the "decent thing to do" to have New York cast a favorite son ballot "for the leader of the Democratic Party in the State of New York who for eight years has been its thoroughly successful and able Governor." Roosevelt to Lehman, March 28, 1940, President's Personal File 93, Roosevelt Papers.

proval in 1938. In a move transparently designed to deny Iowa's vote to Roosevelt on the first ballot, seventy Democratic professionals, half of them county chairmen, requested White House approval of a favorite son endorsement for Henry Wallace.[46] When Roosevelt declined, Gillette pointedly avoided attendance at the Iowa state convention, which then pledged the state's vote to Roosevelt.[47] In Maryland the tightly-knit organization of able, conservative Senator Millard Tydings dominated the state convention. Despite his known antipathy to the third term, Tydings benevolently allowed the minority New Dealers a representative number of seats on the state delegation. The Maryland delegation was instructed to vote for Tydings in the event that Roosevelt was not a candidate; otherwise the contingent was authorized to vote as an uninstructed delegation.[48]

The third-term movement also had to surmount an obstacle placed in its path by National Chairman Farley, who announced in February that he would enter the Massachusetts presidential primary in April.[49] A slate of delegates nominally pledged to Farley won endorsement in the primary without organized opposition.[50] The Postmaster General was personally popular with the Boston Irish, and could count on the support of such veteran foes of the New Deal as the three former governors: James M. Curley, Charles F. Hurley and Joseph B. Ely. Farley's intention was to use the Massachusetts vote as the nucleus of a bloc large enough to choke off the third term.[51] But the Massachusetts delegation also included Representative John W. McCormack, who acted as third-term manager in the state.[52] Far from conceding the Massachusetts vote to Farley, New Dealers brought unrelenting pressure to bear on the

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45 *New York Times*, April 3, 1940, 1.

46 Telegram addressed to Iowa's two senators and three Democratic congressmen, May 5, 1940, Official File 300, Democratic National Committee (Iowa), Roosevelt Papers.

47 *Des Moines Register*, May 9, 1940, 6; May 11, 1940, 1; May 12, 1940, VI, 3.

48 *The Sun* (Baltimore), May 23, 1940, 28.

49 *Boston Herald*, February 11, 1940, 1.

50 *Ibid.*, May 1, 1940, 1.

51 Observers did not immediately realize that the political firm of Roosevelt and Farley had been dissolved. Even Arthur Krock, veteran critic of the New Deal, was temporarily misled into concluding that Roosevelt had a first mortgage on the Farley pledged Massachusetts delegation which could be foreclosed at will. *New York Times*, February 14, 1940, 20.

52 In accepting a place on the slate pledged to Farley, McCormack informed the White House that he would support Roosevelt at the convention. McCormack to Stephen Early, February 19, 1940, Official File 1871, Democratic National Conventions, Roosevelt Papers.

individual delegates.[53] A week before the national convention assembled, McCormack, with State Chairman William Burke in tow, visited the President and claimed that ninety-five percent of the delegation was now in the Roosevelt column.[54] Queried about the conference, Roosevelt coyly replied: "They simply made some very nice little speeches to me."[55]

The President's categorical refusal to declare himself on a third term raised a different sort of problem for Roosevelt's managers in those states which required the written consent of a candidate before his name could be printed on a primary ballot. In Illinois, the State Election Certifying Board, under the influence of the dominant Democratic organization of Governor Henry Horner and Mayor Edward Kelly of Chicago, waived the requirement. The Board validated the Roosevelt petitions without his signature on the ground that the results of the presidential primary were only advisory.[56] In Ohio, a different course was adopted. Instead of seeking to circumvent the law, the third-term manager, National Committeeman Charles Sawyer, became a favorite son candidate purely for the purpose of uniting the Roosevelt vote behind a single candidate. Ohio's votes were then held in escrow for the exclusive use of the President.[57]

This survey of the spring competition for delegates to the 1940 Democratic national convention has demonstrated that there was formidable, tenacious resistance to the third term within the party.[58] The internecine war waged by the Democrats did not end with the state conventions and primaries. The national convention, meeting

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53 David K. Niles to Harry Hopkins, June 4, 1940, Confidential Political File, Hopkins Papers.

54 *New York Times*, July 9, 1940, 1.

55 Press Conference No. 659, July 9, 1940, Roosevelt Papers.

56 *Chicago Daily News*, March 2, 1940, 1.

57 Speech by Charles Sawyer, May 10, 1940, Official File 300, Democratic National Committee (Ohio), Roosevelt Papers.

58 This survey has necessarily been selective. The third term encountered additional stiff opposition in other states. Not only did such unreconstructed Southern conservatives as Senators Harry Byrd of Virginia and Ellison D. Smith of South Carolina use their influence against Roosevelt but also Senator Harry Truman of Missouri, who had a consistent New Deal voting record, was forced by circumstances into the ranks of Roosevelt's foes. Truman's rival in the senatorial primary was the third-term manager in Missouri, Governor Lloyd Stark. In Louisiana, the third term became embroiled in the continuing clash between the remnants of the Long machine and assorted reform groups. On the west coast, leaders of the C.I.O. in Oregon and Washington were in the forefront of battle against the third term because they opposed Roosevent's internationalistic foreign policy. A more thorough treatment can be found in Hugh Ross, "The Third-Term Campaign of 1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1959.

in July, brought together the voting representatives of the major elements of the party which had been arrayed against one another for months.

The anti-third termers included some of the most venerable party leaders. While their titular head was Vice President Garner, the heart of their strength lay among the Democratic professionals, who manned the party apparatus and whose first loyalty was to National Chairman Farley, and in the personal political machines of the phalanx of United States Senators opposed to the third term.[59] But when the time came to stand and be counted at the Chicago convention, they mustered only a fraction of their potential strength.[60] Only Garner, Farley and Tydings allowed their names to be presented in open competition with Roosevelt.[61] When the roll of the states was read on July 17, Roosevelt received 946 votes; Garner, Farley, Tydings and Hull shared the remaining 148.[62]

The political ethics of the third-term nomination can be endlessly debated. The public words of the President have shed little light upon his private feelings. He wrote almost nothing on the subject before his nomination, and his answers to the flood of congratulatory messages were routine expressions of thanks. Perhaps his most candid expression came more than four years later, following his election to a fourth term, in a letter to Hamilton Holt,

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59 This heterogeneous group included such party elders as Richard Russell and Walter George of Georgia, E. D. Smith of South Carolina, Josiah Bailey and Robert Reynolds of North Carolina, Rush Holt of West Virginia, Harry Byrd and Carter Glass of Virginia, Millard Tydings and George Radcliffe of Maryland, David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, Peter Gerry of Rhode Island, Bennet Champ Clark and Harry Truman of Missouri, Frederick Van Nuys of Indiana, Edward Burke of Nebraska, Pat McCarran of Nevada, D. Worth Clark of Idaho, Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, Sheridan Downey of California, and Burton K. Wheeler of Montana.

60 Powerful senators in command of their state delegations, such as Clark of Missouri and McCarran of Nevada, could have had the votes of their states on a favorite son basis. They may have been deterred by the fact that Roosevelt had been assured of a majority of pledged delegates since the third week in May. *New York Times*, May 24, 1940, 16.

61 Senator Burton K. Wheeler had repeatedly threatened during the months preceding the convention to allow his name to be entered in formal nomination. Only on convention eve did he draw back and announce he would not oppose Roosevelt's renomination. *Ibid.*, July 11, 1940, 17.

62 Garner had his bloc of forty-six votes from Texas, the three he had won in Wisconsin, eight from Virginia, and a meager scattering from three other states. Farley was allowed twenty-five votes from New York in recognition of his upstate strength. Only twelve and a half of Massachusetts' votes remained loyal to Farley. Tydings received eight and one half of Maryland's sixteen votes. *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held at Chicago, Illinois July 15 to July 18, 1940*, Washington, 1940, 189-190.

President of Rollins College and in 1940 a prominent Democrat for Willkie:

> I hate the fourth term as much as you do—and the third term as well—but I do not worry about it much as a matter of principle. It would be a mistake, of course, to establish it as a tradition but I think I can well plead extenuating circumstances! The real meat of the question is not the length of the term, but continuing opportunity of the voters of the country freely to express themselves every four years.[63]

On various occasions Roosevelt spoke longingly to friends of his Hudson Valley estate at Hyde Park. In the peaceful surroundings of his beloved home, he may even have deluded himself into the belief that he would be content as a rural elder statesman and gentleman farmer. He did love his land and trees, and he found relaxation in chatting with friends about the approaching pleasures of retirement. But he was also a powerful, experienced national political leader with many outstanding commitments, plus the largely unfulfilled ambition of world leadership. When the two sets of desires came into conflict, the weaker gave way before the stronger.

But Roosevelt was disengenuous when he told the 1940 convention that he had not "exerted any influence in the selection of delegates or upon the opinions of delegates."[64] His third-term nomination was not thrust upon him against his wishes. It would not have come to him if he had systematically discouraged all political activity on his behalf, and had insisted that he would leave office at the end of his second term. A majority of the Democrats clearly favored a third term for Roosevelt. But their strength had to be marshalled. If the New Dealers had not directed an intensive nationwide drive for third-term delegates, the probability is that the will of the anti-third term minority would have prevailed.

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[63] Roosevelt to Holt, November 24, 1944, President's Personal File 345, Roosevelt Papers.

[64] Samuel I. Rosenman, Comp., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, New York, 1941, IX, 292.

How the Chamber of Commerce Viewed the NRA: A Re-examination

A reader of the second volume of the most recent survey of the Franklin D. Roosevelt era, *The Coming of the New Deal*, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., is convinced that the United States Chamber of Commerce stood firmly for that quixotic New Deal planning attempt, the National Recovery Administration. The reader discovers that when the Chamber, a national business organization, supported the NRA it counted among its allies such normally questionable comrades as labor leaders and "theorists of the managed society." When debate over extending the NRA arose in 1935, Professor Schlesinger writes, "On the whole, the trade associations and the trade unions stuck by to the end. The United States Chamber of Commerce voted for continuance by nearly four to one. . . ."[1] Professor Schlesinger's reader may ask why a segment of the national business leadership supported a program labor executives and advocates of a "managed society" also favored. He may ask whether the Chamber's motives were identical to those of its traditional antagonists, or opposed. Nowhere are these questions satisfactorily answered, though they seem fair to ask whenever unfriendly groups suddenly assume similar stands on a public issue.

True, the reader finds that Henry I. Harriman, Chamber president, had a hand in drafting NRA legislation but later fussed over what he thought was its inept administration; that *Nation's Business*, the Chamber's magazine, added to conservative condemnation of government "interference," and that at times the Chamber advanced this or that interpretation of the recovery act, but the total impression remains one of definite Chamber of Commerce support for the NRA.[2]

This impression needs fundamental revision. The facts are that the Chamber, never enthusiastic over the NRA, grew increasingly estranged from the recovery administration, and finally repudiated it by an overwhelming vote. Professor Schlesinger's asser-

[1] *The Age of Roosevelt*, Boston, 1959, 166. This is the fullest treatment of business and Chamber opinion available in a survey; see 87-176, 471-488.

[2] *Ibid.*, 97, 100, 121, 473-74.

tion that the Chamber "voted for continuance by nearly four to one" is based upon a misreading of the national Chamber's November, 1934, referendum to its local groups. This referendum can be better clarified after a review of the Chamber's attitude towards the NRA as expressed in its resolutions and in the statements of its spokesmen.

At the dawn of the Roosevelt administration the Chamber conceded the need for mild government intervention in the shattered depression economy, preferably under the aegis of the trade associations. Its 1933 plan to combat the depression, prepared for the annual convention in May asked that trade associations assist employers in planning "work sharing" schedules, recommended that increased technological efficiency be reflected in lower prices, and that no inflexible wage or work provision become a law. Finally and most significantly, it requested establishment of a government agency to enforce any minimum wage and maximum hour provisions the majority of firms in an industry might adopt.[3]

For its part, official Washington was eager to enlist the Chamber's support for its recovery drive. President Roosevelt himself addressed the 1933 convention, setting an example followed by such leading administration figures as secretaries Cordell Hull, Henry Wallace and Daniel C. Roper.[4] Roosevelt's speech was short. He did not threaten. He did not demand. He did not even mention government regulation directly. Instead he made three "requests" of businessmen: that they cease wage-cutting and keep wage increases proportionate to price increases; that they work with government to stop unfair competition, starvation wages, and substandard working conditions, and that they view recovery in nationwide terms, not in terms of one business or industry.[5]

In their speeches businessmen generally supported the President and even moved beyond him when they frankly discussed government regulation, the subject on which he was discreetly silent. Regulation appealed to P. W. Litchfield, president of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, as a lesser evil than radical change in the social and economic order. "If we are to save our traditional freedom for the future," he cautioned, "it is probable that we must make substantial concessions to what we have in the past classified

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[3] *New York Times*, Apr. 2, 1935, p. 12C. Hereafter cited as *NYT*.

[4] "Business Agrees to Regulate Itself," *Nation's Business*, XXI (June, 1933), 17. Magazine hereafter cited as *NB*. Article hereafter cited as "Business."

[5] *NYT*, May 5, 1933, p. 2.

as the more radical school of thought."[6] His words were echoed by Gerard Swope, president of General Electric, and the president of the Chamber, Henry I. Harriman. "... if industry does not see its opportunity and embrace it, it will be done from without," Swope warned. "The alternative ... is not shall it be done, but by whom it shall be done...."[7] Harriman blasted the "antiquated" economic system of the nineteen-twenties:

> I am confident that if trade associations in conference with labor and the Government were permitted to promulgate fair rules for industry ... covering limitation of hours of operation, minimum pay [and] prices ... and the setting up of reserves for accident, sickness and old age ... the serious economic problems which confront us would soon vanish.[8]

All of this does not mean that the Chamber would countenance any decline in the authority of the trade associations, the intra-industrial cooperative bodies set up by firms in each industry. Swope, one of the most enlightened of business leaders, spoke as though business would be the senior partner in any cooperative effort with government. Speaking of the provisions of some regulatory measures then before Congress, Harriman expressed the traditional fear that they would lead to "autocracy and bureauacracy."[9] A resolution adopted at the end of the convention crystallized these expressions into the assertion that trade associations in each industry "in conference with the appropriate agency of the Government, should be permitted to promulgate fair rules for industrial production and ... to improve the status of labor...." Further in its resolution a contrite Chamber confessed that "Business has had in the past four years a bitter lesson in the evils of unrestricted competition with lowering wages and salaries and disappearing profits. ... perhaps the root of those evils lay in the unrestricted competition of a period of great prosperity...." Thus businessmen did penance in hopes for government sanction of a new era of industrial cooperation guided by the trade associations.[10]

A few days after the convention closed, on June 16, 1933, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act. This act was designed to speed recovery through widespread reemployment. It provided for codes of fair competition in each industry and for their virtual exemption from anti-trust laws, provisions the Chamber

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6 "Business," *loc cit.*, 14.
7 *NYT*, May 4, 1933, p. 1.
8 *Ibid.* "Business," *loc. cit.*, 13. *NYT*, May 4, 1933, 1.
9 "Business," *loc. cit.*, 13.
10 *Ibid.*, 13-14.

approved. Representatives of industry, labor, consumers and government would write the codes. Once a code was approved by the President it was enforceable upon all members of the industry. If an industry refused to draft a code, the President was empowered to impose his own code upon it. Each code had to guarantee freedom for workers to join unions of their choice. It had to provide for prohibitions on child labor, and include safeguards against monopoly or elimination of small business. The famous Section 7a contained the controversial provisions for collective bargaining, maximum hours, and minimum wages. The Chamber's initial attitude toward this portion of the act was cautious and cool, and its later disputes over the meaning of the section were fated to generate considerable heat. Obstacles to accord with labor and government centered in whether "collective bargaining" would be with one union per plant or with any number.

The Chamber's objections are the more remarkable because they were advanced from the beginning, in the teeth of a great positive public response to the recovery act. Credit for generating much of this enthusiasm goes to General Hugh S. Johnson, dynamic, tough-talking NRA administrator. Moved partly by his rhetoric, business hurried to come under the codes. After the first rush of enthusiasm diminished, the President formulated a "blanket code" covering basic matters like minimum wages, which industries could accept while their more lengthly and complex codes were completed. Within a few months there were some 750 codes—codes for pickle packers and powder puff makers, and for manufacturers of everything from anti-hog cholera serum to wood cased lead pencils. At the height of the NRA frenzy a "Blue Eagle" emblem was devised for codified businesses to display as a badge of compliance.[11]

No doubt the Chamber entered into the new alliance with government in something of the spirit of the mass response, willing to assist industry-wide cooperation through the medium of the local chamber.[12] Yet there never was a "honeymoon" between the Chamber and the NRA. Even the enthusiastic Harriman recognized it as a marriage of convenience when he said in a statement immediately after the bill became law, "... there are provisions in the act which I should have been very glad to have seen eliminated or

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[11] *NYT*, July 30, 1933, VIII, 1; Aug. 13, 1933, 3; Aug. 18, 1933, 17.

[12] "Charting the Course of Business," *NB*, XXI (June, 1933), 29. Hereafter cited as "Charting." *NYT*, June 18, 1933, 2. Roscoe H. Goddard, "The Local Chambers' Job in Recovery," *NB*, XXI (July, 1933), 64. "What the Chambers Are Doing," *NB*, XXI (Sept., 1933), 37.

changed." In the same statement he gave another hint of the NRA's fall from grace over the vaguely worded Section 7a:

> The Chamber of Commerce of the United States has consistently stood for the real open shop and I appeared before the Ways and Means Committee of the House . . . to urge that that principle be contained in the bill.[13]

Why, if the Chamber's president had reservations, did he bury them in long acclamations for the NRA? He did so because he sincerely believed the "destructive competition" of the old economic order must give way under the impact of a "grave emergency" to a more sophisticated, enlightened and benign era of business cooperation. Yet he never was willing to treat the NRA as a permanent organization. In the same *New York Times* article that publicized these views on cooperation, he wrote: "The act is, frankly an experiment . . . even those who drafted it would not contend that . . . it was perfect."[14] He also was determined that cooperation was to be the keynote of the new business era even if it had to be ruthlessly enforced. When asked what would be done to competitors who cut wages and lengthened hours, he replied, "They'll be treated like any maverick. They'll be roped, branded, and made to run with the herd."[15] Neither was Harriman ready to surrender business control over its traditional domain, for in November, 1933, he was grumbling that trade associations, not the government, should enforce codes in their industries.[16]

From these first mild irritations in late 1933, the operations of the NRA increasingly chafed the Chamber. From then until the Schechter decision in 1935, it participated in the growing criticism leveled at the NRA, criticism having fundamentally two bases. First, the Chamber often crossed swords with labor leaders and the NRA's National Labor Board over conflicting interpretations of Section 7a. Second, the government's "interference" in business affairs, which challenged the sway of the trade associations, was an irritant that became a festering sore as the months passed.

There were two points in the active and bitter struggle over the collective bargaining clause of Section 7a. Did it forbid the open shop, and, did the phrase "collective bargaining" allow an employer to deal only with a unionized majority, as the A. F. of L. claimed, or did it permit bargaining with all labor groups in the shop, in-

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13 *NYT*, June 14, 1933, 7.
14 *Ibid.*, June 25, 1933, VIII, 1.
15 "Charting," *loc. cit.*, 29.
16 *NYT*, Nov. 8, 1933, 32.

cluding individual laborers? The Chamber held that Section 7a sanctioned the open shop, since the act itself was not explicit, and that employers could bargain with all representatives and even individuals. The initial victory for those with the Chamber's cast of mind came with the writing of the automobile industry code, over the question of union membership as a condition of promotion. A clause of the code guaranteed employers' rights "to select, retain or advance employees on the basis of individual merit without regard to their membership or non-membership in any organization."[17]

In a letter to members, Harriman supported writing merit systems into every code in order that "the principles of true open-shop operations are not contravened."[18] He admitted to readers of *Nation's Business* that

> Certain employers have undoubtedly attempted . . . to bar the representatives of national labor organizations from their shops. On the other hand representatives of organized labor have made unwarranted statements . . . that only through [unions] can the benefits of [Section 7a] be had.[19]

In September, he told the Chicago Association of Commerce he believed American industry was not forced to accept the closed shop. "As Mr. Harriman is one of the advisers of the NRA administration," the *New York Times* opined, "his statement was believed to reflect the attitude of highest Washington officials."[20]

One high Washington official, General Johnson, would not commit himself. Even though the automobile code provisions were not written into any other code, matters hung in the balance. Rumors flew. Once Johnson was reported as flatly opposed to extending the automobile code clauses. If that were true, *Nation's Business* said, it was a "step backward and a dangerous step, a step away from business freedom towards union domination."[21]

William Green, the plain-speaking president of the A. F. of L., refused to remain silent while Harriman broadcast his own interpretation of Section 7a. In a public statement Green declined to "challenge the good faith" of Harriman, but felt forced "to challenge [his] intelligence." "The National Industrial Recovery Act,"

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17 Sidney Fine, "President Roosevelt and the Automobile Code," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (June, 1958), 23–50. "Mr. Harriman Explains the Labor Provisions of the Recovery Act," *NB*, XXI (Oct., 1933), 15.

18 *NYT*, Sept. 4, 1933, 1.

19 "Harriman," *op. cit.*, 66.

20 Sept. 21, 1933, 35.

21 "Charting," XXI (Oct., 1933), 27.

he asserted, "does not prevent the closed union shop. . . ."[22] General Johnson still refused to be stampeded into taking a stand. Obviously irritated by the squabble, he let it be known he was ". . . considering demanding either an end to controversial statements or resignations from prominent members of his advisory boards."[23]

The scales tipped temporarily in labor's favor when the NRA's National Labor Board held that "collective bargaining" meant bargaining by representatives of the majority only, and intervened in elections to enable national unions to propagandize in the shop.[24] When steel producer Ernest T. Weir successfully defied this policy, *Nation's Business* made something of a hero of him.[25] Writing in that publication, Weir noted the membership of the A. F. of L. in 1932 was two and one half million, out of a total "wage earner" group of forty-five million. "If it had so much to offer, no power on earth could have kept 90 percent of American workers out of it. . . . Let us not be too ready to turn over our business heritage to the drillmaster or the bureaucrat." Since both those appellations described General Johnson there was little doubt about whom Weir meant.[26]

Apart from dissatisfaction with Section 7a, business enthusiasm from the NRA declined sharply under the spur of increasing dislike for government "interference" in business affairs. Frederick Shelton, sometime columnist for *Nation's Business,* predicted in the August, 1933, issue that "as the end of the trial period approaches, business will grow more and more reluctant to cooperate in the great experiment of partnership with government."[27] "To put it bluntly," Shelton told his readers in October, "it seems to me that this whole NRA enterprise is a very skillfull job of inspiring mass enthusiasm. Few dare to criticize in public but there is plenty of grumbling in private."[28] The private grumbling became public in November. In that month the Chamber's board of directors resolved that government should keep hands off industry except to deal with law violators or other abuses. The resolution asked that trade associations, explicitly recognized in the act and in Presi-

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22 *NYT*, Sept. 22, 1933, 26.
23 *Ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1933, 7. Green was a member of the National Labor Board. Harriman was a member of the Industrial Advisory Board.
24 Donald Richberg, *The Rainbow,* Garden City, New York, 1936, 150.
25 "Charting," XXII (Feb., 1934), 27.
26 Ernest T. Weir, "Theories and Facts About Labor Relations," *NB,* XXII (Aug., 1934), 24–25, 63.
27 "Watching Washington," XXI, 52.
28 *Ibid.*, 17.

dential statements, be allowed more authority in code administration at the expense of the NRA.[29]

The Chamber's resolution was not received with universal enthusiasm. Senator James Couzens, an independent Republican from Michigan, shot back: "This group of businessmen should be the last to demand anythng.... If we would drop such organizations as the chamber... into the Potomac River we would have some progress."[30]

Unabashed, *Nation's Business* continued to express fears over "enforcing the codes or ensuring 'compliance' with them." Most businessmen expected, it claimed, "Self-government by industry chiefly through its trade associations, with minimum of government regulation...."[31] In December that outspoken commentator on the Washington scene, Willard M. Kiplinger, wrote in his regular column that General Johnson, whom he had described as a "regular fellow" in July, would "have to go, and be replaced by someone who is a good conciliator and who also has firmness."[32]

A growing chorus of complaint prodded the Chamber's board of directors, at a secret meeting in November, 1933, to launch an "investigation" of the NRA. In appointing a committee of seven to conduct the investigation, the directors condemned the codes as "unenforceable" measures permitting practices working "against honest business conduct." Results of this investigation later saw the light in formal recommendations for less governmental, and more trade association control.[33]

In 1934, before the annual convention in May, the Chamber mailed a questionnaire to selected member organizations, asking for their reactions to the NRA. The complaints poured in: government was showing favoritism to employees; costs had risen while prices had not, and restraints on competition were too artificial to be practical. There was a belief that the recovery act had influenced recovery, though the replies could not agree on the extent of that influence, or whether it really was positive.[34]

Harriman delivered his convention address against this backdrop of discontent. He did not need to be moderate, but he chose

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29 *NYT*, Nov. 19, 1933, 3.
30 *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1933, 3.
31 "Questions Which Puzzle Employers," XXI (Nov., 1933), 61.
32 "What's Ahead in Washington," *NB*, XXI, 15. Column hereafter cited as "What's Ahead."
33 *NYT*, Nov. 20, 1933, 1, 3. Nov. 21, 1933, 2.
34 *Ibid.*, May 1, 1934, 17.

to emphasize the constructive gains of the economy under the NRA. "Economic horizons have indeed brightened," he said, adding that

> General business has also improved.... Child labor has been abolished in many industries. The sweat shop is going.... I am sure that in basic industries codes of fair practice are essential, that the chaos of unbridled competition cannot be permitted to return, and that some Federal agencies... must continue to carry out the major functions exercised by NRA....

Harriman had room in his speech for criticism, too. He predicted legal challenges to the recovery act on the grounds that Congress had regulated too much and had delegated too many powers to the Executive. He said he did "not find evidence of a public desire to substitute a new economic or political system for those under which we have made such rapid progress...."[35]

Leaders in the natural resources industries were virtually alone in their praise for the codes. Even these representatives of lumber, coal, petroleum and electric power confined most of their enthusiasm to provisions permitting suspension of anti-trust laws and calling for compulsory conservation.[36]

The Chamber, however, was not yet prepared to break with the administration. It accepted a polite letter from Roosevelt, who asked for continued cooperation in the most gracious phrases. It re-elected the moderate Harriman for a third term, an honor accorded to only one other man. The convention resolution, though uncompromising, was circumspect. It asked for "support of the principle of self-determination of industry" and asserted that "representative and efficient trade associations are the recognized means of industrial self-government."[37]

After the convention the volume of criticism continued to swell. An irate Texan wrote *Nation's Business* that before the recovery act "business was begining to pick up," but by early 1934 "there is practically no building and the price of lumber has advanced 100 percent." Harriman admitted to the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce that "Business desires a slackening of reform efforts. There is a feeling that too many codes have been adopted...."[38] Kiplinger delivered himself of a slashing attack on the NRA in the August issue of *Nation's Business*, calling it

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[35] *Ibid.*, May 3, 1934, 4. Warren Bishop, "Business Sizes Up the New Deal," *NB*, XXII (June, 1934), 15.
[36] *Ibid.*, 17. *NYT*, May 3, 1934, 4.
[37] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1934, 7.
[38] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1934, 5. M. H. Crockett, "A Texas Reader's View of NRA," *NB*, XXII (Feb., 1934), 59.

the worst mess ever seen around this town. There are executive orders, rulings, interpretations, and interpretations of interpretations, but no clarity. The trouble is and always has been due to the tempermental incompetence of the man at the top.

Thus did General Johnson, Kiplinger's "regular fellow" of the year before, fall from favor in *Nation's Business* editorial pages.[39]

When Johnson resigned as recovery administrator in September, 1934, Harriman tossed no bouquets after the retiring executive. "The National Industrial Recovery Act had fallen into serious disrepute, " he told reporters. "As it stood, NRA was an agent for the demoralization of confidence. . . ." He said the recovery act was intended to apply only to farflung and highly developed industries, but that "extremists among the bureaucrats" had attempted to "transform it into an all-inclusive engine for the regulation of the little pants presser up a side street. . . . The form it took under General Johnson was very questionable."[40]

In its November, 1934 report the Chamber's NRA committee cast aside government regulation and stood for clear enunciation of greater business freedom. Recovery legislation should, the committee reported, apply only to business in interstate commerce. The powers of government should be restricted to approval or veto of codes—codes which could be enforced only against those who signed them. A codified industry, or any member of the industry, should have the right to abrogate a code. Finally, provision should be made for minority and even individual workers' representation in collective bargaining, with a definite prohibition of the closed shop. The report did not mention safeguards for labor such as maximum hours, minimum wages, or restrictions on child labor.[41]

Had the directors adopted such a program, they probably would have forced a showdown with the administration. But by November 16, when they met, a showdown policy was sadly out-of-date. For in early November 1934, the Democratic party surged forward to unseat still more Republican congressmen in a continuation of its triumph of two years before. In a victory rare to off-year elections, the incumbent party pushed its house majority from 313 to 322, and won in more than two-thirds of the senatorial contests. On the state level the Republicans emerged from the campaign with only seven governorships. As soon as the Chamber found its voice,

39 "What's Ahead," XXII, 23.
40 *NYT*, Sept. 30, 1934, 32.
41 Henry I. Harriman, "The Future of NRA," *NB*, XXII (Sept., 1934), 67. *NYT*, Sept. 23, 1934, 1, 33.

it began to preach "cooperation" with the administration. Silas Strawn, an ex-president of the Chamber, capitulated with these words: "From the recent election it certainly would seem that President Roosevelt as a popular leader has the overwhelming approval of the American people."[42]

On December 17, some ninety business leaders gathered at White Sulphur Springs, Va., to attend the "Joint Business Conference for Recovery," sponsored by the Chamber and the National Association of Manufacturers. At the end of three days of discussion the conference voted, in resolution form, a watered version of the Chamber's NRA committee report. The conference resolved that new recovery legislation should be passed, but expire one year from its enactment. Although the resolution held out for voluntary codes, it favored provision for government termination, minimum wages, maximum hours, and child labor restrictions. Either individual or collective bargaining would be permitted. Silence over such business desiderata as an industry's right to abrogate a code, restriction of codes to interstate commerce, and explicit bans on the closed shop gave mute testimony to the spirit of "cooperation" so recently enforced upon the business leadership. However, the spirit of "cooperation" did not dim the demands for voluntary adherence to codes, or for that most sanctified tenet of the business gospel, individual wage bargaining in the open shop. Not even a thumping popular endorsement of the administration could shake the core of businessmen's beliefs.[43]

It is in this troubled mood of growing exacerbation that Professor Schlesinger finds the Chamber, in its referendum of winter, 1934, voting "for continuance by nearly four to one." Professor Schlesinger does not explain why the Chamber was willing to abandon previous policies and stand with its natural enemies, the labor leaders and the advocates of a managed society. As a matter of fact, perusal of the propositions conclusively shows that the Chamber did not reverse its previous stands, that it did not vote "for continuance by nearly four to one," but overwhelmingly voted to discontinue the current NRA. Nothing could be more openly obvious than the meaning of a vote in favor of the following proposals:

1. The National Industrial Recovery Act should be allowed to terminate in accordance with its present provisions.

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[42] *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1934, 1.
[43] *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1934, 1, 3; Dec. 18, 1934, 1; Dec. 20, 1934, 1, 18.

2. Prior to the expiration of the National Industrial Recovery Act new legislation should be enacted.

According to tallies announced in June, 1935, the local chambers voted for the first proposal, 1,693 to 251. This means that by a ratio of more than six to one the Chamber of Commerce of the United States voted termination, and not continuance. On the second proposition the local chambers voted yes, 1,495 to 419. This means that by a vote of more than four to one, the Chamber went on record for new recovery legislation prior to the death of the old. There is much more than a quibble separating a vote for "new legislation" and a vote for "continuance," because the twelve remaining articles in the referendum demanded extensive clarification and drastic revision of the NRA then existing. All twelve articles passed.

Anyone familiar with the Chamber's position could have predicted the terms of these articles of revision. In summary, they called for limiting new recovery legislation to business in interstate commerce and giving each industry the power to draft codes. Government's power would be limited to vetoing codes thus drafted, stating "conditions of approval," and making approved codes enforceable against all members of the industry. Article eight said: "... it should be made unmistakable that collective bargaining is bargaining with representatives of all groups of employees. . . ."

Other articles favored regulations for minimum wages, maximum hours, and child labor. The referendum further asked for "an express right of termination" of each code. Apostles of inter-industry cooperation could have hoped for no broader cooperative vistas than those opened by Article 13, which would have allowed businessmen "to enter into agreements other than rules," that, once approved by government, were as binding as the codes themselves. Thus the Chamber declared for elimination of those recovery act provisions it had found distasteful, and retention and extension of portions favorable to business, in entirely new recovery legislation.[44] Perhaps the Chamber itself came closer to the truth than has historical writing on the subject when it declared that it had "gone on record as favoring letting the present . . . Act lapse in June [and] at the same time recommend new legislation that would salvage the good but not the bad features of the present law."[45]

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[44] "Chamber to Vote on NRA," *NB*, XXII (Dec., 1934), 51. *NYT*, Dec. 28, 1934, 30.

[45] "Business Wants a New NRA," *NB*, XXIII (Feb., 1935), 60.

By convention time in May of 1935 the Chamber had abandoned the panicky policy of cooperation with the administration. To an observer at the convention's opening sessions, "the atmosphere seemed charged with anti-New Deal sentiment."[46] Harriman, no longer able or willing to modify the bitter criticism, agreed that "Business is justly apprehensive of the increasing interference of Government in the affairs of business, as exemplified in some features of the NRA. . . ."[47] More extreme statements came from men like C. B. Ames, chairman of the board of the Texas company, who said:

> I venture the opinion that the best thing about NIRA, NRA, the Blue Eagle and the administration of them, is the fact that public sentiment has repudiated them. The people have tired of the bungling effort of Washington bureauacracy to regiment American business.[48]

In another respect this convention was different from the two previous meetings. This year there was to be no heartening speech from President Roosevelt, as in 1933; not even a friendly letter from the Chief Executive, as in 1934. Roosevelt allowed the 1935 convention to pass virtually unnoticed, although he let it be known he was piqued by the Chamber's display of hostility.[49]

As its new president the Chamber chose Harper Sibley of Rochester, New York; mine and mill owner, rancher, and scion of the publishing house sharing his Christian name. The election of Sibley, more critical of administration policy than Harriman, reflected the shift in the Chamber's attitude toward the New Deal. Another storm signal was the resolution adopted at the convention's close; simply a restatement of the referendum of November 1934, already discussed.[50]

A few days after the convention, and a few days before the NRA was to expire, the Supreme Court invalidated the code provisions of the recovery act, calling them an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority to the President. The Court also stated that no economic emergency could justify congressional control over trade not definitely related to interstate commerce.[51] The Court's action pleased business groups. The National Association

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46 *NYT*, May 3, 1935, 41.
47 "Listening In as Business Speaks," *NB*, XXIII (June, 1935), 18.
48 *Ibid.*, 20.
49 *NYT*, May 5, 1935, IV, 3.
50 *NB*, XXIII (June, 1935), 15, and *ibid.*, Warren Bishop, "Business Drafts a Program," 16. *NYT*, May 3, 1935, 1.
51 *Ibid.*, May 28, 1935, 1.

of Manufacturers praised the "notable decision" that made it possible "for industry to go forward on a basis of voluntary self-government."[52] Harper Sibley hurriedly worked some comments on the decision into a speech already prepared for the Merchants Association of New York. "By its action . . . the Supreme Court . . . completely cleared the air—and we hope eliminated from the picture the further danger of Federal coercion in intrastate codes."[53] In June the Chamber's board of directors expressed its "gratification at the wholehearted way in which business enterprises generally have proceeded . . . to maintain orderly and just conditions in their relations with their employees, with one another, and with the public."[54]

Willard M. Kiplinger, mentally poking among the ruins of the NRA, concluded that the board's hopes for voluntary cooperation were optimistic. Business, he wrote, probably would not conform to a voluntary NRA because it would not be "enforceable by law, or by the Government, or even by the industry itself, on those who do not choose to participate. . . ."[55]

Three conclusions can be drawn from this account of the Chamber's position. First, the Chamber grew increasingly restive under the NRA and flatly demanded new and substantially different legislation. Second, the causes for this growing disquietude were the conflict with labor over the open shop and the meaning of collective bargaining, and what the Chamber imagined was bungling, meddling, government control. Finally, this review suggests that more monographic studies of the New Deal era must be written before surveys of the period can be trustworthy in their details.

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52 *Ibid.*, May 29, 1935, 11.
53 *Ibid.*, 10.
54 *Ibid.*, June 15, 1935, 2.
55 "What's Ahead," XXIII (July, 1935), 22.

Edward Bates and the Decision of 1860

Immediately after Stephen A. Douglas defeated his rival, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1858 Senatorial contest in Illinois, Republican Party leaders grew apprehensive over the upcoming Presidential election. Lincoln's defeat and the impending election of 1860 made it imperative that the party decide upon a popular candidate. Several of the Republicans began considering Edward Bates, the Missouri Whig leader and prominent border state politician. As a representative of the West, Bates aroused the imagination of many Republicans who did not favor William H. Seward or who rankled under the onus of "sectional party." More than a few politicians of the newly-formed party speculated on the possibilities of a national ticket headed by Bates with John Bell of Tennessee or John J. Crittenden of Kentucky. Since Bates appeared to be a compromise choice, interest in the Missourian's candidacy heightened.

By the spring of 1859, the growing sentiment for Bates caused Charles Gibson, a young St. Louis lawyer and one of the former judge's many law students, to join forces with Frank Blair, Jr., of the famous political family, in the organization of a Bates movement. Enthused, the pair arranged a meeting in St. Louis with Schuyler Colfax, the Indiana politician-journalist, to discuss Bates' Presidential chances in 1860. Both Blair and Gibson hoped to enlist Colfax's support in presenting Bates as the logical choice of the Republican moderates.[1]

Acting as a representative of mid-western Republicans, Colfax came to St. Louis on April 27, 1859, with some doubts about Bates' qualifications. Aside from one term as a Congressman during the administration of John Quincy Adams, Bates had little political service on the national level. While he had organized and led the Whig Party in his state, the Missourian had demonstrated his reluctance to reenter national politics by rejecting a proferred cabinet post in Millard Fillmore's administration. Still worse, Colfax believed, was the fact that Bates had never joined the Republican Party primarily because of his forlorn hope that the slavery issue

[1] Howard K. Beale, ed., *The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859–1866*, Washington, 1933, 11–12, hereinafter referred to as *Bates' Diary*.

could be relegated to secondary importance. Bates opposed the extension of slavery into the territories and advocated the gradual abolition of slavery, but he refused to heed the call for anti-slavery unity and continuously had worked to end the sectional strife.[2]

Completely aware of these facts, Colfax had to ascertain whether Bates was strong enough for the northeast and yet moderate enough to retain the support of the border states. A recent letter, sent by the potential candidate to the New York Whig Committee, in which he severely castigated southern extremists who wanted Congressional guarantees in the territories, made Colfax's task more difficult. Detecting a change of attitude in his letter, some observers in the southern and border states had begun to question Bates' moderation.[3]

During the meeting in St. Louis, Colfax received satisfactory answers to the questions he asked of Bates who fully understood his interrogator's attitude. After the editor's return to Indiana, Bates again reassured him that no great importance should be attached to his communication to the New York Whig Committee. His only purpose, he wrote Colfax, had been to portray himself as a "national" rather than a "sectional" candidate by upholding the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories and by opposing any legislative restrictions placed on the future admission of slave states. Agitation over the slavery question, Bates wrote, had caused both northern and southern leaders to take an extremist position.[4] As others would, Colfax deduced that the Missourian hoped to end the controversy over slavery and leave the territorial question to unrewarded constitutionalists. Content now, the journalist concluded that Bates was able to carry the banner of the moderates of the Republican Party.

Despite the hesitant entries in his diary, Bates, after years of political frustration, actively sought the 1860 Republican nomination. A confirmed Whig all of his life, however, the Missourian had not displayed much enthusiasm for the Republicans or for Frank Blair's "National Democracy." After a brief flirtation with the Know-Nothings, as a result of presiding over the demise of the Whig Party in Baltimore in 1856, Bates turned to the "national opposition" formed against President James Buchanan's adminis-

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[2] Bates to Colfax, February 24, 1859, Schuyler Colfax Collection, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois; *Bates' Diary*, 38; *St. Louis Evening News*, April 16, 1859.

[3] *St. Louis Missouri Democrat*, May 2, 1859; *Bates' Diary*, 12.

[4] Bates to Colfax, June 16, 1859, Colfax Collection.

tration. Seemingly above a cabal of factions, he represented himself as a potential "agent" of the Republicans, endorsing their materialistic doctrines of national expansion and espousing their opposition to the extension of slavery.[5] With political ambition as his guide, Bates hoped to stand as a candidate above party, unsullied by "higher-law" dogma or Republican sectionalism. In this manner he proposed to solve the national dilemma.[6]

The Bates-for-President movement gathered momentum in late 1859 with each moderate pronouncement of its central figure. Samuel Bowles, editor of the *Massachusetts* (Springfield) *Republican,* John D. Defrees, editor of the *Indianapolis State Journal,* and Charles A. Dana of the *New York Tribune* added appreciative journalistic weight to the Missourian's candidacy, while Hamilton Fish joined fellow New Yorker, Horace Greeley, in championing the cause of the eloquent chairman of the 1847 Rivers and Harbors Convention.[7] Free Soil newspapers in the middle west, such as the *Quincy Republican* and the *St. Joseph Free Democrat,* and conservative journals such as the *Richmond Whig* alike hailed Bates as a promising candidate.[8] Future diplomat, Anson Burlingame, of Massachusetts, agreed to boom Bates in New England as a gradual emancipationist while Governor William Graham of North Carolina endorsed him as a true moderate. Anti-administration groups in New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, closed ranks behind the ex-Whig because of his vigorous attacks on Buchanan.[9] Winter Davis and Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Maryland both stated that they would support the Missourian for the same reason expressed by James O. Broadhead, prominent St. Louis lawyer, who emphasized that Bates was "not touched with Northern or Southern fanaticism."[10] The temper and strength of Bates' following indicated

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5 *Bates' Diary,* 29, 38.

6 Bates to Colfax, February 20, 1859, Colfax Collection.

7 Bates to Gibson, September 1, 1859, Abraham Lincoln Collection, Chicago Historical Society; *Bates' Diary,* 36–38, 54, 77.

8 D. D. Barnard to Fish, August 9, 1859, Hamilton Fish correspondence, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Theodore C. Pease and James G. Randall, eds., *The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning,* Springfield, Illinois, 1925–1933, I, 380–381; *Columbia Missouri Statesman,* October 21, 1859.

9 Bates to Gibson, September 1, 1859, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; *Hannibal Daily Messenger,* (Missouri), September 30, 1859; *Bates' Diary,* 45, 54, 89; *Missouri Statesman,* (Columbia), October 21, 1859.

10 *Bates' Diary,* 63, 80, 83; *St. Louis Missouri Democrat,* November 9, 1859; Broadhead to William Newland, December 6, 1859, James O. Broadhead Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis; Leonard to Robert Wilson, December 12, 1859, Abiel Leonard Papers, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia.

that he might be the candidate longed for by the Republican hierarchy since the unsuccessful 1856 election.

Sensing his growing support, the Missouri aspirant began to carry out his plan to coalesce ex-Whigs and moderate Republicans into a comprehensive political group. His plan became a philosophy and his philosophy a strategic guide which developed as a "two party" view. He would attempt to reconcile the nationalists in the various states, and win the support of moderates in the Seward-Weed faction to oppose the anti-slavery radicals. By declaring that slavery extension was unconstitutional but that slavery, where it existed, could be protected by local laws, he might appeal to moderates of all sections. Circumspectly he also called attention to both the restrictions imposed on slavery and the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law, and properly expressed his alarm over the Dred Scott decision and the southern demands that Congress protect slavery in the territories. Adroitly, Bates ignored the argument that the government might admit slavery into the western areas. Living in a border state, largely populated by southern families, Bates could not afford to identify himself with "Black Republicanism." His own sense of moderation, his southern background, and his political aspirations dictated the obvious strategy. "I have always thought and often said," he wrote, "that slavery is an evil, social and moral and political; but I have never said that it was inconsistent with Christianity."[11] The engima of such a position appealed to the realistic-minded ex-Whigs as well as the moderate leaders of the Republican Party.

Bates' course was not determined solely by political expediency. He was deeply concerned over the slavery issue, and called for courageous wisdom when the reverberation of the John Brown raid shook the country in October, 1859. Watching the fateful events arising from the Harpers Ferry tragedy, Bates concluded that Brown should be punished, but he was incensed when a jury in Norfolk, Virginia, jailed a man who had praised Brown's deed. Exasperated by this irrationality, he confided to his diary "that the slave states live in constant dread; and fear will make wise men foolish and kind men cruel."[12] He watched the mounting tension on both sides and, against the angry passions of men running headlong toward an armed conflict, he sincerely hoped to raise the calm voice of reason.[13]

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[11] *Bates' Diary*, 80, 83; *St. Louis Missouri Democrat*, November 9, 1859; *Missouri Statesman*, November 11, 1859; *Hannibal Daily Messenger*, November 12, 1859; Liberty (Missouri) *Weekly Tribune*, November 18, 1859.

[12] *Bates' Diary*, 63–65.

[13] Bates to Colfax, January 1, 1860, Colfax Collection.

After John Brown's raid, Bates' plan of a coalition, free from allegiance to any party doctrine, seemed logical, particularly to those of similar economic interests. Inherent in his philosophy were many of the old Whig principles, including a high protective tariff to promote American industrial expansion. States, such as Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, looked with increasing favor on the Missourian because of this understanding of industrial interests. Happily, Bates observed these reactions and enthusiastically informed Colfax of his conclusions. "I am the only man," he wrote, "on whom there is any chance of uniting all parts of the nation."[14] His anti-sectional bias and his long-standing conservative views made it easier for the Missourian to challenge the recognized Republican leaders who intended to direct the coming political revolution.[15]

Despite his conciliatory manner, however, the South had not warmed to Bates' candidacy by 1860. His program, Southerners believed, suggested a Northern-oriented society based on a system of free labor and government-protected industries. Although Bates thought that family connections in Virginia and Maryland, and old friends in Kentucky would help his cause, his tariff views, acceptable in New England, incurred a deep hostility in these southern states. In addition, his unctuous appraisal of slavery extension, devoid of Constitutional protection, pleased few southern slaveowners. In addition to his opposition to Federal protection of slavery in the territories, the South recognized also that he favored an emancipation colonization program.[16] All of these were good reasons for the deep South to reject Bates who sought nomination as a "national" candidate.

Border state support was, in contrast, a vital factor in Bates' plans. In Missouri, Charles Gibson personally took change of his old mentor's campaign designed to achieve cross-party integration of Whigs, Know-Nothings and disillusioned Democrats. Attending

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14 Bates to Colfax, January 30, 1860, *ibid.*

15 Henry Wilson to George Julian, January 20, 1860, Julian-Giddings Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; *Bates' Diary*, 99; Edward C. Kirkland, *The Borderland in the Civil War*, New York, 1927, 55; Reinhard H. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign*, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1944, 66.

16 *St. Louis Missouri Democrat*, November 9, 1859; Avery Craven, *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848–1861*, Baton Rouge, 1953, 343; Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Lincoln*, 2 vols., New York, 1950, II, 328. Bates had a considerable following in Maryland while in Virginia and South Carolina he had less support. Early in 1860, his brother-in-law, Hamilton R. Gamble of St. Louis, undertook a trip to these three states to promote Bates' candidacy.

the combined convention of Whigs and Americans in Jefferson City, in February, 1860, Gibson openly bargained with many of Bates' former associates. As partners of the Republicans in the "united opposition," few of the old border Conservatives opposed Bates but the candidate took no chances. Just as the convention began, he silently left St. Louis and on the night of February 28, appeared at the National Hotel in Washington in the company of Seward, Chase, Welles, and other Republican dignitaries, including Abraham Lincoln.[17] His publicized conferences in the national capital made an indelible impression on the Missouri Whigs and Americans. Although there were some protests, the convention nominated Bates as their Presidential candidate. Ten days later the Missouri Republicans met in the same halls to choose their delegates to the Chicago Convention. Shortly afterwards, Bates received news that the Missouri Republican delegates, too, would be solidly behind him.[18]

Strong support among Whigs, Know-Nothings, and Republicans, however, was only part of the Bates' movement in Missouri and the border states. Several people recalled the candidate's inopportune remarks about the foreign-born and his brief association with the innocuous Know-Nothings. Others in the border states were not awed by the Missourian's eastern and northern support and several politicians doubted that Bates could carry his own state. His managers reacted to all opposition by insisting that Bates could carry Missouri and the rest of the border states as a "national" candidate. Charles H. Van Alen, personal agent of Greeley who was sent to confer with Bates on strategy in February, 1860, declared that the Missourian's apparent lack of support among the anti-slavery Germans actually would be an asset in the conservative border states.[19] Motivated by a growing anxiety over the nature of the opposition, the Bates' men stressed his nationalist virtues. As Lincoln, however, many thought that Bates appeared either too weak in the northeast or too conciliatory for the Repub-

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[17] Broadhead to James S. Rollins, February 1, 1860, Broadhead Papers; William Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power*, Boston, 1937, 58; Willard H. Smith, *Schuyler Colfax, The Changing Fortunes of a Political Idol*, Indianapolis, 1950, 117.

[18] *Bates' Diary*, 106; Frank I. Herriott, "Conference in the Deutsches Haus (Chicago, May 14–15, 1860)," *Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XXXV (1928), 135.

[19] Van Alen to Greeley, February 5, 1860, Horace Greeley Papers, New York Public Library; *New York Daily Tribune*, March 3, 1860; Pease and Randall (eds.), *Browning's Diary*, I, 396; Herriott, "Conference in the Deutsches Haus", *loc. cit.*, 135.

licans who wanted a frenzied emotional campaign against the "slaveocracy."[20]

Bates, too, realized that many Republicans, including some in Missouri, sought an avowed party man. He hoped that his conferences with Seward and other leaders might identify him more closely with the Republicans but a committee of the Missouri Republican delegation desired more answers.[21] Replying cautiously to their inquiry, the wary candidate defended Congressional authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, and advocated the immediate admission of Kansas under the Wyandotte Constitution. Some did note that the hesitant phrasing of the letter avoided an endorsement of Republican doctrine but most delegates were satisfied that he answered as a true party man.[22]

Some Bates' supporters realized that he artfully dodged the slavery issue because of his deep-seated fear over unchecked emotionalism. Setting a dazzling pace in popularizing Bates in eastern Republican circles, Horace Greeley maintained that Bates' procrastination on party loyalty and doctrine was political wisdom of a slave-state citizen. Bates was not timid, Greeley wrote, but intent upon unifying old-line Whigs, eastern protectionists, western free soilers, and liberal Democrats.[23] Undertaking a lecture tour throughout the East, the New York journalist championed Bates as a candidate who symbolized honorable compromise and firm principle. Bates was not, nor ever had been a Know-Nothing, Greeley assured his reading public, and no fateful turn of events regarding the slavery issue could goad him into an unwise course of action.[24]

Turning an apparent weakness into a positive asset was no mean task but Bates appeared equal to the challenge. In his letter

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[20] Lincoln to Norman B. Judd, February 9, 1861, *Abraham Lincoln, Collected Works*, Roy P. Basler, ed. (8 vols. and index, New Brunswick, New Jersery, 1953, III, 517; Carl Schurz, *Reminiscences*, New York, 1907, II, 175. Schurz mistakenly believed that Bates was too conciliatory on slavery extension.

[21] Bates to Colfax, February 2, 1860, Colfax Collection; *St. Louis Missouri Democrat*, February 24, 1860; *Bates' Diary*, 107.

[22] Bates to Colfax, March 28, 1860, Colfax Collection; Bates to Hanna, March 24, 1860, John Hanna Collection, Indiana University Library, Bloomington; Richard C. Vaughan to Leonard, March 29, April 6, 1860, Benjamin Howard to Leonard, March 29, 1860, Garth to Leonard, March 29, 1860, Leonard Papers; *Bates Diary*, 111, 114, 117; *New York Daily Tribune*, April 2, 1860; Clarence E. MacArtney, *Lincoln and His Cabinet*, New York, 1931, 67.

[23] *New York Daily Tribune*, February 20, March 26, 1860.

[24] *Ibid.*, April 7, 14, 1860; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, *Horace Greeley, Nineteenth-Century Crusader*, Philadelphia, 1953, 243.

to the Missouri Republicans, he capitalized on his publicity as a "nationalist" opposed to the nomination of a radical or sectional candidate. The Democrats hoped their rivals would select such a man, he stated, thus ensuring them an easy victory over the Republicans. By pointing out the fallacy of pursuing such a course of action, Bates displayed his understanding of the difference between altering principles and changing tactics. More confident of eventual success he projected a non-sectional image and welcomed every opportunity to contrast it to Seward's "higher law" dogma or Chase's blatant political ambition.[25] He candidly suggested to the Missouri Republicans that the inchoate Democratic opposition and the strength of the Republican moderates would eliminate sectional or ultra aspirants.

Such an argument appeared logical to more and more people. Lincoln tested Bates' appeal in Illinois and found it to be growing. He discovered that Bates and Seward both had considerable strength, though neither man could carry the state.[26] Knowing that Bates was opposed by many mid-western Germans, Lincoln decided to probe his anti-sectional position. He purchased the Illinois *Staats-Anzeiger,* edited by Dr. Theodore Canisius, and used it to attack positions taken by the Missouri lawyer. Lincoln's apprehensiveness verified reports from other states that the Missourian's support was increasing among moderate elements.

As Lincoln deduced, the Bates movement appeared on the upswing by early spring of 1860. Spurred on by John P. Usher, the political wheelman, Indiana Republicans evidenced a growing interest in Bates. Gibson, who attended the Indiana Republican Convention confidently predicted that at least twenty of that state's twenty-six delegates would vote for Bates. Titian J. Coffey, a former law reader under Bates and a Pennsylvania politician of some note, declared that his state would turn to his old tutor after casting its first ballot votes for Simon Cameron.[27] Even some of the Missouri Germans, influenced by the clever editorials of the St. Charles *Democrat,* had decided to endorse Bates. Additional support came from the varigated "opposition" parties in the border states of Kentucky and Tennessee, and from groups in Illinois,

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25 *Bates' Diary,* 93, 97–98.

26 Lincoln to Trumbull, March 1, 1860, *Lincoln, Collected Works,* Basler, ed., IV, 47; George Kitchell to Trumbull, April 14, 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

27 *Bates' Diary,* 99, 102, 107.

Minnesota, Ohio, and Connecticut who favored Bates because he was an independent disassociated from Republican radicalism.[28]

Ironically, the effort to divorce Bates from his former American affiliations ran counter to the Bates-Blair-Gibson strategy. Subtle appeals made to the anti-Administration groups endangered Bates' standing with the aroused Germans, and attempts to placate these zealous men was bound to alienate many of the old conservatives. Eventually, Bates discouraged the Blairs from openly wooing German voters, for he desired more the support of the former Whigs and Americans. Sol Smith, the St. Louis theatrical entertainer and one of the "opposition" leaders in Missouri, praised Bates' decision. Bates, however, could not endorse a conservative convention, or even promise the maintenance of old Whig principles, as long as articulate extremists opposed him.[29] The editor of the Columbia *Missouri Statesman,* William F. Switzler, who earlier had supported Bates, decided to repudiate him when the "conciliatory" letter to the Republican committee was made public.[30] Angered, Switzler concluded that his former Whig associate had been forced to align himself with Republican radicalism.[31] The editor's personal reaction illustrated the hopelessness of Bates' attempt to unify the border state conservatives while espousing Republican doctrines.

While it was true that he upheld the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, Bates actually avoided taking a positive anti-slavery stand. He insisted that the "moral and political status of slavery" was significant only when applied to the schemes of expansionist-minded southerners or northern ultras seeking to bend Congressional or executive authority to their liking.[32] Paramount to Bates was to prevent the selection of an extreme anti-slavery Republican as the party nominee.[33] Consequently, he professed that rational men would understand the necessity to subordinate party allegiances to national unity. His behavior, however, often made it appear that Bates was an outsider incapable of com-

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[28] *Ibid.,* 114; *St. Louis Missouri Democrat,* March 6, 21, 1860; Craven, *Growth of Southern Nationalism,* 343; Sceva B. Laughlin, "Missouri Politics during the Civil War," *Missouri Historical Review,* XXIII (1928–29), 417.

[29] Bates to Colfax, April 9, 1860, Colfax Collection; *Bates' Diary,* 124, 126.

[30] Columbia *Missouri Statesman,* April 6, 27, 1860.

[31] Bates to Colfax, March 28, 1860, Colfax Collection.

[32] *Bates' Diary,* 117, 142–143; *New York Daily Tribune,* March 17, 1860.

[33] *St. Louis Missouri Democrat,* April 24, 1860; Bates' Diary, 124; Benjamin Howard to Leonard, March 29, 1860, Leonard Papers.

peting against established party candidates who championed a strong anti-slavery cause.[34]

By the time of the convention, the Missouri delegates to Chicago had grown so apprehensive over Bates' position that they reflected a general confusion. Some of the delegates favored Lincoln while others secretly agreed with those who believed that Bates himself could never carry Missouri in the election. Others feared that the Blairs might compromise with stronger candidates after they had used Bates to make the Republican Party acceptable in Missouri.[35] A few, such as B. Gratz Brown, one of the Missouri delegates-at-large, thought that the favorite son was a stalking horse for Lincoln and an impossible choice as an independent.[36] Unable to present the Missouri delegation with evidence of concentrated support or reassuring statements from their candidate, the Bates' managers hoped for the fortunate results of chance.

During the weekend of May 12–13, the incongruous trio of Frank Blair, Gibson, and Greeley established Bates' headquarters in Chicago's Tremont House and, in a series of preconvention parties and conferences, outlined their strategy.[37] Hearing of their activities, Thurlow Weed visited Blair and Gibson to promise Seward support if the Senator failed in the early balloting. Gibson and Blair received Weed's offer courteously, ignoring the obvious implication that the border states were expected initially to vote for Seward. No agreement was reached with the Tammany leaders for favorable news had arrived from the Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia delegations and the Bates' managers felt equal to the powerful Weed.[38] Stimulated by new confidence, Blair and Greeley circulated a pamphlet which depreciated Seward's chances and enumerated Bates' qualifications.

Continuing to act on the premise that most of the delegates had not made up their minds, Gibson, Greeley, and the Blairs planned to concentrate on the delegates from crucial states. Their assump-

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[34] Bates to Colfax, April 9, 1860, Colfax Collection.

[35] Walter B. Stevens, "Lincoln and Missouri," *Missouri Historical Review*, X (1915–16), 69; Alexander McClure, *Recollections*, Philadelphia, 1903, 396; *St. Louis Missouri Republican*, May 22, 1860.

[36] William E. Smith, *The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics*, 2 vols., New York, 1933, I, 467.

[37] E. Gibson (ed.), "Charles Gibson Autobiography," (unpublished MSS.) Gibson Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis; Smith, *Blair Family in Politics, I*, 475–476.

[38] Charles C. Coffin, "Reminiscence," in Allen T. Rice (ed.), *Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln*, New York, 1888, 164; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 14, 1860; *Boston Evening Transcript*, May 15, 1860; Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power*, 246.

tions had some valid basis. The Indiana delegation opposed Seward and remained divided on other candidates. John A. Kasson, of Iowa, had made much headway in his attempt to swing his delegation over to Bates if there was prolonged balloting, and Pennsylvania delegates still expressed an interest in the Missourian because of his tariff views. Maryland, led by the patriarchial Francis Preston Blair, and Delaware, Connecticut, and Oregon openly declared for Bates. In addition, a poll of the Virginia delegation revealed mounting strength for the Missouri judge.[39] After a hurried assimilation of these reports, the Bates' camp decided that their candidate would run just behind Seward if he received the votes of the uncertain delegates. Many had concluded that whoever ranked next to Seward in the balloting eventually would win the decisive votes and the nomination.

In keeping Bates close to Seward, the Blairs and Gibson had to surmount the formidable obstacle of the mid-western Germans. Fred Muench and C. L. Bernays, prominent St. Louis Germans, supported Bates but had little success in persuading their fellow countrymen to do the same. His affiliation with the Know-Nothings dismayed most of the German delegates and his moderate views on slavery irritated all of them. Theodore Hielscher, editor of the Indianapolis *Freie Presse,* bitterly denounced Bates as did Dr. Canisius of the *Staats-Anzeiger* and Gustave Koerner who already had convinced many Pennsylvania and Indiana delegates that a vote against Bates was a vote against slavery.[40] Many of the mid-western Germans preferred either Seward or Lincoln to the border state moderate who had defended the 1856 Know-Nothing Naturalization Resolution. Anxious to repudiate Bates publicly as a nativist, the Germans agreed to assemble in the Deutsches Haus on the night of May 14, two days before the convention began.

German Republicans from Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin met at the Deutsches Haus to place themselves on record against any candidate with nativist leanings. Despite Bates' strength in many of the states represented, the outcome of the conference was

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[39] *Boston Evening Transcript,* May 14, 1860; Alexander McClure, *Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times,* Philadelphia, 1892, 30, 31; Thomas H. Dudley, "The Inside Facts of Lincoln's Nomination," *Century Magazine* XL (1890), 477; James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress,* 2 vols., Norwich, Connecticut, 1884, I, 168.

[40] Herriott, "Conference in the Deutsches Haus," *loc. cit.,* 117–119, 153; Thomas J. McCormack, ad., *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809–1896,* 2 vols., Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1909, II, 85, 88.

vital to the Missourian's chances. Although later no one would dispute the fact that the Deutsches Haus conference was a serious blow to the Bates' cause, Gibson and Blair chose to ignore it.[41]

Despite the growing conviction that Bates was hopelessly opposed, the Blairs, Greeley, and Gibson continued to concentrate their attention on the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegations. They hoped to obtain enough delegate support from these two pivotal states to give Bates a total of sixty-five votes on the first ballot.[42] Intent on keeping their candidate close to Seward in the early stages, however, the Bates' men failed to discern the movements of the Lincoln strategists who solicited only second ballot votes for their candidate. "We let Greeley run his Bates' machine but got most of them for a second choice," Leonard Swett, a Lincoln manager, later recalled.[43] With the aid of Carl Schurz, Koerner, and other obdurate Germans, the Lincoln men outmaneuvered the hopeful Bates' leaders who depended on the political conservatism of the middle west, and the votes of the Indiana delegation.[44] On May 15, the eve of the convention, it did seem possible that the Pennsylvania and Indiana delegations might vote for the grizzled ex-Whig from Missouri.[45]

On Wednesday, May 16, the Republicans gathered in the munificent Wigwam built for the occasion. Montgomery Blair almost incited a riot when he declared that five more known Bates' supporters should be seated with the Maryland delegation but, after considerable argument, the delegates resolved to give Texas six votes, Virginia fifteen, and Maryland eight.[46] No more important business followed and the convention adjourned. That night, with the Missouri delegation serenading in the background, old Francis Preston Blair freely predicted that Bates would sweep the convention.[47]

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41 Herriott, "Conference in the Deutsches Haus," *loc. cit.*, 186, 190.

42 *St. Louis Missouri Democrat*, May 14, 1860; E. Gibson (ed.), "Gibson Autobiography," Gibson Papers.

43 Swett to Josiah H. Drummond in Osburn H. Oldroyd, *Lincoln's Campaign or the Political Revolution of 1860*, Chicago, 1896, 71. See also F. I. Herriott, "Memories of the Chicago Convention of 1860," *Annals of Iowa*, XII (1915–1921), 451. Judd was determined to make Lincoln the second choice of all doubtful states.

44 "Gibson Autobiography," Gibson Papers; Leonard Swett, "An Insider on the How of Mr. Lincoln's Nomination," in Rufus R. Wilson (ed.), *Intimate Memories of Lincoln*, Elmira, New York, 1945, 294–295.

45 *New York Daily Tribune*, May 22, 1860.

46 Charles W. Johnson, *Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions, 1856, 1860, and 1864*, Minneapolis, 1893, 96, 111–112.

47 *New York Daily Tribune*, May 17, 1860; Smith, *Blair Family in Politics*, I, 476.

Despite the elder Blair's unfounded optimism, the Bates' forces realized that the convention was dividing among those who favored an extreme anti-slavery man and those who desired to nominate a suitable moderate. The majority of the latter group preferred a nominee who had not equivocated on slavery as a moral issue. Bates' practice of treating slavery as a political incubus was too realistic for many of those who felt that they must endorse the moral purpose of destroying the institution. Gloom settled over the Bates' camp as it became apparent that many of the Indiana and Pennsylvania delegates had been convinced by Seward and Lincoln supporters that the Missourian's willingness to challenge the pro-slavery forces was dubious.[48]

On May 15, little change occurred in the convention procedure of the previous day, but with nightfall came developments. Indecisive as to a course of action, the Pennsylvania and Indiana delegates decided to caucus jointly. That night, in the Cook County Court House, a fateful decision was reached. Given the opportunity to speak, Frank Blair began to praise Bates, but loud voices in the back of the courtroom interrupted him. Lincoln men, led by Orville Browning and Koerner, swarmed into the building. Addressing the assembly, Koerner loudly proclaimed that Bates could never carry Missouri or any state with a large German population. In turn, Browning emphasized Lincoln's conservatism as well as his firm opposition to slavery.[49] Stunned by this sudden turn of events, Blair and Gibson witnessed the alienation of the two delegations which were vital to their cause. As the meeting broke up, leaders of the groups informed the dejected pair that the Bates' cause was lost in each of the two key states.[50]

Some hope, however, still remained for Bates. If the convention deadlocked hopelessly on Lincoln and Seward, the latter might throw his votes to Bates. In addition, Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, and Connecticut still stood with the Missouri Republicans, and several others believed that Bates was the only "third choice."[51]

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[48] Bates to Browning, June 11, 1860, Justin H. Turner Collection, Illinois State Historical Library; Albert Shaw, *Abraham Lincoln, The Year of His Election*, New York, 1930, 41; *Bates' Diary*, 129. Bates later objected to the Republican platform because it promoted "negro equality."

[49] McCormack (ed.), *Koerner Memoirs*, II, 89; Pease and Randall (eds.), *Browning's Diary*, I, 407.

[50] *New York Daily Tribune*, May 22, 1860; Bates to Colfax, May 25, 1860, Colfax Collection; Nevins, *Emergence of Lincoln* II, 257.

[51] Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power*, 275; McClure, *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, 30; William B. Hesseltine, *Lincoln and the War Governors*, New York, 1948, 45, 56; Albert B. Hart, *Salmon Portland Chase*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1899, 182-183.

Greeley worked on into the warm May night attempting to persuade delegates that prolonged balloting would bring the nomination of Bates as the only candidate who symbolized national unity. All depended, Greeley realized, on the final decisions of the unpledged delegates who might be attracted to a compromise choice between Lincoln and Seward.

On the morning of May 18, the third day of the convention, the nominations began. Amidst the din of the Wigwam, packed to capacity, William Evarts of New York, nominated Seward for the Presidency while Norman P. Judd performed the same service in behalf of Lincoln. After an arranged demonstration for Lincoln, Frank Blair nominated the western hero, Edward Bates. Other speakers presented the names of Simon Cameron, Salmon P. Chase, William Dayton, and John McLean.[52]

The awaited hour had arrived as the convention clerk began the roll call of the states. Connecticut's chairman announced seven votes for Bates, and Delaware immediately declared eight more tallies for the Missourian. Before the clerk finished, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Oregon had registered twenty-seven votes for Bates, bringing his first ballot total to forty-two, twenty-three less than Gibson and the Blairs desired.[53] The Bates managers were greatly discouraged for no pivotal state had gone for Bates, and the sought-after votes of Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Ohio had not been delivered.

The second ballot revealed decisive changes as Connecticut dropped to four votes for Bates and Delaware switched all six of her votes to Lincoln. Only Maryland, Oregon, and Missouri voted for Bates, leaving him a mere thirty-five ballots as compared to 181 for Lincoln and 184½ for Seward. The Lincoln gain sealed the Missourian's fate.[54] Grimly, the Missouri delegation resolved to hold firm, but most realized that the increased Lincoln strength left little decision for them to make. On the third ballot, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania cast sixty-four more votes for Lincoln and Maryland deserted the Bates' column. At the conclusion of the balloting, Lincoln at 231½, needed only two more votes. Dramatically, the Ohio delegation annuonced that it had

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52 Johnson, *Proceedings of Republican Conventions,* 148-149; Swett, "An Insider on Lincoln's Nomination," Wilson (ed.), *Intimate Memories,* 295.

53 Johnson, *Proceedings,* 194; *New York Daily Tribune,* May 19, 1860.

54 Johnson, *Proceedings,* 152; *New York Daily Tribune,* May 22, 1860.

four votes for the Illinois politician.[55] A wave of uncontrollable shouting proclaimed the end of the balloting and the nomination of Lincoln.

Ironically, the development for which the Bates' men hoped had been the very factor which defeated them. They had believed that prolonged balloting would bring a convention deadlock. The Bates' managers, however, thought primarily of the delegations bound to Seward, and saw no reason for Lincoln's strength to increase significantly after the first ballot. Misunderstanding the temper of the Republican delegates, who sensed an election victory, Bates and his lieutenants concentrated on acting out their roles as impartial "nationalists." In a revealing explanation afterwards, Bates admitted that his strategy was based on the premise that he and Seward would be the only serious contenders for the nomination. He had concluded

> that the convention would take the one or the other, as it might determine the question whether the party should act independently upon its own internal strength, both as regards numbers, locality and moral support, or modify its platform and mollify its tone, in order to win a broader foundation and gather new strength, both numerical and moral from outside . . . if the party felt strong enough to go along, Mr. S[eward] appeared to me its legitimate leader and true exponent and I thought . . . that if they waived Mr. S there would almost be a political necessity to fall back upon me.[56]

Attached to the "two party" concept, Bates had advocated fusion principles of peace and national unity but his attacks on sectionalists and radicals often made him appear irresolute and confused. In the crucible of the convention, many delegates decided that Bates' appeals for national unity and harmony were only the pathetic gestures of a misguided candidate.[57] While men girded themselves to fight against slavery, Bates had called for serious but unpolitical introspection.

In summing up the convention, Bates himself glossed over the major weaknesses of his campaign. Writing to Greeley, he thanked the editor for his support at the convention but expressed his chagrin at the failure of the moderate Republicans to consider border state sentiments.[58] He neglected to mention his overestimate of the

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[55] Johnson, *Proceedings*, 153; *Boston Evening Transcript*, May 19, 1860; Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power*, 286.

[56] *Bates Diary*, 128-129. Bates overlooked the fact that political leaders in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois believed that the party would be defeated if Seward headed the ticket. As it turned out, state and local interests dictated the eventual compromise choice of Lincoln.

[57] *Ibid*, 129; Bates to Greeley, May 26, 1860, Greeley Papers.

[58] Bates to Browning, June 11, 1860, Turner Collection; Bates to Greeley, May 27, 1860, Greeley Papers; *Bates Diary*, 129. Bates wrote that Lincoln was as "far North" as Seward.

Seward strength or his underestimate of Lincoln's. Seeking a middle ground as a contrast to the New York Senator's public stand, Bates had alienated groups of border state politicians who looked on his comprehensive program as worse than Lincoln's inflexible opposition to slavery extension. His chosen course had placed him in a position where he could be charged with being either too moderate or too doctrinaire. A few days after the convention, he endorsed Lincoln as a "sound, safe, national man," but secretly confided to his diary that the Republicans had "denationalized" their party by nominating the Illinois lawyer.[59] In his frustration, Bates associated Lincoln's awareness of political realities with Seward's sectional bias. To meet the latter, he had overlooked the necessity to adjust to the former.

Called upon to summarize the events of the convention, Horace Greeley succinctly stated his reason for Bates' failure. The nomination of Bates, the editor wrote, would have been a farsighted and courageous act, considerably beyond the mandate accepted by the delegates to Chicago.[60] Whether the views of the eccentric old journalist were correct will remain on the problematical shelf of history, put there by those certain that Lincoln was Heaven-sent or those who spurned all save political success.

MARVIN R. CAIN

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[59] *Bates Diary*, 130-131.

[60] Bates to Browning, June 11, 1860, Turner Collection; *New York Daily Tribune*, May 22, 1860; Harlan H. Horner, *Lincoln and Greeley*, Urbana, Illinois, 1953, 179.

A Note on the Origins and Usage of the Term "Butternut" During the Civil War

The word "Copperhead," used by Republicans during the Civil War to characterize outspoken Democratic opponents of the Lincoln Administration, is probably as familiar to students of American history as the expressions "Bull Moose," "Mugwump" or "Wobblie." The term "Butternut," however, a synonym for "Copperhead" coined by "Black Republicans," is neither as familiar nor as widely used. It is employed occasionally by Wood Gray and Frank L. Klement—the leading authorities on the Copperhead movement itself; but it is rarely used by other Civil War scholars.

"Butternut" was a contemptuous reference to the home-dyed clothing of illiterate, poverty stricken farmers of Southern origin who inhabited primarily the southern tier of counties in midwestern States and vigorously supported the Democratic Party. One Democratic editor from Ohio, defending the backwoodsmen from the derisive epithets of "city dandies," commented: "It used to be the 'barefeet' Democracy in Jackson's time—then it was the 'pokeberry' Democracy, and now it is the 'butternut' Democracy—and they all, as used, mean the same thing—a contempt for those who earn their bread by honest toil."

In time, Democrats came to consider the epithet a mark of distinction; and many wore a polished cross-section of a butternut as an emblem—symbolic of the indissoluble nature of the Union.

Printed below is a remarkable document by an anonymous writer entitled: "Politics and Science—Butternuts and Democrats." It appeared in a Virginia newspaper (now West Virginia), *The Clarksburg Patriot,* March 20, 1863. Obviously a defense of the "Butternut" position, it is, nevertheless, the most comprehensive statement on record analyzing both the historical origins of the expression and the symbolism that Democrats derived from wearing a polished cross-section of a butternut.

Richard Orr Curry

Pennsylvania State University
University Park

Politics and Science – Butternuts and Democrats

It has been the custom of late, among a certain class of Abolitionists, to call the Democrats by the name of "Butternuts." This nickname is likely to be of as much advantage to our party, as the epithet *Quaker* and *Methodist* has been to the once despised but now influential religious bodies bearing these titles. There is something in the word, "Butternut," that is rather pleasing; and there is much in the historical associations connected with the White Walnut tree, of which *Butternut* is the synonym, to endear it to the backwoodsman. When the writer was a boy, this tree supplied the coloring matter for nearly all the fabrics worn as clothing by the Western people. Imported dyes, like imported wearing apparel, were then equally unknown in the West.

When the midnight war-cry of the Indian roused the mothers in Ohio from their slumbers, it was the brave "Butternut clad sons of Kentucky" who rushed across to the rescue. "Butternut" was *then* no epithet of reproach in the West.

This costume is still worn in the mountain ranges of Kentucky and Tennessee, and in southern Illinois and Missouri. On the gathering together of the soldiers, at the outbreak of the war, the fresh recruits from these districts appeared in the ranks with garments of Butternut-colored cloth. In derision their *"store-clothed"* companions called them "Butternuts;" and, as they were mostly Democrats, from Democratic districts, the name, ere long, was applied, by the Republicans, to the whole Democratic party.

But this Butternut costume was not limited to one side, it being common to both rebels and loyal soldiers. The epithet was used with the greater zest by the Abolitionists, because the earlier rebel prisoners were dressed in "Butternut," and its application to the Democrats, they expected, would not only fasten upon them an opprobrious name, but convey the impression also that they were in sympathy with the rebels.

So much for history. Let us now examine this term of reproach in the light of science.

The White Walnut tree has the generic name in Botany, of *Juglans,* or the Tree of Jove.

We thank our Abolition neighbors for this name. It indicates the the "Butternuts" are the heaven-ordained party, deriving their power and influence from Omnipotence. But not only is the tree

significant of the near relation of the Democrats to the power that controls the fate of nations; the fruit is also emblematic of the innate sentiments and affections of the party. On removing the outer hull and sawing the nut into two parts, near the center, the most elaborate ornamentation is presented. The surface of a section of a nut itself without alteration from its original structure. It exhibits the typical form of the species:

Cross-section of the Butternut, exhibiting its interior structure

Look closely at the central area. It presents two *hearts,* united at the base, and may well justify the exclamation uttered when the discovery was made: "Two hearts—the Northern and Southern—united at the base, and bound together indissolubly only in the Butternuts!"

Again we thank the Abolitionists for bestowing the name upon us. "Old Hickory" was not more potent, as applied to General Jackson, than will be, in the future, the term "Butternuts," as applied to the Democratic party. Our tree designates us as the favorites of Heaven, while we are represented in its fruits as uniting the Northern and Southern hearts; and thus we are foreshadowed, in the "Butternut," as destined to restore the Union and the Constitution, as formed by the great hearts of the North and the South at the Revolution. This glorious work, now everywhere prayed for by a suffering people—but impossible in the hands of those who are clamoring for the shedding of additional rivers of blood—can only be accomplished by the "Butternuts."

Look also at the rampart surrounding the central area, and see how its jagged buttresses render it impenetrable to an assailing foe, and give perfect security to the united hearts intrenched within. So it is with the Democratic party. It has the rights of the people enshrined in its heart, and will resist the aggressions of every foe to constitutional freedom, and present an impenetrable barrier against foreign assaults.

ANON.

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Progressivism and World War I: A Re-appraisal

Just as most American historians are in agreement about the American people's attitudes toward their involvement in World War I,[1] there is general agreement within the profession on the thought of the progressives and the first international holocaust. In spite of the apparent anti-war sentiments of three progressive "leaders," LaFollette, Bryan, and Wilson,[2] most historians frequently claim that the progressives were in favor of America's participation in the World War.

There is evidence that from the start, some progressives vehemently favored both preparedness and America's entrance into the War on the side of the Allies. Fiorello LaGuardia, the New York progressive, was immediately of the opinion that the nation would ultimately, and indeed should, be involved in the War.[3]

[1] Thomas Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Peacemakers*, New York, 1947; Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, New York, 1943; Ralph Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York, 1940; Eric Goldman, *Rendezvous With Destiny*, New York, 1952; and Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, New York, 1955, are just a few among American historians who have expressed a similar belief that while the majority of American people were shocked at the outbreak of war in Europe on August 2, 1914, by the time America became a belligerent in the struggle, the public, in general, was united behind the declaration of war.

[2] Robert LaFollette hated war and thought the United States should stay out of the War and devote itself to domestic reform. See his speech against the entry of the United States into the World War, delivered in the United States Senate on April 4, 1917. *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 223-228, and also, *LaFollette's Magazine* (Madison, Wisconsin), 1915-1917. For a summary view of Bryan's anti-war attitudes see, Merle Curti, *Peace or War*, New York, 1936, 249-250. For an indication of Wilson's feelings see, Woodrow Wilson, *The Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson*, 8 Vols., ed. by Ray Stannard Baker, Vol. 6, New York, 1937.

[3] Fiorello H. LaGuardia, *The Making of an Insurgent*, New York, 1948, 115.

Another early advocate of America's entrance into the hostilities was Harold Ickes.[4] Charles Evans Hughes continually denounced the President and the administration for a faltering foreign policy and a failure to prepare the nation militarily.[5]

Another early exponent of preparedness and a militant foreign policy was one of the original organizers of the National Security League, Henry Stimson.[6] In addition, Raymond Robbins,[7] William Allen White,[8] Herbert Croly,[9] Brand Whitlock,[10] and Oscar Straus,[11] all were early advocates of America's entrance into the War. Cited most frequently, however, for his militaristic attitude was one of Progressivism's most influential men—Theodore Roosevelt. The "Sage of Sagamore Hill" came to the conclusion that America should go to the aid of the Allies only eight weeks after the outbreak of hostilities.[12] And, according to Richard Hofstadter, "the main stream of feeling in the ranks of insurgency was neither anti-war nor anti-imperialist. Its real spiritual leader, in this as in other aspects, was T. R., with his militaristic preachments. . . ."[13]

Even more clearly than his colleague, Richard Hofstadter, Professor William Leuchtenburg has expressed the consensus of historians dealing with the problem of Progressivism and World War I. In a provocative article entitled "Progressivism and Imperialism,"[14] Leuchtenburg asserted that since the days of the Spanish American War progressives did not oppose imperialism

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4 Harold Ickes, *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon*, New York, 1948, 184.

5 Charles Evans Hughes, "America First and America Efficient." Address of Charles Evans Hughes Accepting the Nomination for President of the United States, July 31, 1916, Republican National Committee.

6 Henry L. Stimson, *The Issues of the War.* New York, 1916, or see, Robert D. Ward, "The Origins and Activities of the National Security League," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 47, (June, 1960), 51-65.

7 Raymond Robbins, "The Progressive Party—Its Record From January to July, 1916." Statement of Raymond Robbins to the Progressives of the County, New York, 126.

8 William Allen White, *Autobiography*, New York, 1946, 506, and William Allen White, *Selected Letters of William Allen White*, ed. by Walter Johnson, New York, 1947, 163.

9 Herbert Croly, "The Effect on American Institutions of a Powerful Military and Naval Establishment." *Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 66 (1916), 163.

10 Brand Whitlock, *The Journal of Brand Whitlock*, ed. by Allan Nevins New York, 1936, 372.

11 Oscar Straus, *National Security League Mass Meeting*, New York (February 29, 1916), 311.

12 George Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* New York, 1960, 311.

13 Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 272.

14 William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 39 (December, 1952), 483-504.

and an active American foreign policy. On the contrary, by 1916, he declared, the progressives were entirely committed to the defense of national honor, excoriation of President Wilson (because of his call for American neutrality), preparedness and Americanism. After 1916, the author went on to say, imperialism and militarism had replaced all reform impetus, and within a year the Progressive movement was dead.[15]

Although it can be shown that early in the struggle some progressives felt America should assist the Allies in their fight against the Central Powers, many other reformers were of the opposite opinion. Contrary to most orthodox accounts, the progressives did not act *en masse* as a body or coherent group in relation to the World War, and one cannot correctly talk about "the progressives" and the War.[16] The progressives, rather, were divided in their views on the War and their divisions merely reflected the divisions of the American people as a whole. The very nature of the Progressive movement with its incoherence and inconsistencies made this inevitable. Lastly, if indeed Progressivism was dead by 1917 (and some maintain it was very much alive all through the 1920's),[17] the War was not the cause of that death, as is so often implied.

It must be remembered, and often historians fail to do so, that many progressives felt their reform movement was already in the process of disintegration even before the outbreak of war in 1914.[18] Theodore Roosevelt sensed this loss of interest in reform. According to one biographer, "the fundamental trouble in 1914, Roosevelt thought, was that the people were tired of reform," and "he [Roosevelt] never failed to assert that a conservative reaction from the progressive movement had set in."[19]

By 1914 many progressives were "spiritually tired," as William Allen White phrased it, and they began to drift away from the

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15 *Ibid.*, 496.

16 I do not mean to imply that Professors Hofstadter and Leuchtenburg, and others, maintain that *without exception* all progressives were in favor of America's entrance into the War. It is apparent from their writings, however, that they do believe that the overwhelming majority of the progressives were advocates of the nation's involvement in the world conflict. In addition, they clearly imply that the position they attribute to the progressives was different from the position held by most Americans at the time. It is these generalizations that I question.

17 Arthur Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" *American Historical Review*, Vol. 64, Part 2 (July, 1959), 833-857.

18 As an example, this certainly can be said for the muckrakers. See, C. C. Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers*, Chapel Hill, 1932, 205.

19 Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 305.

reform movement. Moreover, as early as 1912 there already had been a wide split in progressive leadership with the emergence of Wilson on the national political scene and the LaFollette-Roosevelt dispute over their party's presidential nomination. In addition, even earlier, Roosevelt aided the decline of Progressivism by alienating many "middle class" progressives with his "radical" proposal for judicial recall. In his *Autobiography,* White reminded his readers that in 1912 the former President "made a speech in Columbus, a most radical and indefensible speech, advocating the recall of judicial decisions . . . probably it crippled him more than any one thing that he did in his life. For the speech shocked millions of his countrymen whom he gathered about him as followers. . . ."[20] Finally, and most important, was the fact that during its existence for approximately a decade and a half, the Progressive movement, under Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, had a definite record of achievement. Nearly all of the aims of those "middle class" progressives had been fulfilled by the time the War broke out.[21]

Among other things, the Pinchot-Roosevelt conservation work had taken millions of acres of timber, grazing, and mining land away from the private exploiters and turned it over to the government for conservation. Control over the railroads had come a long way by 1914. The nation had achieved rural free delivery and a postal savings bank. The Pure Foods and Drug Act was fairly effective legislation. The direct primary was instituted in many states, as was the initiative, referendum, and recall. A law had been passed to provide for a minimum wage for women and children engaged in interstate commerce and an eight hour day was instituted for railroad employees. The Underwood Tariff and the Federal Reserve Act also had been enacted. With a split and hatred among its leaders, as well as divisions within itself and the successful achievement of nearly all its legislative aims, many of the bonds which to some extent had cemented progressives together for so long, now were gone. In short, ruptured and divided, the Progressive movement in America was dying before the nation even thought of going to the aid of the Allies during the World War. Furthermore, many progressives were opposed vehemently to the "strict defense of our national honor," preparedness, Americanism and the intervention of America into the European conflict.

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[20] White, *Autobiography,* 456.
[21] *Ibid.,* 505; or, Hofstadter, *Age of Reform,* 196.

George Norris, one of the nation's most vigorous progressives, is an excellent example of the progressive bitterly opposed to America's participation in the War; on the question of World War I he strongly resembled his Senate colleague from Wisconsin, Robert LaFollette. The fighting liberal from Nebraska hated war. "I was opposed to the declaration of war in 1917," he wrote, "and I did everything I could to prevent it. . . ."[22] Norris led the famous filibuster fight over the President's request to arm American merchant ships.[23] Norris felt that there was no immediate threat of the War reaching American soil. He thought, as LaFollette did, that England was as guilty as Germany of hostile acts toward this country. He asserted we ought to have maintained the strictest neutrality from the beginning; we failed to do so. The conflict in 1917 appeared to him to embody a clash of two European imperialisms—the imperialism of Britain and her allies on the one side, and the imperialism of the Central Powers on the other side.

Most important for Norris, however, was the relation between the War and financial profits. In the most passionate speech of his forty years in Congress he declared that the War sentiment had been whipped up by "munition manufacturers, stockholders and bond dealers" who would make enormous profits from American intervention. He concluded with the moving words:

> I know that I am powerless to stop it. . . . I feel that we are committing a sin against humanity and against our countrymen. I would like to say to the war god: 'You shall not coin into gold the lifeblood of my brethren!! . . . I feel we are about to put the dollar sign upon the American flag'.[24]

William Kent, the liberal Congressman from California, also was fearful of the link between war and profits. Feeling that it was absurd for munitions of war to be manufactured and sold to warring belligerents by individuals in a neutral nation, he exclaimed, "If only all munitions of war were manufactured by governments international law would save all of us from the iniquity of promoting murder among friendly nations."[25] He favored putting all munitions manufacturing under government monopoly to the "end that profit may not be coined out of murder and

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[22] George Norris, *Autobiography—Fighting Liberal*, New York, 1945, 194.

[23] *Ibid.*, 174.

[24] *Ibid.*, 197; *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 212-214. The speech was delivered on April 4, 1917.

[25] Elizabeth Kent, *William Kent, Independent—A Biography*, New Haven, 1950, 273.

misery."[26] Kent even went so far as to advocate a self-imposed embargo, proclaiming that "it is far better for us to abandon our trading in disputed territory . . . than to take part in the debacle."[27] Rather than follow Theodore Roosevelt, the Californian chose to follow Wilson. "Our people must recognize that cool, calm leadership of the President who," in his words, "as patriot, American and Christian, is opposed to war."[28]

Amos Pinchot also was against having the United States join the Allies in the fighting. In an open letter to Claude Kitchin, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, written after the nation entered the War, Pinchot revealed that "personally, . . . I was against going into the war. I did all I could to keep the country out of it. I believed the people were against it; and I have not yet changed my mind."[29] Aside from his concern over the popular feeling toward the War, Pinchot was also troubled about "war profits" and their relationship to patriotism. He recognized the danger of speaking out against the link between the two, for he knew that some Americans "would probably go so far as to denounce [him] . . . as pro-German . . . or as one attacking his own country." But he replied, "If it is loyalty to stand by in silence and watch the profiteers give the people and the government a black eye at such a time as this, then God save America from loyalty."[30] Neither the United States, nor any other country can carry on a war, Pinchot felt, which will make the world safe for democracy and plutocracy at the same time. "If the war is to serve God, it cannot serve Mammon."[31]

Albert Cummins, the Senator from Iowa, concurred with many of his fellow-progressives in denouncing preparedness. He, too, advocated the nationalization of munitions manufacturing.[32] Both Cummins and Pinchot, as well as many other progressives, were fearful also of the infringement of civil liberties which the War would inevitably (and did) bring. A typical expression of that common concern is a remark worth quoting:

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[26] William Kent, "Europe and American Defense." *Harper's Weekly*, Vol. 60 (May 22, 1915), 485.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Amos Pinchot, "War Profits and Patriots," Letter of Amos Pinchot to Conference Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives. New York, September 18, 1917, 2.

[30] *Ibid.*, 5.

[31] *Ibid.*, 2.

[32] Albert B. Cummins, "Defense and Revenue in the Next Congress." *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 52 (November, 1915), 596.

I need not remind you that not only the government, but numerous private associations, are trying to stamp out public criticism of the War. The Department of Justice is organizing raids against speakers, political organizations, and labor groups. Judges and police magistrates are imposing heavy sentences for alleged disloyalty. Conventions are even being held by nervous patriots to emphasize loyalty, unity, belief in the war; . . . while in editorial rooms the dictionaries are being thumbed for fresh adjectives with which to denounce our objectors and iconoclasts.[33]

The municipal reformer Frederic Howe, serving as United States Commissioner in charge of Ellis Island when the War broke out, also was apprehensive about a loss of personal liberties which he believed would result from American entrance into the War. With the vindication of those fears when the country finally entered the struggle, he grieved the loss of many freedoms and the temporary subordination of the individual to the state.[34] Thousands of German Americans were picked up during the War and sent to be interned, without trial, at Ellis Island. When Howe tried to comfort the poor unfortunate people and to secure decent treatment for them, he was branded as pro-German.[35] He "hated the suggestion of disloyalty [of himself] . . . and [his] friends; suggestions," he wrote, "that were directed against liberals, never against profiteers."[36] Frederic Howe, in short, was against having the United States enter the War because he prized liberty at home more than he feared the danger from abroad.

Howe also was aware of the fact that preparedness and militarism involve huge expenditures and an increased military budget. It is, therefore, "a menace to social reform and the internal development [of the nation]. . . . imperialism is always at war with the best interests of the state. And it is for this reason," exclaimed Howe, "that I believe in a continuance of the policy of isolation and detachment that has served us so well for a century."[37]

Another interesting and important progressive was Albert J. Beveridge. Beveridge, like Theodore Roosevelt, was an early advocate of imperialism and often orated on the "march of the flag." Many historians, including both Hofstadter and Leuchtenburg, frequently point to Beveridge as an example, or "proof" of the fact that the progressives were imperialists. What historians fail to

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33 Pinchot, "War Profits," 11.
34 Frederic Howe, *Confessions of a Reformer*, New York, 1925, 280.
35 *Ibid.*, 273.
36 *Ibid.*, 279.
37 Frederic Howe, "Democracy or Imperialism—The Alternative That Confronts Us." *The Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 66 (July, 1916), 250.

recognize, however, is that Albert Beveridge was absolutely against America's participation in World War I. As his biographer has told us, Beveridge was interested in imperialism at the turn of the century not for economic reasons alone, but, and even primarily, because he felt America had a mission and an obligation to spread its free institutions—democracy, and Christianity—to the underdeveloped areas of the world.[38] In an interesting mixture of motives, Beveridge closed one of his early speeches by proclaiming that "It is God's great purpose made manifest in the instincts of our race, whose present phase is our personal profit, but whose far off end is the redemption of the world and the Christianization of mankind."[39]

At the request of *Collier's* he agreed to visit the warring nations, interview their statesmen and leaders, and write a series of articles on the War for that magazine. Within a few days after arriving abroad he wrote to his wife: " 'from what I have picked up already, the Germans have been frightfully lied about.' "[40] From his travels in the belligerent nations the ex-Senator concluded that the War was being fought for the balance of power in Europe, and that France and England were as much responsible for the conflict as Germany. Immediately after returning to the United States, Beveridge tried to report, impartially, his findings to the American public. He found, however, that his articles were resented and that he was being denounced as pro-German.

After Secretary of State Bryan resigned from the Cabinet over Wilson's note of protest to Germany in regard to the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Beveridge expressed sympathy with the former Secretary and his point of view that Americans had no moral right to endanger the peace of their country by taking passage on belligerent ships, especially those carrying munitions. "This country is a neutral country," he reminded Americans, and "that means it must act like a neutral."[41] Wilson's declaration of war was a tragedy to Beveridge; he had hoped the United States would remain aloof from the conflict.

What was most important for Beveridge was the fact that when he was across the Atlantic witnessing the War, it appeared to him that the progress of democracy and social justice was receiving an

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[38] Claude Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, Boston, 1932, 73-74.
[39] *Ibid.*, 76.
[40] *Ibid.*, 462.
[41] *Ibid.*, 484.

enormous impetus in Europe from the conflict. "No matter which side is triumphant," he wrote when he returned to this country, "it is not unlikely that the world will behold in the countries at war and indeed all European countries . . . an immeasurable advance of democracy. . . ."[42] Instead of the world watching a contest between despotism and liberty, as was being reported in the press, it appeared to Beveridge that the democratic spirit was spreading all over the Continent. "In short, with the Germans, the battlefield had become a hothouse for democracy."[43] And although this same idea led some Americans to favor entrance into the War, Beveridge saw no need for American intervention and overseas activity.

Obviously, it seems safe to say that both Hofstadter and Leuchtenburg were incorrect in their statements that the progressives followed Theodore Roosevelt on the question of America's entrance into the War. It is true that the ex-President was an outstanding figure during this period, and he was proficient in castigating pacifists. Undoubtedly he did convert some advocates of peace to his point of view. Many were inspired by his crusading spirit, his roaring pronunciations, and his evident sincerity. In spite of this, however, only some progressives were committed to preparedness, Americanism, and America's entrance into the World War.

Many progressives were of the opinion that America should not become a belligerent in the international struggle. Basically there were two main, although related, reasons for their feelings. As progressives passionately devoted to the "freeing of the individual," they had worked long and hard for years, somewhat successfully, to give America more democracy and a greater opportunity for all Americans to assert their individualism. They were now afraid, and rightfully so, that the War would set back their endeavors and achievements. Secondly, and related, was the fact that so many progressives thought that America's problems stemmed from the growth of the corporate economic system. One of the progressives' chief aims was, if not the destruction of, at least the control of "big business." Progressives yearned to restore "a type of economic individualism and political democracy that was widely believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed by the great corporation. . . ."[44] At least to a certain extent they had

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[42] Albert J. Beveridge, *What Is Back of the War*, Indianapolis, 1915, 408.

[43] *Ibid.*, 416.

[44] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 5.

succeeded in controlling or regulating "big business" by 1914, but war would inevitably lead to a resurgence of the importance and growth of corporate business in America.[45] Many progressives surely were aware of and feared this. The War, a greedy struggle for power and wealth, might not only check the program for reform in the nation's economic and social life, but cause a reversal of all previous gains.

Finally, as Merle Curti pointed out in the 1930's, one reason for the slow advance of peace appeared then to stand out as of major importance. "Peace-makers [had] . . . not adequately fought the economic forces that make for war."[46] War seemed to many, always to have been functional to the capitalistic system. Sharing this view, numerous progressives felt the necessity to deal with it. If they could not solve the problem, they at least offered what seemed to them the soundest solution yet proposed. They wanted the profits to be taken out of war through the nationalization of the munitions industry.

There was no one progressive viewpoint. The progressives were split and often disagreed among themselves; so it was with the War. In 1915, 1916, and 1917, most progressives were slowly making up their minds, not yet committed to either extreme view of the War. Many were idealists, but they were also practical. Progressives' emotions pulled two ways, against so-called "kaiserism," and yet for peace. Progressives realized that it was well enough to talk about the protection of American citizens' neutral rights, and honor. But many of them asked how these noble rights could be protected short of armed intervention. While it is true that some progressives were far ahead of the Administration in urging drastic action, it is also true that some progressives were far behind. What is more important, however, is that most Americans were similarly divided on the same issue.

Historians have suggested that the progressives had always been divided by some sort of a geographical line or division—Eastern progressives differing from Middle or Far Western ones. This was not true as far as the War was concerned; the progressives

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[45] Wilson can serve as one example of the progressive's awareness of this "danger." The President wrote to Josephus Daniels: "Every reform we have won will be lost if we go into this war. We have been making a fight on special privilege. . . . War means autocracy. The people we have unhorsed will inevitably come into the control of the country, for we shall be dependent on the steel, oil and financial magnates. They will run the nation." Woodrow Wilson, *Life and Letters*, ed. by Baker, Vol. 6, 506.

[46] Curti, *Peace or War*, 307.

opposing the War did not all come from the West or Mid-West, while those in favor of America's entrance into the struggle did not all come from the nation's East Coast. There were too many exceptions for such a generalization to be taken as valid. Two of the nation's leading muckrakers favoring America's participation in the World War were Ray Stannard Baker and Charles Edward Russell, from Michigan and Iowa respectively.[47] In addition, such early advocates of United States' military aid to the Allies as Harold Ickes, Brand Whitlock, and William Allen White, only to mention a few, certainly were not from the East.

The fact that those progressives favoring America's entrance into the War were from the East and those against that entrance were from the Middle or Far West, is supposedly significant because we are told that the majority of German Americans came from the Middle or Far West and resided precisely in those areas of dissent towards America's participation in the War. The generalization, as has been pointed out, is not true, but even if it was, it would be too simple an answer. It conveniently ignores the fact that many German Americans lived both in New York and New Jersery. Yet some of the most vociferous pro-War progressives, including Theodore Roosevelt, came from those states. Also, the anti-British, Irish-American contingent in the country was largely settled on the nation's East Coast. What is probably more important, is that generally it was on the Eastern Coast of the nation that pro-Ally and preparedness sentiment first developed. The cities along the Atlantic seaboard seemed much closer to the scenes of European strife. As Mark Sullivan has pointed out, when the Atlantic states were ready to go to war, "the Mid-West was only lukewarm, and the Pacific Coast was even cool to the War."[48] Even if the geographical generalization were true, then, perhaps the progressives were merely representatives of the general American public in their attitudes toward the War.

In looking for a logical pattern in the attitudes of the progressives toward the World War, it has also been suggested that the so-called "New Nationalism" progressives were aligned in favor of the War in contrast to the "New Freedom" progressives who were

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[47] For Baker's views on the War see his *American Chronicle*, New York, 1945, or his "How David Grayson Feels About the War," *American Magazine*, Vol. 85 (May, 1918). Charles Edward Russell's anti-German and pro-War attitude can be seen in his two books, *After the Whirlwind*, New York, 1919, and *Bare Hands and Stone Walls*, New York, 1933.

[48] Mark Sullivan, *Our Times, 6 Vols.*, New York, 1932, Vol. IV, 5.

against it. This too, does not hold true. It is true that some of the followers of Roosevelt's domestic policy (as reflected in 1912), advocates of a strong state and a strengthened federal government yielding a vigorous central authority over the nation's business affairs, early favored America's entrance into the War because of their particular strain of Progressivism. Herbert Croly is the best example of that school of believers.[49] It is also true, however, that before the War Albert Beveridge, Amos Pinchot, George Norris, Jane Addams[50] and the overwhelming number of settlement workers, all against the War, were enthusiastic followers of Theodore Roosevelt, his New Nationalism, and the Bull Moose Party. In addition, it is clear that the Wilsonian advocates of the New Freedom were by no means all against American participation in the world conflict. Ray Stannard Baker, Ida Tarbell,[51] and Brand Whitlock, among other Wilson followers, were early advocates of America's entrance into the War.

One of the keys to the Progressive movement was its concern with nationalism. The progressives were intensely patriotic. However, they feared their beloved land was declining both domestically and internationlly. They sought to improve America through reform. They hated class and regional conflicts, and, as reformers, they wanted to strengthen the power of the national government so that it could be made into an agency for the public well-being. The War and the events from 1915-1917—the destruction of American lives and property, and the violation of American neutral rights—even further intensified a nationalist fervor on the part of progressives as well as most Americans.[52]

Most progressives tied to their fervid nationalism some sort of a concept of the "American mission" to promote an international order of peace and righteousness in the world. Many believed that America held a great trust for humanity. The nation had organized itself on the basis of the rights of man and the dignity of common humanity; it had a destiny as a teacher to the world which was greater than that of any other people on earth.

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[49] See, Herbert Croly, "The Effect on American Institutions of a Powerful Military and Naval Establishment." *Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 66 (1916), 157-172.

[50] For Jane Addams' anti-War feelings see, Jane Addams, *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House*, New York, 1930, 113-152. *Peace and Bread in Time of War*, New York, 1922, or, "War, Women, and Babies," *Harper's Weekly*, Vol. 61 (July 31, 1916), 101.

[51] Ida Tarbell, *All In A Day's Work*, New York, 1939.

[52] Henry May, *The End of American Innocence*, New York, 1959, 371.

But did not most Americans all through the history of this nation hold some similar variation of this idea? Besides, the concept of the "American mission" is so ambiguous that it can be interpreted and used in various ways. Americans have always had a traditional concern with America's role in world affairs, but that concern has been an ambivalent one. Although Americans have continually looked at their country as a "Garden of Eden," and have pictured Europe as a backward, corrupt, and decadent society, American action and thought in relation to world affairs has been diversified. On the one hand, Americans have said and felt that America should keep away from the rest of the world, pursue an independent or isolationist foreign policy, reform America domestically, and essentially be a regenerative force through example and ideals rather than through action. Others, in a different vein, expressed a desire to have an America active in world affairs. Both of these attitudes are plainly visible among the progressives. Perhaps once again the progressives were merely mirroring the doubts, inconsistencies, and ambivalence of most Americans.

In addition, the progressives were, on the whole, "middle-class" Americans with some sort of a religious heritage, and their moral impulse was present throughout the entire movement. Mowry, in his classic study of the California progressives, found them to be members of the "church-going middle-class."[53] William Allen White found the same thing true for all progressives. According to the Kansan, the progressives were "profoundly spiritual" and "had the crusader's ardor, and felt for one another the crusader's fellowship."[54]

Who comprised the "middle-class" in America? It is, to be sure, virtually impossible to define the term. But if the progressives' own definition[55] is used, were not the majority of Americans in the "middle-class" in 1914? The majority of Americans in 1914 —"middle-class" people with some religious heritage—were in possession of a great book familiar to all people. The *Bible*, as everybody knows, can be either the greatest war or the greatest peace book known to man, depending on its use by each individual. It has, in fact, been used as both throughout history. It is part of

53 George Mowry, *The California Progressive*, Berkeley, 1951, 99.
54 White, *Autobiography*, 430.
55 *Ibid.*, 482. White estimated that essentially almost all progressives were earning between two and ten thousand dollars a year.

our literary and religious heritage and revered as a sacred authority, occupying a unique place in our culture. Christian and Jews alike, all Americans, seem to have used the *Bible* to aid in rationalizing any practice or idea which they were carrying out and believed to be justified. The *Bible* has been quoted to justify nearly every practice and belief known to man.[56] Just as the clergy, as a class, re-echoed the voices from Washington and the headlines of the press and took the verdicts of the Administration and proclaimed them to be the judgments of the Almighty God based on the Scriptures,[57] many social reformers based their advocacy of peace on the same authority. Pro-War, as well as anti-War progressives both frequently resorted to the *Bible* to justify their opposing positions.

As a philosophy, Progressivism was in many ways a restatement of traditional American ideals; "It was," in part, "the application of Christian morality and Jeffersonian principles to the twentieth century—an effort to shape society to the dimensions of an ideal. In short, it was moral."[58] The War, though, unfortunately raised conflicting questions of morality. Was the awful slaughter and waste of war morally correct? Was it, however, morally correct to kill in an effort to subdue "kaiserism" and establish a just and lasting peace, and thereby a better world? Some progressives said "yes," others responded with a "no."

By 1914 the progressives were completely a part of American life, accepting the traditions, values, and ideals of "middle-class" America; they were simply men and women of their times. In fact, Progressivism had become "a kind of orthodoxy."[59] Although voting for a candidate is not necessarily an indication of one's political and social philosophy, it is significant that in 1912 the two "progressive" candidates combined—Wilson and Roosevelt—re-

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[56] For a very interesting study of the use of the *Bible* in relation to the attitudes of clergymen to the World War, see, Ray H. Abrams, *Preachers Present Arms*, Philadelphia, 1953.

[57] *Ibid.*, 247.

[58] Carl Degler, *Out of Our Past*, New York, 1959, 370.

[59] In the *Perils of Prosperity*, Chicago, 1959, 149, Leuchtenburg wrote: "In rebelling against the standards of the day [in the 1920's] the intellectuals were revolting against the ideas of progressive politics as well. . . . Progressivism had become a kind of orthodoxy, and if you rebelled against orthodoxy, you rejected progressivism as well." If, however, as Leuchtenburg constantly maintains, preparedness and the War brought an end to, or at least caused the decline of the Progressive movement, would not Progressivism have had to be a "kind of orthodoxy" before the War began?

ceived approximately seventy-five percent of the popular vote.[60] As early as 1912, two years before the War, according to Hofstadter, "The Progressive spirit had become so pervasive that any policy . . . could be strengthened if a way could be found to put it in Progressive language."[61] Both policies, the pro and the anti-War sentiment, indeed, were put in progressive language by the advocates of each position. Perhaps it is an anachronism to talk about "the progressives" and World War I. Should not one rather talk about America's or Americans' attitudes toward the World War?

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[60] Wilson's popular vote was approximately 6,300,000; Taft's, 3,500,000, and Roosevelt's, 4,100,000. Figures quoted from, Richard B. Morris, Ed., *Encyclopedia of American History*, New York, 1953, 273.

[61] Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 273.

Immigrant Vote in the 1860 Election: The Case of Iowa

The influence of the immigrant vote in the presidential election of 1860 has been a subject of continuing controversy since the date of the election. The disagreement, though, is not usually in terms of how a given immigrant group voted; it is in terms of how much influence its vote exerted on the outcome of the election. There is a consensus of opinion among historians about the partisan leanings of every major immigrant group. The starting point of this paper was the recognition that there is still some question on the more fundamental level; before it is reasonable to dispute about the influence of a group's vote, the most elementary considerations require that one first determine how the group voted. No adequate evidence has yet been offered on this basic question. This paper is an effort to determine as exactly as possible, on the basis of a study of township voting returns, how the major immigrant groups in Iowa voted in the election of 1860.

When historians try to analyze political trends, there are a number of courses open to them; they may reach a judgment on the basis of an impressionistic survey of the data; they may—in the manner of the modern pollster—accept the judgment of contemporary opinion; or they may use statistical analysis of the votes on the question at issue. Although the third of these alternatives seems to have much to commend it, statistical analysis has not, until recently, been widely used.

Lee Benson has suggested that a closer analysis of voting on the precinct level might reveal the unsoundness of many of our commonly accepted impressionistic judgments about past political behavior. By simply using state voting statistics, he was able, for instance, to disprove the generalizations of Allan Nevins about the Cleveland victory of 1884 and that of Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr. concerning the Jackson victory of 1824. But he was not able, using the figures available to him, to do more than show that the generalizations of German influence in the election of 1860 were not proved.[1]

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[1] Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Mirra Komarovsky, *Common Frontiers in the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1957, 113-183.

The German vote is usually credited with being a major factor in Lincoln's victory in 1860, and on the surface at least, there is a great deal of evidence for this viewpoint. The seven states then known as the Northwest are generally regarded as a crucial area in that election. The area was just emerging from the frontier stage, its population was rapidly increasing, and it represented more than enough electoral votes to determine the outcome of the election. The total vote in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin increased by 440,223 in the quadrennium 1856-1860. In the same period, 976,678 immigrants arrived, many of whom went to the Northwest and most of whom were Germans.[2] Since Lincoln captured the 66 electoral votes in these states, winning them all by narrow margins over Douglas, a large bloc of united voters in this area could very easily have carried the election to Douglas. Lincoln's plurality in the Northwest was only 149,807—far less than the most conservative estimate of the number of German voters in the area.

Addressing the Chicago Republican Convention in 1860, the German-American politician Carl Schurz promised the party 300,000 German votes in the Northwest.[3] Since that time, it has been traditional to assert that the immigrants in general, and in particular the Germans, were largely responsible for Republican success in 1860. Both panegyrists who wished to laud the immigrants for their peculiar humanitarian concern for liberty, and apologists who wished to blame "foreigners" for Democratic losses in the Midwest and for the purely American chaos which followed the election of Lincoln in 1860, have advanced the claim continuously. *The Des Moines Valley Whig* of Lee County remarked in October, 1859: "Verily, Germany is a power in Lee County."[4] The editorial observed that there were no Germans campaigning for the Democrats and estimated that over three-fourths of Lee County Germans had gone over to the Republican Party. On the unfriendly side, the *Sioux City Register* predicted that if the Republicans "refuse to accede to the demands of their German allies they will be defeated in every state west and north of the Ohio."[5]

Historians have generally fallen in line with the thinking of contemporary observers. When they have not maintained that the

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[2] Frederick F. Schrader, *The Germans in the Making of America*, Boston: 1924, 195.

[3] Charles W. Emery, "Iowa Germans in the Election of 1860," unpublished M.A. Thesis, State University of Iowa, 1940, 28.

[4] *Des Moines Valley Whig*, October 17, 1859, 1.

[5] *Sioux City Register*, Vol. 1, No. 47, June 16, 1859.

Germans were responsible for the victory in 1860, they have, at least, listed them as an important factor. The most extreme claim was that of Schrader, who, basing his estimate on German immigration into the Northwest between 1856 and 1860, estimated the German Republican vote in those states in 1860 to be nearly 450,000.[6] Faust, in his two volume study of German immigrants, maintained that a large majority of German immigrants joined the Republican party in an "unselfish effort to advance the interests of humanity, i.e., to banish slavery from the country."[7] Faust based his conclusion on a study of the spokesmen of the German community, who undoubtedly did, both in Iowa and the Midwest generally, campaign vigorously for the Republican party. The same type of evidence led Herriot to conclude that the Germans voted heavily Republican in the Iowa gubernatorial election of 1854,[8] and, more recently, two historians to conclude that Midwestern Germans poured into the Republican party en masse during the decade in a "spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions."[9]

Among all of these studies, only Herriot actually made an effort to determine how the German masses voted, but since his analysis was on the county level, he had to confess that the returns were "somewhat perplexing."[10] Dissent from the majority opinion first came in 1942 when Dorpalen tentatively concluded that the Germans were generally conformists, tending to vote as their neighbors did.[11]

Following the suggestion in Benson's essay, this study was specifically designed as a test of the thesis that Germans were overwhelmingly Republican in 1860. For reasons that will appear later in the essay, this could not effectively be done without at the same time considering the other population groups. I selected Iowa purely as a matter of convenience on the grounds that it would serve quite as well as any of the others. The situation in Iowa at that time was similar to that in the other midwestern states. It had been solidly Democratic in 1850 and subsequent elections

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6 Schrader, *The Germans in the Making of America*, 195.

7 Albert B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States*, Boston, 1909, 130-131.

8 Frank I. Herriot, "A Neglected Factor in the Anti-Slavery Triumph in Iowa in 1854," *Deutsch-Americanische Geschictsblatter; Jahrbuch der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Historischen Gesellschaft von Illinois*, XVIII-XIX, 1918, 1919, 174-335.

9 Lawrence S. Thompson and Frank X. Braun, "The Forty-Eighters in Politics," in Adolf E. Zucker, *The Forty-Eighters*, New York, 1950, 120.

10 Herriot, "A Neglected Factor," 342.

11 Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Element and the Issues of the Civil War," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 29:55, June, 1942.

began showing a marked Democratic decline. Whig strength increased, the Free Soil Party registered small percentages in 1852 in several counties, and the first opposition success came in 1854 with the election of James W. Grimes as governor on a combined Whig and Free Soil Platform. The Grimes supporters were later active in forming the Republican Party, which carried every election in Iowa from 1856 until long after the Civil War. The period of Republican rise coincided with the period of greatest increase in Iowa's population, and also with a definite shift in the focus of immigration from the southern states and the southern part of the Ohio Valley, to the Northern Ohio Valley, the Middle Atlantic states, and Europe. In 1850, the population stood at 192,214, and by 1856 had reached 517,875. Thereafter, immigration from all quarters greatly decreased, and by 1860 only another 150,000 was added to the population. Native Germans in 1860 formed 5.79 percent of the entire state population of 674,913.[12]

In order to apply systematic data in the analysis of a political problem, it is first necessary to translate the question of what happened into a question of who (what voting groups) caused it to happen. In this case, we have a state which over a period of ten years changed its political allegiance from one party to a rival party. The German-Americans allegedly were a causal factor in the change. If this be the case, one would hypothesize that in a national election at the end of the transition period, a relationship would be found between the Republican vote and the presence of large numbers of German-Americans in a given area. The hypothesis can be tested by listing the various nativity groups, or at least the larger ones, found in Iowa at the time and comparing the vote in areas of their dominance. If place of origin does, indeed, play a determining role in the way one votes, a clear pattern should emerge when a large number of areas are compared.

Still, there is one other difficulty which could interfere with the validity of the results. If a historian selects a group and then studies only those areas where it is numerically strong, he will be in danger of neglecting other groups in other areas, equally or more important as causal agents for the trend. For this reason, the author has not considered population as a factor in selecting the areas of study. The only criterion was intensity of partisanship. In making this kind of selection, the only necessary assump-

12 *Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census,* Washington, 1864.

tion is that if a group be notably partisan, it will be almost certain to emerge in a tabulation of extremes.

Two methodological conclusions emerged quite early in this study: first, that the township was the largest political unit that could yield the desired answers, and second, that total population figures were untrustworthy as guides to political strength. On the county level, population groups are so evenly divided and so many changes are occuring at once that no pattern can readily emerge. If, for example, the vote is fairly well split on the county level, as it was in Lee County in the presidential election of 1860 when 51.5% of the vote went to the combined Democratic parties; and if no one group of voters is clearly dominant, as was also the case in Lee County, there is little that the historian can properly deduce about the election. But the Democratic vote in the townships of Lee County ranged from 14% to 74%, and since groups originating from the same locality did tend to settle close together, a clearly dominant group can be distinguished in most of the townships.

The only disadvantages in this approach are in the labor involved and in the difficulty of locating returns by townships. In most cases, the counties themselves did not retain the returns for any great length of time, and one must resort to newspapers for their report. Where no newspaper existed, or where the newspaper did not choose to print such returns, the historian must usually admit failure and try another county. Although this lack of complete evidence does make it impossible to utilize any normal scientific sampling methods, it does not make it necessary to leave the existing material unstudied. The historian must, rather, make the best use he can of the materials he can find. This has been the procedure followed in this study. Township returns for twenty-six counties were located for the presidential election of 1860, and eleven more for the gubernatorial election of 1859. In addition to these, there were twenty-two counties so sparsely populated that for election purposes they were regarded as comprising one township each, and they can be so regarded by the investigator. The fifty-nine counties (from a total of ninety-nine) are distributed throughout the state, and they contained in 1860 over 70% of the total population of Iowa. Considering the present state of scientific sampling techniques, it can be seriously argued that covering this large a percentage of the total population is at least as conducive to accuracy as any sample could be.

While the desirability of pursuing one's study in terms of townships is hardly a controversial issue, there is a deficiency of the census that has not been so often remarked. A look below the surface of the county returns drives one to the conclusion that census figures showing the total population do not necessarily reflect the distribution of voting power. In studies of group voting behavior, historians have characteristically assumed that there is a real relationship between total and voting population, but the results of this study show not only that it is not necessarily so, but also that in a frontier community, it is highly unlikely to be so.*

A comparison of the two kinds of population statistics for any of Iowa's counties will demonstrate that the formal ethnic divisions of the census do not reflect voting power. Comparative figures for Clay County, a particularly revealing example, are shown below:

TABLE I

VOTING STRENGTH IN CLAY COUNTY

	Percent of Total Population	*Percent of Potential Voters*
Middle Atlantic	28.0	20.0
Ohio Valley	20.0	13.3
Germany	22.0	46.7

In other words, the census showed that the Middle Atlantic natives were the largest group and the Ohio Valley group followed closely behind the Germans, while in terms of the voting population, the Germans greatly outnumbered the two combined. In all of the other cases, the greatest discrepancies occurred along the normal migration lines of the most numerous group outside the Ohio Valley, and discrepancies increased in direct relation to proximity to Iowa. Missouri and Illinois were consistently overrated by the census and the immigrant groups consistently underrated in terms of their actual voting power. In cases where, for example, New England was listed as the birthplace of a large percentage of

* After submission of this manuscript, George A. Boeck's "A Historical Note on the Uses of Census Returns" appeared in the January edition of this journal, in which he made the same observations that occur in the above and the following three paragraphs. Doctor Boeck's work and my own were done independently and in total ignorance of each other. Had I known of Doctor Boeck's work earlier, it would have saved me a great deal of labor; but at this point I can only say that I agree completely with all that Doctor Boeck observed about the dangers inherent in working with the census returns. Since my examples were all newly settled frontier areas, and Doctor Boeck's a relatively stable urban area in the same frontier state, the two, taken together, provide a base for a rather broad generalization.

adult males, the Middle Atlantic states without exception received disproportionate representation in the census.[13]

The meaning of all this, so far as this particular study is concerned, is clear. Although we have no way of determining who actually did vote, it is apparent that in order to determine the relative strength of those who could possibly have voted, it will be necessary to count only adult males. This has been done in all the townships used.

The analysis in the remainder of this paper is largely based upon the group of counties for which township returns are available for the election of 1860. The other categories are used as a check upon the conclusions and will only be mentioned when necessary for clarification. While the desirability of including materials for an earlier period is unquestionable, returns before 1859 are so extremely fragmentary that they could add very little to the study.

In order to have a large number of townships for comparison, all those voting over 65% Democratic and all those voting less than 25% Democratic were tabulated along with the most Democratic and the most Republican townships in each county. The only significance which is attached to these percentages is that they undoubtedly deviate a great deal from the state averages and that they yield an equal number of Democratic and of Republican townships (40 each). These, then, are the extremes and their populations are compared in Table II. According to the Table, the Middle Atlantic States of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey supplied the most consistent Republicans.[14] The Ohio Valley states were split, while Germans, Irish and Southerners were clearly Democratic. There are no other groups which appear often enough in a dominant position for one to judge.

These results were taken a step further on Table IV which shows that in every case, an increase in the dominance of a nativity group increased the trend of the township vote. The first entry

[13] The three frontier counties of Boone, Decatur, and Marshall, which in 1850 had 2,051 residents were used to determine whether this kind of distribution was peculiar to the later period in Iowa, or whether it could be applied more generally to frontier communities. 417, or about one-fifth of the total residents were adult males and could possibly have voted in the gubernatorial election of that year. The same pattern is found as in 1860. At one extreme is the foreign group, which had 33 potential voters from a total foreign population of 55, and at the other extreme are the neighboring states of Missouri, Indiana and Illinois which together furnished only 42 voters out of a total of 802 immigrants from those states.

[14] Although New Jersey is included as a Middle Atlantic State, only an insignificant number from this state ever came to Iowa. New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians are about equally represented. No differences were noted when the Ohio Valley States were considered separately.

on the Table shows the median Democratic vote of all the townships studied which contain more than 20% of a given nativity group; the second entry shows the median vote of townships containing more than 40% of the group. In townships where the Germans, for example, supplied over 20% of the voting population, the median Democratic vote was 70%. But if one considers only those townships where Germans numbered more than 40% of the population, the median Democratic vote rose to 81.1%. This is a clear indication that Germans in these Townships did contribute to the Democratic vote.

Every item on the chart, except that pertaining to the Germans, is in accord with the standard interpretation and will require little further comment. It does seem worthwhile to remark that if the known Republicanism of immigrants from the Middle Atlantic states and their known influx into the midwest during the decade 1850-1860 be considered in connection with the migration pattern alluded to in this study, historians will in all probability find that

TABLE II

LARGEST NATIVITY GROUPS IN MOST DEMOCRATIC AND MOST REPUBLICAN TOWNSHIPS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1860

Nativities	*Most Democratic Townships*	*Most Republican Townships*
New England	0	1
Middle Atlantic	3	21
Upper Ohio Valley	21	16
South	4	0
Germany	7	0
Great Britain	1	0
Ireland	4	0
Scandanavia	0	1
Holland	0	1

TABLE III

LARGEST NATIVITY GROUPS IN MOST DEMOCRATIC AND MOST REPUBLICAN TOWNSHIPS GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1859

Nativities	*Most Democratic Townships*	*Most Republican Townships*
New England	0	1
Middle Atlantic	2	4
South	0	0
Upper Ohio Valley	7	5
Germany	1	1
Ireland	2	0

TABLE IV

MEDIAN DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF TOWNSHIPS ACCORDING TO THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED NATIVITY GROUPS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1860

Nativity	*+20% of Voting Population Median Vote*		*+40% of Voting Population Median Vote*	
Ireland	86.7	83.0	89.2	86.7
Germany	70.0		81.1	
South	67.1	66.3	75.1	
Upper Ohio Valley	56.4	56.0	68.4	67.7
Middle Atlantic	22.2		22.2	17.8

their migration into the midwest was the sole cause for the political shift. Although the percentage of population from the Ohio Valley was also increasing phenomenally at the same time, these immigrants were, as it seems, mostly women and children who could have had no immediate political influence. The fact that townships dominated by Ohio Valley immigrants were evenly divided reflects the divided sympathies of their background. There only remains the problem of reconciling the conflict between the statistics on German voting and other types of evidence.

Even though all of the German townships located in this study were Democratic in 1860, the theory of Dorpalen, which was endorsed by Benson is suggestive when it is applied to the Germans in Iowa's large cities. In all of the German townships studied, there was really no chance for the Germans to conform to anything; conformity requires frequent contact in order for the political attitude to be transferred. The situation in all seven of the townships precluded such contact and transfer, for the Germans all lived and worked in purely German communities. Iowa's two largest cities, Davenport and Dubuque, were also the cities which contained the largest number of Germans in an urban environment, where contact, and presumably outside political influence would be almost a daily occurrence. And, the Germans in both cities seemed to adopt the prevailing political attitudes. Dubuque voted Republican only once in the thirteen statewide elections between 1850 and 1860, and Davenport voted Democratic only twice during the same period. The Germans entering between 1852-1854 seemed to do no more than increase the already prevailing trend in each case. According to a census taken in 1858, there were approximately 496 Germans who could have voted in

Davenport in that year, and the Republican majority of that year was 438 out of the total 1864 votes cast for Representative in Congress.[15] While similar population figures for Dubuque (Julian Township, Dubuque County) do not exist, contemporary reports indicate that the German population must have been about the same as in Davenport. Here the Democratic majority in 1858 was 503 out of 2339. It would require a great stretch of the imagination to believe that either city would have voted differently had there been no Germans in them.

Although the situation in Dubuque and Davenport may be explained in terms of conformity, as Dorpalen and Benson would have it, outside of these two areas, the great majority of Germans in Iowa were not diffused throughout the population. Instead, they normally formed communities of their own and enjoyed relative political isolation. In these cases, they did not conform to the political attitudes of the counties in which they lived; in every instance this study shows that they were a great deal more Democratic than their neighbors in 1860. The seven Democratic townships in which Germans formed the largest group were in six different counties, four of which were Republican in 1860, and one of which was only slightly Democratic. In this connection, it is significant to note that while 21% of Scott county's population in 1860 was German, Germans did not appear as a large group in any of the highly Republican townships in that County. On the other hand, in Dubuque County, which contained only 15.6% Germans, they were the largest group in two townships which voted more than 80% Democratic. The one German township voting Republican in the election of 1859 (Amana, Iowa County) is easily explained on the grounds that being a pietistic religious colony, it would have little ideological affiliation with other German groups in the state.

Any way the problem is approached, except by taking the word of interested politicians, German intellectuals and newspapers, it seems that Iowa Germans were definitely inimical to Republican aspirations in the election of 1860, and the indications are that a study would show that the same was true in 1856.[16]

Actually, there were two very potent reasons why German-Americans should have been attracted to the Democratic party

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15 The census returns can be found in Franc B. Wilkie, *Davenport Past and Present*, Davenport, 1858, 325.

16 At least five of the seven German townships found in the election of 1860 were also highly Democratic in 1856. Records do not exist for the other two.

during that particular decade. Republicanism was linked, at least in the popular mind, with Know-Nothingism, and in Iowa it was also linked to prohibition. Democrats, on the other hand, tended to favor free liquor, and in their convention of 1856, had roundly denounced native Americanism and read the Know-Nothing element out of the party. Events outside the midwest also reflected a basic difference between the two parties in their treatment of immigrants, and the Iowa Democratic press seized every opportunity to play up Know-Nothingism in the Republican ranks. When the "two year" amendment was passed by the heavily Republican Massachusetts legislature in March 1859, every Democratic paper in Iowa featured it in their editorials. Obviously aimed at eliminating immigrant influence at the polls, the Massachusetts amendment provided that naturalized citizens must have resided in the state for two years before being eligible to vote. Iowa papers claimed that the Massachusetts action demonstrated that Republican love for humanity extended only so far as the African, while the Democratic party, "places the adopted citizen . . . on a basis of perfect and entire equality with the native."[17] The *Weekly Independence Civilian* prophesied that if the Republicans of Iowa "were strong enough to do without foreign votes, they would soon be walking in the steps of Massachusetts."[18]

In answer to the Republican defense that the nativist attitude was purely local, not reflecting any national Republican attitudes, the Democrats pointed out that the New York and the Connecticut Republican party were sponsoring a similar proscriptive amendment.[19] Democrats also claimed that the union of the American and the Republican parties in Hamilton, Ohio, proved that Know-Nothingism was not a local element in the Republican party.[20]

There is abundant evidence that German-Americans in Iowa were aroused by the nativist tendencies in the Republican party. One German immigrant, a resident of Burlington, Iowa, wrote a lengthy public letter to the press, urging Germans not to vote for the party of nativism and prohibition.[21] Denunciatory resolutions were drawn up by an association of Germans in Scott County,[22] and a group of German political leaders submitted a

17 *Iowa Weekly Democrat*, Sigourney, Iowa, Vol. 1, No. 10, March 25, 1859.
18 *Weekly Independence* (Iowa) *Civilian*, Vol. 4, No. 40, May 12, 1859.
19 *Sioux City* (Iowa) *Register*, Vol. 1, No. 49, June 30, 1859.
20 *Page County Herald*, Clarinda, Iowa, Vol. 1, No. 10, July 29, 1859.
21 *Weekly Independence* (Iowa) *Civilian*, Vol. 4, No. 45, June 16, 1859.
22 *Iowa Weekly Democrat*, Sigourney, Iowa, Vol. 1, No. 17, May 13, 1859.

questionnaire to the Congressional delegation from Iowa asking them, in effect, if they condemned the Massachusetts legislation.[23]

All historians who considered the subject have noted these less attractive—at least from the German viewpoint—features of the Republican party, but have insisted that because of their love of liberty, the Germans overlooked these minor points. Speaking of the German intellectuals, this seems to be perfectly true; and the masses were also lovers of liberty. But like masses everywhere, the rank and file Germans who did the bulk of the voting considered their own liberty to be of paramount importance. Apparently ignoring the advice of their leaders, they cast their ballots for the party which consistently promised them liberty from prohibition and native-American legislation.

At least one German-American businessman expressed the same opinion just before the election of 1860. Samuel Stern of Boston, in an open letter to Carl Schurz, claimed that he had been in the Revolution of 1848, and had learned enough of "radicalism and idealism to learn to be conservative and look after my own interests." Although he offered no statistics to prove his contention, Mr. Stern's experience had convinced him that the bulk of the Germans who had become adopted citizens and could vote were largely Democratic. Only the newly arrived masses, he said, were fooled by Schurz and the other politicians who were really thinking of their own advancement.[24] Although Mr. Stern could hardly be called a disinterested observer, his analysis is suggestive, and would seem to be largely borne out by the results of this study. An editorial in the *New York Demokrat* which was widely reprinted in Midwestern newspapers, although it did not speak so frankly of conservatism and self-interest, came to roughly the same conclusions. The editor described German-Americans who were still voting Republican after all the kicks they had received as "stupid."[25] Whatever the merits of the arguments of Stern and the *New York Demokrat,* it is evident that large numbers of German voters, at least in Iowa, must have taken them seriously.

Although the prohibition issue was undoubtedly a factor, it was probably not as important as Republican native-Americanism. Had a split occurred over prohibition, one would expect a religious pattern to emerge. But an inspection of the *Census of 1860, Social Statistics* and the appropriate county histories indicates that the

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23 *Weekly Maquoketa* (Iowa) *Excelsior*, Vol. 4, No. 10, May 17, 1859.
24 *Mississippi Valley Register*, Guttenberg, Iowa, November 1, 1860, 4.
25 *Ibid.*, (reprint) October 6, 1859, 2.

German Democrats ranged from Roman Catholic in Dubuque and Johnson Counties to Methodist-Episcopal and Mennonite in Lee, and Baptist in Des Moines. Any religious issues were apparently subordinated to the general German hatred of native-Americanism.

Even though it be granted that Iowa Germans were largely Democratic in 1860, it does not automatically follow that Germans throughout the Midwest were Democratic. Conclusions drawn from a study of one state cannot be automatically applied elsewhere, for it is possible that there were conditions peculiar to Iowa which caused the split between the German spokesmen and the German masses, but this conclusion is important for another reason. In a sense, this paper has been a case study in the relationship between the pronouncements of group spokesmen and the actions of group members. And, since no significant relationship existed in this case, it does call into question all generalizations about group voting based upon the opinions of leaders. Historians, accepting the statements of contemporary observers as true, had found reasonable grounds for assigning a large majority of the German vote to Fremont and to Lincoln. That they were wrong in at least one case has been demonstrated in this study; for well over half the Germans in Iowa lived in the six counties where the most Democratic townships were dominated by Germans. It is important to recognize that in every case conclusions of German Republicanism have been made on the same ground—acceptance of contemporary opinion. The broadest generalizations that can be made from this study are that the masses do not necessarily vote the way their spokesmen are campaigning, and that contemporary opinion, including that of newspapers, is a poor guide. If the historian would discover how any group actually voted, he must turn to an analysis of voting returns in terms of the smallest possible units. Only in a unit the size of a township can groups be isolated with enough precision for the historian to be sure that his conclusion is correct. If this study has any applicability outside of the immediate area considered, it is only in adding evidence to Benson's claim that historians must utilize systematic data in political studies if their statements are to bear scrutiny.

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APPENDIX A

The Democratic Vote by Townships According to Nativity Groups Presidential Election of 1860

MIDDLE ATLANTIC TOWNSHIPS

Township	*County*	*Democratic Vote (%)*
Putnam	Fayette	9.4
Fremont	Buchanan	13.6
Jefferson	Butler	17.3
Boardman	Clayton	18.6
Scott	Johnson	16.4
Wayne	Jones	17.8
Cue	Benton	20.0
St. Claire	Benton	21.2
Taylor	Dubuque	35.4
Liberty	Scott	25.7
Union	Boone	31.4
Amity	Page	2.2
Douglas	Page	22.2
Fulton	Muscatine	22.7
Mitchell	Mitchell	9.9
Albion	Butler	17.5
Fremont	Butler	25.0
Sumer	Buchanan	18.8
Ohio	Webster	24.1
Washington	Webster	22.0
Harlan	Fayette	25.0
Clear Creek	Johnson	66.3
Auburn	Fayette	56.4
Rockingham	Scott	57.9

UPPER OHIO VALLEY TOWNSHIPS

Wayne	Henry	0.8
Gower	Cedar	11.3
Yellow Springs	Des Moines	16.9
Brown	Linn	20.7
Bruce	Benton	7.3
Harrison	Benton	23.6
Cedar	Lee	24.8
Valley	Page	11.4
Indiana	Marion	32.5
Milford	Story	30.0
Center	Pottawattamie	20.8
Crawford	Washington	15.2
Clay	Washington	14.7

APPENDIX A (Continued)

UPPER OHIO VALLEY TOWNSHIPS (Cont.)

Township	*County*	*Democratic Vote (%)*
Richmond	Wayne	27.6
Drakeville	Davis	43.5
Springdale	Cedar	17.2
Jefferson	Lee	73.9
Roscoe	Davis	71.6
Dodge	Boone	67.1
March	Boone	78.7
Buffalo	Linn	63.3
Jackson	Jones	60.0
Augusta	Des Moines	73.1
Massilon	Cedar	57.2
Jackson	Butler	71.4
Baltimore	Henry	70.9
Buchanan	Page	70.8
Pierce	Page	68.4
Polk	Marion	79.2
Jefferson	Mahaska	70.7
Collins	Story	56.0
Rocky Ford	Pottawattamie	67.3
Pleasant Grove	Des Moines	67.7
Salt Creek	Davis	81.9
Lick Creek	Davis	73.0
Marion	Davis	74.5
	SOUTHERN TOWNSHIPS	
Fabius	Davis	88.7
Clay	Wayne	66.1
Fox River	Davis	75.1
Yell	Webster	63.2
	NEW ENGLAND TOWNSHIPS	
Denmark	Lee	13.7
	GERMAN TOWNSHIPS	
West Point	Lee	70.0
Liberty	Dubuque	86.6
Mossalem	Dubuque	81.1
Liberty	Johnson	83.2
Clayton	Clayton	56.6
Benton	Des Moines	66.7
Moscow	Muscatine	55.8

APPENDIX A (Continued)

IRISH TOWNSHIPS

Township	*County*	*Democratic Vote (%)*
Prairie Creek	Dubuque	83.0
Iowa	Dubuque	89.2
Union	Benton	86.7
Washington	Jones	93.4

SCANDANAVIAN TOWNSHIPS

Cedar	Mitchell	1.4

DUTCH TOWNSHIPS

Black Oak	Mahaska	31.7

APPENDIX B

THE DEMOCRATIC VOTE AND DOMINANT NATIVITY GROUPS BY TOWNSHIPS
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1859

Township	*County*	*Democratic Vote (%)*	*Dominant Nativity Group*
Butler	Jackson	100.0	Irish
Washington	Clinton	88.9	Irish
Warren	Keokuk	84.6	Ohio Valley
Sioux City	Woodbury	69.5	Middle Atlantic
Clear Creek	Jasper	69.4	Ohio Valley
Walnut	Jefferson	63.7	German
Iowa	Iowa	60.2	Ohio Valley
Columbia	Tama	59.0	Ohio Valley
Sugar Creek	Poweshiek	57.4	Ohio Valley
Green	Wapello	77.8	Ohio Valley
Union	Black Hawk	70.0	Ohio Valley
Amana	Iowa	3.2	German
Buckingham	Tama	8.1	Middle Atlantic
Richland	Jasper	8.6	Ohio Valley
Grinnell	Poweshief	13.9	New England
Berlin	Clinton	19.9	Ohio Valley
Prairie	Keokuk	21.9	Ohio Valley
Richland	Wapello	23.4	Ohio Valley
Correctionville	Woodbury	25.0	Middle Atlantic
Monmouth	Jackson	25.7	Middle Atlantic
Liberty	Jefferson	33.5	Ohio Valley
Black Hawk	Black Hawk	15.4	Middle Atlantic

APPENDIX C

Democratic Vote and Dominant Nativity Groups of Counties Not Organized into Townships Presidential Election of 1860

County	*Democratic Vote (%)*	*Dominant Nativity Group*
Audubon	55.1	Upper Ohio
Sac	72.7	Upper Ohio
Clay	61.9	German
Ida	60.0	Middle Atlantic
Palo Alto	87.9	Irish
Kossuth	23.8	Middle Atlantic
Grundy	11.9	Middle Atlantic
Hancock	12.1	Middle Atlantic
Dickinson	13.2	Middle Atlantic
Humbolt	24.7	Middle Atlantic
Emmet	0.0	Middle Atlantic
Crawford	39.7	Middle Atlantic
Cherokee	23.1	New England
Shelby	39.0	Upper Ohio
Plymouth	15.8	Upper Ohio
Pocahontas	32.3	Irish

The American Medical Profession: Mid-Nineteenth Century

The lowly status of the medical profession in mid-nineteenth century America is well known.[1] The rapidity of its decline in public estimation is not so well known. In 1830, few well-educated and respectable Americans would have consulted any but a regular physician. Two decades later, homeopathic and hydropathic practitioners were welcome in many of the best American homes. The most apparent cause in this deterioration in its standing was the imperfections in the medical profession itself. But these had not changed greatly in the twenty years between 1830 and 1850; other, less obvious causes must be sought within a rapidly changing American society.

The institutional forms of American life were subjected to intense and unsettling stress in the two generations separating the presidency of Andrew Jackson from that of Abraham Lincoln. Historians disagree as to the sources and, more heatedly, as to the ultimate consequences of this dynamism; none doubt its magnitude or significance.[2] The effects of this change were felt everywhere

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1 Though the American physician had never enjoyed a particularly elevated status, the decline of the profession in public estimation between 1830 and 1850 was unmistakable. For a more detailed discussion of contrasts between the status of the medical profession in 1830 and 1850, see: Charles E. Rosenberg, "The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1961. See also the pioneering article by Richard H. Shryock, "Public Relations of the Medical Profession in Great Britain and the United States: 1600–1870," *Annals of Medical History*, New York, II (1930), 308–339, and, by the same author, *The Development of Modern Medicine*, New York, 1947, 248–272, and *Medicine and Society in America 1660–1860*, New York, 1960. A useful survey of the American medical profession in this period is that by Henry B. Shafer, *The American Medical Profession 1783 to 1850*, New York, 1936.

2 In recent years, for example, it has become almost a commonplace to view the Civil War as a consequence of the disintegration of America's chief political institution, the party system. Efforts are being made, moreover, to define the social and intellectual changes which paralleled and underlay this political fragmentation. See, Roy F. Nichols, *The Disruption of American Democracy*, New York, 1948, 19–40; Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-over District. The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800–1850*, 1950; David Donald, *An Excess of Democracy; the American Civil War and the Social Process*, Oxford, 1960 and Stanley Elkins, *Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*, Chicago, 1959. There is, of course, no necessary discordance between such recent interpretation and traditional emphases upon the "liberating," "expansive," and "equalitarian" nature of Jacksonian America. Conflict arises not over the existence of such characteristics, but over the value which should be placed upon them.

in American society, in religion, in politics, in education—and in the status of the learned professions. Indeed, alterations in the public estimation of the professions were among the most sensitive indicators of social change in a self-consciously egalitarian society.

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None were more conscious of their declining status than the doctors themselves. But a few short years ago, lamented a mid-century Ohio practitioner, there had been something dignified and reassuring in the word "physician." Now, like the porter, his services were calculated by the hour and grudgingly rewarded. The "stately step, the solemn look, the 'big gold-headed cane,' and 'consequential air' " were no longer sufficient to inspire deference.[3] Aside from those few medical men whose personal dignity or professional attainments disarmed criticism, the average physician commanded little respect from his fellow Americans.

Doctors, like lawyers, had always served as an object for the resentment of the poor and the humor of the cynical. But, never, it seemed, had public bitterness and unanimity been as great. Physicians were, in the words of one popular saying, the nutcrackers used by angels to get our souls out of the shell surrounding them.[4] Cholera was a most terrible affliction, commented James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald*, August 12, 1849, but bad drugs and bad doctors were worse. The pestilence might come now and then; physicians we had always with us. Unfortunately for the medical profession, such sentiments inspired more than irreverent repartee.

South Carolina and Maryland in 1838, and New York in 1844 removed all legal restrictions upon the practice of medicine. By 1851, fifteen states in all had repealed such regulatory legislation; eight others had never passed any. When, in 1851, the Georgia legislature appropriated $5,000 for a Botanic Medical College the nadir seemed to have been reached.[5]

Even the most credulous and conservative of Americans had become sceptical of physicians' claims to the dignity and traditional

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[3] John Dawson, *Western Journal of Medicine*, Cincinnati, III (1849), 486; R. D. Mussey, *The Trials and Rewards of the Medical Profession . . .*, Cincinnati, 1853, 6; "Yarb-Tea," New York *Day-Book*, December 14, 1848.

[4] When a nation abounds in physicians, it was also said, it grows thin of people. Pottsville, Pa., *Miner's Journal*, March 10, 1849; *America's Own*, New York, August 25, 1849. These two are merely representative of scores of such "doctor jokes" serving again and again as "filler" in the newspapers and magazines of the time.

[5] *Western Journal of Medicine*, X (1852), 183; Shryock, *Annals of Medical History*, II, 322; Donald E. Konold, *A History of American Medical Ethics, 1847–1912*, Madison, Wis., 1962, 6–7.

prerogatives of a learned profession. In Iowa, six months of reading medicine were sufficient to win the title of "doctor". The prospective healer then bought a "pound of calomel, an ounce of quinine, a drachm of morphine," and considered himself ready to locate. The requirements for graduation from medical school, complained a Massachusetts physician, were purely nominal, the final examination a "mere pretense". It is acknowledged on all hands, remarked a Memphis physician, "That we are a *rapid*, not to say fast people, . . . We are *rapid* in dollars and cents; rapid on land and on sea; rapid in eating and drinking, and thinking; but our rapidity in making doctors is above all things wonderful."[6] The requirements for entrance into even the best medical schools were rudimentary; aspiring medical students were often unread, sometimes almost illiterate. After graduation, the average physician rarely subscribed to medical journals and infrequently purchased books, relying on those texts he had acquired in his student days.

It was not only knowledge the ordinary physician lacked; his dignity, bearing, and ethics often reflected scant credit on either himself or his profession. One's local practitioner might, in the words of a disillusioned colleague, "be uncouth in his manners, vulgar and indelicate in his language, slovenly in his dress, and harsh and unfeeling in his treatment."[7] Wealthy patients were eagerly pursued, while many physicians refused to make night calls or to treat the poor. Others paid for adulatory items in local newspapers or sold secret remedies—practices denounced as marks of quackery in those outside the regular profession. Physicians, like other Americans, were businessmen; the rigid institutional codes traditionally associated with the professions seemed somehow irrelevant.

More damaging to the medical profession than either lack of education or of ethical standards was the practice of the average

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[6] *Memphis Medical Recorder*, II (1853), 137; I. F. Galloupe, "One Cause of Empiricism," *Boston Medical & Surgical Journal*, XLI (December 12, 1849), 379–382; "Hoosier Blacksmith," *Ibid.*, XLI (September 12, 1849), 118. The profession, it was clear, made few demands on the student-physician's intelligence. Which, lamented the President of the Pennsylvania Medical Society, "is, obviously, a great cause why so many feeble-minded boys are dedicated to its study." J. D. Ross, "Address of the President," Medical Society of Pennsylvania, *Transactions*, 1865, 237. For a detailed survey of American medical education in this period, see: William T. Norwood, *Medical Education in the United States before the Civil War*, Philadelphia, 1944.

[7] Dan King, *Boston Medical & Surgical Journal*, XL (June 13, 1849), 370.

physician. His ministrations provided neither cure nor the illusion of competence and consistency. Five different physicians attending the same case would, according to popular belief, invariably present the helpless patient with five different prescriptions, alike only in their unpleasantness.[8] Calomel was so unpopular that physicians were forced to devise artful strategems to induce their patients to take it.[9] And the doses were immense; a common rule-of-thumb warned physicians that the drug had not begun to take effect until the patient's gums bled.

Its lack of dignity and education, even its harsh remedies could have been forgiven the medical profession had it produced results. But its failures were too conspicuous. Sceptical Americans found little to justify the pretensions of a profession unable to provide even the assurance of unanimity; medicine seemed the least exact and hence most backward of the sciences.[10] Surgery, not surprisingly, with its standardized procedures and often verifiable results, was exempt from much of the criticism accorded the practice of medicine. One New Yorker, for instance, who had nothing but contempt for most physicians, professed a real admiration for the surgeon. For, he argued:

> If a limb be dislocated or shattered, an artery punctured, or a bullet "propelled" into a gentleman's midriff, we know that the surgeon, with his splints and bandages, his tourniquet, or his probe and knife, as the case may be, is not only a useful, but an absolutely necessary agent.

Moreover, he continued significantly,

> there is but one method of setting a limb, of taking up an artery, or extracting a bullet; and upon this method all well-educated physicians are agreed.[11]

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[8] *New York Sunday Times,* December 31, 1848; Paul F. Eve, *The Present Position of the Medical Profession in Society . . .*, Augusta, Ga., 1849, 8–9; "Criticus," *Christian Advocate,* New York, June 7, 1849.

[9] W. M. Taylor, "Changeability of Disease," Medical Association of Alabama, *Proceedings,* 1852, 72. Even eminent physicians found it difficult to secure patients if they were reputed to prescribe large doses of calomel. *Hall's Journal of Health,* New York, I (1854), 208. "Therapeutic nihilism," the doctrinaire disbelief in the efficacy of traditional remedies was limited to the intellectually ruthless in academic medicine; it held few attractions for the average practitioner who had necessarily to do something for his patients. For an excellent survey of changes in therapeutic practice, see Alex Berman, "The Heroic Approach in 19th Century Therapeutics," *Bulletin of the American Society of Hospital Pharmacists,* Sept.-Oct., 1954, 321–327.

[10] Gamelial Bailey, *National Era,* Washington, D. C., August 23, 1849; Eve, *Present Position,* 9f; *New York Sun,* July 31, 1849.

[11] *New York Sunday Times,* December 31, 1848. Most physicians, of course, practiced both medicine and surgery—with specialization being limited almost exclusively to the large cities.

Not that ordinary folk lacked faith in drugs. Many, for example, believed that physicians took some mysterious potion which protected them during epidemics.[12] It was impossible to wean the common people from their belief in the necessary existence of a specific remedy for every disease and it was to this belief that the patent medicine vender appealed. In the vocabulary of the regular physician, "specific" and "quack" were roughly synonymous.[13] Educated physicians scorned specifics, treating disease through general physiological principles, principles unknown to the untutored empiric. Unfortunately these principles were equally mysterious to a public unable to understand how five different remedies might legitimately be employed in treating the same patient (if all served the same purpose, the reduction of fever let us say). Such reasoning and the education it implied had helped undershore the status of the physician in earlier centuries. But it produced no results and seemed no more than self-serving obscurantism to many Americans in 1850.

Though there had always been a market for "secret remedies," it was not until the 1840's that the sale of individual patent medicines became nation-wide. America's cheap and ubiquitous newspapers had made this possible. In more primitive times, such remedies rarely attained a more than local reputation; advertising too was local. By mid-century, the patent medicine entrepreneurs had become the first of the national advertisers. Grateful editors filled their columns with puffs for purges and tonics—and jibes at the regular medical profession.[14]

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[12] S. X. Ball, *Discovery of the Cause and Cure of Cholera*, New York, 1850, 29; Joel Shew, *The Cholera, its Causes, Prevention and Cure*, New York, 1849, 13–14.

[13] See, for example: *Boston Medical & Surgical Journal*, XL (June 13, 1849), 373; I. L. Adkins, *Medical Examiner*, Philadelphia, V (1849), 525; J. P. Harrison, *Western Lancet*, Cincinnati, IX (1849), 402; L. M. Lawson, *Ibid.*, X (1849), 58; A. G. Lawton, "On the Epidemic Cholera," *American Medical Monthly*, New York, III (1855), 181. Respectable physicians justified their categorical rejection of specific remedies by maintaining that the age and sex of the patient, the climate and season, the stage of the disease, had all to be taken into account in deciding the nature and dosage of medicines. The common belief in the necessary existence of a remedy for every disease is an interesting, if minor, application of the principle of plentitude; cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, Cambridge, Mass., 1936.

[14] For a useful survey of the patent medicine industry in the nineteenth century, see David L. Dykstra, "The Medical Profession and Patent and Proprietary Medicines during the Nineteenth Century," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Baltimore, XXIX (September-October, 1955), 401–419. A more recent survey of this problem may be found in James Harvey Young, "American Medical Quackery in the Age of the Common Man," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLVII (March, 1961), 579–593.

The doctors were not to be trusted. There was only one solution, editors warned: every American must study the laws of health and disease for himself.[15] And none outside the regular medical profession were more zealous in such self-improvement than the clergy. Not only did they continue in some cases, as clergymen had for centuries, to do a bit of their own doctoring, they endorsed patent medicines and supported heterodox medical systems. Far less influential than the clergy in mid-nineteenth-century America, physicians could do little in retaliation.[16]

Yet the clergy were not alone in having withdrawn support from the medical profession. Two decades before, in 1830, Thomsonian or botanic medicine was the only unorthodox medical system with any real following in this country. Though popular, botanic medicine had been primarily a rural and lower-class phenomenon, an enthusiasm of the vulgar and almost destitute of support from respectable city dwellers.[17] By 1850, however, hydropathic and homeopathic physicians could boast of substantial followings among the well-to-do, a claim tacitly endorsed by the imprecations of the regular faculty. Pragmatic Americans could scarcely fail to note that their average physician was neither healer nor scholar. Still in this respect he had not changed greatly in the years since 1830; it was America that had changed. Traditional class distinctions

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15 *Sunday Dispatch* (New York), December 17, 1848; Gilbert Vai, *Independent Beacon*, New York, I, (1849), 424; *Baltimore Sun*, July 16, 1849. Many editors felt free to recommend their own favorite prescriptions and to criticise or condemn those of physicians.

16 Though he complained of declining prestige as well, the minister was still far more influential, as a rule, than the physician, who labored under the traditional stigma of materialism and infidelity; cf. "Curio," *Richmond Whig*, July 18, 1849; Thomas Steel to James Steel, January 21, 1849, Thomas Steel Papers, Manuscript Div., State Historical Society of Wisconsin; J. H. Stuart, *New Jersey Medical Reporter*, Burlington, VI (1853), 114; J. S. Sprague, "Annual Address," Medical Society of the State of New York, *Transactions*, Albany, 1854, 12. More symptomatic than effectual were the frequent threats made by local medical societies to discontinue their traditionally gratuitous treatment of clergymen who endorsed patent medicines or supported sectarian rivals.

17 The most complete study of Thomsonianism in America is that by Alex Berman: "The Impact of the Nineteenth Century Botanical-Medical Movement on American Pharmacy and Medicine," unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1954. See also, by the same author: "The Thomsonian Movement and its Relation to American Pharmacy and Medicine," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, XXV (September-October, 1951), 405–428; *ibid.*, XXV (November-December, 1951), 519–538, and "Neo-Thomsonianism in the United States," *Journal of the History of Medicine*, New Haven, XI (No. 2, 1956), 133–155. My characterization of botanic medicine and of changes in American attitudes toward the medical profession is drawn as well from my study of the social history of cholera in the United States, "The Cholera Years," cited in note 1, above.

had been weakened. The equalitarian and centrifugal tendencies of Jacksonian America had not only undercut the standards of the medical profession, but had eroded as well the conservative convictions of an earlier generation. Successful Americans no longer assumed without question the desirability of a stable graded society. No longer did maintaining the status of the learned professions play a part, a necessary part, in maintaining the stability of society itself.[18]

Most Americans had come to assume as transcendant the virtues of progress and equalitarianism, and these values seemed to deny the "exclusive pretensions" of the regular physicians. In the rhetoric of their "sectarian" competitors, the medical profession was identified with blind conservatism and opposition to change. Medical schismatics pictured themselves as victims of intolerance and obscurantism, the Galileos and Giordano Brunos of a supposedly enlightened nineteenth century. Now, however, charged one dissident, the worst the regulars could do was slander us. "Time was," he continued, "when we should have been kindly caged in cold, damp cells with bread and water for our diet; or had our limbs amiably broken on a wheel, or have been benevolently burnt at the stake." Traditional medical science was an "antiquated heathen humbug, utterly unworthy of the middle of the nineteenth century."[19]

Doctor-craft, like priest-craft, would have to be swept away. We go in for the "largest liberty," affirmed a Cincinnati journalist, "without pretending to decide which system is the best." Liberals everywhere, he continued, "desire that medicine, like theology, should be divorced from State, and that, as in the different sects of religionists, the various medical systems shall be treated alike, . . . We go for free trade in doctoring."[20] It was encouraging to critics of a seemingly authoritarian medical profession to see state after state abolishing "discriminatory" medical legislation; to repeal such enactments was to leave "reason and public opinion as the sole legislators of the medical profession."

Homeopathy, the most wide-spread of the medical sects competing with the medical profession, benefited not only from this climate of opinion, but from a rapidly increasing German immi-

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[18] Cf., in this connection Donald, *An Excess of Democracy.*

[19] William Turner, ed., Samuel Dickson, *Revelations on Cholera,* New York, 1849, 61. cf., *New York Sun,* July 31, 1849; J. S. Buchanan, *Eclectic Medical Journal,* Cincinnati, I (1849), 262–263; *Sunday Dispatch* (New York), January 7, 1849.

[20] *Cincinnati Daily Times,* n.d., cited in the *Physiologico-Medical Recorder,* Cincinnati, XVII (1849), 175–176, 196.

gration which provided both patients and practitioners. Like hydropathy moreover, homeopathy was relatively inexpensive and at worst harmless. At least homeopathic medicines would not "make well men sick, nor keep sick men from getting well."[21] The same could hardly be said of traditional remedies.

Hydropathy, though of European origin, appealed most strongly to the spiritually committed, the reformers and moral absolutists—"ultras" in contemporary slang. Abolition in politics and pure water in medicine were frequently found together, for their advocates saw them as moral, not political or scientific issues. Truth, affirmed the editor of the *Water-Cure Journal*, was always "ultra."[22] God's pure and wholesome water was as superior to "filthy," "unnatural," and "dangerous" drugs, as it was to whiskey, or as freedom was to slavery. It is no accident that both abolitionism and medical sectarianism first gained wide public acceptance in the years between 1830 and 1850. This was an earnest generation: the millenial zeal of an earlier day had faded, but not without leaving behind many Americans unable to compromise with sin, immorality, or imperfection in any form. The orthodox in medicine, in religion, and in politics were alike impeding the attainment of God's Kingdom on earth.[23]

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[21] *Christian Ambassador*, New York, II (1849), 443. cf. *Olive Branch*, Boston, March 31, 1849; Milwaukee *Wisconsin Free Democrat*, December 13, 1848. Homeopathy, which still survives in an attenuated form was a medical system invented late in the eighteenth century by Samuel Hahnemann, a German physician. Its therapy was based upon the assumption that diseases could be cured by drugs which caused, in the well person, symptoms similar to those of the disease. More important practically was Hahnemann's seemingly paradoxical conviction that the strength of a drug increased with dilution. It was clear to even the bitterest enemies of homeopathy that its medicines were harmless. The same had to be admitted of the baths and diets of the hydropaths.

[22] R. T. Trall, *Water-Cure Journal*, New York, VII (1849), 88. The Milwaukee *Wisconsin Free Democrat*, the *Model Worker*, Utica, N. Y., the *National Era*, Washington, D.C., the *Practical Christian*, Milford, Massachusetts, *Burritt's Christian Citizen*, Worcester, Mass., and the *New York Independent* and *Evangelist* were some of the "reforming" publications which supported hydropathy. cf. Thomas H. Le Duc, "Grahamites and Garrisonites," *New York History*, Albany, XX (April, 1939), 189–191, and, especially, Alex Berman, "Social Roots of the 19th Century Botanico-medical Movement in the United States," *Actes du VIII^e Congres International d'Histoire des Sciences*, Florence, September 3–9, 1956, 561–565. Their sectarian opponents habitually called the members of the regular medical profession "hunkers"—the same name given the anti-free-soil wing of New York's Democratic party by political antagonists.

[23] "One sort of *ism* generally begets another," commented a physician orthodox in religion as well as in medicine. S. W. Butler, "Organized Quackery—How should it be dealt with?", *New Jersey Medical Reporter*, VI (1853), 105–106. See also, Alonzo S. Ball, *The Present Position of the Two Schools of Medicine . . .*, Albany, 1854, 24–25. The connection be-

More than a few physicians despaired of such a nation. America seemed to them the natural home of charlatanry. Many regular practitioners could not help but question the values of a society which justified quackery and denigrated their own faithful efforts. Could one acknowledge as infallible a public opinion which seemed to demand charlatanry as the price of success? Under the guise of progress, one physician lamented, the Goths and Vandals of modern barbarism had invested the last strongholds of science.[24]

As we are well aware, these bastions were not to fall. The American respect for tangible results which had been so instrumental in destroying public confidence in the medical profession was, within a century, to raise the physician's status to unprecedented heights. But this knowledge would have been at best an ironic consolation to the physician in mid-nineteenth-century America. His was a hostile world, a world turned upside-down, in which democracy and morality, reason and progress, the ideas he lived by, had become the allies of quackery and humbug.*

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tween orthodoxy in medicine and orthodoxy in religion was clear to contemporaries. See, for example: Charles Anderson to Caleb B. Smith, July 3, 1849, Caleb B. Smith Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. The hostility to recognized social institutions which the abolitionists displayed in regard to slavery, was present as well in their attitudes toward the "conservative" professions. As one abolitionist commented: "...we would as soon trust our spirit to a regular parson as our body to a pill-peddler. There are honest men everywhere, of course. But they are hard to find, in the medical, as well as in the clerical and legal professions." *Model Worker,* Utica, New York, December 8, 1848.

The post-millennial rhetoric of the "ultras" was not, of course, identical with the earlier patterns of Enlightenment rhetoric utilized by the Thomsonians. It is, however, difficult in practice to disentangle the two styles of argument. Yet ultimately the contrasting absolutes of God's dictates as opposed to nature as norm are distinguishable—though they were, by 1850, tending to coalesce at a fairly rapid rate. Of course, the earlier Thomsonian writings appealed to a class bias and a class consciousness in a way that would have been unacceptable to many Americans willing to patronize hydropathy or homeopathy.

[24] *Nashville Journal of Medicine and Surgery,* VII (1854), 68–69, 71. See also Edwin G. Meeks, *North-Western Journal of Medicine and Surgery,* Chicago, II (1949), 153–157; John P. Heister, Medical Society of Pennsylvania, *Transactions,* 1854, 21–23; *Stethescope,* Richmond, Va., IV (1854), 395; Alexander H. Stevens, Medical Society of the State of New York, *Transactions,* 1849, 25.

* Editor's note: This paper is a slightly altered version of that read at the Thirty-third Annual Meeting, American Association for the History of Medicine, Charleston, S.C., March 26, 1960.

Introduction to the Brasilian Jesuit Letters

As Alfred Métraux indicated in an article published many years ago in MID-AMERICA, the Jesuits contributed significantly to the exploration and anthropology of South America.[1] Equally important, as Mr. Métraux also hinted, have been the voluminous contributions of the Jesuits to the historiography of South America. A noteworthy and representative example of this historical contribution would be the sixteenth-century Jesuit letters from Brasil. These copious and informative letters, rich in detail and perception, are a primary source *par excellence* for the study of the formative years of Brasil.

Accompanying the first Governor-General, Tomé de Sousa, the Jesuits arrived in Brasil in March, 1549. Prior to their arrival, the emphasis in colonial policy had been on military and economic activities. Now, under the Jesuits' guidance, Portuguese civilization was to be transferred to the Indians and to the new colony. In letters and reports dispatched to Portugal during the following half-century, the Jesuits chronicled what they saw, did, and felt during those "gestation years of Brasil." Afrânio Peixoto aptly characterized the Jesuit letters when he wrote, "These letters are not just historical documents, they are something more which still lives: History itself which has not passed, which is not just a memory, but History which lives in the emotions of a witness."[2] There were over twenty-five of these witnesses who recorded their impressions in approximately one-hundred-and-twenty letters and four reports which have served as extraordinary primary sources for the writing of sixteenth-century Brazilian history.[3] Some of the authors were well known such as José de Anchieta and Manuel da Nóbrega who have been accorded an important place in Brazilian

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1 "The Contribution of the Jesuits to the Exploration and Anthropology of South America," MID-AMERICA, XXVI (July, 1944), 183–192.

2 Padre Joseph de Anchieta, *Cartas Jesuíticas III; Cartas do Anchieta;* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1933, 23.

3 The best editions of these letters are: Serafim Leite, ed., *Cartas do Brasil e Mais Escritos do P. Manuel da Nóbrega,* Coimbra: Tip. da Atlântida, 1955. *Cartas Jesuíticas II, Cartas Avulsas,* Rio de Janeiro: Officina Industrial Gráphica, 1931. Padre Joseph de Anchieta, *Cartas Jesuíticas III; Cartas do Anchieta,* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1933.

history. Others were obscure or even unknown. However, all contributed greatly to the historiography of Brasil.

Considering their acknowledged importance, it appears inconsistent that these letters should be somewhat neglected in the United States by students of Brasiliana in particular and of Latin America in general. The principal explanation for their neglect might be that, although several good editions of the letters have been published, they remain in their original sixteenth-century Portuguese. Perhaps such a language barrier is not prohibitive, but it does seem to be sufficient to discourage extensive use of the letters.

In an effort to focus more attention on these letters, I have translated four of them which exemplify the principal types of letters found in the collections. These translations are intended to serve as an introduction to the varied information available in all the letters. The first letter paints a descriptive picture of the new land and relates the excitement and novelty of a new world discovered. It is representative of the general type of letter frequently sent to Portugal during the first years of the Jesuits' work in Brasil. The second demonstrates the early interest of the Portuguese in pushing inland and exploring the new colony. This letter is one of the first *bandeirante* chronicles, that is, one of the first to relate the adventures of an exploratory journey westward into the interior of Brasil. The third and fourth letters explain and describe the Indian policies being implemented by the Jesuits in the new colony with the cooperation of the civil government. As a group, these four translated Jesuit letters are representative of the kind of material found throughout the other letters and reports.

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The first letter was written by Father Manuel da Nóbrega, from Bahia, in August of 1549. Father Nóbrega was the superior of the band of six Jesuits who accompanied Tomé de Sousa to Brasil in 1549. For the remaining twenty-one years of his life, he worked enthusiastically to convert the Indians to Christianity and to introduce them to Portuguese culture.[4]

His thirty-nine known letters written from the New World are a wealth of information concerning the life and development of early Brasil. Nóbrega did not limit himself to religious matters in

[4] For an excellent short biography see Jerome V. Jacobsen, "Nóbrega of Brazil," MID-AMERICA, XXIV (July, 1942), 151-188.

his letters. Quite the contrary, he discussed economic and political events, ecology, personalities, geography, etc.

This letter, describing the New World and its indigenous inhabitants, is typical of all the early Jesuit letters. It conveys enthusiasm and dedication along with a multitude of facts and impressions. The author is obviously fascinated by the native customs as he relates in detail some of their ceremonies. Besides its interest to historians, the letter is important for its anthropological data.

The information about these parts of Brasil that I can give you, dearest Fathers and Brothers, is that this land has a coast line a thousand leagues long, completely inhabited by people who go around naked, the women as well as the men. There are some lands very distant from here where the women are dressed with cotton cloths like gypsies because that land is colder than this where it is temperate in such a way that winter is neither cold nor hot and summer, even though it is warmer, is entirely tolerable. However, the land is very humid because of the heavy rains which fall all the time making the trees and grass eternally green, and for that reason the land is very refreshing. In places it is very rugged because of the mountains and forests which are always green.

There are in this land varied fruits, which the natives eat, but they are not as good as those of Portugal, which I think could be grown here also if they were planted because I see grapes growing. Indeed, there are two harvests a year, even though they are meager because of the ants which do a great deal of damage to the grapes and to many other things. Citrons, oranges, and lemons are grown in great quantities as well as figs as delicious as those back in Portugal. The common food of the country is a tree root, which they call manioc, from which they make a flour they all eat, and it produces also a wine, which when mixed with the flour makes a bread that dispenses with the need of wheat.

There are many fish and a variety of edible shellfish, which the natives live on, and considerable wild game and ducks that the Indians raise. Oxen, cows, sheep, goats, and chickens flourish here also and there are many of them.

The Indians are of various tribes, some are called *Goyanazes*, others *Carijós*. The latter is one of the best tribes along this coast. Not many years ago two Spanish monks instructed them, and they accepted the doctrine so well that now they have houses of retreat for women, like nunneries, and others for men, like monasteries. And this lasted a long time until the devil sent there a ship of slave hunters who captured many of them. We worked hard to recover those who were captured. We have some ready to return to their territory, and one of our Fathers will go with them. There is another tribe of Indians called *Gaimares* who live in the forests and have no communication with the Christians at whom they are amazed when they see us, and they say that we are their brothers because we have beards like theirs which the other Indians do not have because they shave off their hair, even the eyebrows. They make holes in their

lips and in their nostrils into which they insert bones which make them look like demons. Some, principally the witch doctors, have the entire face covered with them. These Indians are like giants; they carry a very strong bow in one hand and in the other a thick club with which they fight their enemies and easily smash them. Their enemies flee before them because the *Gaimares* are greatly feared by all the others.

The others who are in contact with us up to now are of two tribes, one called *Topinaquis* and the other *Topinambas*. These have enormous palm houses in which live fifty Indians with their wives and children. They sleep in cotton nets next to the fire which burns all night as much for the warmth, because they are naked, as for a means of frightening the demons whom they say flee from the fire. For that reason they carry torches at night when they go outside. These people worship nothing, nor do they know God; the only thing they regard as divine is the thunder which the call *Tupane*. Thus, we have no other word to make them understand God than to call Him Father Thunder.

Among themselves they perform a ceremony in the following manner: During certain years, some witch doctors come from distant lands pretending to bring holiness. At the time of their arrival they order the paths cleaned and the Indians go to receive them with dances and gaity according to their custom. Before they arrive at a place, the women walk two by two through the houses confessing publicly to each other the sins they committed against their husbands and asking pardon. When the witch doctor arrives at a place amid much rejoicing, he enters a darkened house and places a gourd shaped like a human figure in the most advantageous spot for his trickery. Changing his own voice so that it sounds like a young boy's coming from the gourd, he tells them that they will not have to work, nor go to the fields because the food will grow of its own accord, and they will never lack sustenance, and that the food will come to the house on its own, and that the hoes will dig and the arrows will go to the forest to hunt for their masters, and that it is necessary to kill many of their enemies and capture many for their feasts. He promises them long lives. He says that the old women will turn into young girls and the daughters should be given to whomsoever desires them. These and other similar things the witch doctors tell and promise them, thus tricking them because they believe that something holy and divine is within the gourd. When the witch doctor has finished speaking, they begin to tremble, principally the women, with a great shaking of the body, which seems to be filled with demons (and certainly must be), and they throw themselves on the ground foaming at the mouth. Then the witch doctor persuades them that they are being filled with holiness and whoever does not do this is full of evil. Afterwards they offer the witch doctors many things; and when they are ill, the Indians call for the trickery and sorcery of the witch doctors. These are the contrary beings with whom we must deal; and at times they make the sick believe that we use knifes, scissors, and similar things on their bodies in order to kill them. In their wars they consult with the witch doctors besides following the omens of certain birds.

When the Indians capture a prisoner, with great rejoicing they lead him by a rope tied around his neck, and they give him as a wife the daugh-

ter of the chief or any other who will be more pleasing to him. They begin to fatten him like a pig until it is time to watch the festivities. The day before killing him they wash him, and on the following day they bring him out and tie him by the waist in the ceremonial ground. One of the Indians very fittingly attired comes forward to carry out the ritual of their ancestors. When this is finished and the victim is about to be killed, he [the victim] speaks out saying he is one of the brave who does not fear death and that he also has killed many of them and that his relatives will get vengeance upon them and other similar things. After killing him, they immediately cut off his index finger which shot arrows, and the rest they cut into pieces in order to eat him either roasted or cooked.

When one of them dies, they place over his grave bowls full of food and a very clean net of the type in which they sleep. They do this because they believe, according to what they say, that after they die they return to eat and to rest on the grave. They place them in round graves, and, if they are chiefs, they build them a palm hut. They possess knowledge of neither heaven nor hell; they simply say that after death the departed go to rest in a good place. In many things they keep the natural law. They haven't a thing which is not communal, and he who gets something shares it with the others, particularly if it is something to eat. They never keep food from one day to the next nor do they care to store up riches.

They give nothing with their daughters in marriage, but on the other hand the sons-in-law are obliged to serve their fathers-in-law. To any Christian who enters their houses they give whatever they have to eat and a clean net in which to sleep. The women are faithful to their husbands. They have a remembrance of the flood; however, it is false because they say that when the earth was covered with water, a woman with her husband climbed to the top of a pine tree and after the waters subsided they came down and from them came all men and women. They have very few words for us to use in explaining to them our Faith. But despite that we make them understand the best we can and some things we are able to explain to them in a roundabout way. They are very attached to sensual things. Many times they ask me if God has a head and a body and a wife, if he eats, and how he dresses and other similar things.

They say that Saint Thomas, whom they call Zomé, passed by here, and this they say was told them by their ancestors and that his footsteps can still be seen on a river bank. I went to see them in order to verify the truth, and with my eyes I saw four well defined foot prints which are sometimes covered when the river rises. They also say that when he left these footprints he was fleeing the Indians who wanted to kill him, and arriving there the river parted, and he walked to the opposite bank without getting wet, and from there he went to India. They also say that when the Indians wanted to shoot their arrows at him, the arrows turned back upon the bowmen and they fled through the forests. Others tell this as a taunting gesture. They also say that he promised them that he would return again to see them. He sees them from Heaven and is the intercessor for them before God so that they will come to know Him and receive the Holy Faith as we hope.

This briefly, my dearest brothers, is what I can inform you about this land; as other information comes to my attention I will not forget to inform you of it.[5]

II

This second letter was written by Father João Azpilcueta, from Porto Seguro, on June 24, 1555.

During the first three-quarters of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese generally restricted their explorations to the coastal areas of Brasil. Hence, this letter assumes additional importance because it shows an early effort by the sea-going Portuguese to penetrate the interior of the new colony. The motives of such exploratory probes were dual: the soldiers sought gold; the religious wanted to find new lands where they could carry the word of God.

Accompanied by twelve Portuguese and an unknown number of Indians, Father Azpilcueta traveled through the hinterlands of Minas Gerais and Bahia during the years 1554 and 1555. The small group departed from Porto Seguro and crossed the Serra do Mar penetrating at least as far as the São Francisco River. They returned to the coast via the Pardo River which empties into the Atlantic midway between Porto Seguro and Ilhéus.

Throughout the letter, the chronicler comments on geographical features of the land and presents exotic botanical and zoological information. Following a pattern nearly universal in the Brazilian Jesuit chroniclers, the letter is rich in anthropological data. One of Azpilcueta's comments struck a note which was destined to reveberate throughout Brasilian history: Brasil lacks only immigration to make it flourish. He wrote, "The substantial fruit of this land will appear once it is inhabited with Christians." The call for immigrants to people the land has been perennial over the succeeding centuries.

May the Grace and love of Our Lord Jesus Christ always be in our souls.

Dearest Brothers, a year and a half has passed, since, at the orders of Father Manoel da Nóbrega, I went with twelve Christian men, who, at the orders of the Captain-General, set out for the interior in order to discover if there might not be some nation there of greater civilization, or if there was anything in the land which would cause the Christians to want to settle it, or if it would be possible to Christianize those Indians.

This is only to inform you that after a year and a half I returned with all twelve of my traveling companions, by the grace of God, safe and at peace, which was the reason that the Father sent me with them.

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[5] Leite, *Cartas do Brasil,* 59–67.

If I were to tell you everything that happened on our journey, I would never end; but, as I know that by telling you something I will give you consolation, I will make some general comments about what happened and what we saw. You must know, dearest Brothers, that we journeyed 350 leagues, always on little-known paths, through innumerable, very rugged mountains and across so many rivers that in some areas, in the space of 4 or 5 leagues, we crossed fifty rivers, by actual count, and many times if they had not aided me, I would have drowned. We spent more than three months in very humid and cold lands covered with groves of trees, and those stout and tall trees were covered with a foliage that is permanently green.

It rained frequently; we slept many a night completely soaked, especially in the uninhabited areas; and, then, all, in whose company I was, were nearly dead with sickness, some in the villages and others in the wilderness. We had no other medicine than to bleed ourselves and force ourselves to continue the journey. Without having any other food except the usual flour and water, not one of our group perished because Our Lord comforted us with His mercy. He freed us also from the many dangers of the hostile Indians who sometimes were determined to kill us, especially in one large village where their witch doctors were casting spells. These witch doctors travel from one village to another and are always well received by the Indians who have cleared the paths over which they must travel and who celebrate their arrival with feasts of food and drink.

Well, in this one particular village, there was a multitude of people from the surrounding villages who had come for the celebrations of the witch doctors. As soon as we arrived, there was a great commotion among them; but an Indian chief, a very good man who was with us, began to speak to them in his own manner after which they quieted down. In spite of that, they did not want us to remain there longer than that night, which was for me very long and sad because I saw things which shocked me. In the middle of a clearing they had constructed a large house, and within it another very small one in which they had a gourd made to look like a human head, very much decorated in their style, and they said it was their saint whom they called *Ambozaray*, which means a person who dances and makes merry, who has the power to turn old men into youths. The Indians were painted, even their faces, and covered with multicolored feathers. They danced and made many gestures twisting their mouths and howling like dogs. Each one carried in his hand a painted gourd, which they called their saints, that ordered the Indians not to work because their food would produce itself and their arrows would fly into the forests to kill the game. I saw this amid many other things which were enough to make one cry.

On the following day we left and traveled through many deserted places, especially one some twenty-three days away in an area where the *Tapuzas* Indians are found. They are bestial and ferocious Indians. They go through the woods like herds of deer, naked, with their hair long and flowing like a woman's. Their speech is very barbarous and they are very blood-thirsty. They carry poisoned arrows and are willing to kill a

man at a moment's notice. In order to travel through their lands, we were accompanied by a large number of our Indian allies, and we sent scouts out ahead. One Indian, who was accompanying us and carrying a cross-bow, went ahead. He was sighted by a band of Tapuzas who killed and tore him to pieces. After that fearful event, neither the Whites nor the Indians dared to get off the path even though they might suffer a dire need of such a necessity as water. In that area the days were hot and the nights cold, and we slept without any other cover than the sky. In that wilderness we crossed a large mountain chain which runs from the north, and in it we found very tall rocks of marble. In that mountain range many torrential rivers have their source, two of them descend to the sea between Porto Seguro and Ilhéus, one is called the Grande and the other the Ourinas. From there we passed through the land of a tribe of Indians called *Cathiguzú*. We left there and went toward a very torrential river known as the Pará, which, according to what the Indians told us, is the São Francisco River, and it is very long. We left behind us now those Indians called *Tamoyas* where we formerly were; they are enemies of these in this area; and everywhere else we found the *Tapuzas*. Finding ourselves in this situation [among unfriendly Indians], it seemed wise to all to order boats made so that we could travel by water. So each began to build one the best he could because we had no carpenter. We based ourselves in a village by which passed a stream named the Monayl, which flowed into another, and we did this in order not to be known by the enemy who was about three leagues away. Immediately we made a large cross and planted it at the entrance to the village, and next to it we made a small chapel where we worshiped and with the permission of all I began to visit the villages. As I entered the third village, I came upon their miserable ceremonies. In a clearing they had a small girl tied with ropes in preparation to kill her. Many people had gathered from the other villages. I went to her and spoke in the language of our Indians, but she did not understand me because she was a daughter of the *Tapuzas* who are the savages about whom I was speaking awhile ago. Here I saw ceremonies which I had never witnessed before in this act of killing. From there I sadly went on to other villages where I told them about Our Lord. They rejoiced to hear the news but they immediately forgot it, making mockery out of it by their wars.

I returned to the Christians, and on the way I baptized some children who were certain to die. In one of those villages I found a substance like resin that falls from some trees which are in the fields; and dripping from the tree and leaves, it forms a hard paste on the ground. I took a portion for the boats, and upon arriving I found two almost finished. My companions sent for more resin in order to calk these two boats that were nearly finished. We were running a great risk because the Indians on the opposite bank of the river knew about us and they tried to prevent our departure. The danger was so great that I went to the chapel and prayed before the Crucifix which I carried with me. It was Our Lord's wish that although some were injured none was killed, and I cured them with wild honey. Some Indians were wounded. We embarked with caution and

headed down stream, but we were not able to continue the journey by boat, and so it was necessary to take counsel again about our route because the entire land was populated thereabouts by very diverse tribes of barbarous and cruel Indians. The land which borders this river for thirty leagues or more is very flat and beautiful. It seems to me that in that land anything planted or sowed would grow because the Indians have a great deal of food and there is a wide variety of fruits. There are fish without number just like in the smaller rivers and lagoons. When the Indians have need of fish, a village or two gets together and they go to intoxicate the fish[6], and in this manner they collect so many of them that afterwards they smell up the houses. So they have little necessity for fishhooks, and principally in the River Grande they never fish with them if they are not of iron and with large chains of a palm or two because there is a fish, called *Piray,* that cuts a fishhook with its teeth which are like razors. I have seen it with my own eyes or otherwise I would never believe it. Leaving the river we made our return journey by land. We found in this excellent land which we crossed what appears to be the cause of all the evils: the Indians have among themselves such a law that if the least of them receives an injury from the Christians they band together to get vengeance. They are extremely poor. They have not one private thing, and they eat in common whatever they kill or catch each day. If they show any love toward the Christians, it is because of the covetousness they have for his possessions, and it is so much that when they do not see another thing they take the clothes from them. They then give them something to eat on the condition that they pull out their beards and eyebrows as is their custom and go hunting and fishing with them.

The weather is very temperate except for some dry years. There is much to be hunted, animals as well as birds. There are some animals that they call tapirs, which, although small, resemble mules except they have the feet of oxen. Also there are many wild pigs and another animal that has a cover on him in the manner of an armed horse. There are foxes, hares, and rabbits similar to those in our land. There are many kinds of monkeys among which is one brown variety with a beard like man's; there are deer, wild cats, pumas, and many snakes among which there are some that have something like a rattle on their tails, and they make a noise with it. When they encounter anyone they curl up and make a sound with their rattle, and if the person does not go away, they bite him, and few who are bitten escape death. There are some birds which are like the *catinga tinamou*, others like pheasants, and many others of diverse varieties. Also I saw ostriches in the possession of two Indians. The substantial fruit of this land will appear once it is inhabited by Christians. May God Our Lord by his mercy lift these miserable people from their abominations and give to us His grace so that we may always do His Holy Will.[7]

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[6] Reference is made here to a type of stupifying drug poured into the water as a result of which the fish are rendered unconscious and rise to the top of the water where they can be easily collected by the Indians.

[7] *Cartas Jesuíticas* II, 146–150.

III

The Jesuit author of the next letter was Padre Antônio Pires, who wrote from Bahia on July 19, 1558, to his Paternity, James Laínez, the Jesuit General. Quite possibly Padre Pires was the author of the last letter in this series too. However, since it has not been proven conclusively that he penned it, we will regard that letter as one of the many whose authors are unknown. The last letter was written from Bahia on September 12, 1558. Both of these letters contain considerable information about the establishment of Indian settlements around the colonial capital of Brasil.

The early Indian policy of Portugal was vague. Not until 1570 did the Portuguese kings begin to issue a series of decrees whose ultimate goal was to free the Indians from slavery. In the meantime, the colonists were quick to exploit the Indians as the only available source of manual labor.

The Jesuits were the first and most vociferous to agitate for an enlightened Indian policy. Opposing the colonists' enslavement of the native population, the Jesuits sought to incorporate the Indians into the Portuguese empire by Christianizing and civilizing them. In order to accomplish this task effectively, it was necessary to concentrate the scattered and wondering Indian groups into mission settlements, or *aldeias*, where they could be indoctrinated in the beliefs of the Roman Catholic religion and taught useful trades and occupations as well as the customs of European life. Certainly this approach to the Indian question would seem to be the most positive one followed by the Portuguese to bring the Indians within the pale of empire.

The success of the Jesuits in civilizing and Christianizing the Indians in these settlements varied. The early Jesuit letters from Brasil vividly reflect their experiences in establishing and administering these *aldeias* and contain valuable information concerning initial Indian-Portuguese relations.

Pax Christi

Your Paternity already will have understood from the two communications written from here during this year of 1558 what Our Lord has done in this His indigent vineyard through the Fathers and Brothers of the Company of Jesus. Although it will not differ greatly from what was said in the past, I will write in this letter about the fruit which subsequently has been harvested with divine aid and favor. Father Ambrôsio Pires, who was with Governor Dom Duarte da Costa, will be able to give more details and clearer information.

First of all, Your Paternity must know that we always exert the greatest diligence possible to bring these Indians to a true knowledge of our Holy Faith. In order to do this we seek the simplest and most pleasant means possible since we hope for greater reward from our work than until now we have seen. Of course in proceeding with this work we never lose the propriety which it demands. The Governor, also, with the zeal and good will which Our Lord gave him does not leave undone one thing which he deems necessary to complete his work. Some means are sought so that larger number of Indians can be taught and indoctrinated with greater ease in the matters of the Faith. In order to proceed with this intention, it is necessary to get rid of some impediments which the Indians themselves have raised. The first step, which is already a great success, was to concentrate the Indians from four scattered villages into one large village. Whereas before many of us were needed to teach and indoctrinate them because they were scattered about, now that they are concentrated together fewer of us are needed. In this way it is also easier to correct their errors and sins which they committed before because they were so inconveniently located. We hope that with this good order and harmony, which Our Lord has given, we will have much success among them which will result in the honor and glory of His Holy Name and a clearer understanding of Him everywhere.

The impediments which we earnestly desired to get rid of were the continuous and very cruel wars which they carry on among themselves. Their restlessness was the principal impediment to a mutual understanding with them. From their constant wars many deaths resulted; and they would eat each other, something that was very difficult to prohibit although now they no longer do it. At least, it is not known that they do it, because if it is known, they are severely punished for it in a manner merited by such a grave sin so foreign to the laws of nature. If this progress continues from now on, as it seems that it will with Divine Favor, we will be able to reap an even greater harvest in the future.

At the very beginning, when the Governor determined to put the land at peace and to forbid all those evil customs of war, murder, and the eating of human flesh, and when he issued a law forbidding all this, some Indians ridiculed it. Previously they were not punished much for doing it, and so they did not stop eating human flesh, rather they merely pretended that they did. As soon as the Governor learned of it, he ordered arrested the first one who ate flesh. Without consulting anyone except the Holy Spirit the Governor (we believed him to be learned in this business because he knew that the Devil would come with his denials which he never lacks), ordered the people and boats made ready. Then he ordered two chiefs, father and son, arrested. A great fear was felt by all the Indians, and much greater was the Devil's grief because he was prevented from keeping so many lost souls.

Then, in this conjunction, a similar event occurred in the time of Governor Dom Duarte da Costa. Another Indian, the haughtiest of this land in whose village we intended to construct a building for indoctrination, lived in such liberty that he seemed to fear no one, and he did not want the building constructed there. Before, as well as now, judging the times

by one set of standards, he disdained the laws, and he ate human flesh with his subjects at great feasts. For this the governor ordered him to appear before him; and in case he would not come, the governor said he would order the Indian arrested. The Indian upon hearing this came immediately believing that he would be put to death as the messenger, who came to inform him of the governor's orders, told him. Before leaving his people, he spoke to them advising that they work to become good and they stay where they now were because he would pay for them all. It happened that when the Indian came to the Governor's residence, he was badly received by him, and the Indian threw himself at the Governor's feet and kissed them and begged him pardon offering to receive the Fathers in his village where they would carry out all the Fathers' orders. He said all this with such signs of contrition that he merited pardon. Then another chief came to do the same thing. These are the fruits which the Lord is harvesting from this field that until now was sterile, and for the service of Our Lord it was decided to go immediately to that Indian's village to construct a building where the Indians could be indoctrinated.

At this time, a church was built one league from this city. There, four of the Indian villages, which were closest to this town and in which we had previously been indoctrinating, were joined together. It was the first Indian reduction that we made, and it has the name of São Paulo.[8] It certainly shows that Our Lord wants to open the door which has been closed for so long because, besides the Indians being subjugated and awed, they cease committing some of the sins which were frequently very common among them. In the construction of the church and houses into which the Fathers, teachers of this new Christianity, gathered together the Indians, Our Lord manifested His pleasure, because, although they were built in the winter during which time it rains frequently in this land, the work was completed in four months. The first mass was said in that church on St. Peter and St. Paul's Day with the greatest solemnity possible. The Governor, accompanied by the most honorable men of the city, visited the church where a dinner was given for all. The solemnity began with the new catechumens. At the beginning of the mass, the Father, dressed in priestly robes, blessed the church and then began the solemn baptism during which he baptized 84 innocents. Of all these, the Governor was the godfather. In this ceremony, he demonstrated clearly the zeal and favor he has for such works because there he was next to the baptismal font touching his godchildren with much love as one must feel when he sees the salvation of a soul. Brother Antônio Rodrígues, their teacher and translator, was also their godfather.

Later, on the day of the Visitation, some thirty more were baptized. On the following Sunday, some twenty more were baptized to bring the total to 144. All of them are school children who have been indoctrinated. The older people are baptized more slowly. In former times the parents did not want to allow their children to be baptized; and, if they became ill, they hid them. Now, by the Lord's kindness, if they fall ill, they

[8] Not to be confused with the present, well known, Brasilian city of the same name. The São Paulo mentioned here was an Indian reduction about one league from Bahia.

come offering the children for baptism; and after the first baptism was held in the new church, there were many who complained because we did not baptize their children on that day. They believed it would never be possible again to have their children baptized.

During this solemnity the Governor made one of the principal Indians the bailiff of the village, and he ordered him to be suitably dressed, and he handed to him his staff of office which caused considerable amazement among them because it was new. This good order affected many, not only those who live close to us but those who live 10 leagues from here came to ask for the same laws and for us to teach them saying they will do all that is commanded of them. It would seem that they are adjusting to the Christian manner of living. Confident that the Lord will send from the homeland many laborers for these works of His service, we continue to expand our activities always asking the Lord for aid and help to be able to accomplish our tasks to the greater glory and honor of His Divine Majesty. We ask for His Holiest Grace so that aided by it we can work faithfully in His service as we are obliged. Amen.[9]

IV

Since the letter written on July 19, 1558, from Bahia, the Governor has continued zealously in his efforts and Our Lord has given him rewards for his efforts.

He continued to punish the wrongdoers with such prudence and temperance that he builds up the community and does not destroy it, and for that reason he has been able to subjugate all to the law and servitude whom he wanted.

Thus, from far away they [the Indians] send requests for priests to indoctrinate them because they want friendship with Christians and to change their habits for ours. In this way four large settlements are already constructed for them, but for the present only two of us reside among them in the newly constructed churches because there are only three of us in this Captaincy who can say mass and we are scattered in the following three areas: in the College of Bahia resides João Conçalves with a few Brothers, Father Nóbrega is in São Paulo[10], and Antônio Pires is in São João[11]. The other two settlements are awaiting aid.

Besides these, other settlements are being prepared in more remote parts where the Christians never imagined it possible to enter and subjugate, and we are taking care of this slowly until there are enough Fathers to reap the great harvest there. It is certain that if there were enough people to teach and to maintain them, we could easily establish 20 or 30 churches around which we could settle all the Indians from an area many leagues square.

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[9] *Cartas Jesuíticas* II, 198–202.

[10] São Paulo here again refers to the Indian reduction about one league from Bahia.

[11] São Joao was an Indian reduction about five leagues from Bahia.

All these are losing their habit of eating human flesh; and if we learn that some are about to eat flesh, we order them to send it to us. They send it, as they did several days ago, and they bring it to us from a long distance so that we can bury or burn it. In this way they all tremble with fear of the Governor, a fear which, although it may not last a lifetime, is enough so that we can teach them; it serves us so that we can tell them of Christ, and the kindness which Our Lord will show them will cause all human fear to flee so that they will remain a strong and stable people. This fear makes them more capable of being able to hear the word of God. Their children are instructed; the innocent ones about to die are all baptized; they are forgetting their habits and exchanging them for good ones. Proceeding in this way a noble Christianity will be inculcated at least among the youngsters.

With much diligence the children are being taught good habits, reading, and writing, and there are some very intelligent ones among them. From these we hope to have some good students, because, since they can no longer wander around and now remain among us, they will not be able to forget what they have learned. Those of São Paulo, the first settlement built, are all Christians, that is the children up to 14 years of age, and every day more are baptized because those who are born again bring others for baptism and there are more than two hundred of these. We do not baptize the older ones who may already have committed some mortal sins unless they confess and live in a manner acceptable to Our Lord, and of these older ones many are living orderly lives so that already we have baptized and married a large number. This good order is encountered throughout the other Indian settlements we have createtd.

There are a great many things which I could tell your Paternity and all the Brothers which would please you very much, but I will concentrate only on two things. The first is that one of the boys whom we brought up some years ago and taught to weave is in São Paulo with his loom and is making cloth. The concern which before they all had for their feasts of human flesh and for their wars and ceremonies has been converted to the planting of cotton. They weave it and thus dress themselves. This now is their principal concern. All have begun to clothe themselves and many of them go around dressed now. The second is that in the settlement of São Paulo there is a young Indian girl who, for the love of virtue, determined to live a life of chastity and cleanliness. After the Fathers praised and commended her intention and told her various examples of Holy Virgins, she became even more set in her purpose. This is truly a novelty in this generation in which the flesh corrupts their lives so much that it frightens us; *sed manus Domini non est alligata.*

Not only is there an understanding with these Indians, who are here associated with us, but also with those around Bahia who are opposed to these [Indians] and have done harm to the Christians and have murdered many. These came once again to steal a boat from the Christians, and for this and other reasons war was declared against them because they refused to make the necessary satisfactions. Consequently the Governor commanded that they should be fought, and they [the Portuguese] entered the land of those Indians and killed all the men in one large village

and took the women and children captive without losing one Christian. Such a feat amazed and frightened not only those Indians but those all along the coast because such a thing had never happened there before.

Then the Governor with many people set about to subjugate them and to make them understand the only path by which they can come to have an understanding of their Creator. Therefore, it is necessary that many laborers come to reap such a great harvest, and we hope in Our Lord that beside those of the Company of Jesus, His Highness will send people here who will be able to help to maintain the beginning which has been made and will finish subjugating this land which promises so much.

In this city many confessions are made now that celebrations are coming up. In this college many people, among those whom we are able to confess, confessed. They are women and the poor who do have the hindrance of owning [Indian] slaves. Father João Gonçalves, who now resides in this college with a few Brothers, is very industrious in hearing confessions.

Now there is nothing else to write except to ask your blessing for all these who are yours and your prayers for us to Jesus Christ Our Lord."[12]

E. Bradford Burns

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[12] *Cartas Jesuíticas*, 203–206.

Notes and Comments

A Chronicle of Catholic History of the Pacific Northwest 1743-1960, by Wilfred P. Schoenberg, S.J., was published this year by Gonzaga Preparatory High School, Spokane, Washington, to commemorate the 75th anniversary of this the oldest boys' school in the state of Washington. "Arranged after the manner of certain medieval chronicles and annotated with copious notes for further reference," the *Chronicle* begins with the first recorded visit of Catholics to the Northwest in 1743 and carries on through 483 pages and 2604 items in smaller clear type and neat format. Father Schoenberg has spent years gathering these factual data from archives, letters, published sources, and secondary volumes, checking and rechecking, and eliminating the legendary and hearsay. His interesting *Chronicle* presents the major personalities and events in the development of the Church in Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana: the explorers, the missionaries and Indians, the beginnings of churches and parishes, of bishops and dioceses, of schools and colleges, and the deeds of teaching orders, parochial clergy, and lay leaders, along with the adverse realities and untoward happenings. The volume will prove very useful to students, researchers, and librarians. It has a long bibliography of general works and an excellent index. The 570 pages are well worth the $12.50 list price. It is distributed by Crosby Library, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington.

* * * *

Americana Classics, a new series devoted to the significant and rare source works of the American past, under the general editorship of O. Lawrence Burnette, Jr., and published by Quadrangle Books, this May had an addition to the family: *A Pilgrimage in America, Leading to the Discovery of the Sources of the Mississippi and Bloody River; with a Description of the Whole Course of the Former, and of the Ohio,* by J. C. Beltrami. The Italian lawyer Beltrami, an exile from Italy for collaborating with Napoleon, penned an account of his wanderings in the form of letters in French to Madame La Comtesse Compagnoni. He had them published in 1828. The last half of the book contained the letters describing his river travels in America in 1823. When Captain Long of the

Army, with whom he had sojourned in Minnesota, took issue with him for finding too many sources of the Mississippi and in the wrong places, Beltrami translated his letters into English and published them in one volume so that all could behold his proofs. Now comes this new edition of the *Pilgrimage* in fine format and excellent type, embellished by the controversial map of the Mississippi source, and plates of Indian artifacts. The value of Beltrami's observations has been known to historians, geographers, and anthropologists, but in this new form it should prove entertaining reading for anyone because of its picturesque phrasing, its adventures, and its views of animal, mineral, vegetable and human life as seen through the eyes of the colorful Italian lawyer. The list price is $10.00 at Quadrangle Books, Inc., 199 West Lake Street, Chicago 1, Illinois.

* * * *

The State Historical Society of Wisconsin has embarked upon a laudable enterprise in publishing a series of volumes, called the Logmark Editions, for the Department of History of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The first of these, appearing in February, 1962, was Donald E. Konold's *A History of American Medical Ethics, 1847-1912.* This study, a doctoral dissertation completed in 1954, traces the evolution and practice of medical ethics from the first *Code of Ethics* of the American Medical Association in 1847 to the adoption of the revised Code in 1912. The book is factually written in 119 pages including the bibliography and index and is priced at $3.50. It is reviewed in the Spring, 1962, number of *Wisconsin Magazine of History.*

The second of the Editions is *Nettie Fowler McCormick, Profile of an American Philanthropist,* by Charles O. Burgess. This is a tribute to and a study of a great benefactress of religious and educational institutions. The first part describes the formation of the character of Nettie Fowler from her birth in 1835 to her marriage to Cyrus Hall McCormick in 1858, summed up as that of a "somber, disciplined, and dedicated Calvinist." The second part sketches the vicissitudes of her wedded life, while the third part pictures her business-like pursuit of the religion of philanthropy and personal frugality. The fourth part has her in a planned existence as a philanthropist distributing some eight million dollars until her death in 1923. The last of the 88 pages of the book are taken up with five tables itemizing her many contributions. The list price is $3.00.

The third of the Logmark Editions is *Michel Eugene Chevreul, Pioneer of Organic Chemistry,* by Albert B. Costa. This will interest students of the history of science. It is in 116 pages and calls for $3.50.

* * * *

Besides these Editions of the earlier part of this year the Society brought out in June *A Short History of Wisconsin,* by Larry Gara. This may be read with interest and profit by general readers but it will be particularly attractive as a textbook for students of varying reading levels and as a guide in seminars. The running story is interspersed with documentary excerpts and apt illustrations selected from the large Collections of the SHSW. Proper space is given to each of the major developments in Wisconsin annals and to the numerous native sons who have gained fame. To each of the seven chapters marking off the ages of the State's growth is added a pertinent list of books for additional reading. The neatly printed book is in 287 pages including a good index and may be acquired for $4.00.

* * * *

The people of Indiana, affectionately known as Hoosiers, may feel very flattered by the recent attention given their state by the School of Higher Studies in the Sorbonne, whose division of Economic and Social Sciences published last year *La Vie Agricole et Rurale dans L'État D' Indiana a L'Époque Pionnière*, by Geneviève D'Haucourt. Properly speaking this would not come under the heading of history, but in view of the array of historical writings used in its preparation it must be called to the attention of the historical fraternity. The purpose of the whole series of Studies, of which this is number XII, seems to be to acquaint the French with the way of life of overseas people, past and present. There is no introduction to this corpulent work, and the reason for choosing Indiana for its subject appears to derive from a quotation of our well-known humorist, Irvin S. Cobb, who called "Indiana, the most typically American State in the American Democracy." On this point we will eschew controversy.

The authoress gives every evidence of having ransacked archives and libraries for materials pertaining to the early days of Indiana

from the glacial period to 1850, the climax of her work. Her lists of sources, bibliographies, catalogues, official Federal and State publications, newspapers, historical reviews, documentary publications, and books run to twenty-nine pages, and may well be considered a contribution in themselves. Added to these is an appendix of a dozen pages of pioneer biographical sketches translated into French, followed by several tables of comparative measures, some forty maps, charts and graphs, and twenty-four illustrations of Indiana's rural beginnings from log cabins to noted pioneers. With such a vast assortment of materials collected, Mlle or Mme D'Haucourt translated her ideas of the Hoosier State into limpid French.

While historians will find much to their interest in the volume it will prove of greater significance to students of rural sociology and agricultural history. The thirteen chapters hew to the line established in the title and follow a formal, logical order. The first is on nature's gifts to Indiana, its geology, topography, flora, fauna and varied resources. Next, its peopling in waves from Indians to the million inhabitants of 1850. Then, the juridical and political organization through the Northwest Ordinance, territorial status and statehood. The fourth chapter is all about means of transportation to and in Indiana, including the arrival of steamboats and the iron horse. The remaining chapters describe in detail each phase of life on the Indiana farms; land clearance, cultivation, lodging, daily life, food, clothing, the rise of villages, religions, schools and education, resources and production, technical progress, and a long chapter on the economics, costs, prices, and income.

Much in the paper bound 410 pages may seem commonplace to people of the Midwest but their composition must have entailed an enormous amount of labor for the authoress. Practically every statement has a footnote, even to the number of 328 in one chapter. In the majority of pages and notes she lets her authorities speak for themselves, giving translations of published and unpublished letters of pioneers, accounts of travelers and other observers, newspaper and magazine articles. The publisher is École Pratique des Hautes Études, VIe Section, 20, Rue de la Baume, Paris.

* * * *

Many books will pass over the editor's desk before he sees one as handsome as *The VICTORIA and the TRITON*, by Bern Dibner, just recently brought out by the Burndy Library, Norwalk, Connecti-

cut. The sub-title reveals the purpose of the monograph: "Two global expeditions reveal the advance in maritime technology with the passage of four and a third centuries." The Charles McKew Parr bookplate adds the details: "Santa Maria de la Victoria—Ferdinand Magellan Capt. Gen'l, 1519—U. S. S. Triton 586—Edward Latimer Beach, Captain, 1960." Part I emphasizes the scientific knowledge and instruments that made possible Magellan's voyage and the *Victoria's* circumnavigation of the globe. Part II outlines the duplication of the feat entirely underwater by the nuclear submarine, product of modern science. A conspiracy of artist and printer has made a feature of the heavy paper cover and of each of the forty-eight, wide, double-column pages. The illustrations are exceptionally choice, and among the plates of maps is tipped in a beautiful Ortelius in color. The work is dedicated by Captain Beach to Dr. Charles McKew Parr. It is a collector's item, no less.

* * * *

Historians might easily miss a good biography if they are not acquainted with *The Emporia State Research Studies* which appear quarterly in modest, paper cover brochures as the Graduate Publication of the Kansas State Teachers College, Emporia. Among some forty studies several historical papers are of national interest. The December, 1961, number has the biography of the part Indian, staunch Republican, *Charles Curtis of Kansas: Vice President of the United States, 1929-1933,* by Marvin Ewy. The length of the biography is deceptive in that if it were set up in book form and larger type the 58 pages might well become 200. But there is no deception in the interesting content of the work of Mr. Ewy. He does not term his biography definitive, though it is hard to see how it can be more so in the absence of primary sources and in the presence of the controversial materials of politics. Ewy does not attempt to make Curtis bigger than he was nor does he pad the biography into a "life and times" type. He presents a picture of Curtis as a professionl politician in the Congress and Senate for forty years, until by the award of his party he came to share the disasterous days of Hoover's presidency, an office he had ambitioned strongly. Ewy uses apt quotations descriptive of Curtis as seen by friend and foe and allows the reader to make his own judgment about his stature in the national scene.

* * * *

The Daily Life Series in process of publication by The Macmillan Company was augumented this past March by several new volumes: *Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion 1250-1276,* by Jacques Gernet, translated by H. M. Wright, 254 pages, $4.50; *Daily Life in Russia Under the Last Tsar,* translated by Malcolm Barnes, 242 pages, $4.00; *Daily Life in Peru Under the Last Incas,* translated by Winifred Bradford, 256 pages, $4.00. Each of these is in excellent format, is illustrated, is annotated, and has an index and suitable maps and tables. The studies were made by French scholars and published originally by Librairie Hachette, Paris, in 1959, 1959, 1955, respectively. They amply fulfill the purpose of the originators of the Series, namely, to make scholarly findings readable and available to a wide reading public. The translations are in especially literary English and the books will be of particular service as additions to reading lists for college students in various disciplines.

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MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 44, NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 1962

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MID-AMERICA
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Jane Addams: Romantic Radical 1889-1912

Jane Addams, founder of Hull House and crusader for women's rights and international peace, accomplished her most effective work between 1889 and 1912, in Chicago. She is well known in history for her deeds, but her ideas are no less important. They illustrate to a remarkable degree, a significant chapter in American intellectual history.[1] Miss Addams was not a strikingly original thinker. Her mind was more receptive than creative, but was extremely responsive to the currents of thought around it. In her thought one can find half formulated ideas and impulses which provided the soil for the seminal ideas of John Dewey, Charles A. Beard, Albion W. Small, and others. Her social outlook was based on a romantic faith in the natural goodness of man, in the instinctive wisdom of the meek and poor, and on a conviction that men were more healthy in every way as they lived closer to nature. By eliminating corrupting layers of civilization, a natural resurgence of goodness could take place.

Jane Addams' reasons for moving at age twenty-nine to Chicago's slums, where Russian Jewish, Bohemian and Italian communities existed side by side, involved the basic aspect of her conception of the social reality. This was her firm devotion to the ideal of human unity. This ideal, that between man and man no barriers could exist which their common humanity did not overwhelm, was the guiding force behind her life for half a century.

Her conviction of the unity of humanity was based on a view of man as essentially good, and life as essentially beautiful and

[1] Robert H. Bremner, *From the Depths*, New York, 1956, explores with great insight changing attitudes toward poverty and the welfare functions of the community. These changes constituted a major readjustment of American social thought in the direction of Miss Addams' ideas.

joyous. Children had a natural sense of this joy and beauty which adults, except artists, lost. Adults, to fulfill themselves, must regain this sense "which does not consist in wealth, in learning, in enterprise, in energy, in success, not even in that modern fetich, culture, but in an inner equilibrium, in 'the agreement of the soul.' "[2]

This untainted goodness of youth expressed itself in a natural desire to help the unfortunate, and a divine drive toward the constructive and healthy. Instead of exploiting this drive, however, adult society was suspicious of it, regarding it as naive altruism. If given the opportunity, Jane Addams felt sure that children would prefer healthy athletics to smoking, drinking and gambling. Between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three, this divine drive expressed itself as a burning desire to perfect the world. Modern society should cherish these impulses and take every opportunity to employ them.[3]

Miss Addams also saw other levels of human motivation. There were deep unconscious drives in human beings which could explain their actions. One of these was the need for food, "the hunt developing into war with neighboring tribes, and finally broadening into barter and modern commerce; the second urged [men] to secure a mate, widening into the building of homes and cities, into the cultivation of the arts and a care for beauty."[4]

The very early years of life were of crucial importance. Once set wrong as children, the road to joy and beauty was difficult to rediscover in adulthood. In speaking of women who had become prostitutes at least partly because of parental neglect, Miss Addams wrote "one knows that, whatever may be done for them later, because of this early neglect they will always remain impervious to the gentler aspects of life, as if vice had seared their tender minds with a red-hot iron."[5] Throughout life, too, the environment must

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2 Jane Addams, *Newer Ideals of Peace*, New York, 1907, 70; *The Spirit of Youth in the City Streets*, New York, 1909, 3-9. Hereinafter all references are to the writings of Jane Addams, unless otherwise specified.

3 "Public Recreation and Social Morality," *Charities*, XVIII (August, 1907), 494; "Reaction of Modern Life upon Religious Education," *Religious Education*, IV (April, 1909), 24; "Reaction of Moral Instruction on Social Reform," *Survey*, XXII (August, 1909), 17; *The Spirit of Youth*, 18, 139-162.

4 *Ibid.*, 52, 30. Miss Addams' belief in the primacy of unconscious drives, one of which is sexual, is in some ways similar to the ideas of Sigmund Freud. It is not certain whether she knew of the Clark University conference in September, 1909, which introduced Freud to the United States. Her close associate, Albion W. Small, showed no awareness of it in his *American Journal of Sociology*.

5 *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil*, New York, 1912, 123-124.

encourage rather than frustrate men's natural instincts. A working girl who had stolen money for a wild spree was sent to prison "to expiate not only her own sins, but the sins of those who had failed to rescue her from a life of grinding monotony which her spirit could not brook."[6]

The environment which was most responsible for the frustration of human instincts was the city.[7] Men in cities, Miss Addams thought, were like cats in a mouseless office. Just as the cat would play at hunting mice with bits of paper and string, so men in a natureless city needed recreation which would stimulate the process of subduing nature, and thus give them the illusion, if nothing more, of being masters of their fate.[8] Perhaps recalling with nostalgia her early years in rural Illinois, she was sure that a rural life was man's natural calling. Country work was far more normal than life in a factory.[9] The personal ties of a small town were more natural, where even courtship took place under the protective community eye.[10] Any one who had such pastoral simplicity in his early life had a haven of memories to which he could retreat from the horrors of a city. She wrote of a "drunken man, in a maudlin stage, babbling of his good country mother and imagining he was driving the cows home, and I knew that his little son, who laughed loud at him, would be drunk earlier in life, and would have no such pastoral interlude in his ravings."[11] The city divided men from each other, and thus made them too weak to cope with their environment. One purpose of Hull House was to restore a flow of personal contact within an urban environment.[12]

Nor was the city alone in destroying the goodness and joy in modern men. The United States was in a period of "intense and over-wrought industrialism" which had taken all joy out of work and life.[13] The blot of the factory system was such that whole neighborhoods could be denied any experience of youth's joy simply

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6 *The Spirit of Youth*, 118, 107.

7 *Ibid.*, 10.

8 "Public Recreation and Social Morality," *loc. cit.*, 492–493.

9 "Child Labor and Pauperism," *Charities*, XI (October, 1903), 303.

10 "Problems of Municipal Administration," *American Journal of Sociology*, X (January, 1905), 428; "Public Recreation and Social Morality," *loc. cit.*, 494.

11 Jane Addams *et al.*, *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, New York, 1893, 34–35.

12 "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 432; "Public Recreation and Social Morality," *loc. cit.*, 494.

13 "Charity and Social Justice," *North American Review*, CXCII (July, 1910), 78; "Present Crisis in Trades-Union Morals," *Ibid.*, CLXXIX (August, 1904), 192.

because the young people went into factories.[14] The charms of recent immigrants were also swallowed up by the industrial machine.[15] Jane Addams, perhaps with regret, realized that the days of a rural America were gone forever. She asked for an awareness of the human cost of industrialism, and for some more equitable division of that cost.[16]

This industrial system had led to a false sense of values. With the tenacity of the well-off, Jane Addams would not admit that success in life meant material abundance.[17] People must be measured in human terms such as kindness and generosity. Youth especially must not be subject to commercial standards, and used up in hard labor.[18]

Poverty was one result of the modern industrial system. Each person played such a small role in the total economic machine, that the machine could function without him. Therefore many people were helpless and could be driven to poverty through no fault of their own.[19]

Crime too was a result of the unnatural city environment. Most crimes could be forgiven because "the humble people sin through weakness and passion, but seldom through hardness of heart."[20] These sinners should be treated with the mercy of the founder of Christianity.[21] Along with Judge Ben Lindsay and Clarence Darrow, Jane Addams favored a policy of rehabilitation rather than punishment.[22]

The city environment could even distort the basic drive toward securing a mate. This drive could lead to a deep devotion between individuals, and indirectly to an appreciation for beauty. The city, which quickened the sexual impulses of youths, without providing an outlet for their energy, drove them into vice of all varieties.[23]

The most dangerous result of an urban industrial environment

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14 *The Spirit of Youth*, 107.
15 *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 64–65.
16 "Present Crisis in Trades-Union Morals," *loc. cit.*, 193.
17 *Ibid.*, 180; "Subtle Problems of Charity," *Atlantic*, LXXXIII (February, 1899), 166.
18 *Spirit of Youth*, 9; "Subtle Problems of Charity," *loc. cit.*, 163–164.
19 *Ibid.*, 163.
20 "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 432.
21 "Challenge to the Contemporary Church," *Survey*, XXVIII (May, 1912), 198.
22 *Ibid.*, 196.
23 *A New Conscience*, 167, 100; *Spirit of Youth*, 26–27, 30–44. It is perhaps significant for Jane Addams' own feelings that she always assumed that young girls went wrong through the perfidy of evil men. The rewards expected by these men she termed "hideous."

was what Miss Addams called "group morality" or class consciousness. She regarded all such impulses as destructive. Loyalty to class was nearly as bad as loyalty to self or to one's family. As opposed to "group morality" she argued for a "larger conception of citizenship" embodying the good of all groups.[24]

In sum, the fault of modern society was an alienation of man from man. Her solution was to assert, by word and deed, the unity of humanity. A society which denied this unity denied the natural order. Her task, she felt, was to bring society back to that natural order. Human beings were bound together, she felt, primarily by their own psychological needs, for ". . . no one can safely live without companionship and affection. . . . It is as if we had to build little islands of affection in the vast sea of impersonal forces lest we be overwhelmed by them."[25] In some ways this unity was a heavy load to carry, for each person became responsible for the sins of all. "This is the penalty of democracy,—that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together."[26] On the other hand, the feeling of unity with all of humanity could be an enriching experience, as certain elements in the trade union movement were beginning to find out.[27]

This concept of social unity, of a society in which there were no barriers of class, occupation, or social standing between individuals was Jane Addams' ideal. Yet she herself was from that very class which she felt was, through well being, losing its contact with the common run of humanity. During the first years at Hull House, she made a conscious effort to cast out the devil of social distinctions in her own mind, yet she never quite reached her ideal. In writing to one of her closest friends, Mary Rozet Smith, she referred to Miss Smith as a lady, and the recipients of charity as girls, then catching herself she added "excuse the false social dis-

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[24] "Present Crisis in Trades-Union Morals," *loc. cit.*, 180–181; "Trades Unions and Public Duty," *American Journal of Sociology*, V (January, 1899), 461; Jane Addams to Mary Rozet Smith, April 1, 1889, Addams Correspondence, Swarthmore College Peace Collection; *A New Conscience*, 161.

[25] *Ibid.*, 33; "A New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *Forum*, XIV (November, 1892), 350–351; "Subtle Problems of Charity," *loc. cit.*, 163.

[26] *Democracy and Social Ethics*, New York, 1902, 256.

[27] "A Modern Lear—The Strike at Pullman," *Survey*, XXIX (November, 1912), 135. This article almost shows a clear understanding of the shortcomings of George Pullman's paternalism, yet in casting Mr. Pullman as Lear and the workers as Cordelia, Miss Addams herself betrays a condescension. Was George Pullman simply a well-meaning but shortsighted father? Were the workers children, who, whatever their legitimate grievances, failed to appreciate the benefits they received?

tinction, a remnant of former prejudices."[28] In spite of her best efforts, however, remnants of former prejudices were not completely exorcised.

One aspect of these prejudices was a Thoreauan view of the poor as possessed of a peculiar charm and wisdom denied the well-off. Wisdom, Jane Addams thought, often resided in the hearts of the simple, who had "charms and resources" undreamed of by the upper classes. Indeed, living as they did on the very edge of disaster the poor "have constant opportunities for self sacrifice and generosity. . . . This is their reward for living in the midst of poverty."[29] These opportunities taught the poor, earlier than other classes, the necessity for economic cooperation rather than competition. Therefore the beginning of the new "humanitarianism" to take the place of the present "industrialism" was manifested among the poor.[30] Eventually a day was coming when the affairs of men would be regulated by these "simple people, who carry in their hearts the desire for mere goodness, who regularly deplete their scanty livelihood in response to primitive pity, and . . . who have an unquenchable desire [for simple justice]."[31]

Jane Addams' class consciousness, however, was not wholly a matter of respect for the noble poor. She also retained former prejudices of the type which regarded the poor as in some way worse than other members of society. At Hull House she was always addressed as Miss Addams. She never stopped being a "lady" no matter how ashamed she may have been of using such a term, and dinner was generally a rather formal occasion which, while perhaps omitting fingerbowls, omitted no items of etiquette.[32]

Probably unknown even to herself, Jane Addams had a facet of her mind which looked with condescension on her neighbors. Charity, she insisted, should not consist of forcing the poor to emulate the rich, yet her choice of words in making this point betrayed her. She said that it was as wrong to expect a poor man to act like a rich one as it would be to expect a child to act like an adult. Besides, one could hardly expect the "same human development of

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[28] Jane Addams to Mary Rozet Smith, 1893, Addams Correspondence, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

[29] "Charity and Social Justice," *loc. cit.*, 68–81; *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 94.

[30] *Ibid.*, 15.

[31] "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 438.

[32] Edith Abbott, "Hull House of Jane Addams," *Social Service Review*, XXVI (September, 1952), 334–338; "Grace Abbott and Hull House," *Ibid.*, XXIV (September, December, 1950), 374–394, 493–518.

an Italian peasant and a New England scholar."[33] Surely her choice of simile in the first instance evidences an attitude which expects a poor man eventually to grow up to the point where he will behave like a man of means, as a child will become an adult. Moreover her choice of polar opposites in the second instance indicates that New England scholars are clearly superior to Italian peasants.[34]

Nor were differences between rich and poor purely a matter of background and environment. Perhaps differences in education could account for the fact that the "sophisticated" could respond to books and lectures, whereas the poor needed drama and personality to be affected.[35] Sometimes, however, Miss Addams doubted whether the poor could ever be brought out of their poverty, lacking as they did that "social energy which makes for progress."[36] In a discouraged mood, she wrote to Henry Demerest Lloyd that she respected his faith in what working class people could do, and added "living with them does not always give one this view."[37] She even endorsed the view that "the inherent uncleanliness of their minds prevents many men from rising above the rank of day laborers."[38]

Jane Addams' attitude toward foreigners was similar to her attitude toward the poor. On the one hand she praised old world values. Indeed, one function of Hull House was to keep alive the traditions of the old country, and to help convince the second generation to "have a respect for the older cultivation and not quite so much assurance that the new was best."[39] She felt it was wrong to attempt to Americanize immigrants to the point where loyalty to the old country was swept aside. Italians with the tradition of Mazzini, Garabaldi and Cavour could cherish both their older tradition and the American patriotism of Washington and Lincoln.[40] Moreover Americans should recognize that immigrants often had a different value system, but one which might be as sensible as ours. Under this system, a Russian Talmudic scholar should be respected, even if he could not speak English or get a decent job. In some ways, old world customs might even be better than the American

33 "Subtle Problems of Charity," *loc. cit.*, 177.
34 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 229, where she terms Italian peasants "primitive" in what seems clearly a pejorative sense.
35 *Ibid.*, 228.
36 "New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *loc. cit.*, 347.
37 Jane Adams to Henry Demarest Lloyd, October 18, 1898, Lloyd Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
38 *The Spirit of Youth*, 28.
39 *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, 37.
40 *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 75–76.

system. For instance, Miss Addams was not at all sure that the village settlements of Italy were inferior to the American system of farming isolated quarter sections of land.[41] She opposed any restriction on immigration, arguing that American ideals were broad enough to include all who wanted to come, and that the United States should continue to act as the escape hatch for all the world.[42]

On the other hand, Jane Addams sometimes betrayed an attitude of condescension toward recent immigrants. She had no doubt that Americans were inherently superior to the newcomers. The "primitive habits" of newcomers should not be allowed to interfere with American traditions. Immigrants must be willing to learn from their hosts who "represented a distinctly superior standard of life and thought."[43] America was engaged in building a new civilization. Immigrants should be proud to take part in the task, and not cling too closely to their European ideas.[44]

There was a third aspect of Jane Addams' thought which implied a contradiction with human unity. This was her belief in moral evolution. Individuals and societies, she thought, evolved morally just as species evolved physically. If men evolved morally, it was possible that not all men were at the same stage of moral evolution at the same time. Some people were morally superior to others. At one end of the scale were primitive people like south Italian peasants. At the other end was the "intellect" of, perhaps, a New England scholar. Here again was a belief in precisely that kind of social cleavage which Jane Addams so vigorously denied.[45]

In spite of these remnants of former prejudices, Jane Addams directed her whole life toward achieving her ideal of human unity. She firmly believed that progress toward such achievement was possible. Sometimes she saw evidence that the world was not moving in the right direction at all. Writing in 1909, she saw a moral decline, a world sunk in a materialistic morass, without moral standards. She felt that her society was losing its human concern in a quest for "commercial ideals." In spite of periods of doubt and discouragement she continued to work toward her ideal, and deep

41 "Recent Immigration," *Education Review*, XXIX (March, 1905), 254–256.
42 "Chicago Settlements and Social Unrest," *Charities and the Commons*," XX (May 2, 1908), 165–166.
43 "Recent Immigration," *loc. cit.*, 252–260.
44 "Reaction of Moral Instruction on Social Reform," *Survey*, XXII (August, 1909), 19.
45 *Ibid.*, 18; "Reaction of Modern Life on Religious Education." *loc. cit.*, 23.

within her was a firm core of belief in "the modern evolutionary conception of the slowly advancing race."[46] Believing in evolutionary moral progress did not lead her to accept the inevitability of progress by any process akin to natural selection. With Lester F. Ward she believed that men could, and indeed must, direct their own moral evolution. "The world grows better" she said, "because people wish that it should, and take the right steps to make it better."[47]

Thus, while much of Miss Addams' writing was concerned with the faults of her society, and while hers was an effective voice for viewing them with alarm, her aim was always positive. She pointed out faults not for condemnation, but correction, and she had a very clear idea of how this correction was to be achieved. Her approach to the correction of flaws in the social fabric was quite different from most reformers of that day, for she relied on the new science of sociology. In the first text book on sociology, Jane Addams' close associate, Albion W. Small, wrote that "sociology was born of the modern ardor to improve society."[48] At the same time, the ardor for improvement was given a powerful increment by sociology. Miss Addams' approach to social ills was to "readjust the social machinery" in such a way that conflict would be eliminated in favor of a higher type of social unity.[49] She assumed that there was a social machinery, and that it could be manipulated to achieve a desired result. This does not mean that she was willing to forgo human sympathy in favor of a cold scientism, but simply that normal impulses of compassion must be systematized to become more effective.[50]

The first step in this process was the accumulation of data. Data, she thought, ought to be the final appeal on all human problems. From Hull House and other charitable institutions flowed a steady stream of detailed information about Chicago. *Hull House Maps and Papers* was a large compendium of detail on wages, ethnic groups, occupation and the like in the area around Hull

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[46] "A New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *loc cit.*, 347. See also, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 192 *et passim*, and "Trade Unions and Public Duty," *loc. cit.*, 459, for frequent use of the phrase "increasing democracy."

[47] *Address at the Memorial Exercises for Henry Demarest Lloyd*, November 29, 1903, 12. Addams Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

[48] Quoted in Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London, 1956, 17.

[49] "Trades Unions and Public Duty," *loc. cit.*, 462.

[50] "Subtle Problems of Charity," *loc. cit.*, 177–178.

House. Through such efforts, Miss Addams was sure that the reasons for crime and vice could be revealed, then cured.[51]

Proceeding on the basis of carefully compiled data, much could be done by charity. Since charity was to be based on sociology, it could best be administered by professionally trained workers, whose training supplemented but did not submerge normal human emotions.[52] Charity workers had as one of their purposes the task of caring for "the wounded in the unequal battle of modern industry."[53] They were also "to make the entire social organism democratic" which to her meant the elimination of social and economic barriers.[54] Crossing as they did class and social barriers, charity workers had a duty to interpret various groups to each other. If this could be done, then perhaps Americans could be kept from going berserk over an "anarchist" bombing.[55] In other words, charity workers in a pluralistic community had to be the conscience of the nation, keeping each group from the throat of its neighbor, and all from mass hysteria.

But charity was basically a manifestation of human sympathy, and therefore could provide great benefit for the charity worker as well as the recipient. The charity worker could satisfy her natural urges toward helping others and would, like the master in Tolstoy's *Master and Man* who perished that his servant might live, be "filled with an ineffable sense of healing and well being."[56] The danger in this was that the charity worker might concentrate on her own satisfaction, on "being good" in her own eyes and those of her neighbors, more than she concentrated on social amelioration. At times Jane Addams herself may have fallen prey to this danger.[57]

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51 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 2, 3, *et passim*; "Charity and Social Justice," *loc. cit.*, 68, 78; "A Challenge to the Contemporary Church," *loc. cit.*, 198; "Housing Problems in Chicago," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, XX (July, 1902), 99–107; "Public Recreation and Social Morality," *loc. cit.*, 494; "Probation Work Under Civil Service," *Charities*, XV (March, 1906), 881–882.

52 "The Humanitarian Value of Civil Service," *Survey*, XXVIII (April 6, 1912), 14–16.

53 "Charity and Social Justice," *loc. cit.*, 69.

54 "A New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *loc. cit.*, 345, 350.

55 "Chicago Settlements and Social Unrest," *Charities*, XX (May, 1908), 155–156.

56 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 276; "A New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *loc. cit.*, 352; "Subtle Problems of Charity," *loc. cit.*, 166–167. I have used the feminine pronoun because Miss Addams always thought of charity workers in that gender.

57 "Pragmatism in Politics," *Survey*, XXIX (October, 1912), 12.

In this charitable work, Miss Addams gave women a special place. In dealing with the place of women, she frequently mixed her social views with self justification. Having rejected, or been unable to partake of family life, she was reluctant to regard the family as sufficient for emotional fulfillment. Women, she felt, share with men a responsibility beyond their family to "the State and to society in a larger sense."[58] In fact she could not find adequate justification for family life within the family itself. The sacredness and beauty of family life came not from within the family, but from "sharing the corporate life of the community and making the family the unit of that life."[59] Thus women, especially college women who have been exposed to a wider view of life, could not allow themselves to remain only in the home. To do so was to ignore the "social claim" or the "race claim" on each individual.[60]

Charity then, with women playing a leading role, was one way in which progress toward her ideal of human unity might be achieved. Charity, however was only preventive or corrective. Reform, Miss Addams thought, must also directly foster the good life, must "increase the positive value of life."[61] The great evils resulting from industrialism and the city could only be dealt with, she felt, through education. "Until the educators take hold of the situation the rest of the community is powerless."[62] Much of Jane Addams' thinking on the goals and methods of education parallels in a somewhat less sophisticated form, that of John Dewey. Schools, she insisted, should not simply teach the basic tools of literarcy, but should "free the powers of each man and connect him with the rest of life."[63] In a nation being flooded by immigrants from a wide variety of backgrounds, where thousands of rural families were flocking to the cities, in a nation not yet accustomed to industrialism, she argued for a greater emphasis on what have since come to be called social skills.

How were these goals of education to be reached? Miss Addams, from her experience with children at Hull House, thought that the starting point for all education must be with the children's own experience. The school should teach him the place of this experience in his society, and should show him how to direct his experience to fit better with the experience of others. From this start-

58 "The College Woman and the Family Claim," *The Commons*, No. 29 (September, 1898), 3.
59 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 110.
60 "The College Woman and Family Claims," *loc. cit.*, 5.
61 "Charity and Social Juctice," *loc. cit.*, 69–70.
62 *The Spirit of Youth*, 109.
63 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 179.

ing point in the past, education should go on to the future, teaching children about the life they were going to lead. This life, for most children, would not be that of a professor, or even of a clerk, but rather that of a factory worker. Therefore education should concentrate on what would best fit children from working class neighborhoods for a working class life. Partly, this could be accomplished by technical training, but more was needed. The drudgery of factory life came not so much from repeated operations, but from the fact that each man's job seemed to be only remotely connected with the finished product. Education for workmen should teach the contribution of their operation toward the finished product, and the place of these products in the total economy. Partly, Miss Addams' views simply accepted the facts of industrialism as she found them. However the conclusions she reached would have had the effect of educating workers to be workers, and to keep their place. This could have led to extremely rigid class lines, and just that sort of "group morality" against which she protested.

Women too, should be educated in a special way. Women, no more than workers, were going to be scholars. Therefore their education should not concentrate on intellectual accumulation, but rather on the cultivation of those "larger desires of which all generous young hearts are full." In a word, women should be trained as settlement house workers.[64]

Charity then, could perform important meliorative functions and education could promote long range reforms. The most important institution for fostering the good life, however, was neither charity nor education, but government. Jane Addams admired, beside her father and Abraham Lincoln, a romanticized image of Mazzini. Like him she saw the State as possessing some sort of transcendent existence. The State was a mystical entity above and beyond the institutions and individuals which composed it. The State grew out of, or was, that mass of general principles upon which its citizens agreed. It was thus that entity which bound all its members to itself and to each other. Yet growing out of the ideas of its citizens, the State was also society manifest. It embodied the collective will and the collective conscience.[65]

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64 *Ibid.*, 89.

65 "The Significance of Organized Labor," an address delivered before the Women's Clubs Convention, Denver, Colorado, 1898 (?), Addams Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection; "Trade Unions and Public Duty," *loc. cit.*, 459.

"Society" for Miss Addams meant humanity inchoate. "State" implied a trancendent unity. "Government" was an organizing institution through which society expressed itself.

If the State was society manifest, then it was imperative that the various organs of government respond to the collective will. Jane Addams felt that a great danger for the twentieth century would be to lose faith in the ability of the people to run their own affairs.[66] As a matter of fact she was sometimes convinced that the founding fathers themselves lacked this faith. Expressing an idea later made more explicit by Charles A. Beard, she believed that the Constitution had been drawn up on the basis of English law to protect property rights. This was done in a nation for which these English laws were irrelevant, and in thus drawing the fundamental law, the fathers had failed to provide adequate methods for the expression of the popular, rather than the proprietary will.[67] Along a somewhat contradictory line of reasoning, she argued that the American political system had been devised on purely political grounds, with economic affairs being ignored. Since then, however, the common life had ceased to be political and become economic. As society manifest, the State must respond to these changed conditions and "not remain motionless, enchained to a degree of civilization attained [by a previous age.]"[68] Therefore government had to deal with economic conditions brought about by the new industrialism.[69] She was even willing to live with political corruption, although she deplored it, if the corrupt politician dealt with the daily economic problems of the people.[70] Through government, then, the conscience of society could be brought to bear on social and economic problems. Without government, philanthropy was ineffectual; with government, anything could be accomplished.[71]

Jane Addams saw an even greater role for government than that of society's conscience, or a supreme agent for reform. She argued for a welfare state more inclusive than anything that was to appear for over half a century. Government should not simply concern itself with the wicked by punishing them, and the destitute by help-

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66 "One Menace to the Century's Progress," an address delivered before the Sunset Club, Chicago, February 14, 1901, Addams Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

67 "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 427; *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 34–35.

68 "Significance of Organized Labor," address *ut cit.*, n. 65 *supra*.

69 "Recent Immigration," *loc. cit.*, 246, 263; *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 222–223; *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 87–89.

70 "Ethical Survival in Municipal Corruption: A Chicago Example," *Review of Reviews, XVII* (May, 1898), 605–606; "Why the Ward Boss Rules," *Outlook*, LVIII (April, 1898), 879–882.

71 "Ten Years Experience in Illinois," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, XXXVIII (July, 1911), 144–148; "Charity and Social Justice," *loc. cit.*, 70; "Trade Unions and Public Duty," *loc. cit.*, 450.

ing them. These extreme cases were happily in a minority. Government should also take an interest in the great mass of the population in its normal, everyday occupations. "We care with tenderness for the defective and the dependent," she said, "but for that great mass of people just beyond the line, from whom they are constantly recruited, we do practically nothing."[72] Here she was setting forth a new definition of the needy as not only those on the verge of death, but all those who could not adequately fulfill their own destinies.[73] If most of the people were to fall short of full success in the struggle of life, then government surely had an obligation to deal with these near-failures.[74] That the government in the United States was far from accepting these responsibilities was shown by the extent to which private groups had to exercise welfare functions which were in fact societal responsibilities.[75]

Societal responsibilities began with food and housing. Miss Addams felt that it would not only be humane, but actually economical for government to set minimum standards of nourishment and housing and to support people at this level, rather than to allow them to sink into abject poverty. Beyond this minimum, each municipality had responsibilities for the emotional and moral well-being of its members. Conditions of labor, and disputes between labor and management should also be the concern of the government. In short there were few aspects of life toward which Jane Addams did not feel government had a prime responsibility.[76] In return, each individual had responsibilities to the State, that is, to society. These duties forbade any individual, every family, and every group from concentrating on its own well-being. The ultimate responsibility of every individual was to the community as a whole.

It is clear therefore, that Jane Addams was above all a moralist, but a moralist on her own terms. Her fundamental appeal was not to practicality, to tradition or to godliness, but to a humanistic ethic. On occasion she referred to her ethics as Christian, but she was careful to emphasize that she meant no present Christian church,

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72 *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 84, 86; "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 432.

73 Bremner, *From the Depths*, 123–140.

74 "Democracy and Social Ethics," *loc. cit.*, 266–267; *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 62; "Trade Unions and Public Duty," *loc. cit.*, 448.

75 *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 42; "Problems of Municipal Administration," *loc. cit.*, 437.

76 "Charity and Social Justice," *loc. cit.*, 72–73; *Spirit of Youth*, 7; *A New Conscience*, 124, 126; "Pragmatism in Politics," *loc. cit.*, 12. In spite of the large function she favored for government, she insisted that she was not a socialist.

but "the original primitive communal (and completely tolerant, self-sacrificing and self-effacing), kind" of Christianity.[77] Ethics, for her, concerned not man's relation to God, but to his fellows. Religion must connect itself to the daily lives of its communicants, and for her any faith which turned its fervor to social ends was fulfilling its purpose.[78] In fact, the cosmos beyond man held very little interest for her. She defined ethics purely in human terms. She felt that ethics were undergoing a revolution, and that she must help bring this change to pass.[79] Thus ethics was for her, not an unchanging body of precept to be approached more or less closely by succeeding generations, but rather ethics consisted of the necessities demanded by the circumstances in which each generation found itself. Here again we arrive at the tap-root of Jane Addams' social philosophy, the concept of human unity. In the twentieth century she felt that individual righteousness was not enough. Being moral in this new era meant having what she called a "social ethic," a sense of responsibility toward society. Morality consisted in having this sense and acting upon it, immorality meant a concentration on either self-aggrandizement, or individual salvation.[80]

In sum then, Jane Adams believed that somewhere deep within every human soul, obscured by urban industrialism, was a kind and benevolent nature, thirsting for fundamental communication with the rest of humanity.[81] The good life could be reached by nourishing this thirst for communality, by clearing away all barriers between men and stamping out the individualistic ethic which had raised these barriers. There were three methods by which this goal of social unity might be furthered. The first was charity, which could alleviate immediate suffering and provide a nucleus of people whose allegiance was to society as a whole rather than to any part. The second was education, which could show workers reasons for satisfaction in even the most humble task and teach women how to exploit their natural humanitarian impulses. The third, and by far

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77 "A New Impulse to an Old Gospel," *loc. cit.*, 353.

78 "Reaction of Modern Life upon Religious Education," *loc. cit.*, 23, 24, 26; "Reaction of Moral Instruction on Social Reform," *loc. cit.*, 18.

79 "A Modern Lear—the Strike at Pullman," *loc. cit.*, 135.

80 *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 2–3, 7, 75, *et passim.*

81 See particularly David Riesman with Ruel Denney and Nathan Glazer, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, 1950. David Riesman, "Their Tribe and Ours," a review of Dorothy Lee's *Freedom and Culture*, New York, 1960, *The New Republic*, CXLII (February, 1960), 15–16, is a short summing up of his views. William H. Whyte in *The Organization of Man*, New York, 1956, specifically attacks something which he calls the "social ethic."

the most important, was government. As the conscience of society, as society manifest, government had a prime obligation to each individual not only to provide certain political rights, but also the basic economic and social necessities for satisfactory living. In return, each individual must contribute toward the advancing welfare of the whole social organism.

Thus, although Jane Addams was neither socialist, anarchist nor communist, she was a radical. In fact she was more radical than any of these three groups. Not only did she demand an all pervasive welfare state, she also demanded a drastic change in human actions and morals. Not sharing the Marxists conviction that a change in institutions would bring a changed morality, she wanted both changes to come at once. As the state adopted more welfare functions, the individualistic ethic should be discarded and the social ethic adopted in its place.

After the passage of half a century, many of the reforms which Jane Addams advocated have been at least partially adopted. Not only have health regulations, child labor laws, social security, unemployment and accident insurance gone a considerable distance toward eliminating the worst abuses of industrialism, but in fact a type of "social ethic" has become fairly widespread. Recently many social critics, led by men such as David Riesman and William H. Whyte have been pointing out the dangers of that ethic, especially too much conformity, and a lack of individualism. Yet this is hardly a criticism of Miss Addams' proposals. She was always willing to acknowledge that new reforms would be needed and that the millenium would be an ever receding goal. The reforms of the progressive era and of the New Deal have demonstrated that her social outlook was an effective basis for solving many of the problems of an industrial society. A more telling criticism of her thought is that it was naïve. Her unquenchable optimism and her confidence that human beings could control their own destructiveness and cruelty sound now like echoes of another age. And yet Americans have not yet abandoned this faith.[82] Perhaps it is just as well that they have not.

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[82] Clarke A. Chambers, "Belief in Progress in Twentieth-Century America," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIX (April, 1958), 197–224.

Slavery in New Orleans in the Decade Before the Civil War

With the vast preponderance of slaves in the ante-bellum South residing on plantations, the existence and condition of slavery in urban centers has often been overlooked. There are relatively few studies of urban slavery and most of these are either superficial or treat urban slavery only in passing.[1] Yet the variety of experiences available to the urban slave was infinitely wider than that afforded by the routine patterns of his plantation brother. The study of urban slavery assumes a greater significance when it is remembered that the pre-war urban slave and the urban free Negro served during and after the Civil War as Negro leaders as well as formulators of Negro institutional patterns and socio-political goals.

There were two groups of slaves in New Orleans; slaves who were brought into the city and sold in slave auctions and slaves who were owned by New Orleans residents.

As a slave trading center New Orleans was the greatest in the South.[2] The bull market in slaves, which lasted all through the 1850's for the Southwest, made this one of the major "products from the interior" sold in the city.[3] Slaves were sold by auctioneers or by slave dealers. The former received a commission on the sale, while the latter generally purchased slaves in the upper South, transported them by sea, steamboat, or in overland coffles to the city.[4] If the slaves were from Louisiana and spoke French they would be designated "Creole Negro"; if from the upper South they would be advertised as "Virginia Negro" or "American Negro."[5] There were also a smaller number of slaves brought di-

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[1] See, John Smith Kendall, "New Orleans 'Peculiar Institution,'" *Louisiana Historical Quarterly,* XXIII (July, 1940, 864–888; Werner A. Wegener, "Negro Slavery in New Orleans," (unpublished M.A. thesis, New Orleans, Tulane University, 1935); U. B. Phillips, "Slave Labor in the Charleston District," *Political Science Quarterly,* XXII (September, 1907), 416–439; Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution, Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South,* New York, 1956, 60–67; U. B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South,* 2nd ed., Boston, 1937, 216–217.

[2] Frederic Bancroft, *Slave Trading in the Old South,* Baltimore, 1931, 315.

[3] *Daily Picayune,* February 8, 1860. All newspapers cited in this article were published in New Orleans.

[4] Charles H. Wesley, "Manifests of Slave Shipments along the Waterways, 1808–1864," *Journal of Negro History,* XXVII (April, 1942), 172–173. New Orleans was also a shipping port for slaves to Texas. Ship Manifests, (MS) Xavier University Library, New Orleans.

[5] See, for example, an advertisement in *Daily Picayune,* November 10, 1860.

rectly from Africa, smuggled into the Delta area and sold in New Orleans.[6]

Slaves were kept in "jails" or "yards," that is, compounds open to view for prospective buyers and containing quarters for the slaves. There were at least twenty-five of these slave depots within a half mile of the St. Charles Hotel, mostly on Gravier, Baronne, Magazine, and Esplanade Streets. Sales were made at the depots or by bi-lingual auctioneers in the rotundas of the St. Charles and St. Louis Hotels.[7] There was no disapprobation connected with being a slave auctioneer; indeed, some, as Joseph A. Beard, Julian Neville, C. F. Hatcher, Thomas Foster, and N. Vignie were community leaders.[8]

In the interest of the slave dealers, their charges were well fed and well dressed. When up for sale they were attired in their "Sunday best." Men wore good quality blue cloth suits, with vests, ties, white shirts, well shined shoes, and high beaver hats. Women were adorned in multi-colored calico dresses with bright silk bandanas.[9]

To the average traveler the slave jails and auctions were terrifying reminders of the existence of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century.[10] What is less well known was local criticism of the slave depots. One newspaper reported:

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[6] Kendall, "New Orleans 'Peculiar Institution,'" *loc. cit.*, 879; S. J. Peters to Capt. T. C. Randolph, March 2, 1850, Thomas C. Porter to James Guthrie, February 25, 1857, Franklin H. Clark to F. H. Hatch, May 5, 1857, F. H. Hatch to Howell Cobb, March 12, 1859, P. E. Weldon to Lt. B. J. Kellsam, July 14, 1860, in "Excerpts from Letter Books of the United States Custom House, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1834–1912," Women's and Professional Projects Division, Works Progress Administration, Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, Archives of the Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, typewritten copy; *Weekly Mirror*, May 14, 1859; Harvey Wish, "Revival of the African Slave Trade in the United States, 1856–1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVII (March, 1941), 585–586.

[7] Bancroft, *Slave Trading in the Old South*, 318–320; "New Orleans," *Chamber's Edinburgh Review*, N. S. XVIII (November 6, 1852), 314–315; Ebenezer Davies, *American Scenes and Christian Slavery, A Recent Tour of Four Thousand Miles in the United States*, London, 1849, 57–58; Henry Ashworth, *A Tour in the United States, Cuba, and Canada; a Course of Lectures Delivered before the Members of the Bolton Mechanics Institute*, London, n. d., 81–82; Moritz Wagner and Carl Scherzer, *Reisen in Nordamerika in den Jähren 1852 und 1853*, Leipzig, 1854, 354.

[8] Bancroft, *Slave Trading in the Old South*, 324–325.

[9] "Slaves for Sale," *Illustrated London News*, XXXVII (April 6, 1861), 307; "Slave Market of New Orleans," *Chamber's Edinburgh Review*, N. S. XVI (July 19, 1851), 47–48.

[10] See especially, Francis and Theresa Pulszky, *White, Red, Black, Sketches of American Society in the United States During the Visit of Their Guests*, 2 vols., New York, 1853, II, 96–97.

Scarcely anyone desires to pass such places; while to the ladies it is like running the gauntlet, to be exposed to the prying, peering gaze of lengthened lines of grinning negroes of both sexes ranked in Indian file; and who have nothing to occupy their attention stare 'out of countenance' with their very large and saucer eyes.... They hardly await the passing of persons before their extended lines, ere they commence making thir comments, and these eke out lengthened and amusing conversation for each other.[11]

Aware of these nuisances the city council passed an ordinance in December, 1856, to control the slave marts. No future slave depot was allowed in the city without common council approval. If the majority of people in a four block area of a slave depot protested its presence the mayor could force the removal of the depot. The depots had to meet standards of health, cleanliness, and privacy. Negroes were not to be displayed on the streets or sidewalks in front of the slave pens.[12]

New Orleans was not merely a place for slave depots with transient slaves and masters utilizing the city's auction and transportation services. New Orleans was also an extensive slave owning area in itself; in fact, Orleans Parish was the third highest slave holding parish in the state. In 1850 there were 18,068 slaves in New Orleans but by the next federal census the total had dropped to 13,385. As in the free Negro population, women outnumbered men—8,003 to 5,382. In contrast however to the free Negroes, among slaves the numbers of blacks was significantly higher than the number of mulattoes.[13]

There were very few large slaveholders in New Orleans.

In 1860 there were in New Orleans 1,435 individuals who owned one slave each; 821 who owned two slaves each; 609 who owned three shaves each; 369 who owned four slaves each; 203 who owned six slaves each; and 128 who owned seven slaves each. After that the numbers in one column diminished sharply while they increased in the other. Thus there were but forty persons in the city who owned fifteen slaves each; three who owned forty each, and but two who counted one hundred slaves among

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11 *Daily Orleanian*, January 20, 1852. See also, "New Orleans by an American," *Chamber's Edinburgh Review*, N. S. XVIII (November 27, 1852), 342–344.

12 Ordinance 3148, December 17, 1856, in Common Council Ordinances and Resolutions, 1856–1866. This volume, and one for the period 1852–1856, both found in the City Hall Archives, New Orleans, are scrapbooks of clippings from newspapers of city ordinances and resolutions.

13 United States Census Office, Seventh Census, 1850, *Statistical View of the United States... Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census...*, by J. D. B. De Bow, Washington, 1854, 248; United States Census Office, Eighth Census, 1860, vol. [1]. *Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of Interior*, by Joseph C. G. Kennedy, Washington, 1864), 195.

their possessions. There was nobody who owned as much as two hundred slaves. The total of 14,484 slaves in New Orleans was distributed among 4,169 owners.[14]

As can be observed from above, holdings were small, with one-third of the slave holders possessing only one slave, and one-half owning two or fewer.

The majority of slave holders in New Orleans were whites. The exact figure of slaves owned by free people of color is unknown, but by 1860 it was probably somewhat lower than 1830 when 749 free Negroes owned slaves.[15] Free Negroes customarily purchased relatives or close friends; because the conditions of manumission were often difficult to meet, and after 1857 impossible, the purchase of a slave would at least overcome the spirit of slavery if not the exact letter.[16] There were however free Negroes who purchased slaves as investments or as servants and their relations toward these slaves probably did not differ vitally from those of whites toward their slaves.[17]

While the number of slaves declined in the city, the total assessed value increased from $3,852,700 in 1852 to $6,394,058 in 1859.[18] In this latter year slaves were valued at $585.90 each—far below the market price. An indication of the value of the slaves may be observed by comparing it to other taxable values in the city (1859).

Slaves	$ 6,394,085
Real Estate	76,742,324
Income	4,420,000
Furniture	1,694,850
Horses, cows, carriages	1,155,930
Stocks in ships and corporations	788,825
Capital and money at interest	18,592,782
TOTAL	$109,788,796

14 Kendall, "New Orleans 'Peculiar Institutions,'" *loc. cit.*, 871. The census returns listed as locally-owned, slaves held in depots, so it is reasonable to assume that some of the large holdings listed above were not actually possessed by permanent residents of New Orleans.

15 Carter Woodson, *Free Negro Owners of Slaves in 1830, Together with Absentee Ownership of Slaves in the United States in 1830*, Washington, 1924, v.

16 *Ibid.*; Donald Edward Everett, "Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803–1865," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New Orleans, Tulane University, 1952, 209-210.

17 One free colored woman caused the death of her slave by overwork. *Daily Crescent*, April 22, 1858; *Daily Picayune*, May 8, 1858.

18 New Orleans Comptroller, *Report*, 1859, New Orleans, 1859, 9, 11. After 1856 the city and state placed an assessed values on slaves aged 1-5 at $200, 5-10 at $300, 10-15 at $450, females 15-45 at $650, males 15-45 at $850, over 45 at $300. *Louisiana Acts*, 1856, 180 (No. 173).

In other words slaves provided one eighteenth of the major property value in the city, and at the regular market prices the figure would be somewhat higher.[19]

Probably the major employment for slaves in the city was as house servants in the form of cooks, washwomen, maids, valets, butlers, carriage drivers, hair-dressers, gardeners, and general handymen. Slaves were also used by small business men as porters, laborers, and general unskilled workers. German and Irish immigrants occasionally invested in slaves to operate drays or hacks.[20]

There were several industries in New Orleans which were large employers of slaves, among which were the Leeds and the Amstrong foundries, the gas works, the Canal Banking Company, and several cotton presses.[21] The gasworks had a Negro compound with all facilities for the slaves' room and board. Even the overseer was a Negro slave.[22] It should be noted however that an extensive use of slave labor in New Orleans industry never developed.

More commonly large slave holders rented slaves to private individuals as servants or to various companies as laborers.[23] The cotton presses took large numbers every winter season as did the steamboat lines for stevedores. One example of the slave rentier was Isaac Pipkin. He brought his slaves from Virginia to New Orleans where he hired them out chiefly as levee workers, employing his nephew as overseer. After the elder Pipkin's death the nephew continued to employ the slaves in this manner. He had twenty males, ten females, and nine children. By hiring an assistant overseer, collecting slave wages daily, and by efficient management, T. J. Pipkin made a profit of $16,538 in two years.[24]

Like the free Negro in this decade, the slave saw his position become subject to more stringent legal bounds.[25] The state gov-

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19 Comptroller, *Report*, 1859, 11.

20 United States Eighth Census, 1860, manuscript returns of Schedule 2, Slave Inhabitants, for Orleans Parish (original in the National Archives, microfilm copy in the Library of the University of Texas).

21 These examples were found in the slave census of the First District. United States Eighth Census, 1860, manuscript returns of Schedule 2, Slave Inhabitants, for Orleans Parish. The federal government also employed as many as seventeen slaves on construction of the United States custom house. *Daily Creole*, July 26, 1856; *Daily Picayune*, June 4, 1858; *Daily Crescent*, October 18, 1858.

22 Pulszky, *White, Red, Black*, II, 98.

23 Charges ranged from twenty to twenty-five dollars a month. *Weekly Delta*, June 19, 1853.

24 *Succession of Isaac Pipkin—T. J. Pipkin, Executor on an Opposition, M. E. More et al* (1852), 7 La., 617–620. According to census figures Pipkin had thirty slaves in 1860. United States Eighth Census, 1860, manuscript returns of Schedule 2, Slave Inhabitants, for Orleans Parish.

25 It should not be imagined however that the courts were indifferent to the plight of the slaves. On one occasion the state Supreme Court

ernment declared that slaves accused of a capital crime in Orleans Parish were to be tried by a jury of six slaveholders.[26] The penalties for slave offenses were made stricter in 1855 and then even more elaborate in 1857.[27]

Various restrictions on the slaves' mobility were enacted during the decade. By state law slaves were not allowed out after 9 P.M., before dawn, or on Sunday. Even loitering in front of a tavern or a warehouse was a punishable crime.[28] City ordinances were more restrictive even than state laws. Along with free Negroes, slaves were not allowed either to congregate in numbers or shoot fireworks. Slaves had to have the approval of the mayor for Sunday dances. They could not carry sticks or guns, could not ride in public vehicles without their master's approval, and could not play cards with whites or free people of color. They might not purchase any article over $5.00 without written permission from their master. And in addition to the above, the city fathers proclaimed: "All slaves are forbidden to quarrel, yell, curse or sing obscene songs, or in anywise disturb the public peace, or to gamble in the streets, roads or other public places, or on the levee."[29]

The slave who wished to escape his servitude had several recourses. The first and most obvious was by manumission. Since a slave in New Orleans could often earn money, the wherewithal

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requested district attorneys to be "humane" and represent slaves in cases of appeal. *The State v. Henderson, a Slave* (1858), 13 La., 489–494. In the case *Eulalie and Her Children v. Long & Mabry* (1854), 9 La., 9–11, the court protected a Negro woman and her family from illegal seizure, but insisted upon the principle that the "State has absolute control by its legislation over that class of persons. . . ." In *Maille v. Blas* (1860), 15 La., 100–102, the Supreme Court took the position that "Slaves not being devoid of reason, but having a will to control their actions, are not looked upon as inert matter which may sometimes be driven about by the elements, but as intelligent beings, who are responsible to the law for their unlawful acts." Less interested in abstract justice was the city official who once left a slave woman in jail for two years because the owner did not pay her fine. The common council then decided to sell the slave if the owner did not turn up in a few months. Resolution 1118, July 28, 1853, in Common Council Ordinances and Resolutions, 1852–1856. Under a city ordinance of 1855 slaves and free Negroes who were arrested could be kept in prison and employed on public works almost indefinitely. Ordinance 2493, December 10, 1855, in *ibid.*, 1852–1856.

[26] *Louisiana Acts*, 1855, 37–38 (No. 43).

[27] *Ibid.*, 1855, 377–391 (No. 308); *ibid.*, 1857, 229–234 (No. 232).

[28] *Ibid.*, 1857, 183–184 (No. 187).

[29] Resolution 500, December 18, 1852, in Common Council Ordinances and Resolutions, 1852–1856; Ordinances 3203, January 7, 1857, in *ibid.*, 1856–1866; Henry J. Leovy, comp., *The Laws and General Ordinances of the City of New Orleans Together with the Acts of the Legislature, Decisions of the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Provisions, Relating to the City Government, Revised and Digested, Pursuant to an Order of the Common Council*, New Orleans, 1857, 257–262.

for buying his freedom was not always lacking. There were also slaves who were freed in their masters' wills or by a personal act of some white or free Negro benefactor or relative.[30] Of sixty-four slaves brought before a New Orleans emancipation court between January 7, 1850, and August 28, 1851, sixteen were emancipated under the terms of estates (two of which had free Negro executors), thirty-three by requests brought by whites, and fifteen by free Negroes. In this same period manumission was denied in twenty cases.[31] Manumission was obtained also through a direct legislative enactment and through the instrumentality of a local branch of the American Colonization Society.[32] During the antebellum years two hundred and ninety slaves were sent to Liberia from Louisiana under the auspices of this Society.[33] Of these, one hundred and twenty-one had belonged to John McDonogh.[34]

As community prejudice against free Negroes increased it became more difficult for slaves to be emancipated. By an act of 1852 manumission was to be allowed only if the slave were to leave the country.[35] This act was repealed in 1855 and emancipation was allowed by a suit for freedom in the state courts. The appellate had to be of good character and have an unblemished past. If the court permitted the individual to remain in the state after manumission, he had to post a $1,000 bond that he would not become a public charge.[36] Finally, in 1857, in the shortest law on the statute books for the decade, the state closed the legal door of emancipation:

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30 Wills or legal statements allowing a slave emancipation at a future date created a group of *statu liberi* Negroes who remained under slavery but were governed by the code of the free Negro. Thomas Gibbs Morgan, ed., *Civil Code of Louisiana with the Statutory References to the Decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana to the Sixth Volume of Annual Reports,* New Orleans, 1861, 6.

31 New Orleans Emancipation Court, Docket of Cases, 1846–1851, (MS) New Orleans Public Library Archives. A study of manumission cases in the Third District between 1846 and 1851 revealed that 260 slaves were freed by 178 masters. Of the masters, 60 were free Negroes. Everett, "Free Persons of Color in New Orleans," 144.

32 Sterling C. Scott, "Aspects of the Liberian Colonization Movement in Louisiana," unpublished M. A. thesis, New Orleans, Tulane University, 1952, 65. After John McDonogh's death in 1850 the militancy of the local branch appears to have dissipated.

33 *Forty-Third Annual Report of the American Colonization Society With the Proceedings of the Board of Directors and of the Society, January 17, 1860,* Washington, 1860, 72.

34 Scott, "Aspects of the Liberian Colonization in Louisiana," 65.

35 *Weekly Delta,* July 25, 1852; Everett, "Free Persons of Color in New Orleans," 46–47.

36 *Louisiana Acts,* 1855, 371–390 (No. 308).

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rspresentatives [sic] *of the State of Louisiana in General Assembly Convened,* That from and after the passage of this act no slave shall be emancipated in this state.[37]

In almost equally terse manner the state Supreme Court upheld this law.[38]

A few New Orleans slaves attempted to escape their bondage by simply running away. The average runaway of course was uninterested in a thousand mile trip to free territory. He probably intended merely to escape from some immediate task; or he preferred to live by his wits in the anonymity of the city. There were frequent notices in the police records of Negro runaways or of individuals harboring them.[39] But for a few Negroes at least freedom via the underground railroad beckoned. Cases of Notherners or free Negroes being arrested for enticing, secreting, or transporting slaves were common enough to indicate that New Orleans was a way-station for slaves seeking freedom. The *Picayune*, noting a case of two free Negro sailors who attempted to hide two slaves on board a ship, advised local police and slave holders "to keep a bright look out for these colored cooks, stewards and crews of foreign vessels, who are but too often the instruments which abolition fanatics use to carry out their nefarious designs."[40]

A slave revolt was apparently suggested once in this decade. On June 14, 1853, a free Negro warned the police about an insurrection planned by local slaves. The police ignored the warning until

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[37] *Ibid.*, 1857, 55 (No. 69).

[38] *Delphine f.w.c. v. Mrs. Guillet, et al* (1857), 13 La., 248; *Pelagie Brown f.m.c. v. Ursin Roby* (1859), 14 La., 41.

[39] According to lists of arrests published in the *Crescent*, there were between 40 and 80 runaways picked up monthly. The police often jailed Negroes who were not actual fugatives and claimed a $10 reward from the owner. Slaves wandering over into Jefferson Parish often faced arrest by reward-eager policemen. *Weekly Picayune*, June 2, 1856; entries for July 19, September 5, 1856, in Mayor's Office, Complaint Book, 1856–1859, (MS) New Orleans Public Library Archives.

[40] *Weekly Picayune*, June 25, 1855. In July, 1858, two white men were arrested for trying to entice a gas company slave to flee to Canada. *Daily Crescent*, July 31, 1858. A month earlier a free Negro couple and a white man were caught attempting to smuggle a slave woman on board a steamer bound for Canada, *Ibid.*, June 24, 1858. A few slaves attempted to escape alone. During the epidemic of 1853 several slaves, claiming to be servants, took up-river berths for the North, *Commercial Bulletin*, August 3, 1853. In another case, a slave, so light he could pass for a white, boarded a steamboat for the North and got as far as Memphis before he was apprehended, *Samuel T. Williamson v. Alexander Norton, Master* (1852), 7 La., 393–395. One slave sought freedom through the courts by bringing suit against her master on the grounds that she had resided in free territory (France). The court rejected her plea. *Liza c.w. v. Dr. Puissant et al* (1852), 7 La., 80–83.

they arrested a heavily armed slave. He declared that 2,500 city and country slaves, led by a white teacher from a free Negro school, were involved in a plot to attack New Orleans in three places. Rural slaves were to kill their masters and march on the city.[41] Always ready for such an emergency, a militia unit was called out and armed patrols were sent to arrest all slaves found on the streets. Twenty dazed Negroes were brought in and locked up.[42] The "revolt" turned out to be a "humbug," the product of the cerebral wanderings of an overly imaginative slave.[43] But the extent to which the fantastic cloak and dagger plot was believed indicated the fear prevalent in the city.

In practice the New Orleans slave was not always as restricted as the nature of slavery was thought to be. Negroes were often free to seek their own hire and even their own room and board; in return the master asked only a certain remuneration.[44] Slaves were often street or market peddlers or flower girls with little or no regulation over their conduct. Occasionally slaves served as prostitutes with the tacit knowledge or even the overt direction of the master.[45]

Laws to regulate the slaves were often unenforced. There were constant complaints of slaves congregating with free Negroes and whites. One newspaper deplored the fact that the corner of Perdido and Baronne was "continuously blocked up with a great number of impertinent negroes, mingled with the lowest class of white people male and female. . . ."[46] Slaves gambled, drank, and went hunting often with impunity—directly contrary to municipal and state laws.[47] Even the mysterious purlieus of the white woman's bedroom was not unknown to the male slave as some elements at least of Southern womanhood were willing to share their favors with Africa's sons.[48]

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41 *Daily Crescent,* June 16, 1853; *Weekly Delta,* June 19, 1853.

42 *Daily Crescent,* June 17, 1853; *Weekly Delta,* June 19, 1853; *Propagateur Catholique,* June 18, 25, 1853.

43 *Daily Crescent,* June 17, 1853.

44 *Weekly Delta,* June 19, 1853, January 7, 1856; *E. Boulin v. W. J. Maynard* (1860, 15 La., 658–659.

45 *Daily Orleanian,* May 19, 1852; *Weekly Picayune,* July 9, 1855.

46 *Louisiana State Republican,* March 31, 1855. See also, *Weekly Picayune,* December 24, 1855; *Daily Crescent,* March 22, 1858.

47 *Daily Orleanian,* January 15, 1852. In one evening the Second District police arrested 150 Negroes for illegal assemblage, drinking in cabarets, gambling and blocking sidewalks, *Weekly Picayune,* December 8, 1856.

48 *Weekly Picayune,* June 18, July 23, August 27, 1855; *Daily Orleanian,* January 15, February 12, June 6, 1852.

The slave was excluded of course from most of the community's social institutions. One of the few exceptions was the church. Most of the Protestant churches made some allowance for slaves either in special areas of the main church or in mission churches.[49] Slaves attended the African Methodist Episcopal churches in New Orleans from the church's formation in 1848 to its closing by city ordinance in 1858.[50] Ministers were free Negroes, but slaves were probably given some responsible church functions; one slave, Stephan Walter Rogers, who taught Sunday School, was the author of a book of religious meditations and Bible hymns.[51] The Roman Catholic Church did not sanction racial segregation within its churches or cemeteries, though separate religious fraternities were established.[52]

There was no school system for slaves, but literate slaves were not unknown as clandestine schools, and private tutors offered the rudiments of learning to a handful of slaves. However during the 'Fifties the number of educated slaves declined due to rigid enforcement of laws against such teaching and the difficulty of obtaining instructors who were willing to accept this pedagogical task.[53]

Though there is no source for the personal view of any slaves in New Orleans concerning their position, it can probably be concluded from their actions that they were, on the whole, contented; certainly the urban slave had more freedom and adventure than the plantation Negro. However it might well be that the comparative tolerance the slave found in New Orleans only whetted his

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[49] Herman Cope Duncan, *The Diocese of Louisiana: Some of Its History, 1838–1888. Also Some of the History of Its Parishes and Missions, 1805–1888*, New Orleans, 1888, 59, 187; Charles F. Deems, *Annals of Southern Methodism for 1856*, Nashville, 1857, 221; *Semi-Weekly Creole*, October 27, 1855; Louis Voss, *Presbyterianism in New Orleans and Adjacent Points*, New Orleans, 1931, 85; W. E. Paxton, *A History of the Baptists of Louisiana from the Earliest Times to the Present*, St. Louis, 1888, 126. For a general view, see Robert C. Reinders, "The Churches and the Negro in New Orleans, 1850–1860," *Phylon: The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture*, XXII (Fall, 1961), 241–248.

[50] *The African Methodist Episcopal Church v. The City of New Orleans* (1860), 15 La., 441–447; Everett, "Free Persons of Color in New Orleans," 256.

[51] Nathan Wiley, "'Education of the Colored Population of Louisiana," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, XXXIII (July, 1866), 250.

[52] Frederick Law Olmstead, *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, New York, 1856, 582; T. L. Nichols, *Forty Years of American Life*, 2nd ed., London, 1874, 130; Davies, *American Scenes and Christian Slavery*, 76–77; George Rose, *The Great Country; or, Impressions of America*, London, 1868, 191; John T. Gillard, *The Catholic Church and the American Negro*, Baltimore, 1929, 30–31; *Propagateur Catholique*, December 20, 1851.

[53] Wiley, "Education of the Colored Population of Louisiana," *loc. cit.*, 249.

desire for freedom. But in 1857 all possibility of freedom was legally ended by the state legislature. This could have produced an added resentment in the slave community toward the white society, which might account for the fact that the local slaves were more than unusually pleased to see the "Bluecoats" in 1862.[54]

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54 James Parton, *General Butler in New Orleans, Being a History of the Administration of the Department of the Gulf in the Year 1862 with an Account of the Capture of New Orleans and a Sketch of the Previous Career of the General, Civil and Military,* New York, 1864, 73, 130–131.

Republican Reformers and Foreign Policy, 1913-1917

Some observers of American politics during the Progressive Era have suggested that the supporters of domestic reform measures generally agreed on foreign policy issues. Professor William E. Leuchtenburg is convinced that the progressive reformers were united in their attitudes toward foreign policy, for he writes, "the Progressives, contrary to the orthodox accounts, did not oppose imperialism but, with few exceptions, ardently supported the imperialist surge or, at the very least, proved agreeably acquiescent."[1] Professor Eric Goldman also seems to believe that most progressives agreed on foreign policy issues; for in discussing "isolationism" in *Rendezvous with Destiny* he concludes,

> The usual progressive . . . was under isolationist influences from which the conservative was comparatively free. From the Samuel Tildens, down through . . . the reformers of the early 1900's, American discontent had been deeply concerned with preventing the United States from going the way of Europe, and consequently any involvement with Europe raised fears in reform circles.[2]

Samuel Lubell expresses similar views by asserting in *The Future of American Politics,*

> World War One broke upon America after a long period of agitation against monopolies of all kinds and the "money trust" in particular. The isolationism of that day merged with the forces of economic protest.[3]

Walter I. Trattner, however, challenges those who have said the progressives agreed on foreign policy in "Progressivism and World War I: A Re-appraisal," printed in the July, 1962, number of MID–AMERICA. He argues that although many progressives did support American intervention into World War I, many others—including George Norris, William Kent, Amos Pinchot, Albert Cummins, Frederick Howe, and Albert Beveridge—either held strong misgivings about intervention or opposed it altogether. Thus

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[1] William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1916," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIX (December, 1952), 483. See also Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1956), 272–273.

[2] Eric E. Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, New York, 1952, 234.

[3] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, New York, 1951, 136.

Trattner concludes, "There was no one progressive viewpoint. The progressives were split and often disagreed among themselves; so it was with the War."*

Trattner's view that "there was no one progressive viewpoint" on foreign policy accurately describes the voting of progressive Republicans on some of the major foreign policy questions which were considered by the United States Senate between 1913 and 1917. The following paragraphs will attempt to show this by 1) identifying the Republican Senators who supported progressive reforms and by 2) determining how these Republican supporters of reform voted on six major foreign policy questions before the Senate during the years 1913–1917.

The supporters of reform whose votes are to be examined in this paper are limited to Republican Senators[4] who held office between 1911 and 1917. To identify them, the author examined 134 roll call votes on domestic issues during these years, each of which seemed to the author to present to the Senate a clear-cut opportunity to support or oppose a reform measure. The examination of these 134 votes revealed that the following Republicans each cast over 50% of his votes in support of a reform measure:[5]

1. Borah, Idaho
2. Brady, Idaho
3. Bristow, Kan.
4. Clapp, Minn.
5. Crawford, S. Dak.
6. Cummins, Iowa
7. Curtis, Kan.
8. Fall, N. M.
9. Gronna, N. Dak.
10. Jones, Wash.
11. Kenyon, Iowa
12. LaFollette, Wis.
13. Nelson, Minn.
14. Norris, Neb.
15. Perkins, Cal.
16. Poindexter, Wash.
17. Sherman, Ill.
18. Sterling, S. Dak.
19. Townsend, Mich.
20. Works, Cal.

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* Editor's note. Mr. Trattner's article runs from page 131 to 145, and this specific quotation is on page 140. He and Mr. Allen were unaware of each other's research. While Mr. Trattner's paper was in press Mr. Allen's arrived. Galley proofs of the former were sent to Mr. Allen, who added the present three introductory paragraphs without further revision of his paper.

4 One of these Senators, Miles Poindexter of the State of Washington, was from 1912 to 1915 the only member of the Progressive Party in the Senate; but since he spent most of his political career in the Republican party and because he tended to vote on domestic issues with the Republican supporters of reform, he is included in this group. See Howard W. Allen, "Miles Poindexter: A Political Biography," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1959.

5 Howard W. Allen, "Geography and Politics: Voting on Reform Issues in the United States Senate, 1911–1916," *The Journal of Southern History*, XXVII (May, 1961), 216–228.

This group of twenty Republican Senators, all but three from States west of the Mississippi River, will be used as the author's list of Republican supporters of reform in the United States Senate from 1911 to 1917. The central question then becomes: did these progressive Republicans vote together "with few exceptions" on issues of foreign policy?

Of the six major foreign policy issues selected for examination, three were included in Professor Leuchtenburg's study cited above: 1) the Congressional resolution of 1914 which authorized President Wilson to use military force in Mexico; 2) the bill to repeal the American exemption from payment of Panama Canal tolls; and 3) the "Preparedness" legislation of 1916.[6] Three additional issues related to intervention in World War I have been selected by the author: 1) the Gore resolution of 1916; 2) the LaFollette filibuster of 1917; and 3) the Declaration of War against Germany in 1917. All six of these foreign policy issues were voted upon at least once by the Senate in recorded roll call votes.

The first of the foreign policy issues discussed by Professor Leuchtenburg, the decision to grant President Wilson's request for authority to intervene in the Mexican Revolution with the armed forces of the United States, was considered by the Congress after an incident at Tampico, Mexico in April, 1914.[7] The Senate resolution which granted President Wilson the authority he requested passed by a vote of 72 to 13.[8] On that occasion those Republican supporters of reform who voted were divided as follows, 14 for the resolution and 4 against:[9] (According to Professor Leuchtenburg, a vote for the resolution was a vote for "Imperialism.")[10]

FOR INTERVENTION	AGAINST INTERVENTION
1. Borah	1. Bristow
2. Brady	2. LaFollette
3. Clapp	3. Norris
4. Crawford	4. Works
5. Cummins	
6. Fall	
7. Jones	
8. Kenyon	

6 Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," *loc. cit.*, 493–496.
7 Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, New York, 1954, 122–123.
8 U. S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1914, LI, 7014. Hereafter to be cited in the following manner: *Cong. R.*, 51: 7014.
9 *Ibid.*
10 Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," *loc. cit.*, 493.

FOR INTERVENTION	AGAINST INTERVENTION
9. Nelson	
10. Perkins	
11. Poindexter	
12. Sherman	
13. Sterling	
14. Townsend	

The great majority of the progressive Republicans, therefore, voted together for intervention in Mexico; but it should be noted that 4 out of 18 opposed the resolution and that of the 13 votes cast in the Senate against this resolution, 4 (almost 25%) were cast by Republican supporters of reform.

The second foreign policy issue discussed by Professor Leuchtenburg concerned the exemption of the American coastwise trade from payment of the Panama Canal tolls. Contending that it violated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, the British Government objected to this special exemption for Americans; and by 1913, although the Democratic platform of 1912 had pledged the party to oppose the repeal of the exemption, President Wilson was persuaded to accept the British contention. With Wilson's support, the bill to repeal the American exemption passed the Senate on June 11, 1914, by a vote of 50 to 35.[11] The voting on this issue (a vote against repeal of the exemption was considered a vote for "Imperialism" by Professor Leuchtenburg)[12] showed that the 18 Republican progressives who voted were divided, 7 for repeal and 11 against:[13]

FOR REPEAL	AGAINST REPEAL
1. Crawford	1. Borah
2. Gronna	2. Brady
3. Kenyon	3. Bristow
4. Nelson	4. Clapp
5. Norris	5. Cummins
6. Sherman	6. Jones
7. Sterling	7. LaFollette
	8. Perkins
	9. Poindexter
	10. Townsend
	11. Works

On this vote, if the author's definition of "Republican supporter of reform" is accepted, one must conclude that the Republican reformers were sharply divided.

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[11] Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 90–93; *Cong. R.*, 51: 10247–10248.

[12] Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," *loc. cit.*, 493.

[13] *Cong. R.*, 51: 10247–10248.

The third foreign policy issue cited by Professor Leuchtenburg as "Imperialistic," the "Preparedness" Program, became a matter of national concern after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. Supporters of "Preparedness" sought to improve and to strengthen the national defenses, and in 1915 President Wilson threw his influence behind the Program. In the summer of 1916 Congress passed legislation which more than doubled the size of the army, increased the National Guard, established national training camps, authorized the Federal Government to construct a nitrate plant, and provided for increased naval construction.[14] The voting in the Senate on the various "Preparedness" issues indicated that the Republican supporters of reform divided into two camps, 7 for and 8 against "Preparedness:"[15]

FOR PREPAREDNESS	AGAINST PREPAREDNESS
1. Borah (14–3)[16]	1. Clapp (4–13)
2. Brady (8–2)	2. Cummins (7–12)
3. Jones (12–6)	3. Curtis (4–14)
4. Nelson (16–2)	4. Gronna (2–16)
5. Pointexter (18–1)	5. Kenyon (7–12)
6. Sherman (14–2)	6. LaFollette (1–18)
7. Sterling (14–2)	7. Norris (3–16)
	8. Works (1–14)

On this issue the Republican supporters of reform were clearly not united.

A less striking division of the progressive Republican reformers can be seen in the voting on the Gore resolution. This resolution was an effort to forestall American intervention in the war then raging in Europe by proposing to warn Americans against

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14 Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 174–190.

15 Support and opposition to "Preparedness" has been determined by an examination of the roll call votes taken in the Senate during the summer of 1916 on three major pieces of legislation: 1) a Bill to Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States (H.R. 12766); 2) an Army Appropriations Bill (H.R. 16460); and a Naval Appropriations Bill (H.R. 15947). Nineteen roll call votes seemed to the author to present to the Senate an opportunity to support or oppose a build-up of the armed forces of the United States. Only Senators who voted at least 10 times are listed except Senator Townsend of Michigan who voted 5 times for "Preparedness" and 5 times against the Program. The votes included are found in *Cong. R.*, 53: 6198, 6345, 6359(a), 6359(b), 6371, 6372, 6374, 6368, 11483, 11564, 11192, 11367, 11372–73, 11373(a), 11373(b), 11375, 11378, 11379, 11384.

16 The first number in parenthesis indicates the number of votes cast for "Preparedness," the second number denotes the total votes cast against "Preparedness."

travel on armed merchant ships flying the colors of the warring powers, and decisive opposition from the White House insured its defeat. In the Senate when his resolution was brought to a vote, Senator Gore, apparently aware that his forces were overwhelmingly outnumbered, altered the wording of his resolution so that when voted upon it declared that the death of an American citizen caused by the sinking of an armed merchant ship would be considered a "just and sufficient cause of war."[17] The resolution was tabled, 68 to 14. Most of the progressive Republican reformers voted together, 10 against tabling Gore's resolution and 4 for tabling.[18] The alignment was as follows:

FOR THE GORE RESOLUTION	AGAINST THE GORE RESOLUTION
1. Borah	1. Curtis
2. Clapp	2. Nelson
3. Cummins	3. Poindexter
4. Fall	4. Sterling
5. Gronna	
6. Jones	
7. LaFollette	
8. Norris	
9. Sherman	
10. Works	

On an issue which raised the question of intervention of the United States in the European war, then, the majority of the Republican supporters of reform voted together.

The LaFollette filibuster of early 1917, like the Gore resolution, was aimed at preventing the United States from intervening in the European conflict. It was organized by Senator LaFollette after President Wilson requested authority from Congress to arm American merchant ships so that they might defend themselves from attack by German submarines. Senator LaFollette and a small group of his followers, convinced that such a bill would lead to war, used the filibuster to prevent its passage. During the debate 4 roll call votes were taken; on these votes LaFollette was consistently joined by 7 of the progressive Republican reformers

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17 Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, 213–214; C. C. Tansill, *America Goes to War*, Boston, 1938, 465–478; and *Cong. R.*, 53: 3464.

18 *Cong. R.*, 53: 3465.

and consistently opposed on the same votes by 5 of the same group.[19]

FOR THE LAFOLLETTE FILIBUSTER	AGAINST THE LAFOLLETTE FILIBUSTER
1. Clapp	1. Borah
2. Cummins	2. Curtis
3. Gronna	3. Nelson
4. LaFollette	4. Poindexter
5. Norris	5. Sterling
6. Sherman	
7. Works	

Thus, of the Republican supporters of reform who voted during the LaFollette filibuster of 1917, a majority (7 out of 12) voted with LaFollette; but a minority (5 out of 12) did not.

The last of the six foreign policy issues to be considered here, the resolution to declare war on Germany, passed the Senate on April 4, 1917, by a vote of 82 to 6.[20] The voting revealed that the great majority of Republican supporters of reform who voted were in agreement; but on this vote the majority clearly voted *for* intervention, not against it. Three progressive Republican reformers, however, joined with 3 Democrats to vote against the declaration of war;[21] they thereby furnished one-half of the opposition to American intervention in World War I which was officially recorded in the Senate. The position of each of the group who cast a vote was as follows:

FOR THE DECLARATION OF WAR	AGAINST THE DECLARATION OF WAR
1. Borah	1. Gronna
2. Brady	2. LaFollette
3. Cummins	3. Norris
4. Curtis	
5. Fall	
6. Jones	
7. Kenyon	
8. Nelson	
9. Poindexter	
10. Sherman	
11. Sterling	
12. Townsend	

19 *Cong. R.*, 54: 4720, 4744(a), 4744(b), and 5013.
20 *Cong. R.*, 55: 261.
21 *Ibid.*

The voting of the progressive Republican reformers in the United States Senate on six foreign policy issues of the years 1913 to 1917 may be summarized as follows:

	FOR	AGAINST
The resolution to intervene in Mexico	14	4
Repeal of the Panama Canal tolls exemption	11	7
The "Preparedness" Program	7	8
The Gore resolution[22]	10	4
The LaFollette filibuster of 1917	7	5
The Declaration of War Against Germany, 1917	12	3

A substantial majority of this group voted together to support intervention in Mexico, to oppose tabling the Gore resolution and to declare war on Germany. However, on none of these three issues were the Republican progressives in complete agreement. Furthermore, on the remaining issues, the repeal of the American exemption from paying Panama Canal tolls, the LaFollette filibuster of 1917, and the "Preparedness" Program, the group was decisively divided. On none of these issues (two labeled "Imperialistic" by Professor Leuchtenburg) does the voting support the conclusion that the Senate progressive reformers "with few exceptions" were in agreement.

Further study of congressional voting in the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as in other traditional sources, appear necessary to establish definitively the relationship between American attitudes on foreign policy and domestic reform; but it does appear that the Senate Republican reformers between 1913 and 1917 were by no means in complete accord on questions of foreign policy.

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[22] A vote against tabling the Gore resolution is interpreted here as a vote for the resolution.

A Just War in the Philippines

The Years following Legazpi's transfer of the Spanish colony in the Philippines from Cebu to newly founded Manila in 1572 were, to say the least, tumultuous. The difficulties revolved about three main points, *encomiendas,* tributes, and aggressive war. From the beginning of the conquest in 1565, Miguel López de Legazpi had generously granted *encomiendas* to his fellow conquerers, but many of the grants were of Indians living in territory as yet unpacified.[1] The tribute was being collected from the natives by the *encomenderos,* who were not fulfilling the duties imposed upon them by the grant, namely civilizing and Christianizing their Indians.[2]

A bitter dispute over the succession and perpetuity of *encomiendas,* which in Mexico had aroused irritation bordering on rebellion,[3] was likewise a source of irritation in the Philippines. Governor Francisco de Sande wrote in 1576 that

> when an encomendero dies in New Spain, his Indians are allotted to the Royal Crown of Your Majesty, as being in a simple and peaceful country, where there is no need of soldiers. In these islands I think that this would be impossible; and I would not dare to do it until I receive an answer from Your Majesty ordering me to do so. For, as so many men die here, all the encomiendas would belong to Your Majesty in four years, and the soldiers would have the incentive to attempt the deaths of others.[4]

Five years later, however, Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa reversed the policy. He thought a permanent *encomienda* would cause the soldiers to dispair of ever receiving that cherished reward for services rendered the Crown. "Those who are now here would not serve, and no others would come to this land. The city needs estates. But the vacant *repartimientos* are very necessary to reward persons who have served."[5]

Closely related to the *encomiendas* was the question of tribute. A moderate tax from the fruits of the earth was to be paid by

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[1] For the first grants see Colín-Pastells, *Labor Evangélica,* 3 vols., Barcelona, 1900–1902, I, 155.

[2] "Sande's Account to Philip II," June 7, 1576, in *The Philippine Islands,* Blair and Robertson, eds., 55 vols., Cleveland, 1903–1909, IV, 71–73.

[3] Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain,* Berkeley, 1950, 145.

[4] "Sande's Account," *loc. cit.,* 83.

[5] "Ronquillo de Peñalosa to Philip II," July 17, 1581, *ibid.,* IV, 306–307.

the Indians, in recognition of Spain's universal lordship and jurisdiction over the Indies. This tribute was to be rendered to *encomenderos,* but to enable them to discharge the obligation they contracted of providing for the spiritual needs of the *encomendados.*[6] It was not to be mere legalized pilferage. The embittered Augustinian, Fray Martín de Rada, whose reports to Philip II evince a degree of indignation comparable to that of Las Casas, wrote in 1570:

> . . . for they no sooner arrive in a tribal village than they serve notice that if it wants peace and friendship with the Spaniards it should pay tribute, and this without telling the people anything either of God or of Your Majesty, so that the tribute which they bring is just as much plundered as if they had openly stolen it, and so is the gold that they now send Your Majesty, which cost more than seventy Indian friends and some Spaniards killed by them in defense of their haciendas.[7]

Writing in the same tenor a few years later, Fray Diego de Herrera, one of the five Augustinians who accompanied Legazpi to Manila, complained to the king that if the natives

> say that they want to be friends, soon talk begins about how much tribute they will have to pay and what they will be taxed, and [the conquerors] ask them for tribute for the first year without teaching them anything about God or King, and nothing that would be to their advancement.[8]

Herrera indignantly reported that the pacification of the islands was in great part accomplished by individual captains accompanied by a group of soldiers who simply rode into villages and informed the people that if they wanted peace with the Castillians they had to pay tribute:

> . . . thus it is done on the coast of Bulinao and others and Ilocos on the isle of Luçon and almost a hundred leagues of coast where within one year they go twice to collect the tribute of more than 1000 marks of gold, and the same order obtains on the rest of the coasts of these islands.[9]

Unjust methods of subjugating villages was another matter demanding correction. War was made on the slimmest pretext. An enemy town was commonly defined as one which had not been

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[6] See the resolution concerning the payment of tribute in Colín-Pastells, *Labor Evangelica,* I, 607.

[7] Cited in Manuel Marino, O.S.A., "Semblanzas Misioneras: Fr. Martín de Rada, Agustino," *Misionalia Hispanica,* Año I, Tomo I (1944), 195.

[8] "Relacíon del orden que la gente española que por mandado de su magestad salió de la nueva españa para las islas Philipinas a tenido y tiene en pacificar la tierra y sustentarse della," n.d., Jesuit Province of Tarragona Archives, Coleccíon Pastells, IX, 233.

[9] *Ibid.,* 234.

visited by Spanish soldiers[10] The consequences of this attitude of hostility were disasterous. Again, Herrera lamented:

> Also in the council of war they give as a just reason for destroying a village, plundering it, and making the Indians slaves, the death of a Spaniard in the village, without an enquiry into or knowledge of the reasons or circumstances of his death. It is very common among them to commit such offences since they do not have anyone to right their wrongs, unless it be God or their own hands. They [soldiers] were so free that each administered justice by his own hand and they have no king or lord whom they can ask that chastisement be given, and without finding out who are culpable, and at times only one is guilty, they punish the whole people for it and make war and are destroying the people in the islands of Luçon in Candaya because they killed a cabin boy, and in Bohol because they killed a Spaniard for too many molestations over the tribute.[11]

The Filipinos, however, were not entirely passive. A delegation of Tagalog Datus, or chiefs, travelled to Manila in order to voice their complaints to Bishop Salazar. Spanish acts of oppression and native grievances were presented with pitiful clarity, and summed up in the simple conclusion that "their afflictions were so many that they cannot be endured."[12]

It was in this anarchical period in Philippine history that Bishop Domingo de Salazar convened the First Synod of Manila, 1581–1586. The main business of the meeting concerned the treatment given to Filipinos by Spaniards. How did these actions measure up to the standards of Christian justice and charity? It was Salazar's and the Church's concern, not only because they were bound to protect the rights of the Philipinos, but also because the stated objective of Spanish colonization was being seriously impeded by Spanish injustice. In addition, it was very important that priests should know clearly what was sinful and what was not sinful in the treatment of the natives, since the Catholic population was bound to submit their acts to the judgment of the Church in the sacrament of Penance.[13]

The process of the Synod and its results have been admirably treated elsewhere. Suffice it to say that certain norms were fixed, and although future years showed not much adherence to these

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[10] See de Rada's letter to the Viceroy of New Spain, Colín-Pastells, *Labor Evangelica*, II, 665.

[11] "Relación," 234.

[12] Cited in H. de la Costa, "The First Synod of Manila, 1581–1586," *Bulletin of the Philippine Historical Association*, 6 (December, 1958), 68.

[13] *Ibid.*, 61; the Synod is also given considerable attention in the same author's *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1961, 15–36.

counsels, they nevertheless did represent a step forward in the Church's struggle for justice in the Philippines.

How did the Synod's recommendations effect further conquest in the Philippine Archipelago, of which only a comparatively small part was effectively under Spanish rule? It reminded the governor that although he could safely presume that the territory already under Spanish rule was legitimately acquired, it could not be presumed that he had the authority to extend that territory by new conquests. War outside the confines of the present Spanish frontier had to be a just war, legitimately approved by the king. Governor Sande's expedition against the Sultan of Brunei, it was noted, was an example of unjust aggression. It was not only uncalled for but undertaken without informing the home government.[14]

Once the justice of the war was established, the Synod continued, a number of rules in the conduct of the war had to be observed. An expedition must be of sufficient force to accomplish its objective, or it should not be sent at all. Too small an expedition was capable of nothing but a hit-and-run raid; such an expedition was brigandage, not warfare. Again, if the objective was conquest, the expedition should bring with it enough provisions to maintain itself until the conquered could be justly taxed. It should not be assumed that a people could be justly taxed the moment organized resistance ceased. For tribute could be levied by a sovereign only on his subjects, and the conquered did not become subjects until they accepted the authority of the new sovereign, at least tacitly, by living in peace under his rule. This might take some time; during that time the army of occupation ought to live on its own resources or purchase what is needed.[15]

Laws were produced for the Spanish Indies, to transfer the simile of a modern statesman, like frankfurters from a machine. Consequently, their huge quantity tended to lessen their effect considerably. Can the same be said of the just war recommendations? Only a few years after the Synod formulated its regulations, and they codify nothing more than the widely held contemporary notions concerning a just war, the opportunity was given the government in the Philippines for putting them to the test. Zambales, a mountainous, rugged province, northwest of Manila, was the scene of a fairly serious uprising. The natives there had disregarded

14 De la Costa, "The First Synod," 66.
15 *Ibid.*, 67.

the pledges of peace they had given, had raided neighboring villages of peaceful Filipinos and had successfully halted traffic on the main road leading to Ilocos and Cagayan in the north. Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas wished to call out his troops and march into Zambales, and put an end to the disturbances with a punitive expedition. But would he be justified in doing so? Did the uprising merit a war? And to what degree did the facts of the case square with the canons so well formulated by Francisco de Victoria, fifty years before, and more recently, and uncomfortably close at hand, by Salazar and the Synod? Dasmariñas, a clever politician, who was later to show his hand in his bitter dispute with Salazar over tributes, early in 1592 referred the whole matter to the four resident religious Orders in Manila, the Augustinians, Franciscans, Jesuits and Dominicans. To each he sent an objective account of the charges against the Zambales and the circumstances of the case. The religious were to discuss separately the matter and submit to him their conclusions. All of the opinions concluded that war was justified, and Dasmariñas acted accordingly. In the expedition over 2,500 natives were killed or taken captive, and 400 were given to the galleys where the Governor reported that "they are learning to row."[16] Philip II's subsequent note to his governor approves his actions but finds fault with the enslaving of some of the Zambales. This, Philip admonished, was the direct opposite of what was previously commanded.[17]

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[16] Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas to Philip II, May 31, 1592, Archivo General de Indias, Filipinas, 18. Slavery and the galleys, however, were not quite enough to keep down the Zambales. Just a few years after the Dasmariñas expedition, the Manila Audiencia, Cabildo, and Religious Orders were again discussing whether war could be made on the Zambales. The answer was: "A lo 2° de los Zambales por ser notorio los robos y muertes que han hecho y continuamente hazen, por ser gente indomita de quién no se espera humanamente enmienda, si no es por camino de castigo, y por tenerle tan merecido, perecio que es justificado hazerle, y en esto no se pone duda." *Casos Morales resueltos por los PP. Juan de Ribera y Diego de Bobadilla de la Compañía de Jesús pertenecientes á la Provincia de Filipinas, desde 1602 á 1636.* MS., ff. 145v–146.

[17] Although in 1574 a decree forbade holding slaves in the Philippines, it did not apply to the taking of Mohammedans, especially numerous in Mindanao. Philip II in 1570, and Philip III in 1620, decreed: Al distrito de las Islas Filipinas, y sus confines son adyacentes las de Mindanao, cuyos naturales se han rebeldo, tomado la secta de Mahoma, y confederándose con los enemigos de esta corona, y hecho muy grandes daños a nuestros vasallos, y para facilitar su castigo ha parecido eficaz remedio declarar por esclavos á los que fueren cautivos en la guerra: Mandamos que así se haga, procediendo con tal distinción, que si los Mindanaos fueren puramente Gentiles, no sean dados por esclavos, y si fueren de nación, y naturaleza Moros, y vinieren á otras Islas á dogmatizar, ó enseñar su secta Mahometana, ó hacer guerra á los Españoles, ó Indios, que están sujetos á Nos, ó á nuestro Real servicio, en este caso puedan ser hechos esclavos; más á

The opinions, or *pareceres,* however, are what will be examined in the following pages. For what resulted from Dasmariñas' request for the judgments of the religious Orders was a thoroughly philosophic and theological application of the current theories of the just war to a concrete situation. With typical scholastic nicety, the case was dissected and the principles applied. It became evident, in the present case at least, that the doctrines enunciated by Vitoria and his school can be seen in operation in Asia, just as they had been in America. True, a law, and the fulfillment of the law are two entirely different matters, but as the Synod of Manila had replied to its objectors,

> It would be a definite gain to set forth clearly what right reason and sound theology demand in matters of justice, even though it was forseen that many would fall short of it. Then, at least, they would have some ideal to live up to, a fixed norm by which to guide themselves and others. The application of the norm might sometimes go awry, but it would never do to have the norm itself crooked to begin with.[18]

The Opinions

The first point that must be ascertained, according to the opinion of the Jesuit Superior, Antonio Sedeño,[19] and this under the supposition that the report of the robberies and murders were actually true, is exactly how these crimes of the Zambales were committed, whether the whole or just a part of the province is guilty. It must be clear whether a few or many of the towns joined together and acted in common, or was it the whole province; whether there is one leader or did some chiefs from the settlements undertake the business. It would be an entirely different case if neither the towns joined together nor the chiefs took part, but independent bands

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los que fueren Indios, y hubieren recibido la secta no los harán esclavos, y seran persuadidos por lícitos y buenos medios, que se conviertan á nuestra Fe Católica. *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias,* (1791), Libro VI, Título II, Ley XII, (Consejo de Hispanidad, 1943), II, 204.

[18] De la Costa, "The First Synod,", 62. Although it was a fairly frequent practice for colonial officials to request the opinions of Religious regarding the justice of a proposed war, such care was by no means always taken. In the Philippines the leader of an expedition would sometimes merely call together a few of his friends who acted as his advisors. If one opposed, he was replaced by one more "susceptible to reason." See Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America,* Philadelphia, 1949, 144.

[19] Parecer del P. Antonio Sedeño, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús en Filipinas, AGI, Filipinas, 18. The texts of the *pareceres* are also partially given in Colín-Pastells, *Labor Evangelica,* I, 587–591.

of brigands were the cause, acting without the consent of their leaders.[20]

This distinction of Sedeño is important for it could nullify any just basis for a punitive expedition. It is an echo of Vitoria for whom a simple injury received did not in itself justify a war; war could be justified only when all legitimate, pacific means for the restoration of justice had been exhausted.[21] If individual Zambales, therefore, have become marauders their chiefs must assume the task of punishing the disturbers. Only upon their failure to act, or succeed, can a war be justified. But if these individual bands of brigands have the approval of their chiefs, there is sufficient cause of war.

The Jesuit then hypothecates the case of guilty natives acting without the connivance of their leaders, but supplied by friends and relatives who likewise take no actual part in the crimes. In this instance the Spanish government can only try to bring the guilty into custody for punishment proportionate to their crimes. For the aid would be coming from women and children, and men who did not fully realize the seriousness of their acts. To bring future peace and security to the whole area, the women and children could be distributed little by little among the surrounding settlements. This remedy is proposed as a penalty for the criminals instead of mutilation, the contemporary form of punishment for robbers. The only result from the latter, said Sedeño, would be the flight of the women and children, for mutilation was "a great cruelty and only engenders in all an abhorrence of our nation." And finally, he concludes,

> if war has to be made it should be done with that moderation which our Catholic King has Christianly commanded, with as little bloodshed and harm as possible; and the prisoners should not be put to death ex-

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20 ". . . . se ha de averiguar como han hecho estos males, si es toda la tierra junta ó parte de su provincia de suerte que de mancomun se conciertan los de uno ó de muchos pueblos ó de toda la provincia, y vayan los mas animosas y esforzados y roben y matar etc., ó si tienen cabeca y principal de uno ó de muchos pueblos ó de toda la provincia y por orden de este ó de estos principales salgan algunos a hazer estos males, ó verdaderamente ni de mancomun, ni por via de los principales sino de alguno ó algunos pueblos como en quadrilla de salteadores hazen los diches insultos." Parecer del P. Antonio Sedeño, AGI Filipinas, 18.

21 Teofilo Urdanoz, O.P., ed., *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, Relección Segunda, 60, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1960, 857; Francisco de Vitoria, *De Indiis et de Jure Belli Relectiones*, edited by Ernest Nys with translation, in *Classics of International Law*, James B. Scott, ed., Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1917, 173–174.

cept those whose particular crimes merit such punishment, and the rest should not be given into perpetual slavery, but only for a limited time.[22]

It is interesting to notice the coincidence between the *Relecciones* of Vitoria and a number of ideas in the *parecer* of Sedeño. As regards the right to enslave enemies captured in a just war, Vitoria is quite explicit. In his *Relección Segunda,* the question is proposed in the doubt, "Supposing that it is not allowed to kill women or children, is it licit at least to reduce them to slavery and servitude."[23] Vitoria argues that when the war is just and such that all the enemy can be despoiled of their goods, it is then licit to subjugate all, innocent and guilty. War against pagans is of such a nature, and certainly the women and children of Saracens can be so enslaved. In war between Christians, however, prisoners cannot be reduced to slavery, since the *jus gentium* had to be observed. Slaying enemies after the war had ended, to which Sedeño refers in his opinion, was considered licit in some cases by Vitoria.[24] Since it is permissible against our own citizens, it is certainly so against foreigners; for a Prince when at war has by right of war the same authority over the enemy as if he were their lawful judge and Prince.[25] Vitoria qualifies this, however, by adding that it is not always lawful to kill all the guilty merely in order to avenge a wrong. Account must be taken of the nature of the wrong done, the damage caused, as well as their other deeds, and from this proceed to punishment, but avoiding all form of cruelty or inhumanity.[26]

The opinion submitted by the Franciscan, Fray Pedro Baptista, is clear and concise. It is worth quoting in its entirety.

I read the documents which Your Majesty sent and though at first sight it seemed permissible to undertake the business, yet, because it was a serious matter I wished to confer with the doctors who treat of these things and to find out if something which I once heard said were true, namely, that the Zambales have been seriously molested several times by Spaniards. This is very important, for, if we have given the occasion by first irritating them a good deal by our evil deeds or demanding tribute which they do not owe, our cause can hardly be justified. But I am not certain about this. After having read the account Your Majesty sent me, I find that they were notified [requerido] and offered peace with pardon for the faults they had committed, Religious [men] having been sent with

22 Parecer del P. Sedeño, AGI, Filipinas, 18.
23 Vitoria, *Obras,* 42.
24 *Ibid.,* no. 46.
25 *Ibid.*
26 *Ibid.,* no. 47.

the captains for this purpose. And the Zambales gave their word just as they did to past governors, but afterwards they completely disregarded their pledge. They then acted even more shamefully than before, robbing and killing many people. Because of this I say that all the evildoers should be punished and that there is an obligation to remedy the situation and to safeguard the roads for the Tagalogs, Ilocanos and all the rest who pay tribute, since it is for this very reason that they do pay tribute and have put themselves under the care of Your Majesty. If this punishment cannot be administered without war I say that it is allowed for the above reasons, presupposing the authority of the king, which is the primary condition, and preserving a right intention, joined with Christian moderation which the saints, particularly St. Augustine, advise. In this way the common good is procured; and may the innocent ones be freed, since the foundation for a just war is an injury received, and they did not inflict the injury. This is my opinion, written according to the *relación* mentioned above, *salvo mejor parescer.* Done in the Convent of St. Francis, Manila. January 20, 1592.

FRAY PEDRO BAPTISTA[27]

It is extremely difficult to say what part, if any, Spanish tax collectors played in the Zambales disturbances. The Franciscan's reply mentions the possibility of Spanish provocation. When it is recalled, however, that in the seventeenth century a whole series of revolts throughout the Islands was sparked by unjust demands on native labor for the Cavite shipyards, it is not inconceivable that the cause for the uprising can be likewise traced to imprudent measures adopted on the northern frontier, far from the capitol and the "pious interference" of the friars. However, the causes remain questionable.

The lengthier opinion of the Dominicans, on the other hand, does not mention the possibility of the Spaniards themselves having given occasion for the Zambales trouble, but states rather emphatically that the Zambales' crimes were committed neither in just defence nor in revenge of injury.[28] This is evident, they say, because the Batanes, Pampangos, Pangasinans and Ilocanos were at peace with them and did nothing to disturb them. The Dominicans also mention that the Zambales had a reputation for their warlike tendencies, indiscriminately beheading Filipino and Spaniard alike. The last presupposition of the Dominicans is that the Zambales were

[27] Parecer del Padre Pedro Baptista, Guardian del Convento de San Francisco de Manila, January 20, 1592. AGI, Filipinas, 18.

[28] "... presupuesto lo que comunmente se save que son las muertes que hacen cada dia y an hecho y que no lo an hecho en defensa suya justa ni en justa venganza de injuria." Parecer de los PP. Dominicos, January 10, 1592. AGI, Filipinas, 18.

not provoked into action but freely left their own dwellings to prey on the royal roads and settlements of the surrounding area.

Two conclusions are drawn. The first is that the Negrillos and Zambales have no title to prey on their neighbors arising from the standards or norms in vogue before the arrival of the Spanish, but, and this is the second conclusion, the Batanes, Pampangos and others who have been attacked now have a legitimate title to take up arms against the Zambales. These two conclusions are clear and certain, they say, but the whole difficulty comes in reckoning whether the injuries already done and the worsening situation plus the circumstances, whether all this warrants such an extreme measure as war and the devastation of their land. In response to this doubt the Dominicans answer that the condition of the people and the great diversity of the country must be taken into account in order to apply judiciously the *jus gentium*. For there may be problems settled in one country according to the *jus gentium* which would call for an altogether different solution in another, due to diversity of circumstances.[29]

> . . . so we say that if in Castile, where they know neither the people nor the customs of the Philippines, this case were proposed with only a written report furnished, they would judge that they were mere highwaymen and we should proceed as against highwaymen; v.g., if this happened in the Sierra Morena they certainly would not order all of that territory's towns destroyed, or if it happened in the Pyrenees, war would not be made on the Gascons or the Navarrese. The reason is because it would be judged a personal crime and not one of the whole community. But here, where we know the land and the people and their ancient warlike practices we ought not to judge it a personal crime,[30] where violence is almost natural to the people, but one of the community.[31]

Whether the crimes were personal or common was likewise a capital point in the *parecer* of Sedeño. To Governor Dasmariñas, at least, they were apparently communal, as his subsequent actions showed. The Dominicans continue further, however, and apply the words of Aristotle who said that against men who act as beasts war can be made, and they can be killed as beasts. But it is clear that Aristotle was speaking of their harmful effects on others, for

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29 *Ibid.*

30 At this point the text given in Colín-Pastells, *Labor Evangelica*, I, 589, is considerably altered, due to the omission of a complete line. The *parecer* actually reads, "... mas aqui donde conocemos la tierra y las gentes y las abominables costumbres antiguas supas, no emos de juzgar el delicto cometido por personal sino por delicto de comunidad ni emos de presumir emienda donde la fiereza nace de la costumbre. . . ."

31 *Ibid.*

although men act as beasts, they cannot be punished unless they violate the rights of others. Since the above facts obtained among the Zambales the Dominicans conclude that the war must be judged as just or unjust giving principal consideration to the peculiar conditions prevalent in the country and the possibility of avoiding future trouble. Other means than war seemed out of the question; continually guarding the roads was no solution,

> for it is proven by experience that they can travel faster in one night than our soldiers in eight days; nor are town garrisons adequate, for the people must go out to their fields. A war, therefore, is just for the territories surrounding the Zambales and Negrillos, for their ferocity is something almost natural to them and there seems no hope of their making peace or settling down, as their very life consists in living separate and independent; nor are they a people who keep their word.

Again, however, the *parecer* returns to the contingency of circumstances, so emphasized throughout the opinion. Once the war is finished the captives should be distributed to the neighboring settlements, or sent to the galleys, but for a definite period, not perpetually. The Dominicans end by cautioning that not all the Zambales are equally at fault.

> For since the word Zambales embraces a great many people to whom the above reasons justifying war do not apply, we say that by Zambales and Negrillos we mean only those who steal and kill, as was described. Just exactly who these people are, however, we do not judge. We simply arrive at a conclusion from the information supplied us. . . . Sainto Domingo, Manila. January 20, 1592.[32]

The most detailed and analytical of the four *pareceres* was that submitted by the Augustinians.[33] For them, there are three conditions required for a just war, authority, a just cause, and a right intention. All three are present. Authority, for it is the governor who is the prime mover, and although he is still subject to the king, he may *defend* the country without prior permission. There is a right intention, for the purpose of the war is the peace and security of the people. This has been seriously disturbed and since other peaceful means have been vainly attempted, even the offering of a general amnesty, it seems to the Augustinians that war is a legitimate, albeit ultimate, measure.

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[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Parecer de los Padres Agustinos sobre si es lícito hacer guerra a los Zambales, January 19, 1592, AGI, Filipinas, 18.

The second condition for a just war, that it be for a just cause, is developed at greater length. There are four reasons justifying the war. 1) The obstruction of free passage; robbing and killing those who would travel to Cagayan, Ilocos and Pangasinan. 2) Unprovoked injuries; the Zambales do not confine their marauding to the roads, but even search out those working in the fields. Insecurity is the result. 3) Rebellion against the king and governor, after having promised obedience. 4) Continued breaking of treaties. The *parecer* notes that frequently governors succeeded in persuading the Zambales to promise peace and just as frequently the Zambales broke their pledge, attacking both Spaniard and Filipino. Even ecclesiastics were not excluded from Zambales terrorism, for an Augustinian Friar had been killed in 1591. In the light of these four causes the Augustinians consider a war to be justified.

Added to the opinion by way of corollary are *algunos puntos,* or the ways in which the war could be carried on, deducible from the circumstances and situation as outlined in the *parecer.*

1) If the capture of the Zambales necessitates burning their fields, houses and other goods, and killing those who resist, although it is presumed that among them are some who are innocent, this can be done licitly during the war, up to the time of victory. We say necessitates, because what is not done of necessity would be impious. This should not be left to the judgment of the soldiers, but to the commanders.

2) If during the war, supplies are required for its prosecution, these can legitimately be taken, without necessity of restitution, from what the enemy had, even though they previously belonged to the innocent. The reason given is, "Since war is permitted, the necessary means for attaining victory are permitted."[34]

3) *Ex jure gentium*, all movable goods (bienes muebles)[35] captured from the enemy during the war belong to the captor. But after the war, booty may not be taken.

4) Once the Zambales are subject, the more culpable ringleaders can be condemned to death, and also those whose death the common good and security of the country demand. But the innocent are not to be executed, nor are even those who are considered dangerous for the future, for these did not cause any injury. Who

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34 *Ibid.*

35 *Bienes muebles* can be considered personal property which does not directly pertain to house or land. See *Leyes Civiles de España*, Madrid, 1911, Libro Segundo, Capitulo II, Titulo I.

are the innocent? Those who in a Republic are generally considered such, boys too young to bear arms, old men, unless they had been troublemakers before, women, unless it is clear that they had been engaged in the war, and not by merely supplying their husbands with food, which is an obligation according to the natural law. All the others are to be considered guilty, unless the contrary is proved. There is added the note that in judging close scrutiny should be made lest injury be done.

5) *Ex jure gentium*, the persons captured in a just war are held as slaves.[36] This cannot be understood of Christian captives, but as the Zambales are not Christians the *jus gentium* can be applied. The Augustinians, however, advise leniency, "taking into consideration that the people are of slight mental capacity and do not realize the gravity of their crimes." Consequently, the rigor of the law should not be employed, but only a limited period of slavery, from ten to fifteen years.

6) After the war the governor may demand indemnity from the Zambales, and by way of punishment, a tribute can be levied.

7) Simple punishment for past crimes is not sufficient, but a safeguard for the future must be sought. And because long experience has shown that these people value pledges lightly, leaving them in the mountains would be to invite a repetition of this whole affair. The *parecer* suggests that they first be disarmed, then placed in peaceful villages, giving them their own fields to plow. Under surveillance and paternal government they may learn to live in peace, "and this we judge to be the ultimate remedy and necessary for the peace and security which are sought."

The opinion ends by "recommending always moderation and Christian piety which in all should be guarded, especially with respect to this people who as we have said do not comprehend the gravity of their fault, and thus the rigor of the law should not be used on them. . . ."

Commenting on a section of this Augustinian *parecer,* James Brown Scott says that it reads like a page out of Vitoria.[37] And if it were not for the gloss on the fifth justifying cause, we might be tempted to say that the Augustinians had the *Relecciónes* in hand when they composed their opinion. To establish, however, the precise degree of influence of the *Relecciónes* on the doctrine ex-

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[36] The Augustinians here cite Pierre de Palude, the fourteenth century Dominican moralist.

pressed in the *pareceres* is well beyond the scope of this short paper, and, in a sense, beside the point. What is of importance, though, is that the whole tradition of Christian philosophy, from Augustine, through St. Thomas, to Vitoria and the theologians of the sixteenth century who so painstakingly tried to establish norms for a Christian government of the Indies, is all brought to bear and concentrated on the uprising of an isolated Philippine tribe, in a remote corner of Spain's far-flung empire. The fact that such was the case is deeply significant.

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[37] James Brown Scott, *El origen español del derecho internacional moderno*, Valladolid, 1928, 179.

Book Reviews

Prelude to Greatness—Lincoln in the 1850's. By Don E. Fehrenbacher. Stanford University Press, California, 1962. Pp. ix, 205. $4.75

This attractive volume treats a theme which will undoubtedly continue to intrigue historians so long as the American people place a high value upon democratic processes. The emergence of Abraham Lincoln as a national figure came as a result of the cross-currents of politics in the fateful decade prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.

Professor Fehrenbacher first clearly establishes the setting for his subject. The great economic expansion of Illinois and the Northwest and its bearing upon the struggle for political control and the sectional struggle is clearly seen. Though extensive coverage of the economic factors is beyond the scope of this book the author's concise treatment of such topics as the new railroads and their role is sufficient to establish perspective. The fabulous expansion of Illinois was a favorable factor for both Lincoln and Douglas. Illinois had become "by a wide margin the grain-raising leader of the nation." The new prosperity also had the effect of giving northern Illinois a dominant position in the State at the expense of "Egypt."

The decline of the Whigs and the extinction of the party, the rise of the new Republican party, and the futile attempt of the Know-Nothings to divert attention from the main issue are carefully considered. Of major importance in Lincoln's rise was the impact of the Kansas-Nebraska agitation upon Illinois and national politics. One of the topics treated most interestingly is the repudiation of the Lecompton constitution by Douglas. A "Republican-for-Douglas movement" came into being and, for a time, appeared to indicate that some leading Republicans might make important concessions to draw the "Little Giant" into their camp. Lincoln was indeed a worried man. The author has given the House Divided speech a very searching analysis. It "was more than a prophecy. It must also be read as a declaration of purpose." The Great Debates are skillfully presented The author warns against "the tendency to explain motives by consulting results. . . ." In their determination to reach the people the two debaters together covered nearly ten thousand miles in about a hundred days. "Even stripped of all its folklore the Lincoln-Douglas campaign was a remarkable chapter in American political history, full of home-spun vivacity and colorful incident, revealing the youthful exuberance of a still youthful nation."

An entire chapter is devoted to "The Famous 'Freeport Question.' " The author rejects the commonly accepted version that Lincoln by one brilliant maneuvre out-generaled Douglas and split the Democrats; he objects to "the undue emphasis commonly put on the Freeport question and to the inflated estimate of its influence." The concluding chapter, "The Path to the Presidency," considers the complex political situation confronting Lincoln in his bid for the Republican nomination. As a final note, the author rejects the view of some writers (who regard Douglas and not Lincoln as the strong man

of the 1850's) that greatness was wrung from Lincoln only by the ordeal of the presidency. Professor Fehrenbacher concludes, "Never in the presidency did he surpass the political skill with which he shaped the Republican party of Illinois, held it together, and made himself its leader." The notes are conveniently arranged. The bibliographical note is adequate. This fascinating volume deserves a wide audience.

WILLIAM A. PITKIN

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Confounded Rot about Napoleon, Reflections upon Science and Technology, Nationalism, World Depression of the Eighteen-Nineties, and Afterward. By James C. Malin. Published by author, 1541 University Drive, Lawrence, Kansas, 1961. Pp. 254, lithoprint, paper. $3.00

In retrospect, the 1890's appear as a controversial decade filled with evidences of progress on the one hand and on the other all the frustations accompanying rapid industrialization, urbanization and technological innovation.

These pressures within society are emphasized in James Malin's volume with the arresting title, *Confounded Rot about Napoleon.* When Kansas farmers were hit with recurring drouth, depression and grasshoppers, feelings ran high, tempers flared and politics took on vivid hues.

In this maelstrom of emotion, the author concentrates on the political careers of William Patrick Hackney, John James Ingalls and Eugene F. Ware. The interest in these chapters lies not in the fortunes of local Kansas politicians, because in all election campaigns there are winners and losers, the outraged and the vindicated, the pure in heart and the villians. Readers of past politics expect candidates to play these traditional roles. But Professor Malin with penetrating insight rises above the grubby politics of local factions to demonstrate how some leaders on the plains tried to attain real statesmanship by addressing themselves to national and international issues. They often probed the mysteries of the tariff, monetary policies, business cycles and international affairs. Above all, the resurgence of nationalism in the 1890's became associated with the revival of interest in Napoleon. Apparently the people of Kansas admired Bonaparte and craved to learn more about his life largely because they too were feeling intense nationalism tinged with expansionist leanings.

These essays include a fascinating collection of evidence dredged from obscure sources by a scholar possessing an eye for colorful human interest material. A typical example of the liveliness of the author's evidence is seen in one of William Hackney's bits of oratory (p. 68):

"The Anglo-American imbeciles tell us that with free trade, open ports, and the gold standard, the United States could go forth and conquer the commerce of the world. . . : and for college students without knowledge, for pedantic professors without brains, and demagogues with a diarrhea of words and a constipation of ideas, these theories are entirely satisfactory to themselves.

Such have read history with small purpose, and that upside down. Such have not the financial capacity sufficient to manipulate a pigsty, nor brains enough to grease the point of a cambric needle."

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The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). The Diary of Thomas Pereira, S.J. By Joseph Sebes, S.J. Bibliotheca Instituti Historici S.I., Vol. XVIII, Rome, Institutum Historicum S.I., 1961. Pp. xxxv, 341. Paper, $5.00

While polemical literature since the sixteenth century has pictured the "wily Jesuit" behind every significant event whether it be war, revolution or pestilence, and history text books for generations have assessed the importance of the Order in Catholic religious life, it is in our own times that Jesuit scholars through careful editing of documents are providing that body of evidence necessary for an appreciation of the historical role of the Society of Jesus. In editing and translating Pereira's diary, Father Joseph Sebes, S.J., of Georgetown University, has added important details to our knowledge of the diplomatic history of Russia and China, as well as of the Jesuits.

The expansion in the seventeenth century of Muscovy through Siberia to the Pacific brought the Russians into contact with territories and peoples subject to the Manchu emperors. Both China and Muscovy were unable to supply much military force to maintain their mutual claims in far-flung, unmapped and largely unknown frontier regions and had every reason to come to an accomodation. The 1689 treaty of Nerchinsk was the first formal agreement between the two countries; that the Jesuits in the persons of Fathers Thomas Pereira and his assistant Francis Gerbillon were "intermediaries and participants in political action," Sebes claims in his introduction, and the diary proves the point. While this reviewer cannot agree with the editor that at Nerchinsk the Jesuits witnessed "strange proceedings between two oriental states," it is certainly true that the position of the Jesuits in the oriental state of China did much to forward Chinese diplomacy with the European state of Muscovy.

The Jesuits in representing the best of seventeenth century European civilization played an important educative role in the Chinese embassy at Nerchinsk. Such things as "the law of nations," and negotiation between two independent powers on an honorable basis were unknown to the Chinese, whose diplomatic primitiveness was demonstrated in their bringing with them an overwhelming military force and in their expectation the Russians would poison them! Father Pereria many times harangued the Chinese to convince them of the good intentions of the Russians, and added greatly to his stature among the Chinese by his bravery in eating presents of food from the opposing camp.

The diary is presented both in Portugese and in English. In the translation the flavour of seventeenth century artificial classicism is kept, while the style remains clear and entertaining. Pereira emerges as a man thoroughly dedicated to the cause of religion, but ready to participate in politics if demanded for the sake of religion. He accepts it as quite natural that his scholarship and his abilities as a musician should have given him a high place at the court of the Chinese emperor, but he never forgot his purpose in being there was to extend the work of the Christian mission. He was ready to accept honors and luxuries from the emperor, but did not balk at danger or hardship in his service. Dreadful attacks from mosquitoes he saw as opportunities for the exercise of patience—but was glad enough for protective covering. Genial, honest, well educated, clever, chaste and incorruptible, it is easy to see why such men had the confidence of rulers in non-Christian as well as in Catholic lands.

Sebes' introduction is both a useful history of the negotiations and of Chinese-Russian relations. He makes many acute observations on the rivalry between Portugese and French Jesuits owing to Portugese imperial claims, and on Jesuit ambitions for religious freedom in Russia. The reports of the Russian representative at Nerchinsk to Moscow were unfriendly to the role of the Jesuits, Sebes remarks, so that the Order could be blamed in the event the government felt too many concessions had been made to the Chinese. An extensive bibliography is added which includes works in Chinese and Russian, along with the major European tongues.

More careful editing of the introduction would have improved this book. The style is sometimes faulty: too many "thuses" smack of the PhD thesis; the historical discussions are too obvious for the specialist, and too obscure for the general reader. The introduction is filled with spelling errors. This is not the fault of the author but of European typesetters, but it is to be regretted that the publishers did not provide a more exhaustive proofreading. Such careless printing of the introduction casts an unmerited suspicion on the text of the diary, which stands as a valuable source of historical scholarship.

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The Holy See and the Nascent Church in the Middle Western United States, 1826–1850. Analecta Gregoriana, vol. 125. By Robert Frederick Trisco. Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1962; Pp. xii-408. Paper $5.90.

The foregoing doctoral dissertation is notable for its reliance on the Roman archives of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. The author's exploration of its archives shows a wealth of historical material hitherto unknown and is bound to stimulate further research. A feature of the work is the liberal reprint of original texts in footnotes. A bibliography of published sources and secondary books is adequate and only lacks the Redemptorist *Annales* (Ilchester, Maryland). The outstanding contribution of the volume is the narration of the Congregation's effort to gather information and to

cooperate with the bishops. Historical backgrounds are given sufficient space. Though the title covers a region that had two archbishoprics, nine bishoprics, and one vicariate apostolic by 1850, the text is limited pretty much to Bardstown-Louisville, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Vincennes, and Detroit.

The task of planting and tending the growth of the Church in the midwest was handled by a department of the Holy See, known as the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, whose head and secretary played the leading roles in securing papal approval. Some popes like Gregory XVI had been heads of the Congregation and brought to their supreme office understanding and sympathy. The Congregation looked for facts regarding the number of Catholics, economic security and lay-trusteeism. The bishops in turn stressed the geographic items involved and felt that new dioceses could counter Protestantism more effectively, and that more clergy would be enlisted. After learning the facts the Congregation set up bishoprics and archbishoprics and followed the instructions of the bishops in fixing boundaries, usually those of the civil government. The nomination of bishops consumed most of the time of the Congregation which followed the recommendations of the American hierarchy.

Native Americans were preferred all around and especially acceptable if bilingual. The scarcity of such compelled the bishops to recommend foreigners. The author concludes that the bishops of French origin were free of nationalistic bias. Germans were articulate quite early in asking for leaders who knew German, and the Congregation heeded their requests. The question of auxiliary bishops did not arise because only coadjutors were nominated since these acted as a legal guarantee of succession to property.

The Congregation served as a mediator between religious superiors and bishops, generally concerning rules which forbade members to accept the episcopal dignity or to live outside the community. In 1848 Pius IX appointed James Oliver Van de Velde, S.J., Bishop of Chicago, after revoking the rule by which Jesuits were forbidden to receive ecclesiastical dignities.

The present volume solves the mystery of the authorship of an attack on the administration of Irish bishops in the United States, which was published in 1840 at Philadelphia under the title: *Die Katholische-irische-bischöfliche Administration in Nordamerika* by Severus Brandanus. The author of the libel was the Rev. William Pisbach, a native of the Trier diocese who labored briefly in the United States, and wrote out of resentment.

To advance the Church the Congregation allotted some of its own funds, handled collections, and recommended petitioners to the different European missionary aid societies.

Two obscure points in American Catholic history are treated in detail. The cases of Bishop Rese of Detroit and the Poor Clares have nearly been solved. The Congregation did its best to unravel the mess created by the strife within the sisterhood, the spiritual jurisdiction of Rese, and his financial involvements. Finally the sisters were disbanded and Rese agreed to have a coadjutor and administrator appointed in his place. The space given to the foregoing cases seems justified on the grounds of clarification alone, though they form minor items in history. How much the Diocese of Detroit suffered from the conflict, or how much scandal was created among Catholics, or jubila-

tion among anti-Catholics, especially over disregard for the episcopal office, still remain in the realm of guessing or mystery.

The book has a good index. It is a joy to students and a lesson of research in a limited field. It may be called an introduction to the central mission archives at Rome. It has more maturity than is generally associated with doctoral theses.

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Los Mayas Eternos. By Rafael Girard. Antigua Libreria Robredo, Mexico, D.F., 1962. Pp. xiv, 493. Illustrated, $6.00 (U.S.)

Los Mayas Eternos is the twelfth major publication since 1947 of Rafael Girard of Guatemala—including his five volume *Los Chortis ante el Problema maya* (1949) as one work, and the second edition of the same title (1958) as another. Nine of the publications are Maya-centered. This latest book, the product of thirty years of work in the field of Mayan religion, is probably unsurpassed in bringing together in one volume such a quantity of detailed descriptions of Mayan rituals as witnessed by a non-Mayan.

Part I, ethnography, 72% of the book, gives the solid impression that Mr. Girard is presenting valid data when, for example, he speaks of the priestly caste of the Chorti community, but his extension of the conclusions to the Mayan people in general seems more subjective than factual, in spite of the footnote (p. xiv) to the contrary. The integrated approach to understanding the eternal Mayan through cross-interpretation of cult, creed, and calendar provides the warp for the woof of speculation.

Part II, history, is dedicated to proving that Mayan "immutability is rooted in the mythical foundations of its culture," and a good case is built for the permeation of the daily life of the Chortí-Mayas by these culture values. By contrast just such a cultural saturation was observed by D. Byers and O. La Farge, II, among the Mayans of Jacaltenango, 1927, (*The Year Bearer's People,* Tulane University, 1931), but was a defunct entity when this reviewer visited Jacaltenango in 1958.

Depicting the Quiche-Mayan communities as "models of good government" in which social injustices are unknown and of which "their directors personify a series of gods, and their elected [leaders] are most able and virtuous" seems utopian and is in strong contrast to many other Highland Mayan communities. This reviewer recalls, for example, that in 1958 the Alcalde Rezador for San Pedro Soloma was a renegade Catholic imported from another village, and both Indian prayer-leaders of Santa Eulalia were intoxicated frequently.

The author's identification of St. Francis with the fertility god, of the Virgin with the moon goddess, etc., is interesting and not without parallel in the Highlands. But rather than showing the "admirable persistence of the [Mayan] religious patrimony," this reviewer sees these as examples of the

syncretism resulting from acculturation, a conclusion which the author seems to deny explicitly (p. 346, n.).

Mr. Girard uses some excellent sources for his archeological data, including A. V. Kidder, G. Willey, S. F. Borhegyi, J. E. Thompson, Alfonso Caso, and others. Many, of course, will dispute the statement that Guatemala is the "'patria primordial" of the Teotihuanacans.

The book does achieve one objective set by the author, who says, "La presente publicación consisté básicamente en la descripción de ritos y ceremonias celebrados por los Chortís en el curso del año," (p. 2, n.). The limited first edition, 2500 copies, will probably quickly become a rare item. It is hoped that the second edition will bring better reproductons of the 250 fine photographs, fewer typographical errors, and a bibliography.

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The Catholics in Caroline England. By Martin J. Havran. Stanford University Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 208. $4.75.

Few reigns in English history have been studied so fully and so carefully as that of Charles I. Years ago the researches of Samuel Rawson Gardiner laid down the political and religious pattern; a generation ago Gordon Albion devoted a volume to further exploration of the condition of the Caroline Catholics. Professor Martin Havran's reappraisal of this topic adds new data and focusses the status of the Caroline Catholics in a still clearer light. He has produced a balanced, scholarly work; the important primary sources, manuscript and printed, were used; the research is fully authenticated by adequate footnotes; the bibliography comprehends the essential monographic studies. Very obviously the book was subjected to careful planning: the subdivisions are well defined; the chapters read easily; the subject matter is fitted together without confusion or unnecessary repetition. The style, however, is pedestrian and unexciting and the author, in some chapters, should have thrown more into relief what is new in information and interpretation.

The purpose of the book in part is to test the historical judgment that during the 1630's, the period of Charles I's personal rule, the Catholics enjoyed a relaxation of the restrictions imposed by Elizabeth I and James I. In fact the Catholics suffered considerable harassment and, even worse, an uncertain status *vis-à-vis* the law. The value of this book is that it probes into the condition of the various ranks of the Caroline Catholics.

The first three chapters lay the setting for the remaining six. There is a brief but competent survey of the treatment of the Catholics under Elizabeth I and James I. The reader, in order to understand the Catholics under Charles I, must keep in mind that neither the last Tudor nor the first Stuart treated the Catholics with the harshness of contemporary Continental religious persecutions; that generally official policy under all three of these

sovereigns was restrictive rather than persecutive. The dilemma of the Caroline Catholics, besides resulting from longstanding policy, arose also from the marriage of Charles I, legally head of the Church of England, to a Catholic princess, Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France. A secret condition of this union was private freedom of cult for the English Catholics which Charles proved ambivalent in enforcing. The presence of a Catholic queen in England with a corps of chaplains of her Church, free to perform their sacerdotal functions and even to proselytize could not fail to enrage a strongly nationalistic, Protestant, and highly suspicious realm. The results were unhappy for the Catholics because either rigid or lax enforcement of the law, which alternated periodically, left them uncertain as to their future and strained the ardor of their devotion to the king; the efforts of France to enforce the religious clauses of the marriage treaty through diplomacy were fruitless and impolitic. A king with a stronger personality might have formulated a more decisive policy, no matter what the obstacles, but Charles's shifty personality prevented this. Although the king had an affinity for much that was contained in Catholic belief and practice, he lacked the courage of his convictions when faced with pressures and opposition, and his Catholic queen was of no help to her husband or to her coreligionists; a flighty, superficial woman, she was guided chiefly by the emotions of the moment and lacked the subtlety to understand contemporary England.

The fourth through the ninth chapters supply the details about Caroline Catholicism. "The Arena of Politics" treats the years 1625-1629, the years of parliamentary quarrels, in which religion played so important a part. "The Missionaries" explains the unhappy picture of the priests resulting from the longstanding, acrimonious division between the seculars and regulars, which was complicated by the presence of an unpopular bishop, Richard Smith, wielding an undefined jurisdiction challenged by a part of the Catholics. The priests lived out an existence, not of romance, evangelizing amid an exciting secrecy, but of constant real and possible dangers and many privations. Evidence adduced in this chapter indicates that there were sufficient priests for the number of Catholics then in England; what we do not know, and the book makes this clear, is the number of Catholics within England. Havran accepts the figures determined by Brian Magee in *The English Recusants,* which puts the Caroline Catholics at 320,000 to 360,000. This reviewer feels that the correct figure ought to be less than this, since Catholicism dwindled to a small minority soon after the religious change of 1559. "The Toils of the Law" includes much of the heart of the book. Although certain of the Catholics of upper ranks enjoyed a *de facto* immunity, many did not: they suffered fines, imprisonment and disabilities because of baptism, marriage, and burial. Only three Catholics, however, suffered the death penalty between 1625 and 1640, two priests and a layman. The intricacies of the law, especially in regard to fines and disposition of property, and the Caroline policy of composition as a source of governmental income, kept the adherents of the traditional Church, more than anything else, under official supervision and control. It is of especial interest to note that during the king's personal rule, 1629-1640, fines were levied and compositions were worked out as in previous reigns and that the government, which depended upon the penalties exacted from the recusants as a source of income, experi-

enced practical difficulties in securing an honest collection of and an honest return from Catholic wealth. "The Informers" shows how the pursuivants and a flourishing trade of spying gave the government the informations necessary for keeping check on the Catholics. "The Calm before the Storm" takes up the happier side of Caroline Catholic life. In and around London, near to the court, during the king's personal rule, the Catholics enjoyed a measure of toleration; two papal agents, Gregorio Panzani and George Conn, were received by Charles, and made a favorable impression on some, but failed to achieve anything substantial; and some persons of prominence were converted to Rome or were reputedly crypto-Catholics. In the final chapter, "The Scottish War", the dilemma of a king facing bankruptcy and frantically seeking aid, financial and military, for a war against one of his realms, shows that the leaders of the traditional Church, but not their followers, were eager to assist the king. This was obviously the best test how Charles's Catholic policy, tortuous for fifteen years, had reacted upon the various ranks of the adherents of the Roman Church.

W. R. Trimble

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MID-AMERICA

VOLUME XLIV

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